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Abstract
The present thesis addresses the role of maternal interpretations of infant facial 
expressions in the development of emotions. Emotion theories explain emotionality 
in terms of implicitly intra-individual processes resulting in serious conceptual and 
empirical limitations. In contrast, social constructionist theories reflect the inherently 
socio-cognitive nature of emotions and propose inter-individual processes to explain 
emotional development. Using the hitherto neglected perspective of interactional 
others, a social theory is developed which rejects the Cartesian dualism inherent in 
current theories of emotional development by assigning a central place to the 
perspective of caregivers in the development of emotions.
An observational cross-sectional study examining the effect of age and context 
on mothers' perceptions of their infants was conducted. Twelve normal, primiparous, 
white, English, middle class mothers, aged between 25 and 35, were filmed interacting 
at home with their infants (aged 4-6 months (range 4;l-6;3), 7-9 months (range 7;0-9;l), 
and 10-12 months (range 10;1-11;3)). Mothers were asked to select and describe infant 
acts they found meaningful in a face to face play, a prohibitive, and a toy play 
condition. Facial expressions were coded using a standardised coding frame. 
Maternal interpretations of infant behaviour were collected and analysed. Two 
further experiments assessed differences between mothers' and observers' selections 
and interpretations of infant behaviour.
Mothers' selections of infant facial expressions differed between age groups and 
situations. As infants got older, mothers selected fewer positive expressions in face 
to face play, more negative expressions in the prohibitive episode and more positive 
expressions in toy play. Differences in maternal interpretations, reflecting situational 
and age related specificity, were also found. While mothers perceived emotions and 
intentionality in infants of all ages, mothers of the oldest infants accompanied these 
attributions with descriptions of cognitive and communicative skills. A relationship 
between selected facial expressions and attributions of emotion states was found to 
be dependent on situational context. Mothers also differed from observers in both the 
num ber of meaningful acts they selected and the types of interpretations they made,
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demonstrating the divergence in perspective between caretakers as knowledgable 
participants in interaction and external observers.
This thesis demonstrates the dynamics of caregivers' perceptions in expressive 
interaction and discusses the implications of these perceptions for understanding the 
process of emotional development.
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CHAPTER 1
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS, EMOTIONS, AND DEVELOPMENT
"When I look at her face...she was trying to say something..."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 4-6 month age group)
1.0 Aims and Objectives
Facial expressions in infancy are central to the development of emotionality. 
A growing body of research has pointed to the importance of facial expressions in 
infancy as central regulators of interpersonal relationships (Campos, Barret et al., 1983; 
Sroufe, 1979; Lewis and Rosenblum, 1983; Kaye, 1982). From the start, mothers 
respond to infants' facial expressions by interpreting and responding to them as 
affective states. In this thesis it is argued that, in early infancy, facial expressions are 
the result of physiological reactions, but with increasing age, they become socio- 
cognitively mediated and linked to emotional feeling states (Sroufe, 1979; Bruner, 
1986; Vygotsky, 1962; Ratner, 1989; Sameroff, 1991; Kaye, 1982). Emotions arise out 
of an understanding of the social significance of events, a process for which caregivers 
are largely responsible in infancy. While theories of social development have stressed 
the importance of instruction (Vygotsky, 1962) and scaffolding (Bruner, 1986) by 
caregivers as an integral part of social development, little research has been done on 
understanding the role of mothers in the social development of emotionality. It is 
proposed that investigating how mothers begin to transmit social rules of what to feel 
during infancy starts with their perception of the infant's affective state. An essential 
first step in understanding the nature of emotion and its development is thus to 
investigate how mothers interpret infant facial expressions. With this aim in mind, 
mothers' interpretation and selection of infant facial expressions will be examined.
In the following, the predom inant paradigms (behaviourism and cognitive 
psychology) that have characterised research on emotion are examined to assess the 
ways in which they have conceptualised emotions and facial expressions. Current 
theories, such as the new organisational approaches, have attempted to overcome 
some of the shortcomings of these paradigms by presenting a more holistic and 
functional picture of emotional development. Through a review of these theories and 
a critique of them  it will become apparent that the nature and development of
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emotions can be better understood in the light of social theories of emotional 
development. These theories overcome Descartian limitations regarding the link 
between the outward manifestations of expressive actions and the presence or absence 
of emotion states by allowing for the perspective of interactional others in the socio- 
cognitive development of emotions. By incorporating this perspective, it is possible 
to account for emotional development in terms of the social-regulatory function facial 
expressions fulfil in interactions, how they may gain social significance for the child 
through the prescriptive nature of the mother's interpretations and responses.
The proposal advanced here is that, from a very early age, emotion rules are 
transmitted to children through interactions with adult members of a specific culture. 
In infancy this transmission takes the form of the mothers' role of instruction. 
Mothers respond to infants' facial expressions on the basis of how emotional reactions 
are understood and used within specific social contexts. Their responses to infants 
increasingly come to approximate the feeling rules and displays of the cultural group. 
Thus, from the start, infants are immersed in a process of socialisation in which they 
are at first only apprentices and later master and internalise the rules of social 
conduct. Within this theoretical framework, how mothers interpret their infant's 
emotional signals within specific contexts becomes an important factor in develop­
ment.
Support for this theoretical framework rests on examining a num ber of issues 
related to the infant's emotional development. In this chapter the relationship 
between facial expressions and emotion states is discussed. Evidence is presented 
which suggests that the way mothers respond to facial expressions in interaction is 
a vital step in the development of emotionality and can be better understood by 
examining maternal attributions of emotion states. This perspective is presented as 
an alternative to theoretical and methodological approaches, which account for the 
development of emotionality and facial expressions in terms of purely cognitive 
processes or in terms of physiological and behavioural manifestations. It is argued 
that emotions cannot be accredited to the infant on the basis of adult similarities in 
facial expressions. Rather, caretakers (referred to as mothers in t)^" this thesis 
although they can be fathers, older siblings, or child minders, that is, any adult who 
interacts w ith the infant on a regular basis) perceive and interpret expressions in 
terms of their social-regulatory significance and respond on the basis of these
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perceptions. This process is proposed as a critical factor in the development of socio- 
cognitive skills which are essential for emotions to develop.
Chapter 2 examines empirical evidence on the presence of facial expressions 
in infancy and how expressions differentiate w ith development. For maternal 
interpretations and responses to be effective, the perceptual, inferential and social 
skills the infant possesses at various ages, and how these skills work at the level of 
the dyad, are examined. In Chapter 3, the theoretical importance of the mothers' role 
in development is reassessed and expanded in the light of the above issues. Chapter 
4 addresses methodological concerns related to the analysis of facial expressions and 
proposes how maternal interpretations may be investigated. In Chapter 5, the 
techniques arrived at in Chapter 4 are piloted to determine if the sampling and 
analysis of facial expressions and maternal accounts tap into the processes under 
investigation. In Chapter 6 the hypotheses of the study are reassessed and the 
empirical objectives are synthesised with theoretical proposals. Chapter 7 reports the 
procedure for the main observational study and presents the results of the analysis. 
The results of the study are discussed in the light of the theoretical proposals 
advanced in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, and their implications for understanding the 
development of emotionality considered in Chapter 8.
1.1 Levels of Meaning for Infant Emotionality
"This hitting herself off the back of the chair...'I don't want to be here...Oh, well, actually
this is quite interesting, so I'll reach forward and play with it after all.'"
Question: How else did you know she didn't want to be where she was?
"Her facial expression, but its difficult to break it down into bits."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 7-9 month age group)
Emde (1984) has divided the body of research on infant emotionality into two 
main domains: the individual and the social. This division of approaches into the 
study of the individual and of the social has dogged psychology for over 100 years 
and remains one of differences in philosophical perspective on the relationship 
between mind and body. The distinction between the individual and the social is still 
very real in psychological research and never more apparent them in the field of 
developmental psychology, as will become evident in the following discussion.
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The implication of working within the individual domain is that emotion is 
treated as a purely intra-individual process. This view is best summarised by Clore 
and Ortony's (1984) statement that:
"...the subjective feeling state has a special status that cannot properly be considered as 
a component of emotion at all-it is the emotion." (Clore and Ortony, 1984, p.53, their 
emphasis)
This definition is consistent with classical theories of emotion (e.g. James, 1890; 
Descartes, 1911-12) which linked linguistic allusions to feelings of internal bodily 
sensations, such as 'butterflies in the stomach' or Tump in the throat'. With the 
advent of behaviourism, this approach led to a concern w ith the physical manifesta­
tions and stimulus conditions of emotions (Watson, 1930; Skinner, 1953).
On the other hand, if one adopts a social perspective on the study of emotion 
in infancy, the research emphasis is placed on the inferences surrounding interpreta­
tions of emotional expressions. Take, for example, Ichheiser's (1949) distinction 
between expression and impression:
"Mechanisms of expression are mechanisms operating entirely within the individual 
personality. Impressive mechanisms and impressive phenomena, on the other hand, are 
fundamentally socio-psychological in their very nature...(they are) problems of social 
perception and of human relations." (Ichheiser, 1949, p .7)
In drawing a distinction between expressions and impressions, Ichheiser points out 
that the manifestation of emotion is an inherently social phenomenon. Expressions 
are received by others, be they researchers or caretakers, as impressions, and hence 
the inferential process guiding the formation of these impressions should be an 
important area of investigation if one is to understand the function of expressions in 
interaction.
If one's starting point is the individual, such that emotion is viewed as an 
intra-individual process, questions of concern surround (a) the physiological 
mechanisms which control processes of emotion, (b) genetic origins of emotions, such 
as how those physiological mechanisms, as controlling dynamics of emotion, develop 
both in the history of the human species and in the make-up of the individual; and 
(c) how the processes of emotion influence the formation of personality. If, on the 
other hand, one's starting point is social, such that emotion is viewed as an inter­
individual process, then the emphasis is on (a) the signalling function of facial
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expressions, (b) the role facial expressions play in regulating interaction and what 
effect they have on the infant-caregiver communicative system; and (c) how processes 
of others' perceptions result in enduring interactional traits.
For the most part, past theory and research surrounding infant emotional 
development have focused on its intra-personal aspects. Relatively less has been 
written about the social and interpersonal nature of emotionality in infancy. Almost 
nothing has been written about maternal interpretations of infant facial expressions 
as an important characteristic of the interpersonal aspect of emotional expressions and 
their socialisation in infancy. It is to this gap that the present thesis has addressed 
itself. This issue is especially important (although mostly neglected) because of the 
preverbal nature of the child. Without language, emotional expressions provides the 
medium of messages in the mother-infant dyad.
A number of perspectives can be adopted in interpreting these emotional 
expressions. Kaye (1982) outlines three senses in which an expression can be 
interpreted:
" Consider the sentence 'Expression X shows that person A feels Q', which is equivalent 
to 'X expresses Q'. These sentences might have three different meanings:
(Sense 1) 'X is a manifestation of A's inner feeling7 that is, it is an accurate index;
(Sense 2) 'X leads someone to infer that A feels Q' that is, it is interpreted as an
index;
(Sense 3) 'A wants someone to believe that he feels Q' that is, X is a gesture."
(Kaye, 1982, p.141)
Individualistic theories do not make distinctions between the three senses, but 
generally consider that the presence of an expression is evidence of an emotion state 
(sense 1 above). However, they overlook the fact that they infer emotion on the basis 
of facial expressions and thus employ the criteria of sense 2. Parental inferences are 
regarded as "biased" in such a framework. For example, Campos et al. (1983), in 
reviewing a study by Johnson et al. (1982) in which mothers' reports of their infants' 
facial expressions was used to measure the existence of discrete emotional expressions 
in 3 month old infants, state:
"This study, like all others depending on maternal reports, is subject to numerous biases, 
but several factors lead us to propose that the mothers' reports are valid-that is, the data 
may be more an indication of responses by the baby than attributions by the mother." (Campos 
et. al, 1983, p.818, emphasis added)
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How they are able to differentiate between the mothers7 attributions and the 
infants' facial responses without any independent evidence of the meaning of the 
infants' responses remains unclear. The meaning of facial expressions in infancy must 
be inferred. The 'biases' pointed out by the authors therefore pertain to differences 
in the criteria for inference between trained external observers and mothers. As 
inferred emotion states in infants cannot be corroborated by asking infants how they 
feel, the primary concern should be who is inferring emotional states and not who is 
more or less biased. So called "objective", standardised coding frameworks have their 
own 'biases' (see Chapter 4) just as mothers' inferences do. As mothers interact with 
their infants more often than researchers do, it seems reasonable to investigate the 
criteria mothers' use to interpret their infants' facial expressions.
This is especially important as researchers often look for the early presence of 
emotions in infancy on the basis of facial expressions. More recently, there has been 
a growing appreciation that emotions should not be attributed to the infant on the 
basis of the resemblance of her facial expressions to adult expressions of emotion. As 
Kaye (1982) illustrates:
"A face does not have to be a human face in order to appear expressive to us. Watch 
people imitating and interpreting the faces of fish in an aquarium. They simply respond 
to the configuration of eyes, mouth, and snout, even though it is a permanent 
configuration having nothing to do with the fish's mood or personality. They project 
onto such an expression the meaning it might have if a human being wore it. An 
analysis of these different expressions, then, would be an interesting study of 
intersubjectivity in human beings, but it would not be a study of fish." (Kaye, 1982, 
p.142)
The meaning imputed to infants' expressions could therefore be regarded more as a 
function of adults' ability to project meaning than as evidence that the infant either 
feels, or intends the other to think she feels, a particular emotion. The infant at some 
point becomes an adult, at which point we can suspend our scepticism about the 
meaning of her expressions. When to do so, and on what basis, would depend on a 
set of behavioural criteria which would indicate that the infant may be said to be 
intentionally communicating, e.g., gaze, timing of interactions. In the meantime, to 
attribute emotion states to infants on the basis of adult similarities 'goes beyond the 
evidence given', as we cannot ask the infant what she is feeling. While experimental 
paradigms are advantageous in isolating specific influences on expressive develop­
ment, naturalistic settings provide valuable insight into how emotion displays are
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integrated into interaction. A good starting point, towards that end, is to define 
infant emotion displays in terms of their signalling functions. That is, in terms of 
projections of meaning by parents, since their interpretations are likely to influence 
the infants' development.
The present research thus proposes to employ the sense 2 criterion of Kaye, 
but from the perspective of the primary caretaker. This approach overcomes the 
conceptual problem of linking particular emotion states to particular facial expressions 
in infancy on the basis of their physical characteristics or stimulus conditions. 
Empirical studies which will be reviewed presently have shown that the use of facial 
expressions to infer emotions is subject to social and contextual influences. Moreover, 
in cases where facial expressions are coded by trained observers, no clear evidence 
was found that infants display discrete facial signals that can be linked to particular 
emotion states. The following discussion also demonstrates that maternal responsivity 
to infant expressions is selective and based on inferences which cannot be deduced 
from looking at facial expressions per se.
1.1.1 Maternal Responsivity to Infants
"That's just he's had enough of it. Turning around to me and he looks...his face is 
starting to crumple and he's about to cry...Now he wants to be with me, for me to pick 
him up. I could tell by his body movements and him turning towards me and his 
expression. It's hard to describe with expressions, but its just that7s the kind of look he 
has when he just wants...like if he was in a group of people he didn't know, he'd want 
to be picked up. He didn't want to be by himself."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 10-12 month old age group)
How mothers respond to the facial expressions of their infants has been 
investigated under the rubric of the socialisation of affect displays or the acquisition 
of 'display rules' (Ekman, 1980). This body of research has important underlying 
theoretical assumptions that bear on the interpretation of the findings. It therefore 
warrants a brief digression in order to address them.
The theoretical assumption underlying research on display rules is that what 
is socialised is the display of emotion rather than the nature of emotion itself. Social­
isation is seen as allowing the individual control over performing expressive 
behaviours in accordance with cultural and personal rules. The underlying emotion 
state remains unchanged, and all that is affected is the display itself. However, an
17
alternative argument is that socialisation affects the emotion itself and not only its 
manifest qualities. As Barrett and Campos (1987) point out:
" ...these [display] rules comprise only one effect of socialisation upon emotionality. 
Socialisation does not merely change the way emotions look and sound; it changes the 
very nature of emotionality in later development." (Barrett and Campos, 1987, p. 569)
As will be elaborated upon later, the transmission of rules on how to feel is 
the process of emotional development. This does not take place only through 
maternal contingent responding to infant expressions. However, to the extent that 
facial expressions communicate affective states to caregivers and are embedded in 
interpersonal context, they serve important social-regulatory functions within the 
mother-infant system.
A number of mechanisms are hypothesised for the socialisation of display 
rules. For example, as mentioned, contingent responding, such as reinforcing 
appropriate displays, and ignoring or punishing inappropriate displays, and the 
modelling of affect displays have been considered by social learning theorists (e.g., 
Maccoby, 1980). In addition, Campos and Sternberg (1981) propose a mechanism 
based on social referencing whereby the young child, faced with its own emotional 
uncertainty in a situation, refers to the mother and, by responding to her affect 
display, resolves this uncertainty. Campos, Campos, and Barrett (1989) explain:
" ...when social referencing or the imposition of emotional signals by the caregivers 
becomes repetitive, dispositions towards action are created, and these dispositions, at 
least in part, underlie what we call the 'value system' of a culture." (Campos, Campos, 
and Barrett, 1989, p. 296)
This explanation is couched in behaviouristic terms. However, it outlines an 
interpersonal process where caretakers are able to communicate affective information 
to infants via facial expressions and where infants in turn incorporate this information 
through processes such as social referencing. It implies that facial expressions are 
used by caretakers to communicate affective states and attitudes towards other people 
and events. In addition, it suggests that it is the understanding of the social signifi­
cance of the situation that determines the emotion both internally and externally in 
terms of its communicative and interpersonal regulatory functions. This theoretical 
distinction is important in that developmental differences should not be seen as 
simply dictated by stimulus response contingencies controlling expressive displays.
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A number of studies have documented mothers' responses to infant facial 
expressions. Malatesta and Haviland (1982) and Malatesta et al. (1986) investigated 
maternal contingent responding to infant emotional displays between 3 and 6 months. 
Mothers and infants were observed during play and reunion following a brief separ­
ation. Both mothers and infants showed the same categories of facial expression; 
interest, enjoyment, surprise, knitted brow, brow flash, sadness/distress and anger. 
Mothers, unlike infants, did not display pain/discom fort expressions although infants 
did.
They found that, in general, infant facial expression changes showed a 
significant age effect, with older infants displaying significantly fewer expression 
changes by 6 months of age, although in the later study (Malatesta et al., 1986) they 
found that by 7V£ months the rate of facial expressions increased again. Results also 
showed that maternal responses were limited to positive expressions, especially 
towards the younger infants. The predominant positive maternal expressions were 
enjoyment and interest followed by surprise and brow flash. Mothers rarely 
displayed anger and, when such expressions were seen, they were usually of 'mock 
anger' enacted playfully which they tended to show more frequently to older infants. 
Sadness was also infrequent and was shown more often to older infants. Mothers dis­
played increasing levels of negative facial expressions to infants, but did not show a 
decrease in positive facial expressions w ith infant age.
They also found that contingent1 maternal responses to infant facial 
expressions consisted of only 25% of all maternal expressions. Thus, mothers were 
more active in directing face to face interaction than in accommodating to infants' 
expressions. There was a tendency for mothers to 'm atch' infants' facial expressions 
except for pain, which mothers ignored. They found that 35% of all contingent 
responses were matches, whereas the remaining 65% were dissimilar responses. As 
the predominant maternal expressions were of enjoyment, this suggests that mothers 
matched mostly positive expressions. Mothers' contingent responses for infant sad 
expressions was higher for older infants, whilst for infant enjoyment maternal 
contingent responding increased with age for boys and decreased for girls. Significant 
age related differences for discomfort and knitted brow were also found, i.e., they 
decreased as babies got older. The above results show that mothers were being
1. Contingent responses were coded when a maternal expression changed within a second following 
an infant expression change.
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highly selective of what they chose to respond to. While there was a tendency for 
mothers to follow the infant by adapting their facial expressions to match their 
infants, 75% of maternal expressions were initiators, i.e., occurred before the onset 
of an infant expression. This demonstrates that, by and large, there is a strong 
tendency for mothers to lead the interaction.
Age differences also highlighted the changing nature of mothers' contingent 
responsivity, suggesting that mothers begin to establish empathetic sequences with 
their infants by matching sad expressions. As infants got older mothers acknowl­
edged fewer expressions, becoming more selective, and discouraged negative express­
ions by ignoring them. Mothers of older infants displayed less nonverbal and verbal 
acknowledgment of older infants' expression changes and did not acknowledge 
certain infant negative expressions. Mothers of younger infants made more references 
to infant positive affect, e.g., encouragement of positive affect (give me a smile), 
perhaps indicating the importance to the mother of initiating positive affective contact 
with the younger age group infants. They found no difference in maternal 
verbalisation for infant sex.
The results are interesting in that they reveal important changes in maternal 
responsivity to infant emotional expressions. They demonstrate that mothers, by and \
large, lead the interaction by initiating facial expressions, rather than follow the infant ,
\
by matching or responding to the infant's displays. In cases where they responded 
to infant expressions there were age and sex related differences, suggesting that 
mothers highlight certain expressions and become more selective in what they 
acknowledge as infants get older. However, the study did not find significant 
changes in specific facial expressions over age save for discom fort/knitted brow for 
infants and brow flash for mothers. The failure to identify more age related changes 
may have been due to the fact that the study did not distinguish between play, 
separation and reunion episodes. The three situations would have imposed con­
straints upon the elicitation of and responsivity to facial expressions for both mothers 
and infants, and would have affected the way mother and infants interacted with 
each other, possibly in different ways for the different age groups. Thus, these differ­
ences, which may have resulted in an age x situation interaction effect, were 
confounded and may have cancelled each other out.
Secondly, and related to the first point, the study only looked at maternal 
contingent responses to infant expressions, that is they only looked at infant facial
20
expressions followed by maternal expressions. They did not address the other 
contingent relationship, maternal expressions preceding infant facial expressions, which 
occurred for the majority of maternal expressions. As we will see later, mothers' 
facial expressions are important factors in the types of facial expressions produced by 
infants. Mothers' definitions of the situations in which they were being asked to 
interact may have influenced both the types of expressions they directed at the infant 
and the way they responded to the facial expressions of the infant. This points to the 
importance of taking into account the mother's perspective in defining what is 
responded to. What is a contingency to the observer is couched in intentional terms 
for mothers. As we will see in the following study, mothers' perceptions of infant 
expressions always imply some course of action on the mothers' part and thus, ipso 
facto, imply that maternal perception of intentionality is at the centre of what they 
perceive and how they respond to it.
Huebner and Izard (1988) investigated maternal responsivity to the facial 
expressions of infants aged 2-15 months using slides of 'pure ' infant expressions of 
sadness, anger, distress and interest. All background contextual information was 
eliminated. Mothers (not those of the infants shown in the slides) were asked to view 
the slides and report what the expressions were and how they would respond to 
them, by choosing from a list of reaction statements. The methodological weaknesses 
of this method present serious shortcomings to the validity of the findings and will 
be discussed shortly. For the present, the results are briefly as follows. They found 
that mothers responded differently to the three types of infant negative expressions. 
When infant distress was identified, mothers endorsed picking up the infant 
immediately and cuddling it, more so than if the infant was sad or angry. 
Disciplining and controlling maternal responses were associated more w ith anger 
expressions than both distress and sadness. Mothers said they would respond by 
"keeping their distance" when the infant was sad.
Maternal affective-type reactions also appeared to be differentially elicited by 
different types of expressions. For example, they stated feeling sad and sympathetic 
when the infant was distressed. Smiling was associated w ith infant sadness, whilst 
feeling annoyed and angry was elicited by infant anger expressions. Lastly, they 
asked mothers to 'decode' infant facial expression slides by labelling the intensity of 
the expressions they were shown. Although results indicated that mothers attributed 
the highest intensity to labelled expressions corresponding to the "correct" emotion
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slide, there were a large number of other attributions made of the same expression. 
Thus, for example, infant distress expressions signalled pain most intensely (7.8 on 
their scale). However, mothers also reported that the expression signalled anger (7.0), 
sadness (6.9), fear (6.3), disgust (5.0), interest (1.1), and happiness (1.1). Similar results 
were obtained for anger, sadness and interest.
The results were interpreted by the authors as supporting the notion that 
discrete facial expressions of negative affect exist in infancy; furthermore, that they 
have been further validated as differentiated social signals. Whether the data 
supports such conclusions is debatable. Mothers made a wide range of attributions 
concerning each expression. This was so despite the presence of a check-list, static 
slides of 'pure7 emotion expressions and no contextual background or, perhaps 
because of it. Moreover, vocalisations were not included and hence important 
information from the vocal modality was ignored. Given these limitations, their 
results cannot be taken to indicate the universality of differential negative expressions 
in infancy.
Their findings on maternal responses, although based on hypothetical 
situations, are nevertheless interesting. They show that mothers respond to what they 
perceive the infant is feeling in ways that minimise distress and maximise com fort, 
security and stability. Although such findings are hardly surprising, they indicate 
that maternal interventions are influenced by their perception of infant state. While 
the evidence from research on display rules shows what mothers respond to, the 
above study, by including the mother's perspective, reveals why she responds to it 
and to what end. It also demonstrates that mothers7 perceptions of negative 
expressions are variable, and do not, by and large, correspond to the researchers7 
criteria of 'pure emotion expressions'.
The above research highlights the fact that the inferential process of caretakers 
is an essential component in how infant emotionality is managed and shaped. 
Implicit in the three senses of the meaning of expressions outlined by Kaye (1982) is 
a developmental process which is ignored if these levels are not made explicit in 
research. Emotional expression may well be a reflection of instinctive activity in the 
newborn. Primary caretakers, however, treat these expressions as true emotional 
states. Through this process of interpretation and responding, the infant learns what 
effect their expressions will have on others and begins to use them intentionally, that
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is, as gestures. Such a developmental progression is reflected in Vygotsky's views on 
emotional development as expounded by Bruner (1987):
"What recedes in man is not emotion, but its original links to instinctive actions. In man, 
with his attenuated instinctual system, emotion takes on new functions. Emotion moves 
from the periphery to the centre, as it were, moves to the cerebral cortex where it has 
an equivalent status to other cerebral, central processes. It now can interact with those 
other processes. As with other processes, then, the development of the emotions cannot 
be understood separately from their connections with other mental processes." (Bruner,
1987, p.12, emphasis added)
Thus, facial expressions, which are at first manifestations of instinctive reactions, 
become dissociated from these reactions and become mediated by socio-cognitive 
processes which determine the emotion feeling state and the inter-personal 
significance of the emotional display. This occurs through a process of social 
development whereby caretakers incorporate affective signals into interactional 
dialogues, demonstrating the significance of these signals to the infant in dynamic 
action sequences.
Most of the theories and empirical findings that will be reviewed below fall 
into a number of traps: attributing an isomorphous relationship between emotional 
expressions and emotion; not taking into account the behavioural context of the 
expression; and working at sense 2, i.e., inference, without taking into account 
inference as an inter-personal process. Furthermore, by treating emotion as an intra­
individual process, they fail to appreciate the functional significance of emotional 
displays as important organisers of interaction for the infant's caretaker. Although the 
standardised measurements that have been used as indices of emotional states serve 
as comparative means for exploring various aspects of emotional expressions, 
researchers would benefit from placing a stronger emphasis on facial expressions in 
infancy, not in terms of their meaning to the researcher, but in terms of their meaning 
to caretakers whose interactions with the infant will inevitably influence the infant the 
most.
In the next section, the main theories which have guided research on infant 
emotions will be critically evaluated in the light of the above distinctions. It will 
become evident that the individual orientation of work on emotion, characterised by 
either S-R or cognitive theories, is inadequate for a proper understanding of infant 
social development for both the conceptual and methodological reasons highlighted 
above. Instead, it is argued that some of the new organisational theories provide
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more balanced approaches to expressive development, although some of their basic 
premises will be questioned.
A reading of the literature on emotional development in infancy suggests that 
emotions (as socially and cognitively mediated reactions to the world) should not be 
accredited to the young infant, but rather that facial expressions, which resemble j 
adult expressions, are treated by caregivers as if they are meaningful, and responded j
I
to in culturally and socially appropriate ways. In this way, emotions, via the j 
signalling function of facial expressions, develop through personal interactions with 
others. Thus, the present thesis endeavours to examine an important aspect of this 
process by looking at the way mothers' interpret their infants' facial expressions as 
an important facet of the preliminary development of emotions in infancy. This 
framework adheres to the theoretical views of the social interactionists, such as 
Vygotsky (1962), Bruner (1986), and Kaye (1982). It is argued here that such a 
theoretical framework is useful in overcoming difficulties inherent in behavioural, 
biological and cognitive theories.
1.2.0 Individualistic Theories
Historically, the study of emotions and their expression has been closely linked 
with two dominant paradigms: behaviourism and cognitive psychology. Both these 
paradigms treat emotions as secondary processes, at best byproducts of other 
processes. In doing so, they fail to explicate (a) the different levels of organisation 
required to do justice to the complexity of hum an functioning (behaviourism), and (b) 
the central role of expressive processes in development in general and socialisation 
in particular (cognitive theories).
1.2.1 Behaviourist Theory
"He had had a little cry and looked at the object, and then he looked at me, as though
expecting me to do something about it."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 4-6 month age group)
Watson (1930) and the behaviourists initially gave emotional reactions a central 
role in explaining behaviour. Briefly, Watson proposed three innate emotions which
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he had observed in neonates: fear, elicited by loud sounds; rage, elicited by restriction 
of bodily movements; and love, evoked by tactile stimulation. He demonstrated that 
emotional responses to new stimuli can be learned through classical conditioning. By 
associating the appearance of a furry rat with a loud, fear-eliciting sound, Watson 
produced fear reactions (intense crying) to the rat as well as to other white furry 
objects in a 9 month old baby (Watson and Raynor, 1920). He extended his findings 
to include all classes of emotional reactions and proposed that the researcher could 
identify the type of elicitor by viewing the type of expressive response. His theory 
was discredited by Sherman (1927a; 1927b) and Dennis (1940) whose research led to 
dissatisfaction with the behavioural and expressive criteria for emotion. Sherman 
(1927a; 1927b) argued that emotions could only be identified if one knew the stimulus 
circumstances that produced the emotion. This implied that emotions were a mere 
rubric for categorising stimulus inputs. Using emotions as unifying constructs 
seemed unnecessary and erroneous (Bentley, 1928; Skinner, 1953).
The second behaviourist paradigm, in the 1950s and 60s, introduced the notion 
of operant conditioning. Researchers showed that infant smiling, vocalising, and 
crying could be manipulated through the careful application of reinforcers and 
punishments (Brackbill et al., 1958; Etzel and Gerwitz, 1967; Rheingold, Gerwitz, and 
Ross, 1959). While, at one level, emotional reactions may be acquired according to 
conditioning principles, the behaviourist paradigm is a reductionist and limited one. 
It cannot explain why some emotional responses emerge spontaneously, without any 
prior association with unpleasant experiences. For example, babies reared in normal 
families often show fear of strangers around 8 months of age. The fear reaction 
occurs despite the fact that infants previously reacted positively to strangers, and 
strangers continue to smile and initiate playful interaction with the baby.
Operant conditioning cannot explain the basis on which emotional reactions 
are managed in interaction. For example, Sternberg et a l/s  (1983) experiment, which 
demonstrated the elicitation of anger in 1, 4, and 7 month old infants by repeated 
trials of arm restraint, may be interpreted as evidence of behaviourist assumptions 
(the operant conditioning paradigm that repeated trials resulted in the learning of the 
anger reaction). However, they also demonstrated that the anger movements were 
almost always directed at the mother. At 4 months, infants directed the signals at the 
hands of the person producing the restraint, and, less frequently, at the person 
causing the anger; at 7 months, infants looked at the mother while expressing the anger
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face (Campos, Campos and Barrett, 1989). Such eye-contact has been used as a 
behavioural criterion for "illocutionary acts" (Austin, 1962) which refer to behaviours 
that intend to affect the observer. Without a notion of mental or psychological 
processing, it is not possible for the behaviourist paradigm to present a coherent 
picture of emotional functioning and development, either from the point of view of 
the infant's own actions as intentional or those of its mother inferring an intention 
from the infant's behaviour, as is illustrated by Bruner (1981);
" Not only w ill I claim that action in fact has intentional quality, but that it is perceived 
by others with whom we are interacting to have such a quality. Not all behaviour is 
seen as steered by intentions. Some actions are seen as caused by events, regardless of 
what the actor "intended". The response of others to action is strongly affected by 
whether it is seen as caused or intended. If it is seen or interpreted as the latter, it will 
be more often subject to correction of a kind not usually given to action perceived as 
caused." (Bruner, 1981, p. 42)
The failure of behaviourism to go past stimulus-response contingencies means 
that it cannot explain such transitions in signalling functions in the child, or how they 
affect the complex system of mother-infant communication. No doubt, at some level, 
behavioural contingencies are instrumental in development. However, without 
development in the cognitive system, there can be no developmental progression to 
more complex levels of communication. Furthermore, by looking at behaviour from 
a perspective external to the participants, intentionality is removed from emotional 
reactions. As Bruner points out above, the perception of intentionality has very 
important consequences for the way behaviour is responded to.
1.2.2 Cognitive Theories
"She gave another squeal. She really likes shutting the door [of the toy]. It was different 
the other times, its a matter of degrees. The first time she did it, it was the best, 'Aah!', 
and then just the time before this one it was 'Ah, I thought of it m yself rather than 
'Mummy told me to do it.' This time it was 'Oh, I'll do it again.'"
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 10-12 month age group)
Cognitive theories of emotional development view the relationship of emotions 
to cognition in terms of emotion being produced as a consequence of a cognition, 
such as appraisal theory (e.g., Schachter and Singer, 1962) and discrepancy theories 
(e.g., Hebb, 1946; Kagan, 1978).
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1.2.2.1 Common Characteristics of Cognitive Theories and Problems
Cognitive theories are concerned with inferring mental processes in infancy 
by using emotional reactions as sensitive dependent variables. Appraisal theories 
posit that emotion results from the evaluation of a stimulus. The basis of most 
appraisals is memory, such that a new object will evoke a memory of the feelings 
associated with past experience with similar objects. Appraisal theories, such as 
Schachter and Singer's (1962) theory of physiological arousal, cognition and emotion, 
led to a concern with cognition rather than emotion as the central focus of research. 
By proposing that physiological arousal was the same for all emotions, but that the 
cognitive labelling was not, Schachter and Singer's work led to the idea that, in order 
to understand emotion, one had to first understand cognition. Thus, their work 
fostered, rather than challenged, the belief that emotions were processes of secondary 
significance; emotions were then essentially epiphenomena (Campos et al., 1983).2 
While their theory was intended to address emotion in adults, developmental 
psychology was influenced by the resulting shift in focus to cognition.
The main cognitive paradigm for emotional development stemmed from 
discrepancy theories of emotion. Discrepancy theories, which were first advanced by 
Hebb (1946), regard emotional reactions as the products of certain discrepancies or 
incongruities between external events and internal representations or schemata 
(Lewis, Sullivan and Michalson, 1984). Hebb's (1946) discrepancy theory essentially 
posited that a high degree of discrepancy between past experience and present 
experience provoked fear. In an attempt to avoid classical conditioning or innateness 
theories, he proposed that, when stimulation is processed in the central nervous 
system, it produces neurophysiological circuits called phase sequences. Once well 
established, these phase sequences are activated whenever the subject encounters a 
similar stimulus in the future. If the new stimulus is not sufficiently familiar to
2. Harr£ (1986) defends Schachter7 s work by stating that it is a mistake to see the work of Schachter 
as proof of a cognitive theory of emotions. His work on the presumed causes in identification of emotion 
is a special case of the point that emotion words or states are intentional. Similarly, Lazarus (1991) points 
out that cognition and emotion are interdependent and interrelated, as one needs meaning to appraise the 
situation for its significance in order to know how to react to it emotionally. He states that meaning, and 
hence cognitive activity, is always involved in emotion. His argument is therefore that appraisal is the 
personal significance of an event. It is unclear how this differs from Barrett and Campos's theory below. 
The only difference is that they propose some sources of significance that are biological. Although they 
are explicitly rejecting a cognitive theory of emotion, their arguments in the end fall into an appraisal 
theory framework.
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maintain the smooth activation of the phase sequence, the disruption of neural timing 
and patterning of the brain is reflected in the periphery by fear (Campos et al., 1983). 
This theory was extended (e.g., Kagan, 1971,1974; Kagan, Kearsley and Zelazo, 1978; 
McCall and McGhee, 1977) to include other emotional reactions. The underlying 
paradigm  was that emotions were produced in the process of differentiating stimuli 
in the environment (Haber, 1958).
Examples from developmental psychology were work done with the Visual 
Cliff (Walk and Gibson, 1961) and with looming stimuli (for example, Ball and 
Tronick, 1971). Both paradigms led mostly to an assessment of infants' reactions in 
what they revealed about depth perception or sensitivity to optical expansion 
patterns. It is only recently that researchers have begun to relate these paradigms to 
the development of emotions (Campos, Hiatt, Ramsey et al., 1978; Cicchetti and 
Sroufe, 1978; Scarr and Salapatek, 1970). Similarly, stranger and separation distress 
were of interest primarily because of their apparent dependence on cognitive 
development (Decarie, 1974; Schaffer, 1974). It was believed that separation and 
stranger distress measured discrepancies from existing mental representations 
(Bronson, 1968), and the establishment of a permanent image of the mother (Brossard, 
1974). Only rarely did those researchers speculate on the possible consequences or 
functions of these processes in the social or intellectual life of the infant (e.g., Clarke- 
Stewart, 1978; Dixon, Yogman, Tronick, Adamson, Als, and Brazelton, 1981). By and 
large, emotions and their expression were studied from the point of view of cognition, 
in their capacity as indicators of memory, perception and sensorimotor intelligence 
(Campos et al.,1983; Campos, Campos and Barret, 1989; Kaye, 1982).
Discrepancy theory does not explain why the mother, a familiar stimulus to 
the infant, does not result in boredom or habituation. Some researchers, e.g., Lewis 
and Michalson (1983), clarify the role that discrepancy plays in emotional reactions 
by suggesting that its chief consequence is not to produce a particular affective 
response, but, instead, to arouse and alert the organism. Specific emotional reactions 
occur only after a discrepancy is noticed, and they depend on situational context as 
well as the momentary goal of the individual. For example, a mother putting on a 
mask is a discrepant event that will capture the attention of a baby but, whether the 
infant responds by laughing or crying, depends on the situation and the baby's needs 
at the time. Furthermore, discrepancy theory cannot explain other phenomena, such 
as why infants show evidence of well-established memories of their mothers long
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before they experience fear of unfamiliar persons (Schaffer, 1966). It leaves unex­
plained why the same or similar stimuli can elicit diverse emotional reactions (Cohn 
and Tronick, 1982; Sroufe et al., 1974; Sroufe and Waters, 1976). Campos et al. (1983) 
point out that:
" The postulation of these cognitive capacities has rested on an apparent coincidence in 
time of onset of the cognitive capacity and the emotional reaction to a specific circum­
stance. However, in studies in which age is held constant and the presence and absence 
of the cognitive capacity in question is permitted to vary, the presence of the emotional 
reaction (typically fear, but sometimes anger) is found not to relate to the predicted 
sensorimotor underpinning (Campos et al., 1978; Scarr and Salapatek, 1970; Sternberg et 
al., 1983)." (Campos et al., 1983, p.812)
This overemphasis on cognitive developments, to the exclusion of studying emotion 
in its own right or within social interaction, was a result of the predominant influence 
of the cognitive paradigm within developmental psychology, specifically Piagetian 
psychology. For example, Barrett and Campos (1987) state:
" The most influential paradigm in developmental psychology has been Piagetian theory. 
All of us, entrenched in that perspective, think of development in a particular way... 
Thus it is only natural that most initial attempts to describe emotional development have 
tied emotional developments to broad cognitive abilities (e.g., Lewis and Brooks-Gunn, 
1979; Sroufe, 1979). Some of our own research provides a vivid example of this, we 
believe, mistaken, approach." (Barrett and Campos, 1987, p.558)
To give a concrete example, the development of fear, which occurs during the third 
quarter of the first year of life, appeared around the time that Piaget's stage 4 was 
predicted to begin. Barret and Campos (1987) explain,
"Naturally, captives of the paradigm that w e were, we thought that the sensorimotor 
achievement might provide a mechanism for the emergence of fear, at least of fear of the 
visual cliff. But w e were wrong." (Barrett and Campos, 1987, p.558)
They conducted a study in which the role of sensorimotor development in the 
development of fear on the visual cliff was assessed (Campos et al., 1978). No 
support was found for any connection between sensorimotor development and the 
development of fear. Babies were assigned a Piagetian stage based upon their 
performance on the Uzgiris-Hunt object permanence tasks. When locomotor and pre­
locomotor babies at various stages of object permanence were tested on the deep and
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shallow sides of the visual cliff, using the direct placement heart rate paradigm,3 
results showed that locomotor experience significantly influenced heart rate 
acceleration on the deep side of the visual cliff, whilst object permanence stage 
exerted no such influence. The authors believe that locomotor experience was 
effective in explaining the development of fear because it provided the infants with 
the kinds of experiences that endowed heights with significance for the infants. This 
may also be the result of social communication where another person's emotional 
reactions to an event may teach the infant wariness of heights.
Thus, to date, traditional cognitive theories of emotion have failed to provide 
a comprehensive account of the development of emotions. As with behavioural 
mechanisms, cognition is an integral and necessary part of emotional development. 
However, the focus of research stemming from the cognitive paradigm fails to 
account for emotional and expressive development as a topic in its own right, using 
it only as a sensitive measuring device for unveiling cognitive processes. The 
cognitive focus of research also grew out of the tradition of regarding the "object" in 
the infant's field as inanimate and passive; "object" as "the other person" was not 
included. Such an omission leads to the neglect of important aspects in the 
development of emotionality. As we saw, fear reactions to the visual cliff, which had 
been attributed to the development of sensorimotor developments, is found to be 
influenced by locomotor experience and, perhaps more importantly, by mothers' 
emotional reactions towards the event. It may also be argued that locomotor 
experience is "framed" within mother-infant interaction, as mothers would assist the 
infants' exploration of the environment. This would indicate that even locomotor 
experience is gained within an interactional or parental framework, where the mother 
transmits to the infant the significance of her actions. The following sections consider 
models which include the social nature of the development of emotions.
1.3.0 Current Theories of Emotional Development
In recent years, a new Zeitgeist has emerged which has sought to address the 
problems of traditional paradigms which focused on emotions and facial expressions
3. The heart rate of the infant is measured as it is lowered into the deep end of the visual cliff. 
Increase in heart rate is taken as an indication that the infant has developed a fear of the visual cliff.
30
either as simple manifestations of instinctive or conditioned reactions to environ­
mental stimuli or as byproducts of cognitive processes. This Zeitgeist has generally 
fallen under the rubric of what is called the New Organisational Approach to 
emotional development (Campos et al., 1983; Campos, Campos and Barrett, 1989). 
The dramatic shift that has led to a reevaluation of emotions, and a rekindling of 
interest in their investigation, has been partly brought about by advances in audio­
visual technology. The recent spate of research on facial expressions especially has 
been very influential in the emergence of interest in emotions and their development. 
Recent theories have been concerned with the regulatory and organisational aspects 
of emotions and facial expressions in terms of both individual and social processes.
Although a number of different organisational theories exist, they are all 
influenced by general systems theory (von Bertalanffy, 1968) and, hence, they all share 
an emphasis on emotions as central forces in virtually all aspects of human behaviour.
The Organisational approaches share some common themes:
• The adaptive role of emotion in fostering exploration of the environment, retreat 
from threatening situations, and bonding.
• Emotions are seen as important in the development of self-awareness.
• Emotion and cognition are intimately interdependent.
• Examination of discrete emotions, and not just the intensity of globally positive and 
negative states, is necessary to understand the emotion-cognition relationship.
• Emphasise that emotional development includes increasing control over the 
expression of affect, as well as developmental changes in the conditions under which 
affect is expressed.
They differ on two main points:
• How early discrete emotional states are present in the young infant.
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• What is the exact relationship between emotions and cognition.
1.3.1 Izard's Theory of Emotional Development
Izard (1984) is one of a group of theorists who uses systems approach 
principles while adhering to a biological view of emotions. His differential emotions 
theory is an elaboration and extension of two previous theories, Darwin's (1872/1975) 
and Tomkin's (1962,1963) theories of emotion. These theories stressed the adaptive 
value of facial expressions. Facial expressions evolved from biologically adaptive 
behaviours connected with such activities as grooming and fighting. Natural selection 
resulted in facial movements that initially functioned as associated habits and later 
came to serve as social cues about internal states and environmental events. One 
implication of this evolutionary development is that facial expressions are regarded 
as isomorphic with emotion states.
These "naturalistic theories" (Ratner, 1989) advocate that emotions are products 
of natural processes which are independent of social norms and intersubjective 
interpretation. The natural, biological basis of emotions is regarded as proven by the 
universal existence of many emotions, not only in adult humans, but also among 
animals and infants who are devoid of social awareness. This argument is advanced 
to defend the proposal that emotions do not require cognition as these organisms 
have rudimentary self-awareness. The phylogenetic and ontogenetic universality of 
emotions demonstrates their primacy over cognition (Izard and Buechler, 1980; 
Zajonc, 1980). Emotions result from hormones, neuromuscular feedback from facial 
expressions and genetic mechanisms. For example, Izard (1984) states that:
" Emotion has no cognitive component. I maintain that the emotion process is bounded
by the feeling that derives directly from the activity of the neurochemical substrates."
(Izard, 1984, p.24)
He proposes that emotions are a function of naturally elicited facial expressions which 
are, in turn, determined by intrinsic processes in the somatic nervous system. Auto­
nomic arousal and emotional experience are produced by sensory feedback from the 
face such that a smile creates the emotion of happiness (Izard and Beuchler, 1980).
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Thus, Izard postulates that the newborn possesses several quite discrete 
emotions evidenced by specific facial expressions. The emotions emerge when they 
first become adaptive in the life of the infant and their developmental onset, although 
occurring in close parallel with changes in perceptual, cognitive and motoric 
capacities, do not result from these processes.4 He dismisses the idea that perceptual, 
cognitive and motoric factors may be directly involved in the development of 
particular emotional reactions or facial expressions. Izard posits that the development 
of facial expression capacities is a major criterion for the existence of emotional states 
and also for their experience. In Izard's view, emotions precede and determine 
cognition, and cognition serves emotions (Izard et al., 1980, Zajonc, 1980; Plutchik, 
1980a). Moreover, Izard's naturalistic position stipulates that a few basic emotions 
underlie and comprise all "emotions". All emotions are therefore essentially reducible 
to the basic ones: fear, anger, joy, sadness, interest, surprise, disgust (Plutchik, 1980b).
Many researchers (e.g., Barrett and Campos, 1987; Ratner,1989; Armon-Jones, 
1989) have pointed out that one cannot postulate that facial expressions of infants 
mean the same thing as adult expressions, based on their similarity. Izard's theory 
falls prey to biological reductionism, both for postulating a basic biological relation­
ship between facial expressions and emotions and, secondly, by proposing that all 
emotions are essentially innate, and present, in the newborn. These basic assump­
tions will be criticised in more detail presently.
1.3.2 Sroufe's Theory of Emotional Development
Sroufe disagrees with Izard on the existence of emotions at birth and proposes 
that the neonate manifests precursors of three emotions: wariness-fear, rage-anger and 
pleasure-joy (Watson's three innate emotions). What changes w ith development are 
the cognitive level of the infant, the systems available to express emotions, and coping 
capacities, thus ensuring that the infant will experience more complex emotions. True 
emotions, he argues, are not possible until the child has a differentiated sense of self, 
which he postulates to be around the third quarter year of life. He bases this on the
4.For example, he suggests that personality becomes organised at progressively more organized levels 
with the domination of sensory-affective processes giving way in development to affective-cognitive 
processes (Izard, 1978).
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social-cognitive development of the infant which is characterised as a process of 
differentiation of self from non-self, of human objects from non-human objects and 
of one human object from another. This process of differentiation, although it has not 
progressed very far by the end of infancy, has made a definite beginning (Bretherton 
et al., 1981). Sroufe postulates the emergence of the first true emotions by the third 
quarter of the first year based on the emergence of stranger anxiety. Such a 
phenomenon is taken to indicate that the infant is now able to differentiate between 
familiar and unfamiliar people, and thus has a rudim entary ability to differentiate self 
from other. It is also taken to mean that the infant now has a permanent representa­
tion of its mother.
"... by 9 months the infant is an emotional being. N ow  the subject-object relationship is 
primary. In a new way the meaning of the event for the infant is responsible for the 
affect. Thus, by about 9 months the infant laughs in anticipation of mother's return in 
peekaboo, rather than in response to the completed sequence. It is angry in the face of 
an obstacle blocking an intended act (a particular relationship and a psychological invest­
ment)...and it can experience threat in advance of noxious stimulation (fear). This is also 
the age at which surprise, as opposed to startle, appears...Awareness has become 
anticipation. While in the second quarter the infant has motor anticipation based on 
well-established sequences, by 9 months there is cognitive anticipation." (Sroufe, 1979, 
p.488)
An example of the developments Sroufe posits concerns the precursor of 
wariness-fear. In the neonatal period fear is observable when certain environmental 
stimuli produce 'obligatory attention/ 5 However, once the child is capable of 
forming representations of prior experience and of detecting discrepancies, wariness 
becomes possible (at 4 months). As the infant grows older she is able, not only to 
react warily, but also to assimilate events to negative schemata (learned expectations 
that something undesirable will happen). At this stage true fear becomes possible 
because the child has differentiated her self from the outside world, as evidenced by 
the child's level of object permanence.
Evidence has shown that some of Sroufe's mechanisms for emotional 
development do not apply. For example, he states that fear at 8 months is based on 
learning that something is harmful and comes about because of generalisations from 
past experience. He bases this on evidence of a change in the infant's reactions to 
strangers before and after 6 months of age (Bronson, 1978). Recent reviews of the
5. Engaging visual stimulation sometimes leads to prolonged cessation of infant behaviour resulting 
in distress (Sroufe, 1979).
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literature on fear of strangers at 8 months down play the importance of learned 
expectations (e.g., Horner, 1980). Moreover, there has been no evidence to show that 
the emergence of fear of heights and of looming stimuli results from negative 
encounters such as falls or other painful experiences (Bertenthal et al., 1983; Yonas, 
1981). Campos et al. (1983,1984) maintain that one cannot determine whether or not 
a cognition will lead to an emotion without considering the goals of the organism.
1.3.3 Campos et al.'s Theory of Emotional Development
Barret and Campos (1987) define emotions:
"As bidirectional processes of establishing, maintaining, and/or disrupting significant 
relationships between an organism and the (external or internal) environment. They are 
bidirectional in that they involve the interdigitating impact of the environment and the 
organism upon each other. They are processes in that both organism and environment 
are constantly changing in relationship to one another: A change in one evokes a change 
in the other. They are relational: the emotional quality associated with an event is 
dependent upon how that event affects the organism, and the quality of the organism's 
emotional responses is determined, in part, by the implications of that response for the 
environmental event. And finally, the relationships are significant: the impact of environ­
ment and organism upon each other has implications for that organism's adaptive func­
tioning in that environment." (Barrett and Campos, 1987, pp. 558-559)
They propose seven postulates to describe the most important features of 
emotional development:
1. There is a set of differentiated core emotion states that are present throughout the life span.
2. As cognitive development proceeds and as new goals appear in the life of the child, complex inter-
coordinated emotions become evident.
3. The effectiveness of specific eliciting circumstances changes as the organism develops.
4. The relationship between emotional expression and emotional experience changes as the organism 
develops.
5. Coping responses to emotions change as the organism develops.
6. Emotions become socialised as the organism develops.
7. Receptivity to others' emotional expressions changes as the organism develops.
Barrett and Campos (1987) state:
"The presence of a particular emotion is determined not by documenting a particular 
type of response, but rather by documenting a particular set of functional relationships 
between an organism and the environment." ( Barrett and Campos, 1987, p.556)
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Significant relationships between the organism and its environment are based 
on the goals of the organism, which may be "conscious" or "unconscious", according 
to the authors. In connection with this, they postulate three major sources of goal 
significance: certain event-organism relationships are significant because they are 
biologically given, that is, they are "prewired" survival goals for the organism. For 
example, infants' reactions to gustatory substances (Lipsitt, 1979; Steiner, 1979) or 
negative emotional responses to abrupt sensory onsets, such as loud, sudden noise 
(Gunnar, 1980) are sources of biological significance. Social communication is another 
source of significance, i.e., "another organism's emotional reaction to an event". They 
believe that babies may also be prewired or biologically prepared to respond to this 
source of significance. For example, another organism's reactions may endow any 
ambiguous event with significance. Thus, although 'affective contagion' (Hoffman, 
1977), 'affective attunement' (Stern, 1985), and 'emotional resonance' (Campos and 
Sternberg, 1981) may be prewired processes, they provide a means through which an 
endless variety of event-organism relationships can acquire significance. A third 
source of significance is the event implications for the organism's ongoing goals and 
striving. This is different from the first source of significance where these goals were 
prewired and all pervasive. Here, in contrast, the goals in this third source may be 
learned, and regard ends toward which the organism is striving concurrently. For 
example:
"This interweaving of event and goal provides an explanation as to w hy the same 
unexpected snowfall will elicit joy in someone who wants to go skiing, fear in someone 
who needs to travel to another city unprepared, anger in an individual who has to 
shovel a driveway rather than rest, pride in someone who predicted the snowfall with 
a new theory, and even guilt in the person who interprets it as retribution for a trans­
gression." (Campos et al.,1983, p.812)
For Campos et al., this explains why the same stimulus may evoke different 
emotional reactions in the same organism depending on its goals and striving at the 
time. The above three types of goals are regarded by the authors as "significance 
inducing processes" (Barrett and Campos, 1987, p.560) and they imply a develop­
mental process.
The strength of the organisational approach of Campos et al. is that it 
overcomes most of the shortcomings and individualistic biases of previous theories. 
It stresses the functional nature of emotions and emotional development and proposes 
a relationship between emotion, cognition and socialisation built on the concept of the
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goals and striving of the organism /infant and how these are socialised. However, its 
weakness lies in its failure to be mindful of the distinction between physiological 
reaction and emotion, by proposing that there is a set of core emotion states that are 
present throughout the lifespan. In doing so, it fails to appreciate the social nature 
of emotions. For example, social emotions such as pride, shame and embarrassment, 
by the nature of their functions, imply that they can only exist if one has a notion of 
self versus other and a set of social rules indicating that one has transgressed in some 
way against others within socially defined situations. To the extent that events in the 
environment are imbued w ith meaning for the expresser, they will elicit an emotional 
reaction in that person. Although Campos et al. do not propose as extreme a form 
of biological determinism as Izard does, their notion of a psychophysiological 
programme that is intrinsic to the infant still adheres to a biological account of the 
development of emotions.
Both these explanations, proposing that emotions are innate, or are based on 
psychophysiological programmes, lead to serious conceptual difficulties. Postulating 
an innate sense of loss, for example, apart from any specific cause or expression, and 
arguing that this is filled in by culture (Malatesta and Haviland,1982; Ekman, 1980) 
or that an affect, by virtue of its innateness, is independent of the external environ­
ment, is improbable. As Ratner (1989) points out, basic affective programmes are too 
general to be viable. How can we be innately sensitised to an indeterminate thing, 
and how can we be innately programmed to react sadly in the absence of any 
specification of what such a response would be? Only specific programmes can be 
biologically determined because genetic material specifies particular sensitivities and 
responses. For example, male dogs, stimulated by a specific female scent, copulate 
in very stereotyped response patterns. Without such specificity, the notion of a 
programmed basic affect loses any semblance of meaning (Ratner, ibid).
The other explanation is to propose a psychophysiological programme. As 
was stated above, Campos et al. (1983) propose an endogenous psychophysiological 
programme.6 Although they attempt to distinguish between social emotions and 
what they call primordial or concurrent-goal emotions, they stress that both types of 
emotion are present throughout the lifespan (Barrett and Campos, 1987), implying that
6. The psychophysiological programme dictates that one responds to loss with sadness, the blocking 
of a goal with anger, and so on.
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they regard the social emotions to be present at birth in some form. Thus, Barrett and 
Campos (1987) state that there are:
" Intrinsic but not invariant links between specific emotion families and particular 
(l)...'hot/ cognitions regarding the significance of organism-environment relationships (2) 
goals that these appreciations usually regard, (3) action tendencies, (4) vocalic patterns, 
physiological patterns, (5) facial movement patterns, and (6) adaptive functions. That 
is, emotion families typically are associated with particular patterns of these 
characteristics; however, particular instances of an emotion (family members) may not 
be associated with one or more of the characteristics." (Barrett and Campos, 1987, p.557)
The notion of a psychophysiological programme may be too deterministic to 
accommodate social constituting of later emotions (Ratner,1989). It predetermines 
sadness as a response to loss when no such cause and effect relationship is necessary. 
To return to our earlier example, loss of parents should instigate sadness. However, 
Super and Harkness (1982) have demonstrated that there is wide cultural variation 
in separation anxiety. They note that any early natural tendency to feel sadness at 
parental separation or loss is differentially organised into the structure of daily life 
and ceases to be a general, unconditioned, reaction among older children and adults. 
Culture not only specifies when loss of parents instigates sadness but w hether it will 
produce sadness at all. As Ratner (1989) points out, "Postulating a psychophysio­
logical program that inevitably links sadness to loss is overly deterministic and 
overlooks culture's ability to constitute or deny this association" (p.225).
Furthermore, while Campos et al. (1983) reject Sroufe's argument concerning 
the importance of the role of socio-cognitive differentiation, they do not explain how 
their account of goal significance is different in principle from his. It would appear 
that the main distinction they draw between the role of representation and goal 
significance is that the latter involves biologically preprogrammed capacities. It is 
argued here that this view confuses physiological reaction with emotional response. 
Social constructionist theories of emotion provide an important insight into the 
consequences of not maintaining a distinction between the two processes.
The constructionist argument maintains that emotions are world-dependent. 
It implies some kind of link between the emotion and an external state of affairs. The 
naturalists would argue that the external referents of emotions have a natural and 
universal status and give rise to responses constituted by natural beliefs and desires; 
hence the literature on the universality of facial expressions. The rejection of this 
thesis rests on illustrating that the notion of universality of facial expressions outside
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the notion of sociocultural contexts is invalid, a subject we shall be returning to 
shortly.
1.4.0 Social Theories of Emotion
Social theories are essentially derived from the social constructionist approach 
to emotions. They propose that, in adult humans emotions depend upon social 
concepts (Averill, 1980a,b; Hallowell, 1955; Harre, 1986; Hochschild, 1979; Lazarus, 
Kanner, and Folkman, 1980; Lutz, 1988; Shweder and LeVine, 1984; Solomon, 1980; 
Super and Harkness, 1982; Vygotsky, 1987; Ratner, 1989). In infancy, however, 
behavioural reactions are immediate, biologically determined responses to stimuli.
In this framework, the judging and interpreting of internal and external stimuli 
constitute the quality of emotions. In effect, this means that a physiological reaction 
is only such until one can interpret it as an emotion. Averill explains:
"Emotions are viewed here as transitory social roles, or socially constructed syndromes.
The social norms that help constitute these syndromes are represented psychologically 
as cognitive structures or schemata. These structures-like the grammar of language- 
provide the basis for the appraisal of stimuli, the organisation of responses, and the monitoring 
of behaviour." (Averill, 1980b, pp.305-306, emphasis added)
Emotions depend upon social awareness concerning when, where and what to feel, 
as well as when, where and how to act. That is, they are a set of guidelines for 
feelings. Ratner (1989) states:
"These feeling rules delineate social codes. Emotions are so socially functional that 
violating feeling rules is tantamount to developing a new  social ideology and a new  
social system. For instance, the feminist demand for women to feel and act more 
assertively is nothing less than a demand for women to take on new social roles."
(Ratner, 1989, p.212)
How does the infant change from an organism whose emotional reactions are 
biologically driven, to an adult human whose emotions are mediated by socially 
constructed cognitive structures? The social constructionists argue that there are two 
general classes of hum an emotions. One class has natural analogues in animals and 
human infants. Joy, sadness and fear are examples. Even these emotions, however, 
lose their natural, spontaneous basis in hum an adults and become mediated by social
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awareness as described above. These natural analogues to emotions indicate an 
original natural basis; however, "natural" emotions in human adults are qualitatively 
different from their counterpart in organisms devoid of social intersubjective 
awareness. Their correspondence to each other therefore is minimal.
The other class of emotions have no natural analogue at all. Shame, guilt, 
pride and even anger are all socially constituted emotions because they presuppose 
a notion of right and wrong. For instance, anger presupposes a notion of intentional 
responsibility for a misdeed. If I believe that the act was not the person's fault, I 
would not be angry at him. I might be distressed that the misdeed occurred, but I 
would not feel anger. Entire cultures, such as the Ennuit, lack anger, according to 
Solomon (1984), because they do not blame individuals for their actions. Solomon 
points out that their feelings of annoyance are not equivalent to anger. He suggests 
that they do not feel it at all. They can feel disturbed, threatened and aggressive, but 
not angry at someone for what they have done. Shame, guilt and pride are all 
socially constituted emotions, because they presuppose an ethical notion of right and 
wrong. Such a view may be criticised for placing too much emphasis on social influ­
ences on development.
Social constructionism does not deny the existence and importance of biology 
in the development of emotions, rather, it recognises the importance of social 
influences as essential in the development of emotions. Instinctive reactions which 
are specified by external stimulation, do exist, but they cannot be called true j 
emotions. Only after socialisation has begun are these instinctive responses dissoci- 
ated from stimuli, and become mediated by socially constructed schemata. Bateson j
(1985) provides a helpful insight into the distinction by likening the process of 
development to baking a cake. Although a cake may have distinct constituents in its 
raw uncooked state, the process of baking creates a qualitatively new object from 
which the initial parts cannot be reconstituted.
This is echoed in Vygotsky's conceptualisation of the relationship between 
higher and lower mental functions. He used the Hegelian term superseded to 
designate the transformation of natural functions into cultural ones. Kozulin (1986), 
a disciple of Vygotsky, makes the same point as Bateson when he says:
"If one decomposes a higher mental function into its constituent parts, one finds nothing 
but the natural, lower skills... All the building blocks of higher behaviour seem absolutely 
materialistic and can be apprehended by ordinary empirical methods. This latter 
assumption does not imply, however, that the higher functions can be reduced to lower
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ones. Decomposition shows us only the material the higher functions are built with but
says nothing about their construction." (Kozulin, 1986, p.266)
Thus, while the infant displays specificity in its response to stimulation, to label such 
reactions emotions suggests that the infant is able to comprehend the significance of 
events through complex socio-cognitive processes that give rise to true emotions. 
More importantly, it limits the investigation of how socialisation creates a higher, 
emergent function out of an instinctive one. If it is recognised that all emotion types 
are socioculturally constituted to some extent, it enables us to investigate how and to 
what extent both primary and nonprimary emotion types are socially constituted. In 
adopting this position, concern is directed to how much significance can be attached 
to natural emotions relative to socioculturally constituted emotions.
Those who adhere to a naturalist view would argue that emotions, primitive 
and socialised, share the same biological bases, and where applicable, the same 
natural cognitions. Sociocultural variables, in so far as they feature in naturalist 
theory, have a peripheral influence, e.g., in reducing the intensity of the natural 
responses and in determining the manner in which they are outwardly displayed. 
Thus "display rules' (Ekman, 1980) are introduced to explain the cultural prohibition 
and control of natural emotion states.
Naturalists justify the use of the term 'emotion' to both primitive and 
socialised emotion by suggesting that both phenomena are sufficiently similar to fall 
under the same term. However, in so far as emotions involve specifically 
sociocultural attitudes, feature in specific sociocultural contexts and bear a prescrip­
tive, functional relation to such contexts, the naturalist cannot extrapolate his or her 
account of natural emotions in order to explain them. The application of the term 
'emotion' to both natural and social instances of a response leads us to ignore their 
discontinuities (Armon-Jones, 1986).
Contemporary theories, like those of Campos et al., are, however, consistent 
with the view advanced here to the extent that they share the notion that the attitudes 
which constitute emotions can in principle be acquired through learning and can only 
be differentiated on the basis of the goals of the organism. However, they are 
inconsistent with the current view in so far as they conceive of all emotions as 
existing throughout the life span. In a sense, what Campos et al. propose may be 
modified by reinterpreting the evidence of early emotionality in infancy as indicating 
the presence of an instinctive reaction rather than an emotion in the adult sense of the
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word. It is rather a basic physiological response at first, which is dissociated from 
innate response patterns to become cognitively mediated. The notion of an innate 
affective programme, preceding, yet interacting with, culture, clings to biological 
reductionism. Hum an biology has a capacity for a great range of emotions, however 
none of these is predisposed or "basic7.
Indeed, Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) have identified enormous conceptual 
confusion regarding the notion of basic emotions. 7 For example, basic emotions 
have often been defined as universal. They have also been used to mean primary, in 
the sense of being building blocks for other emotions, and are either posited as 
adding together to form the derivative emotion, or they are compounded into a novel, 
qualitatively different emotion, thus creating serious ambiguities as to the latter 
connotation of the term "basic'. They have also been used to refer to emotions that 
appear chronologically early in ontogenetic development.
No justification is provided for the use of this term nor is there agreement as 
to what it represents. Ratner states that:
"Just as universal is not necessarily basic, neither is the early appearance of an emotion.
Initial emotions may be temporary, or insignificant for later life, thus not basic at all.
Compounding the ambiguity of the term 'basic emotion' is the lack of agreement as to
which emotions are in fact, basic." (Ratner, 1989, p.220)
According to the social constructionists, culture specifies the details of what 
to feel, when and how we will experience these emotions, thereby concretely realising 
a very abstract potential. This is not to say that there is no differentiation in 
emotional state save that which is given by the socially defined situation in which it 
occurs. Taken to an extreme, such a view would be akin to an inverted version of the 
James-Lange theory (we are afraid only because we flee) where, in this case, we feel 
afraid not because we flee but because we recognise that we are in a situation that is 
culturally defined as dangerous. However,
"...no cultural significance need be attached by persons to a charging bull in order for it
to be construed by them as dangerous and warranting fear." (Armon-Jones, 1986, p.38)
7. Campos, Campos and Barrett (1989) substitute the term basic for the term 'emotion families' in their 
later work. This does not disguise the fact that the term is used essentially to refer to the concept of 
preprogrammed initial emotional states from which other, more differentiated states are derived.
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Rather, as Bruner (1986) (and also Armon-Jones,1986) points out, such an 
extreme is not necessary, as the general view advanced here holds equally well if we 
acknowledge, as indeed we have above, that there are primitive or natural emotions 
like fear, rage, and hunger. It still remains the case that a more specific "affective 
signature" (Bruner, 1986) is required. The process of emotional development may 
then be described as the "social contextualisation of emotion" (Bruner, ibid).
Socially defined context serves the role of providing this signature. The 
instinctive physiological reactions that are associated w ith facial expressions in infancy 
are not, however, functional in the same way as they are in later life. The notion of 
'functional' is of central importance here. It is an aspect of the emotion that it serves a 
social function. The emphasis is not in the ontology of the primary emotions but on 
their adaptation to particular social contexts and on the function they serve w ithin the 
context of a particular society. Thus, as expounded by Bruner:
"...emotions achieve their qualitative character by being contextualised in the social 
reality that produces them." (Bruner, 1986, p.114)
Applying this premise to emotions in the developing infant, the stress thus falls on 
how her emotional reactions are integrated into the social context of the situation.
This brings us to another important point. Contextualising emotions might 
imply that describing an emotion as socially functional means no more than merely 
reinforcing a universal and natural disposition by rewarding its expression in 
particular situations (Armon-Jones, 1986). This view would not be compatible with 
the thesis developed here. Prescribing an emotion, such as fear or happiness for 
example, involves defining it by reference to those symbolic items that compel fear 
or joy within a social system. In order for a child to be 'afraid' or 'happy ' within 
those contexts, she must understand the significance of such contexts and be able to 
respond/act appropriately.
The inner feeling of 'joy' is qualitatively different from the natural feeling 
involved in its prototype, the primary emotion of 'enjoyment' in infancy. It is not just 
the social constraints imposed on the intensity of feeling, the type of display, and the 
type of context in which the emotion features which change. Armon-Jones (1986) 
explains, for example, that:
"../fear feeling' would not remain unchanged but rather would be qualitatively different 
to the extent that the attitudes constitutive of the emotion feeling are specifically
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cultural...for a child to be appropriately 'afraid' she must have a grasp of the contexts, 
behaviour and attitudes which are expressive of the emotion as [socially] defined." 
(Armon-Jones, 1986, p.66)
It is in this way that later emotions are qualitatively different, by virtue of their being 
socio-cognitively mediated, from primary emotions. This is congruent with the 
statement made earlier by Bruner (1987) regarding Vygotsky's account of the 
development of emotions and is worth repeating:
"What recedes in man is not emotion, but its original links to instinctive actions. In man, 
with his attenuated instinctual system, emotion takes on new functions. Emotion moves 
from the periphery to the centre, as it were, moves to the cerebral cortex where it has 
an equivalent status to other cerebral, central processes. It can now interact with those 
other processes. As with other processes, then, the development of the emotions cannot 
be understood separately from their connections with other mental processes." (Bruner,
1987, p.12)
Within this framework it is maintained that, in order for infants to develop 
adult emotions, their physiological expressions must be contextualised in some way. 
It is argued here that this occurs through mothers interpreting, assigning socio­
culturally predefined meanings, to what their infants are expressing, and responding 
accordingly. The meaning or significance of emotions is thus explained and clarified 
by being used instrumentally by mothers within specific routines. Mothers create 
and maintain these contextual realities which become the infant's first 'culture'. They 
create formats for interaction in which they interact according to the social realities 
that they have created in their exchanges. In the light of this perspective, the primary 
function of infant facial expressions may be conceived of as providing a signalling 
system to care givers, since it follows that the development of emotions is in fact their 
socialisation in the way described above.
In becoming dissociated from natural stimuli and responses and becoming 
associated with socially specified stimuli and responses (Shweder, 1985), the natural 
basis of infantile "emotions" is replaced by a new socially constructed basis. 
Consequently, infantile emotions are not prototypical of adult emotions. Nor do they 
serve as constant core constituents of adult emotions. Evidence for this may be 
derived from the fact that emotions are not given in discrete facial responses. As 
Plutchik (1980b) states:
" At best there is a prototypic facial pattern that may appear briefly under extreme stress 
or conditions but it is quickly changed, modified, or inhibited on the basis of rules and
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experiences that are unique both to the culture and to the individual." (Plutchik, 1980b,
p.257)
This socially mediated modification and meaning of facial expressions as 
indicators of emotion can be evidenced in inconsistencies in data from studies on the 
universality of facial expressions of emotions. They indicate that innate responses do 
not, by themselves, constitute emotional expressions in any significant way. For 
example, Ekman, Freisen, and Ancoli (1980) found only low correlations ranging from 
0.4 to 0.6 between subjective reports of happiness and various measures of facial 
smiling response. Feelings of disgust correlated .37 to .55 with various corresponding 
facial expressions, and a composite of negative feelings correlated from .10 to +.35 
w ith corresponding facial expressions.
Evidence concerning cross-cultural agreement on the emotional significance 
of facial expressions also shows important contradictory findings. For example, 
Ekman (1972) found cross cultural agreement in judging photographs which depicted 
emotions, but agreement was only forthcoming when the stimulus was a highly 
stereotyped, uniform, posed expression of a single emotion that was explicitly chosen 
for its lack of cultural display rules. In addition, the emotional adjectives that subjects 
could use were confined to a handful of terms which greatly increased the likelihood 
of agreement (Ekman, ibid; Plutchik, 1980b). Despite these forced conditions and 
restrictions, cross cultural judgements of emotional expressions were not unanimous. 
For example, Japanese and American judges correlated only 60% of the time on 
photos reflecting stress, only 10% above chance level. Similarly, a fear photograph 
was judged to be so by 85% of Americans and by only 54% of Argentineans. 
Moreover, while 90% of Brazilians judged a facial expression as angry, only 45% of 
Japanese did so (Ekman, ibid). Similar variations in results were obtained by Izard
(1980). On posed surprise photos, Americans identified it correctly 90% of the time 
whilst Mexicans correctly identified it 54% of the time. When judges were allowed 
to describe the photos freely, instead of being forced to use a small number of 
predetermined adjectives, agreement dropped significantly. An international sample 
of judges who viewed various photographic expressions of emotions only achieved 
50% correct identifications.
Further evidence which highlights the importance of social context and the 
unreliability of emotion displays investigated in contextual isolation is research 
showing that the same expression perceived in varying contexts is judged to indicate
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different emotions. Although evidence from dynamic, real time stimuli is rare 
(Wallbott, 1988), it is more ecologically valid, and of importance to the present study 
as it relies on real time video segments of infants to obtain maternal interpretations.
Those studies that have been carried out indicate that context information 
influences interpretations of facial expressions. For example, Goldberg, (1951) showed 
observers one of two film clips consisting of 4 takes, the last take in each being 
identical (showing a woman screaming). In one film the context information 
suggested a fear experience and, in the other, a joyful experience. Results showed 
that the fear context led to more fear judgements while the joy context resulted in 
more joy judgements. This is not to say that either context or facial expression is more 
dominant in attributing emotions to subjects. The studies rather suggest that context 
is as important as emotion displays when attributing an emotional state.
In another study, Wallbott (1988) found that, when presented with television 
and film clips, judges relied on context just as much as they relied on facial 
expressions in guiding their inferences about the emotional states of an actress or an 
actor, when the context information was congruent with the facial expression 
portrayed. When presented with discrepant clips, judges did not use the information 
objectively given in person takes and context takes, but instead inferred other 
emotions, probably by 'reinterpreting' both sources of information to arrive at judge­
ments. The results also indicated that the more consonant cue combinations there 
were, the more intense the main emotion was judged to be and the less ambiguous 
judgements were with respect to the other emotions. Thus, consonant cue combina­
tions led to more intense emotion judgements, which were less ambiguous and which 
used information presented both in the person and context domain. When presented 
with discrepant clips, however, judges were less certain about the main emotion 
presented in the clips, judging it as being of lower intensity, and they reinterpreted 
the emotions within the different takes. In other words, the relative dominance of 
context versus facial expressions as sources of information depends, at least partly, 
on the discrepancy or consonance of the two types of information (Wallbott, 1988).
More striking results were found for infants. Sherman (1927a) found that, 
when infants' bodily and facial expressions were observed (by psychology graduate 
students, nurses and medical students) in the absence of any precipitating circum­
stances, judgements of the infants' emotions were inaccurate and variable. For 
example, 20% of psychology students who observed infants immediately after they
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had been dropped 2 or 3 feet (without observing the actual dropping of the infant) 
reported the infants as expressing hunger. Interobserver agreement improved, 
however, when the observers were shown the precipitating circumstances. Moreover, 
when hungry infants were shown in pictures as being forcibly held down on a table, 
observers in this instance attributed fear, anger or some other emotion appropriate to 
being forced down, but none attributed hunger to the infants. This strongly suggests 
that facial expressions are interpreted in the light of surrounding conditions, and that 
sometimes these interpretations are totally at odds w ith what the expressions "should" 
denote (Leff, 1977).
The evidence so far, taken as a whole, leads to some important points. Facial 
expressions cannot be studied in isolation; they occur and develop in cultural 
contexts, in spatiotemporal contexts, and in interactional contexts, all of which 
influence the way in which they are produced, interpreted and responded to. The 
influence of culture and contextual variation also shifts the locus of responsibility 
from the infant to the caretaker and the context of interaction. The new organis­
ational theories reviewed above have misunderstood the nature of facial expressions 
and emotionality to the extent that they have neglected this vital aspect. The social 
constructionists have provided the missing link between natural and social emotions 
by introducing as a central mechanism in emotional development the prescriptive 
quality of others' perceptions in providing the affective signature needed for emotions 
to develop. This is the link that has been overlooked by the organisational theories 
(Campos et al., 1983). By assigning a secondary role to social and interpersonal 
processes, they have dissociated emotional development from the wider development 
of the child. Thus, inevitably, they fall prey to behavioural contingencies by studying 
how different emotional expressions in the infant are contingent upon various 
environmental stimuli at various levels of functioning.
The above studies have shown that, amongst adults, facial expressions are not 
synonymous with feeling states. There may be a biological connection between facial 
expressions and emotions in adults. However, as Ekman (1972) points out, the 
relationship is surely one in which the emotion engenders the expression, rather than 
the expression determining emotion (as Izard believes). Facial musculature expresses 
the individual's cognitively mediated emotional state and striving (Mandler, 1980). 
The above studies have also demonstrated that the way observers make inferences, 
regarding the emotional states of others, is subject to contextual information which
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may completely alter the interpretation of the facial expressions from one context to 
the next. These are important findings, especially in the light of mother-infant 
interaction. How mothers interpret and respond to their infants' facial expressions 
must be looked at as a vital part of the interplay of the various components of context 
which influence the development of emotionality. Gottlieb (1991) echoes Bateson and 
Kozulin's view above when he states:
" The cause of development, what makes development happen is the relationship of
the...components, not the components themselves." (Gottlieb, 1991, p .7)
The mother7s interpretations of her infant's facial expressions are a vital and essential 
component of emotional development in infancy. Interpretations of interactional 
others, the influences of situational context, influences of infant capacities, and the 
responsivity of caretakers are all components of an integrated process whose 
relationships need to be investigated in order to understand this process of 
development.
1.4.1 Summary and Synthesis: Which Theory?
The discussion above has highlighted vital issues and shortcomings in the 
study of facial expressions and the development of emotions. As we have seen, social 
theories reject isomorphic links between emotion and expression as they do 
psychophysiological programmes. Instead, emotions are seen as transient social roles, 
and development is thus seen as a process of socialisation. How mothers interpret 
their infants' expressions becomes a vital issue within this framework. Facial 
expressions are the medium through which mothers both communicate affective 
attitudes to infants and respond to perceived affective states. The research focus is 
turned to inter-individual concerns: How do mothers interpret their infants' facial 
expressions? Are mothers subject to contextual influences in judging these express­
ions? If so, do the dynamics of maternal selections and interpretations reflect the way 
infants become involved in emotional interactions? In what way? It is maintained 
that at first the emotion is the mother's, the physiological reaction is the baby's. Later 
on, with the adoption of rules and roles, emotion becomes understood as part of
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socially determined action sequences and attitudes and becomes the property of the 
child.
Behaviourist paradigms present the view of the individual as being at the 
mercy of autonomic forces, devoid of voluntary control. Cognitive paradigms 
represent the individual as driven by cognitive maturation at the expense of 
understanding affective development in interpersonal context. Both paradigms 
present emotional development as an intra-individual process. The shortcomings of 
behaviourist and cognitive psychology paradigms have directed researchers to look 
elsewhere to more holistic and integrated approaches. Despite variations between 
them, the new organisational approaches have attempted to work within a functional, 
open system framework. However, although they have stressed the role of emotions 
within the context of the infant's wider environment, they have not relinquished links 
with past theories. The dominant theories of emotion development still adhere to the 
biological or naturalist principles that characterised earlier theories of emotions to one 
degree or another. Emotions are regarded as voluntary (or involuntary) acts which 
are reinforced by environmental contingencies. These theories thus appear to adopt 
classical conditioning and operant conditioning paradigms. The repercussions of this 
inheritance and that of cognitive psychology (which ignores social aspects of 
development) is that the development of higher order processes is ignored and hence 
the role of caretakers in the development of emotions is theoretically marginal. 
Empirical paradigms point to this by the nature of their experimental designs. The 
predominant designs investigate the infant in settings where interaction w ith the 
mother is either tightly controlled or the caretaker is not present at all. Instead, it is 
argued here that caretakers are the gateway to the wider culture. Ignoring the 
important role they play means that we only look at the primary components and 
ignore their transformation into mature emotions; central processes in Vygotskian 
terms.
In line with this theoretical perspective, it is proposed that the preliminary 
step in this transformation is how mothers interpret their infants' facial expressions. 
Evidence from studies reviewed above has shown that mothers attribute different 
emotion states to facial expressions. Both in terms of what facial expressions they 
choose to respond to and how they respond to them, mothers create contextual 
realities which they use to organise infants' input in interaction. Drawing on 
evidence from studies on the effect of situational context in identifying infant emotion
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states, infant facial expressions are interpreted in line with the observers7 representa­
tion of the situation. In line with constructionist theories of emotion, emotions are 
contextualised in the reality that produces them. They are contextualised by mothers 
through their interpretations of what these expressions mean, which in turn are based 
on what they perceive as the cause of them, and their implicit attribution of intention 
to the infant. Mothers respond to facial expressions by selecting what is of 
significance to them in interaction, and by describing a perspective course of action 
which addresses the infant's state. Hence, the infant is engaged in an intricate 
process of interaction where her expressive responses are constantly incorporated into 
event sequences and consequences. This raises the question of how much of this 
parental structuring and instruction infants are able to comprehend. For the process 
of interpretation and responsivity to be effective, the infant must possess some 
capabilities which allow her to interact with the environment, and to incorporate 
information from the environment. The following chapter examines how much of the 
mother's input is processed by the infant.
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CHAPTER 2
PRECURSORS TO EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
"I did a certain thing that I knew would catch his attention, which is to say
'Where's Bertie?' (the dog). He immediately looked around."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 10-12 month age group)
2.0 The Infant's Repertoire
In hypothesising that the mother's interpretation and response to the infant's 
facial expressions are a socialising factor in emotional development, we must consider 
a number of issues that bear on this process: Firstly, how is this information 'read ' by 
the infant? There can be no doubt that the perception of a stimulus and an evaluation 
of it, with respect to its personal significance for both mother and infant, are 
contributing factors in the social theory that is being proposed here. In order for 
maternal interpretations and responses to be effective in socialising the infant's facial 
expressions, they must be perceived and processed in some way.
Secondly, we need to know the infant's facial expression repertoire at various 
ages. This may seem inconsistent with the approach adopted here in that it has been 
argued that facial expressions are interpreted within social and interactional context 
and, hence, 'objective' studies are not accurate in this regard. However, these studies 
allow us to asses the types of 'emotional' reactions that are elicited by different 
stimuli in different age groups, and how mothers may be responsible for this 
differentiation of behavioural responses. To avoid using inference laden labels I will 
use facial or emotional expressions to refer to infant expressive responses.
Infant abilities can be represented by different levels of analysis. Just as from 
an external observer's viewpoint the infant's response to a stimulus is represented as 
a contingency, while from the mother's view point it is represented as an intention, 
so, too, different levels of analysis pertain to different schemata we impose on infant 
behaviour. Retaining the external perspective on infant behaviour, the ways in which 
infants' expressive capabilities have been examined are discussed. The subsequent 
section deals with infant cognition, specifically w ith regard to perceptual and 
inferential capacities. The communicative and interactive abilities of the mother-infant
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system at various stages of development are reviewed, providing the context for the 
infants' expressive and inferential abilities. Lastly, the importance of maternal 
interpretations in the light of this research will be discussed.
2.1 Facial Expressions in Infancy
From birth to 4 months newborns show most of the adult discrete emotion 
expressions including smiling during drowsy states (Oster, 1978; Rosenstein and Oster 
1988). While smiling in neonates occurs during REM sleep, starting at the end of the 
first month these endogenous (internally regulated) smiles gradually decrease and 
exogenous (externally regulated) smiles begin to be seen. These are elicited by mild 
to moderate stimulation of the auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic and visual modalities in 
response to stimuli in social and nonsocial contexts (Sroufe and Waters, 1976). 
Preferential smiling at social over nonsocial stimuli was found to develop between 6 
and 12 weeks, where, by 12 weeks, infants have begun to smile selectively at familiar 
persons and during newly mastered task activities (e.g. Lewis, Sullivan, and Brooks- 
Gunn, 1985).
Studies on eliciting stimuli in newborns have also shown that infants respond 
with different facial expressions to different taste substances (Fox and Davidson, 1985; 
Cowart, 1981; Ganchrow, Steiner, and Daher, 1983) and to different odours (Steiner, 
1979). For example, Rosenstein and Oster (1988) tested two hour old babies' 
responses to substances which to adults tasted sour, sweet, salty and bitter. Infants 
responded with higher rates of negative facial expressions to salty substances but 
there was no evidence of specific facial patterning. Steiner (1979), however, reported 
that infants' facial expressions to similar taste stimuli became more differentiated 
during the period immediately after birth and ending three days later, suggesting that 
Rosenstein and Osier's findings could have resulted from the less than optimal state 
of the infant after the stress of birth. These studies suggests that newborn infants 
respond in rudim entary ways to some stimuli.
There have been a number of important studies on the eliciting power of 
situations on the infant. For example, a comprehensive study by Hiatt et al. (1979) 
employed six situations presumed to elicit three emotions - joy (peekaboo game, 
vanishing toy), fear (stranger approach, visual cliff), and surprise (vanishing toy,
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covert toy switch). Emotional expressions were compared between the situations 
presumed to elicit the same emotional reaction and against the other two situations 
intended to produce different emotional reactions. Comparison of proportions of 
predicted versus nonpredicted facial expressions in these conditions permitted a 
comparison of whether the situation elicitors produced the predicted facial 
movements significantly more than they produced facial movements not predicted for 
those elicitors. Results showed that the predicted patterning was evident for both joy 
and surprise but not for either of the fear elicitors.8 Their results provided strong 
evidence that some types of facial patterning were found in 10-12 month old infants.
Their study was followed by one which looked at facial expressions of anger 
in 7 month old infants (Sternberg, Campos and Emde, 1983). The emotion elicitor 
was the removal of a teething biscuit just prior to the baby placing it in her mouth. 
They found strong evidence of facial patterning. Anger components increased after 
removal of the biscuit from 3%, before, to 29% after, the biscuit removal. After 
repeated trials this became stronger (prestimulus= 32%; poststimulus=66%). These 
findings were replicated by Sternberg (1982) using different elicitors (arm restraint), 
a different coding technique (MAX (Izard,1983) rather than FAST (Ekman and Friesen, 
1975)) and a different sampling method (the first negative expression regardless of 
which type of negative affect). One, 4 and 7 month olds were tested. In all three age 
groups there were higher levels of anger components after the stimulus than before. 
The 4 and 7 month olds especially met with all the criteria of facial patterning ident­
ified by MAX. A later experiment (Sternberg and Campos, 1988) tested the same 
aged infants using AFFREX (an alternative coding system developed by Izard) and 
found that 56% of 4 and 7 month old infants showed the complete anger expressions, 
while one month old infants displayed expressions distress expressions (differentiated 
from anger by the closure of the eyes).
Izard et al. (1981) found differential reactions to painful stimuli in 2 and 7 
month old infants. Using infants' experiences of being inoculated, he found that two 
and four month old babies showed distress (crying with eyes tightly shut) when given 
a vaccination. Seven month old babies, however, responded with more angry
8. Other studies of fear expressions in infants using the Tear of strangers' paradigm also 
reported few or no instances of the stereotyped fear facial patterns (eg. Fox and Davidson, 1987; 
Sroufe, 1979; Waters, Matas and Sroufe, 1975). In both stranger approach and visual cliff 
studies, nonfacial indicators of fear (avoidance of stranger, refusal to cross the cliff) have been 
produced (Camras, Malatesta and Izard, 1991).
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expressions, crying with open, eyes. Further investigations showed that there was a 
particularly sharp increase in anger expressions between the ages of 8 and 19 months 
(Izard et al., 1983;1987). Anger expressions were also found to occur at separation 
from the m other at 13 months (Hyson and Izard, 1985; Shiller, Izard and Hembree, 
1986; McGinnes, Izard, and Phillips, 1984).
Investigations have not produced sadness expressions as a principle expression 
in research. Observational studies, however, such as Camras (1982) and Demos
(1986), found that distress patterns occur in situations in which pain or anger 
expressions have been produced. In Camras7 study, these included aspirating the 
infant's nostrils with a syringe, moving her suddenly, administering a sour vitamin, 
bathing her, removing her pacifier, and terminating physical contact with her mother.
These studies are important indicators of the infant's growing differentiation 
in expression and sensitivity to the environment. For example, Sroufe (1979) suggests 
that in infancy arousal becomes increasingly a function of the baby's transaction with 
external events, rather than being a one to one correspondence to the quantity of 
stimulation, as evidenced by the transition from endogenous to exogenous smiling. 
Taken as a whole, they show that, while some aspects of infant expressions are clearly 
elicited by certain situations (e.g., smiling in response to mastery of a task or a 
familiar face), the findings for negative expressions, i.e., anger, fear, pain and sadness, 
are less clear cut. Infants appear to produce a combination of these expressions in 
most of the eliciting situations designed to elicit one specific expression. Neverthe­
less, the studies do indicate that the baby is able to respond to its surroundings in 
ways that have adaptive functions for the infant and that would affect the mother- 
infant system in important ways. They provide evidence that the infant's behaviour 
is organised in ways that potentially signal to caregivers certain information regarding 
the infant's state. In the light of the evidence presented in Chapter 1 on maternal 
responsivity to facial expressions, they are an important indicator of what signals are 
incorporated into interaction, and the types of contextual routines in which they 
become embedded. How much significance the infant is able to attach to the mother's 
responses is a subject we will turn to next.
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2.2 Perceptual and Inferential Capacities
"...he considers that funny, looking back at my face. I was probably making 
some idiot facial expression. He was responding by laughing."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 4-6 month old age group)
How much of the mother's contingent responding to the infant's emotional 
reactions is processed by the infant? The infant's ability to discriminate between 
various facial expressions has generally been taken as evidence of the infant's 
sophisticated perceptual abilities. Emotion theories underlying this work have used 
this evidence as indicating a natural aptitude for understanding the emotionality of 
others. However an important distinction needs to be made. These perceptual and 
instinctive capabilities of the infant must not be confused with emotionality. As 
Armon-Jones (1986) points out:
"The characterisation of emotion as attitudinal and cognition-dependent is 
crucial to constructionism in the following respects. According to 
constructionism, a socioculturally constituted emotion is an acquired response. 
This requires that the elements constitutive of the emotions are ones which are 
capable of being acquired by the agent. Consequently, it is essential to 
constructionism that an account of emotions be given in which emotions are 
neither identifiable with, nor have the same ontological status as, phenomena 
such as sensation and perception. This is so because although perceptual 
skills, for instance, can be acquired, we also have reason to believe that 
perception and sensation are not essentially skills acquired by training but are 
natural phenomena which exist prior to the acquisition of any sociocultural 
frame of reference within which we might want to explain them." (Armon- 
Jones, 1986, p.44)
The relationship between cognition, perception and emotion is a complex one 
and thus one that has not been properly addressed or explicated. For purposes of 
analysis, the current discussion has separated various components of the infant's 
behaviour. That is not to say that these processes are independent of each other. 
Rather the components of emotional development are not emotions, cognitions and 
actions, each in isolation, but aspects of a larger whole. Cognition is not a form of 
pure knowledge to which emotion is added, and action is a final common path based 
on what one knows and feels (Bruner, 1986). For purposes of analysis, these different 
components are presented separately; however, it is stressed that they are not to be 
treated separately or independently of each other.
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Studies on infant discrimination of facial expressions have been concerned 
w ith looking at whether infants are able to detect common attributes of a set of 
discriminable entities, such as recognising expressions over varying instances (e.g., 
posed by different models or presented in different ways), and whether infants' 
discrimination of facial expressions is based on the infant generalising specific features 
or is attending to the whole gestalt. The latter focus underlies a concern w ith the 
development of intermodal perception which is argued by some (e.g., Walker- 
Andrews, 1986; J.J.Gibson, 1976) to indicate the ability of infants to perceive the 
intentions underlying the visible and audible behaviours presented to them and 
respond accordingly. While such conclusions cannot be supported by the presence 
of such abilities alone, the studies nevertheless provide evidence on what infants are 
able to perceive and when.
Investigators have studied the ability of infants to recognise or discriminate 
between different facial expressions by monitoring what they select to look at. One 
such study was performed by Young-Browne, Rosenfeld and Horowitz (1977). Using 
the habituation recovery paradigm, they investigated 3 month old infants' ability to 
discriminate between the facial expressions of sadness, happiness and surprise. 
Previous studies have suggested that infants are capable of discriminating between 
different facial expressions at 5-6 months, but there has been a lack of evidence of 
infants being able to discriminate earlier. Charlesworth and Kruetzer (1973) also 
found differential responses in 6 month old and older infants, but found no 
differential responding in 4 months olds. The lack of evidence does not necessarily 
imply that infants are not able to discriminate, as much as implying that the lack of 
positive findings may be due to methodological limitations (e.g., in the presentation 
of the stimuli and in the assessment of the responses made). Previous studies have 
used questionable representations of the human face, have confounded verbal and 
visual stimuli or have lacked precision in experimental procedure (Young-Browne et 
al., 1977).
In the study by Young-Browne et al. (1977), stimuli consisted of standardised 
pictures of the facial expressions accompanied by background lullaby music. Results 
showed that infants were able to significantly discriminate between happy and 
surprise faces and vice versa, as measured by the differences in fixation at each 
change point of presentation of expression. A large significant difference was also 
found in the sad to surprise presentation but not the other way around. LeBarbera,
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Izard and Vietze et al. (1976) also found evidence of discrimination at 4 months old. 
Four and 6 month old infants, shown slides of facial expressions of joy, anger and no 
emotion, looked more frequently at the joy facial expression than at either the neutral 
or anger expressions.
The results of the Young-Browne et al. (1977) study provide evidence that 3 
month old infants are capable of discriminating between happy and surprise faces 
and, under certain circumstances, between sad and surprise faces. These results 
suggest that the infants may be exhibiting a preference for focusing on the eyes, as 
the expression pairs involved widening of the eyes (surprise), and therefore that 
infants may be discriminating on the basis of specific features rather than on the 
whole expression. Several studies have found support for this (e.g., Bergman, Hiath 
and Mann, 1971; Donnee, 1973; Maurer and Salapatek, 1975).
Caron, Caron, and Myers (1985) have suggested that there is a general age 
related progression in the salience of specific facial regions for the infant. Caron, 
Caron, Caldwell, and Weiss (1973) found that infants initially start off by selectively 
perceiving external borders of the face, such as hairline or chin. Then they begin to 
perceive internal features, initially the eyes, then the nose and mouth area. By 5 
months they begin to integrate eyes, nose and m outh into a total face gestalt.
Therefore, 3 month old infants may be discriminating between isolated 
features of the face rather than features which are affect relevant. For example, Oster
(1981) noted that infants pay greater attention to smiling over nonsmiling and 
suggested that this may be due to the presence of a physical contrast produced by 
bared teeth. She reported a study by Oster and Ewy which found that 4 month olds 
preferred to look at photographs of toothy smiles than of sad faces but did not show 
any preference to nontoothy smiles over the same sad faces (Oster, 1981). In addition, 
McGrath (1983) showed that 3 month olds could discriminate between photos of 
happy, surprised and angry expressions whether they were upright or upside down. 
Thus, discrimination may be due to perceived featural differences rather than affect 
related discrimination.
Caron, Caron, and Myers (1985) tested 4, 5, 7 and 10 month old infants on 
their discrimination of happy and angry expressions in which the teeth were present 
and not present (toothy and nontoothy respectively). Results showed that 4, 5, and 
7 month old infants dishabituated to the toothy smiling faces after having been 
habituated to the two nontoothy anger and smiling faces, but that they could not
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discriminate between the toothy smiling faces and the toothy angry faces. The two 
oldest group infants were, however, able to classify toothy and nontoothy smiles from 
nontoothy anger faces. Like the younger groups, however, they failed to discriminate 
between the anger and smiling faces when both were depicted with teeth bared. The 
pattern of results suggested that infants in all three age groups were more responsive 
to differences in an isolated feature (mouth-teeth) than to change in emotional 
expression per se.
Nelson (1987) points out, however, that the interpretation of the findings may 
be premature in that the infants in the study were not given the opportunity to 
categorise both toothy and nontoothy exemplars of the same expression. Only if 
infants had been habituated to such a range of exemplars and then tested on a new 
expression, would such a test have been possible. Secondly, the results suggested that 
"toothiness" was a more salient feature than other features of the face. Other investi­
gators (Nelson and Horowitz, 1980) have shown that 6 month old infants are able to 
discriminate between fear and surprise faces when the only feature to change is the 
eyes, but were unable to do so when either all the features changed, or when just the 
m outh feature changed. This suggests that the extent to which particular facial 
features of a given expression becomes the more salient feature to an infant may 
depend, in part, on how many exemplars are used, the particular expression depicted 
and whether other features are left to vary with the change in expressions (Nelson, 
1987).
Some researchers have criticised the above studies for their use of still-faced 
representations of the face rather than dynamic real-life facial expressions (e.g., Caron, 
Caron, and MacLean, 1988). They argue that, based on Gibsonian theory, emotional 
expressions are not fixed entities but events or happenings in time that serve 
communicative and regulatory ends (E.J. Gibson and Spelke, 1983; J.J. Gibson, 1979; 
Klinnert, Campos, Sorce, Emde and Svejda, 1983). They further point out that the 
way static objects are perceived may be different to the way dynamic ones are 
selected and perceived.
These results must therefore be supplemented by others which are more 
ecologically valid, that is, ones which look at facial expressions within temporal and 
vocal context. In a series of experiments, Caron, Caron, and Maclean (1988) tested the 
ability of infants between 4 months and 7 months to discriminate between dynamic 
facial expressions with and without vocal information. They asked women to read
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a script using either a sad or happy affective manner. Results showed that, not until 
5 months of age, can infants discriminate between naturalistic expressions of 
happiness and sadness. At 4 months, infants recovered slightly to novel happy 
presentations following habituation to sad presentations, but did not recover to novel 
sad presentations following habituation to happy presentations. On the assumption 
that infants may have been able to discriminate between these expressions because 
of their marked difference in tempo and animation, the authors tested the ability of 
5 and 7 m onth olds to distinguish between two expressions with similar intensity, joy 
and anger. Five month old infants could not discriminate between happy and angry 
stimuli, whereas 7 month olds could. By 7 months this appears to represent at least 
a 2 month advance over what infants were able to do with photographs of these same 
emotions (see Caron et al., 1985). A further test examining the role of voice in this 
discrimination revealed that 7 month olds could only discriminate between the two 
stimuli in the presence of accompanying appropriate vocalisation. Support for this 
is found in the Walker-Andrew study (1986) in which 7 but not 5 month olds 
increased fixation to a facial expression when it was sound specific (angry or happy). 
On the other hand, the happy-angry comparison, involving as it did stimuli that are 
quite similar in animation level, may be more difficult to distinguish on a purely 
visual basis than more disparate emotions such as sad and happy.
Caron et al. (1988) tested this by repeating the experiment with 5 month olds 
to see if they would distinguish silent happy from previously habituated silent sad 
episodes. Infants in the no voice group recovered fixation to the novel happy 
expressions to the same extent as the voice group. Here, therefore, elimination of the 
voice had no disruptive effect on the ability of 5 month olds to resolve the sad-happy 
discrimination. Taken together with the results of the above experiment where the 
removal of the voice completely nullified the happy-angry discrimination, the results 
suggest that, for some expressions, infants rely more on the voice than the face to 
differentiate dynamically similar expressions such as happy to angry, but can utilise 
visual information alone to distinguish more distinct expressions.
The findings suggest that infants are able to form categories on the basis of 
central features, and associate facial expression with the corresponding tone of voice. 
Five month old infants are able to differentiate emotion stimuli on the basis of visual 
stimuli alone if these expressions are distinct; however, for similar emotion stimuli, 
they rely more on the voice. By 7 months infants develop multimodal perceptual
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abilities and require both face and voice to discriminate between emotion stimuli. 
The gradual ability of infants to process increasingly complex and integrated features 
of perceptual stimuli and events means that they are able to infer more complex 
categories of facial expressions and of different events, on the basis of overlapping 
features of these events. Applying these basic abilities to our framework, suggests 
that infants become increasingly adept at both perceiving and categorising more 
complex features of the mothers' responses. It is possible to speculate that, with the 
development of these perceptual abilities, infants develop a greater receptivity to 
mothers' responses to them vis-a-vis the external environment. Support for this 
proposal comes from work done on joint referencing and social referencing, a subject 
we shall be returning to shortly. The evidence presented here indicates that in social 
referencing, for example, infants would become increasingly more competent at 
processing and integrating mothers' facial signals, both in terms of one of a category 
of facial expression, and as a category of event associated with another external 
stimulus, e.g., an unfamiliar object, or a steep staircase. In other words, infants are 
learning about the implications of perceptual information rather than learning to 
perceive. The findings also suggest that mothers may be instrumental in the 
increasing ability of infants to process more complex facial and vocal information. 
As Caron et al. (1988) point out, middle class, 5 month old infants who were not able 
to discriminate between dynamic expressions of anger and joy stimuli would have 
been rarely confronted by anger or its consequences prior to becoming mobile, 
suggesting that discriminatory ability must also rest with the type of emotion 
stimulation the infant receives in natural, everyday settings.
The above literature deals with immediate perceptual inference, but it is 
important to look at inference beyond the domain of immediate perception. The 
reason for this is that facial expressions and events surrounding infants occur in 
sequence in time and space, that is they are dynamic by nature. The studies above 
used a static method, relying on two dimensional stimuli. The infant's world is 
comprised of both stationary and dynamic objects and it is plausible to suggest that 
these differences in perspective are integrated over time to give some sort of coherent 
view of the events surrounding the infant (Slater, 1989). An important requirement 
for infants to pick up the mother's actions is that they are able to make inferences 
about the behaviour of objects (including the mother) that move fully out of view, 
and about the identity or distinctiveness of objects encountered at different places and
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times. Whereas the above discussion centred on the infant's ability to integrate 
various features in its environment, the next section deals with the infant's aptitude 
for integrating these abilities in space and time.
Several important experiments have investigated the ability of young infants 
to perceive an object that has been occluded from view. Such inferential capabilities 
are argued to rest on the infant's ability to construct the object in its absence (Piaget, 
1954), suggesting that the infant has a schema or representation of the object. Others 
(e.g., J.J. Gibson, 1979) have argued that the ability of the infant to construe objects 
in space is an inborn perceptual capacity. Bower (1967) has attacked Piaget's claim 
regarding the development of object permanence by 8-9 months of age, by providing 
evidence that infants were able to infer the location of objects not visually perceived 
much earlier than Piaget had proposed, i.e., by 3 months. More recent work on object 
permanence is illustrative of the degree of inference the infant possesses at different 
ages.
Kellman and Spelke (1983) demonstrated 3-4 month olds' apprehension of 
moving objects which were partially occluded. In this experiment a rod was partly 
occluded by a block of wood. The rod was moved from side to side behind the block. 
Infants were habituated to the natural motion of the rod. Kellman and Spelke then 
asked the question, did the babies perceive the rod as two unconnected bits of wood 
that happened to move synchronously, or did they see it as a single rod connected 
by an invisible portion? They tested this by showing the babies either a single 
complete rod or two unconnected parts. Babies clearly dishabituated to the latter 
condition, indicating that they found the two disconnected rods a novel stimulus.
Further tests have shown that a critical factor in this apprehension is motion: 
babies do not perceive the visible parts as connected if the rod is stationary, or if one 
part only moves. Both parts have to move, although it does not seem to matter in 
which direction they move provided it is in the same direction (Harris, 1989). This 
ability appears to be age related. Slater, Morrison and Sommers (1987) tested 
newborn babies and found a preference for the connected rod rather than the two 
unconnected parts.
Extending this research further, Baillargeon et al. (1985) conducted a study of 
5 month old infants which focused on their apprehension of objects persisting over 
full occlusion. The test involved a stationary block behind a rotating screen. The 
screen rotated backwards and forwards in front of the box, hiding it from view. The
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critical test was rotating the screen 180 degrees, making it impossible that the box and 
the screen occupied the same place. With the appropriate controls, infants 
dishabituated to the impossible rotation, providing evidence that infants represent 
the continuous existence of the block behind the screen. Baillargeon (1987) found 
similar evidence for 3 and 4 month old infants. To ensure that infants were not 
dishabituating to the longer persistence of motion of the screen, 180 degrees rather 
than 120 degrees, they used a control condition in which the block was placed in full 
view by the rotating screen and out of its path. Under these conditions, infants 
looked for an equally long time at both 180 and 120 degree rotations of the screen.
These studies demonstrate that infants as young as 3 and 4 months possess 
some form of object permanence, are able to perceive differences in shapes (faces), 
and, by 7 months, are able to integrate information from different perceptual 
modalities (face and voice). Such abilities indicate that the infant is a very skilled 
perceiver and information processor. It does not, however, answer questions about 
why the infant should only exhibit stranger anxiety at 8 or 9 months and not before, 
a capacity that has generally been linked to the development of object permanence. 
The point being made here is that these abilities are only the ingredients of infant 
cognitive understanding. The infant's experiences with intermodal stimulation over 
the first year are likely to provide the abilities necessary for emotional development. 
These experiences occur within, and are part of, social interaction. Maternal 
responsivity is likely to affect the differentiation and development of these abilities. 
Thus, to reveal how these skills function, one has to look at the infant in the context 
of mother-infant interaction.
2.3 Perceptual and Inferential Capacities in Social Context
"She's very much looking at me to see how I was reacting to what was there
cause she's not sure."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 10-12 month old age group)
At what time does the infant develop the ability to understand another 
person's facial expressions? There are various areas of research that may shed light 
on this. One source of evidence is work done on joint attention. Another source of 
evidence comes from research on social referencing. More recently, Reddy (1991) has
63
described the infant's ability to engage in 'teasing'. These mechanisms are important 
in demonstrating how the infant is able to share aspects of the adults' world in ways 
that influence its assessment of the environment and its ability to share goals and 
intentions w ith others.
Im portant developments occur around 9 months which have implications for 
the infant's ability to interact with its environment. For example, Trevarthen and 
Hubley (1978) found that infants under 9 months old could not yet coordinate person 
and object attention (see also Sugerman-Bell, 1978). The infants either played with 
a toy or engaged in a social game with the mother. At around 9 months, however, 
infants began to look up from the toy to mother during joint play and to invite the 
m other's participation by offering and giving objects.
These early signs of interpersonal communication appear around 9 months, 
when the infants are able to anticipate familiar sequences, 9 and develop into more 
active involvement in interaction by the infant. Between 10-12 months infants 
combine their ability to form concepts with their ability to use motor skills in a 
directed way. An example of this may be found in relational play where the infant 
performs actions that demonstrate a knowledge of the relationship between two 
objects like putting lids on pots and spoons in cups (Fogel, 1991).
Infants are capable of joint referencing by 6 months of age. During joint 
referencing the infant uses the behaviour of the mother to infer the existence of 
objects in space. Such a mechanism is important in demonstrating one of the ways 
in which an infant's ability to differentiate itself from the outside world may be 
constructed through the actions and interactions of others. Through joint attention 
to a topic, it becomes possible for the child to discover links between a sign and what 
it signifies, and to learn to "use social procedures in concert with one another to 
assure that the sign and the significant that become linked overlap in some negotiable 
way with the uses of others" (Bruner, 1983a, p.88). The idea that infants construct 
their concept of the outside world through actions within the world is found in 
Vygotsky's writings on the Zone of Proximal Development. Easily the most quoted 
passage from Vygotsky's (1966) work:
"Any function in the child's cultural development appears twice, or on two 
planes. First it appears between people, as an interpsychological category and
9. See Sroufe (1979) for example on the infant anticipating mother's face in peekaboo.
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then within the child as an intrapsychological category. This is equally true 
with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts 
and the development of volition." (Vygotsky, 1966, p.41)
Vygotsky's fundamental difference from the Piagetian conception of 
development was also evident in his disagreement with Piaget regarding the concept 
of egocentrism. Flavell (1963) states that for Piaget:
"Egocentrism denotes a cognitive state in which the cogniser sees the world 
from a single point of view only, his own, but without the knowledge of the 
existence of viewpoints or perspectives and without awareness that he is a 
prisoner of his own [viewpoint]." (Flavell, 1963, p.60)
Vygotsky, on the other hand, although he agreed that egocentrism implies an 
unconscious point of origin for experience, would have denied that egocentrism 
implies solipsism, indifferentiation of experience, or an inability to share in the 
experience of others (Butterworth et al., 1989).
One important source of evidence of the infant's ability to share in the 
experience of others comes from studies on joint visual attention or referential 
communication. The ability of mothers and infants to share a perspective on the 
world is evidenced by findings that mothers very closely monitor the focus of their 
infants' attention. Schaffer (1984) has pointed out that the majority of episodes of 
joint activity arise as a result of the mother monitoring the infant's line of gaze. 
However, Scaife and Bruner (1975) and Churcher and Scaife (1982) have found that 
not only does the mother monitor the infant's direction of gaze but infants also 
redirect their line of gaze to share in the focus of the mother's attention. This is an 
important discovery as it indicates that the infant cannot be totally egocentric. The 
baby perceives a change in another person's point of view. The findings also suggest 
that the infant perceives the mother's gaze as signalling the 'perm anent possibility of 
an object' (Butterworth, 1989) at the terminus of their joint lines of gaze. Again, as 
mentioned earlier, this raises the question of whether object permanence lies at the 
very root of cognitive development rather than being derived from it (Butterworth, 
ibid).
A series of empirical studies have found evidence for the ability of infants to 
engage in joint referencing. Butterworth and Cochran (1980) and Butterworth and 
Jarrett (1980) conducted a series of studies in which the mother and infant were 
seated face to face in an undistracting environment, with pairs of identical targets
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placed at various positions to the left and right of the room. The mothers were asked 
to interact naturally with the infant and then, at a set signal, to turn silently to inspect 
a designated target. Infants were between 6 and 18 months old. The results indicated 
that 6 month old babies look to the correct side of the room corresponding to 
m other's head direction, but cannot tell on the basis of the mother's action alone 
which of the two identical targets on the same side of the room mothers were 
attending to. If the object attended to was the second one along their path of 
scanning, they were at chance level of correctly turning their attention to it. Infants 
also only localised targets in their own visual field. If mothers located a target behind 
the infant they would not turn to search for the object behind them. Other studies 
have demonstrated this phenomenon (e.g., Landau and Spelke, 1988), suggesting that 
the inaccessibility of the space behind the infant may be a general cognitive limitation.
At 6 months therefore, joint visual attention is restricted to targets within the 
infant's view. At this age the ability of infants to localise the target depends not only 
on the mother's direction of gaze but also on the intrinsic differentiating properties 
of the object being attended to, by the mother. By adding movement to the target 
being attended, 9 month olds were able to locate it accurately 100 % of the time as 
long as the correct target was moving (Grover, 1988). Butterworth (1991) has termed 
this earliest mechanism of joint visual attention 'ecological', since it is the differentiat­
ing structure of the environment that completes the adult's direction of gaze. This 
mechanism enables a 'meeting of minds' (ibid) in the self same object. Furthermore, 
it is important in that, what attracts the mother's attention in the natural environment, 
is likely to capture the attention of the infant, demonstrating how this mechanism 
enables the mother to structure the environment for the infant.
By 12 months the infant is able to identify targets correctly, be they first or 
second along its path of vision, even when the target is stationary. Here the infant 
depends solely on the mother's head orientation towards the target, and would need 
to extrapolate from this information an invisible line between the mother and the 
referent of her gaze. Hence, it has been called the 'geometric mechanism' 
(Butterworth, 1991). Again, however, the geometric mechanism is restricted to the 
infant's field of vision. The 12 month old infant, and the 18 month old, still do not 
turn  around if the target attended to by the mother is behind them. However, the 18 
month olds will turn to look behind them if no other target is in the room save the 
one behind them. Butterworth (1991) and his coworkers have termed this mechanism
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the Representational' spatial mechanism for controlling joint visual attention, which 
is now based on an understanding of being contained within space. At 18 months 
there is an extension of joint reference to a 'represented' space which contains the 
infant and other objects outside the immediate visual field.
When seen in social context, the earliest 'ecological' mechanism allows 
communication in relation to publicly shared objects. During the first year joint visual 
attention remains limited within the infant's visual field. As Butterworth (1991) 
points out:
"The phenomenon of joint visual attention is ultimately possible because
perception, even in the infant, presupposes a world of objects that exist in
space held in common with other people." (Butterworth, 1991, p.231)
During the first year of life the baby behaves as if its own field of vision is shared 
with the adult. Although the infant will not search manually for hidden objects 
before 8 or 9 months, the mother's behaviour nevertheless signals the 'permanent 
possibility of an object' potentially within the field of view. Such a mechanism 
provides important evidence, suggesting that the world of the infant is constructed 
by others. The ability of the mother and infant to share the same space is followed 
by the ability of the mother and infant to share the same space even when it is not 
immediately visually available. Through joint mechanisms such as these, the infant 
is able to internalise, by attending to, aspects of the world that are selected and 
responded to by adults. Through such mechanisms one can see how the child learns 
to represent the world in ways that have been shaped by adults.
Joint referencing of objects is not the only shared activity between mother and 
infant. Social referencing is also a mechanism whereby the mother and infant can 
share aspects of events in common. Social referencing is a process of emotional 
communication in which one's perception of other people's interpretations of events 
is used to form one's own understanding of that event (Feinman, 1982). The ability 
of infants to use emotional information expressed by other people begins around 8 
months of age. Social referencing occurs under two main conditions. Firstly, in 
uncertain situations, infants will look at the mother to note her reaction and will take 
their cue from this. Thus, by 9 to 10 months, infants are beginning to use the 
emotional information displayed by others instrumentally. When their mothers 
display negative expressions, one year old infants avoid crossing short visual cliffs
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(Sorce et al., 1985), are inhibited from playing with toys (Gunnar and Stone, 1984; 
Hom ick et al., 1987) and are less friendly to strangers (Feinman and Lewis, 1983; 
Feinman, Roberts et al., 1986). Between 10-12 months infants begin to use social 
referencing systematically, although it does not occur frequently in naturalistic 
situations (Homick and Gunnar, 1988; Nelson, 1985). It has also been found that, in 
social referencing, negative expressions have a more powerful effect on regulating the 
infant's behaviour at this stage (Gunnar and Stone, 1984; Hornick et a l . , 1987; Feiring 
et al., 1984; Sorce et al., 1985; Zarbatany and Lamb, 1985).
Secondly, social referencing has been demonstrated in appraisal situations. For 
example, infant smiles, turns round to others to appraise their reactions, if they are 
smiling infant continues to smile. Between 6 and 12 months this is the most common 
response in social situations and tends to involve positive expressions (Homick and 
Gunnar, 1988; Klinnert, 1984; Walden and Ogan, 1988). Lastly, some studies have 
found that infants will also be influenced by the mother's general affective tone and 
facial expression (e.g., Termain and Izard, 1988).
Some current theories on social referencing hypothesise that this mechanism 
involves the infant's understanding of the significance of the parent's emotional signal 
(e.g., Feinman, 1982; Walden, 1991). While such a suggestion over-attributes 
capabilities to the infant, as emotional development entails the internalisation of roles 
and m les which are beyond infant capabilities, it does point to an initial, rudim entary 
ability to incorporate others' emotional reactions towards events. Social referencing, 
as another example of referential communication in infancy, is therefore important in 
that it indicates that the mother and infant are able to share intentions towards 
particular events. It also means that the parent at this stage can communicate the 
significance of the event. However, that the infant now has a mind of its own and 
therefore can read and impute mental states to others, cannot be attributed to the 
infant at this age. Such a suggestion has been made in the case of infant teasing.
Infants' 'teasing' has recently been documented by Reddy (1989, 1991). The 
description and explanation of this phenomenon has rested largely on descriptions 
of small sample case studies (N=7-12). Conceptualisation and operationalisation of 
this phenomenon are still at an early stage of development and no empirical studies 
have been run to test the validity of this concept. However, let us look at what has 
been presented so far. Reddy (ibid) has defined 'teasing, joking or mucking about' 
as a mode of interaction whose central behaviour is directed to achieve affective
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effects on other organisms, rather than for obtaining such things as food or toys. It 
involves the rapid alternation of metasignals, which create and then remove doubt 
(Altman, 1988). The range of behaviours described by Reddy are regarded by her as 
involving the infant's engagement with the intentions and expectations of the adult. 
She lists a variety of interactions of this nature; showing off by performing specific 
actions which amuse others, teasing by opposing another's actions or intentions or by 
opposing another's directives/expectations with amusement, and tricking such as 
pretending to cry, or performing an action prohibited by the caregiver 'behind her 
back'. The descriptions of episodes where these sequences occur are phrased in 
"explicitly 'intentional' language" as Reddy herself points out (Reddy, ibid, p.144). 
According to her, an example characteristic of teasing episodes involves the creating 
of a false expectation and disrupting it:
" Shamini (9 months) within a chatting session following some showing off 
with eye crinkling etc., ...offers object to F saying 'ta' and waving her fingers 
with it as an additional call, looking at F's face intently; F stretches hand out 
to take it, as F's hand comes closer, Shamini with eyes intently on F's face 
begins to smile, then withdraws object with smile broadening and turns away, 
then looks back, F laughs, and says in a voice acknowledging being teased 
'You gimme, gimme, gimme' stretching his hand closer to her face; Shamini 
makes briefly as if to run, but is caught by the high chair she is in, then turns 
around again, by which time, F has withdrawn his hand. She repeats offer 
saying 'ta, ta' with her face this time less intent and with a slight smile, F 
holds out hand again, Shamini repeats withdrawal with smile broadening as 
F's hand approaches and as she turns rapidly away." (Reddy, 1991, p.145)
Reddy sees the infant's ability to engage in such reactions as evidence that 7- 
12 m onth old infants possess a theory of mind. In defending this claim, she points 
out that alternative explanations, based either on behaviourist or Piagetian theorising 
create a false division between mind and body:
" ...it is possible to explain these sequences in a purely behavioural way, by 
making a distinction between understanding physical behavioural contin­
gencies and understanding the psychological meaning 'behind' behaviour. The 
give and take exchanges and the emerging compliance of the nine month old 
infant can be explained physicalistically; the knowledge involved can be seen 
as a knowledge simply of the physical actions involved, with no knowledge 
of the psychological significance of the actions for the other." (Reddy, 1991, p. 
152)
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The author questions what she regards as the complete separation of the physical 
form from the psychological.10 She sees the development of the infant from a 
behaviourist infant into a mentalist adult as having roots in Piaget's cognitive theory. 
Piagetian theory advocates that the infant's knowledge must first develop through her 
own actions upon other objects, both social and nonsocial, and does not distinguish 
people from other objects. Thus, the understanding of others as psychological beings 
similar to self, can come only after the self's actions on the world have allowed the 
formation of cognitive structures which can yield second order representations; 
development proceeds along a path whereby cognitive structures must mature before 
the infant can become a symbolic being. Reddy's alternative suggestion is to regard 
psychological meaning as intrinsic to the understanding of actions, developing only 
in complexity. In this regard she is in agreement with Trevarthen (Trevarthen and 
Hubley, 1978) who imputes innate intersubjectivity to the newborn (see Chapter 3). 
Intersubjectivity is dependent upon the recognition by infants of the psychological 
similarity between themselves and separate others. For Reddy, proposing an innate 
intersubjectivity:
"...avoids the trap of the question: 'When do infants come to understand others 
psychologically? He [Trevarthen] argues that the capacity to recognise 
similarity between oneself and other persons is present from birth...." (Reddy,
1991, p. 157-158)
While she is justified in criticising cognitive and behaviourist theories for their mind- 
body dualism, her adoption of the perspective of the interactional other as the unit 
of analysis is without objective basis. I would also argue that, rather than calling the 
question of the development of psychological understanding a trap, it lies at the very 
heart of understanding infant development. As I have argued elsewhere, by implying 
that this process is innate, it does away with the need to explain how it arises in 
development. Although there is no doubt that how and when infants come to 
understand others psychologically is one of the most difficult questions in develop­
mental research, explaining it away by treating it as a 'biological given' does not solve 
the problem. Indeed, the very meaning of the word mfersubjectivity implies a 
psychological understanding between two people.
10. Her solution is to create a mentalistic infant. However, in doing so she is being 
dualistic herself as such a position ignores behaviour and interaction as an integral part of the 
developing infant.
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Reddy regards the infant's rudim entary communicative abilities, such as joint 
attention and social referencing, as demonstrating the infant's knowledge of the other's 
capacity to perceive, understand and respond to particular actions by the infant. On 
this basis she states:
" Infants from nine months of age discover that they have minds and that 
other people have minds as well (Stem, 1985), and that other people's reactions 
can be messages about shared surroundings." (Reddy, 1991, p.153)
Such an argument is clearly controversial. She is ascribing a self-reflexive ability to 
the infant, a position which furthermore is not necessary, if one approaches the 
problem from a Gibsonian perspective.
J.J Gibson (1979) posits the existence of basic 'meaning-sensitive' perceptual 
faculties. Meanings in the form of 'affordances' are what the infant begins by notic­
ing. This highlights two important points: Firstly, that organisms have innately 
constituted propensities to perceive the world in such a way as to engage their own 
tendencies to action. Secondly, we as observers may define a sense in which an 
organism perceives an object or event as belonging to a certain conception of action 
(e.g., as a predator), even if the organism itself is merely reacting in an instinctive- 
mechanistic manner (Hobson, 1991). Defining perceptual capacities, as with 
expressive capacities, in this way is to indicate what kind of organism-environment 
relation this kind of 'perception' or 'expression' entails; it is not to suggest that the 
organism recognises itself to be 'seeing as' or 'feeling as', much less others.
Hobson (1991) argues that the ability of infants to form categories, to infer, and 
to respond in 'meaningful' ways to their surroundings should not lead to the 
presupposition that infants already have a concept of their own minds or those of 
others. Taking his reasoning one step further, it may be said that this 'meaningful' 
aspect of the infant's response to its environment, that is to other persons and objects, 
is more a property of observers than in the 'm ind' of the infant. Adults impute this 
meaning to the infant; parents infer intentional and communicative capacities from 
the infant's activities, they might even ascribe the infant with a mind, but that is not 
to say that the infant does have a mind, much less a theory of mind.
Gibson and Hobson are arguing that, at some basic level, inferential capacities 
and concept formation can exist, w ithout representation, as innate, in-built processes
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that are built on through personal interactions. These abilities, however, do not 
constitute 'theories' about others' mental states as Hobson (ibid) explains:
"It would seem that an individual theorist needs to formulate possibilities as 
possibilities in order to entertain and appraise alternative constructions of 
reality...It is relevant to note that theory is 'used' by a person rather than 
operated by mechanisms at a subpersonal level. This implies that in order to 
have and apply a theory, an individual must know what it is to theorise, and 
for this he or she must already have a concept of his or her own theory holding 
mind. In order to avoid an infinite regress, therefore, we should have to 
acknowledge that a person needs to begin by acquiring a concept of mind on 
some 'non-theoretical' basis." (Hobson, 1991, p.36)
Reddy's argument presupposes that one has a 'self' capable of reflecting on 
one's own experiences as an innate capacity. In so far as behaviour (whether of the 
child or others) is supposed merely to provide 'cues' or prompts for such analogical 
reasoning, the account misrepresents the relation between experience and behaviour. 
There must be some form of necessary relation between the outward expressions and 
'internal' experiences of at least certain mental states, and under at least certain 
conditions, for the ability of identifying and ascribing mental states to get off the 
ground (Hobson, 1991). For example, it is mistaken to suppose that one can identify 
the same mental states or events, as they recur in one's own private experiences, 
without recourse to some form of external confirmation or correction by others (Wittgenstein, 
1958).
If, as Reddy does, one assumes that certain critical aspects of one's theory of 
mind are innate, this raises the question: How does a child come to appreciate that 
it is appropriate and necessary to consider 'w hat it is like' to be another person 
(Nagal, 1979)? Hobson (1991) maintains:
" If one posits a primary, nonderived and essentially 'cognitive' representa­
tional (or in this case, metarepresentational) capacity, then one faces thorny 
problems in trying to link up the representations not only with subjective 
aspects of mental life, but also with an outside world which includes bodies 
and the behaviour of bodily endowed persons or more generally, to render 
meaningful whatever is supposed to pass 'in and out of the black box' of the 
computational mind (Hamlyn, 1990)." (Hobson, 1991, p.44)
Infants arrive at knowledge about the nature of persons through experience 
of interpersonal relations. The ability of a child to apprehend another as a person, 
who has both bodily and mental characteristics, is mediated through innate capacities
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for perceptually anchored personal relatedness such as preferences for facial configur­
ations. In this context, the biologically determined biases and preconceptions' 
(Murphy and Medin, 1985) are those that promote and reflect personal relatedness, 
and it is through such relatedness that an infant establishes the basic ontological 
distinction between persons and things. Far from reflective self-awareness preceding 
the ascription of mental states, it is rather that some form of awareness of other minds 
is a precondition for acquiring reflective self-awareness. This is because, in order to 
adopt a psychological orientation towards one's own mental states, one needs to 
appreciate that there are alternative vantage points that one can assume towards a 
mind-endowed self (Hobson, 1991).
Thus, in summary, infants' capacity for perceptually anchored person 
relatedness promote their integration into the world of others. The development of 
perceptual abilities occurs rapidly, and in the context of mother-infant interaction. 
The discovery of the ability of infants to engage in joint referencing and social 
referencing has illustrated that the mother is instrumental in aiding the infant in a 
greater exploration of the environment and in the increasing differentiation of 
perceptual and exploratory abilities. It has also shown that, while mothers and 
infants exert a reciprocal influence on each other, mothers, on the one hand, follow 
the infant by tracking h is/her line of gaze, and lead by directing the infant's gaze 
towards targets of interest in the surrounding environment. Further evidence of the 
potency of the mother comes from studies on the effect of maternal affective style on 
the organisation of dyadic interaction.
2.4 The Dyad at Work
"She's smiling at me, speaking to me...more smiles, and just...we'll smile like
that at each other for ages."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 4-6 month age group)
Currently, there is growing acceptance of the fact that a major component of 
the mother's behaviour vis-a-vis her infant is its affective quality (Cohn and Tronick, 
1989). There have been numerous studies using the still faced paradigm which 
indicate how lack of maternal interaction and expressivity has disruptive and 
distressing effects on the infant and, more recently, researchers have been interested
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in the effect of maternal depression on infants. There are also a number of findings 
that suggest that mothers' positive expressions are essential to the quality and 
organisation of the infants' behaviour.
For example, Cohn and Tronick (1987) observed mother-infant interaction with 
3, 6, and 9 month old babies during normal play. They found that babies at each age 
were far more likely to display positive expressions after their mothers did so. At 3 
and 6 months, the probability of the infant displaying positive expressions was 0.33 
whereas the probability of the infant displaying positive expressions before the 
mother was only 0.03. Not until 9 months did infants begin to initiate joint positive 
engagement, but even then the mother was more likely to do so. Thus, mothers' 
positive expressions provide a frame within which the infant cycles between neutral 
and positive expressions (Cohn and Tronick, 1987; Kaye and Fogel, 1980).
More specifically, Cohn and Tronick (1983) tested how infants would respond 
to their mothers if they acted depressed. They found that simulated maternal 
depression decreased the probability of play and positive expressions and increased 
negative expressions on the part of the infant. They also found that it disrupted the 
organisation of mother-infant interaction, with infants displaying more instances of 
negative expressions and avoidance behaviour (looking away). In another study 
Cohn and Elmore (1988) modified the still-faced paradigm by testing the contingent 
effects of the mother's behaviour on the infant by asking the mothers of 3 month old 
infants to become still-faced for 5 seconds contingent on their infants displaying 
positive expressions. Infants became less likely to cycle between positive and neutral 
expressions and more likely to turn away. These results were replicated using video 
monitors instead of direct interaction (Gusella, Muir and Tronick,1988) and 
demonstrate that infants are highly sensitive to the quality and reciprocity of mothers' 
emotional responses.
A further study by Cohn and Tronick (1989) looked at the effect of maternal 
behaviour in multi-problem families. These mothers displayed high rates of self- 
reported depressive symptoms and had been identified as having high rates of factors 
associated with risk of childhood behaviour disorders and thus needing intervention. 
Mothers were found to be withdrawn, or interacted in an aggressive, intrusive way 
with few positive affective expressions. They found that, when mothers were unable 
to provide periods of positive expressions, infants' expressions were limited to neutral 
or negative displays and became less involved with both persons and objects. These
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results were found to be consistent across situations. More specifically, the infants of 
disengaged mothers were distressed and unsuccessfully sought engagement. Those 
of intrusive mothers looked away, whereas those of mixed and positive mothers had 
a greater breadth of behaviour and expression.
Thus, infants respond to the affective quality of their mothers' behaviours in 
a way that is specific to that affect. Put another way, the results presented here 
indicate the significance that the facial expressions of others hold for the infant. Such 
results are important in the light of the ability of infants to respond to external stimuli 
and, especially, their ability to discriminate between different facial expressions. The 
overall picture created by the evidence presented is that the infant's responsivity to 
the environment is part of a tightly interconnected system, whereby the infant's 
responses never occur in isolation from the wider social context in which she exists. 
At all levels of functioning, be they perceptual, affective, cognitive or behavioural, the 
child's actions are incorporated into the inter-personal context of interaction. The 
question now remains as to how the mother's role can be conceptualised within the 
broader theoretical framework that was discussed earlier.
2.5 The Role of the Mother
In many ways the material already presented has demonstrated the 
importance of the mother's role. That is, in studies on maternal responsivity to the 
infant, her differential responding (Chapter 1) and how she is able to direct 
interaction through joint attention and referencing and in experiments demonstrating 
how a change in her behaviour and affect can have profound effects on interaction. 
There have been other studies which have looked at how mothers may have long­
term effects on infant development. These studies have been concerned with either 
infant temperament or cross-cultural variation in maternal interaction styles and their 
influence on the infant. The latter research focus is more appropriate to our dis­
cussion as it demonstrates theoretical points made earlier about the socio-cultural 
nature of emotion.
The importance of the mother's role in the infant's socialisation is highlighted 
by the implications of how her beliefs can affect the development of the child. Super 
and Harkness (1991) argue, for example, that:
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"The emotional differentiation of settings in early childhood is part of the 
culturally regulated sequence of development. Intimately related to differenti­
ation of settings is the way superficially similar developmental transitions can 
yield divergent psychological meanings depending on the preceding and 
surrounding experience... The emergent patterning of emotional expression 
across settings, and the sequence of settings across time, are probably more 
important for the normal socialisation of affect than learning in any one 
situation." (Harkness and Super, 1991, p. 69)
Similarly, Rabain-Jamin (1989), reporting on differences in maternal interaction styles 
between African and French families, points out that:
" ...child-rearing practices clearly affect social behaviours. The fact that parents 
emphasise one type of activity over another in early social exchanges can have 
long-term effects and even create obstacles later on in adulthood for indi­
viduals who are confronted with other social models - for example, in another 
culture." (Rabain-Jamin, 1989, p.231)
There are many examples of cultural differences in emphasis and style of instruction, 
although there are also universals in certain patterns of development, such as onset 
of age of smiling and frequency of smiling between mothers and 3 month old infants. 
Differences between cultural groups have been attributed to parental values and 
beliefs and to the structuring of the child's development by the physical and social 
resources for caretaking. The expression of parental values is not a direct effort to 
achieve some later effect. Super and Harkness (1991) state:
" Their expression is, rather, a more immediate reflection of adult psychological 
functioning. That is, values influence behaviour more in the sense of 'This is 
the way I feel like acting with my baby' or 'This is the way I would like to see 
my baby act' ... Socialisation values at this age are expressive goals in their 
own right, not only means to some later goal...The effect of such socialisation 
is usually to provide the infant..with practice in culturally appropriate social 
and emotional behaviour." (Harkness and Super, 1991, p.63)
Some examples will serve to demonstrate the above points. One study, which 
compared American with Japanese mothers, found that Japanese mothers spend large 
amounts of time soothing and quietening their babies, rather than stimulating them 
with active 'chatting' as American mothers do. The patterns of social intercourse that 
result are consistent w ith the interaction patterns at later ages and with the larger 
patterns of the social milieu in the two cultures. American mothers encourage open, 
expressive, independent and assertive behaviour, whilst Japanese mothers seek quiet,
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contented babies (Caudill and Frost, 1973). Parents' beliefs about the nature of infants 
shape the emotional lives of infants. The Kwoma of New Guinea and Zinacantecans 
of Mexico, for example, believe that the infant is vulnerable to supernatural threats. 
They keep their babies close and quiet (Brazelton et al., 1969; Whiting, 1971).
The mother's role in socialisation has also been investigated in object related 
play (Dixon et al., 1984). Important differences were found between American 
middle-class mothers and Gusii mothers in Kenya, when teaching 6 to 25 month old 
infants a task. There were pronounced differences between the two groups of 
mothers in the type of verbal interaction and the type of control over the child. Gusii 
mothers tend to control their infants visually more than verbally. They use physical 
contact and physical control to orient their infant toward the task. They use a high 
amount of instruction and do not encourage the child through praise. American 
mothers, on the other hand, provide verbal encouragement and their mode of 
teaching includes more modelling, a considerable amount of remarks on the child's 
mood as well as reflections on the child's actions.
The authors found that infant behaviours also showed variations. American 
infants between 6 and 8 months spent more time at play with the toys outside the 
task structure then did the Gusii babies. There was a trend for Gusii babies to 
attempt the task more frequently, and social interaction with mothers was more 
frequent than with the American sample. In the 12-14 month old age groups, they 
found some differences between American and Gusii babies in specific tasks. For 
example, a pegboard task elicited more directed attempts by Gusii babies, whereas 
the American infants used the pegs and board for play outside the task. Similarly, 
face to face and other social interactions occurred more frequently with a stacking- 
block task among Gusii infants. In general, they found that the frequency of 
attempts, or compliance with the teaching task structure, was greater for the Gusii 
infants than the American infants.
The studies presented above demonstrate, perhaps indirectly, how maternal 
strategies with their infants have important consequences for the way infants learn 
to interact vis-a-vis the external environment. More specifically, they highlight how 
socialisation factors at the level of dyadic interactions exerts influences that go far 
beyond that level to reinforce cultural and belief systems. The literature also 
highlights an important aspect of interaction. The mother leads the interaction. The 
way in which she defines the situation and defines her goals vis-a-vis the infant
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determine what she will respond to and how. This must not be understood to mean 
that dyadic interaction is unicausal, with the mother represented as a conditioning 
stimulus. Interaction is reciprocal and multifaceted, but the prescriptive quality of 
maternal interpretation of infant behaviours creates the directionality required to 
socialise the infant in ways that are congruent with cultural and social norms.
2.6 Theory and Objectives Revisited
We have seen from a review of the literature that there has been a widespread 
neglect of important social influences on emotional development in infancy. The 
focus of individualistic theories has been the objective evaluation of emotional 
responsivity as stimulus-response contingencies. Adopting an external perspective 
on emotionality has resulted in the neglect of the influence of maternal perceptions 
on infant behaviour. By adhering to biologically based explanations of the develop­
ment of facial expressions and emotions, they have ignored the importance of social 
context in the production and recognition of facial expressions. As we have seen, the 
perceptual and cognitive skills of the infant are embedded in interpersonal contexts. 
The evidence on joint and social referencing, taken together with the rapidly 
developing information processing capabilities of the infant, provide strong evidence 
for the importance of the mother in the differentiation of infant capacities. Mothers 
structure interaction by selecting objects for joint focus, providing information on how 
to feel about these objects and responding to the infant in culturally, socially and 
situationally prescribed ways. The profound influence of maternal affective style on 
infants' behaviour and affective responsivity has been demonstrated by research on 
simulated and actual maternal depression. The precocious ability of infants to 
categorise and differentiate stimuli, to perceive continuity in action sequences, and to 
integrate information from multiple modalities, points to the importance of involving 
the perspective of the interactional other in the differentiation and integration of 
infant capabilities. In the light of the literature discussed above, the evidence on the 
importance of culture and context in the interpretation of emotional displays places 
the emphasis squarely on maternal interpretations of infant emotional displays as a 
crucial factor in the development of emotionality.
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The focus of this study is to find out how, in early infancy, the initial 
rudim entary acquisition of sociocultural frames of reference occurs. This involves 
investigating how the initial emotion displays of the infant are appropriated by the 
caretaker within social frameworks that define and constrain the significance of 
rudim entary skills for the infant. It is hypothesised that infants' facial expressions 
develop and are socialised through a processes of social interaction in which maternal 
interpretations of the infants' expressions are instrumental in structuring the 
environment for the infant in socially meaningful ways, embedding the infants' 
actions in social frameworks. By selecting specific facial expressions within specific 
situational and social contexts, and responding to them on the basis of what meaning 
they have for her, the mother imbues the interaction with meaning both for herself 
and increasingly for her infant. Her role is one of instruction; instructing the infant 
on the meaning of facial expressions when they are displayed in specific situational 
contexts.
We have found evidence of sophisticated perceptual and inferential skills in 
the infant, which indicate that 5-6 month old infants can discern differences in facial 
expressions. But by 9 months important developments occur that are believed to 
influence the infant's emotionality. Social referencing and joint referencing develop 
and thus pave the way for a greater sharing of events between mothers and infants. 
At this age the mother's interpretations and responses to the infant take on 
significance for the infant. It is proposed that, with each new development of infant 
skills, mothers' perceptions of their infants' change, influencing how they segment the 
infants' actions and what meaning they ascribe to them. How mothers perceive and 
understand their infants' facial expressions is an important indicator of what aspects 
of the infants' repertoire the mothers find important at a given age and in given 
situations and thus what is salient to them in interaction. One may argue that the 
process just described involves nothing more than the application of behaviouristic 
principles whereby the mother's interpretations and selections of infant acts is the 
result of the mother being conditioned to select certain infant behaviours. In the 
following chapter it will be demonstrated that the theory advocated here is in direct 
contradiction to the behaviourist paradigm.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF THE MOTHER IN DEVELOPMENT
"He saw something on the table he wanted and started calling for that, which 
I knew 'cause he looked away immediately and then started pointing, going 
'Um, um, urn', which is his way of saying 'Get me what I want, slave'."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 10-12 month age group)
3.0 Chapter Aims
In assessing the infant's effect on the parent, this thesis expands on the role 
of the active environment in development. The ways in which the developmental 
literature has addressed the mother's role in development will be discussed and 
empirical studies which have attempted to examine maternal reports reviewed. It is 
argued that mother-infant interaction is bidirectional, characterised by reciprocal 
causality. Models which represent interaction (and development) as linear, 
misrepresent the nature of development and are unsuitable frameworks for examining 
the role of maternal interpretations in socialising infant emotionality.
3.1 Theoretical Frameworks and Structural Models
Infant research is often centred around implicit, underlying models of the 
nature of development and interaction. Overton and Reese (1973) suggest that 
models perform many functions:
" First, to the extent that theory building is involved, models establish the basic 
categories which determine the introduction of certain classes of theoretical 
constructs and the exclusion of others. For example, it is no accident, but 
rather a reflection of the adherence to a particular model that Erikson (1950), 
Piaget (1967) and Werner (1948) all introduced constructs which explicitly 
postulate the direction of developmental change while general behaviour 
theorists do not introduce constructs of this type. Second, models explicate 
particular features of theories. Examples are the two-stage or mediational 
model (e.g., Kendler and Kendler, 1970) operating within general behaviour 
theory, and the equilibrium model operating within Piaget's theory (Piaget, 
1967). Third, models aid in the deployment or extension of theories (Lachman, 
1960; Toulmin, 1962). Finally, regardless of whether explicit theories are 
employed or not, models function to define meaningful problems for 
investigation, to suggest types of methods for exploring these problems, and
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to provide types of explanations for interpreting the data (Fodor, 1968, Kessel,
1969, White, 1970)." (Overton and Reese, 1973, pp.67-68)
In the following discussion, some of the functions outlined above will be 
discussed; how different models conceptualise the impetus of developmental change, 
what child-environment relationships they use to do so and how this is illustrated in 
theories of emotional development. How the role of the environment is 
conceptualised within the framework of the present thesis will be demonstrated, 
through expanding and illustrating the role of the mother in development theoretical­
ly and empirically.
3.2 Models Characterising Person-Environment Relationships
Riegel (1978) places models of development into four categories reflecting 
various combinations of passive and active persons and environments. In the passive 
environment-passive person category, he places mechanistic theories that arose from 
the empiricist philosophy of Lock and Hume. Such models proposed that combina­
tions of events that occur in the environment in the presence of observers are 
imprinted on their minds. This view has served as a basis for learning theories, in 
which factors such as the frequency or recency of stimuli determine how they will be 
coded in the receiving mind. In a similar manner, naturalist theories of emotional 
development argue that the infant is born with an innate repertoire of emotions. Any 
differentiation that ensues over time is attributed to the effect of invariant biological 
maturation resulting from environmental stimulation. The structures which serve to 
define the function of emotions are physiological rather than psychological. 
Physiological processes are subject to stimulus response laws and, as such, the goal 
of analysis is to reveal antecedent-consequent relations rather than structures, and 
contingent relations rather than functions. The analysis of structure-function involves 
the attribution of purpose, goal or function to the organism. Such a position implies 
that cognition plays an essential role in emotional development, an argument that is 
rejected by the naturalist theories of emotion.
The second category is the passive person-active environment model. 
Examples of this are Skinnerian approaches to behaviour modification. The person's
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behaviour is actively structured by the environment (the conditioner) in particular 
directions. The person does not contribute to the outcome. Within developmental 
psychology, this approach is characterised by its adherence to external causality as the 
main cornerstone of development. Infants do not mature as active persons capable 
of deliberate actions, but as organisms adhering to basic cause-effect patterns. Devel­
opment is explained in terms of simple stimulus-response contingencies and is 
therefore unidirectional and unicausal. The infant is in a state of inertia until s /h e  
is stimulated by the environment. Emotion theories which propose that the infant 
can be conditioned to respond to social situations using display rules (Ekman, 1980), 
adhere to this framework; the infant's emotional reactions to events are 'socialised' 
by the contingent responses of others. In adopting this position, later forms of 
emotionality are not distinguished as qualitatively different and irreducible to earlier 
forms due to their integration into cognitively mediated processes. Furthermore, 
infant emotional displays are approached from the perspective of the external 
observer and, hence, there is an implicit denial that any socio-cognitive processes in 
the mother are responsible for the emotional development of the child.
The third category of models characterises the person as active and the 
environment as passive. Models of development which retain this concept are those 
of Piaget and Chomsky. Piaget sees the infant as an active constructor of knowledge 
based on experience of the environment. Although the environment is a necessary 
part of development, it has no active role in structuring thought or action. In the 
same way, Chomsky sees language developing as a result of the child's application 
of innate linguistic categories to linguistic experience. How this experience is 
organised is not a determinant of language competence (Sameroff, 1991). The child 
develops alone in this model (Feinman, 1991). In the Piagetian view, it is direct 
experiential contact (motor activity) with the world, rather than what is learned from 
other people that is the primary force which drives the infant's cognitive develop­
ment. Cognitive growth derives mainly from direct experiential learning rather than 
from social learning. As Bruner (1983a) has observed,
"The world is a quiet place for Piaget's growing child. He is virtually alone
in it, a world of objects that he must array in space, time, and causal relation­
ships...[in which] others give him little help." (Bruner, 1983a, p.138)
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Consequently, research paradigms stemming from this model framework have not 
sought to understand how the wider environment can actively shape the infant's 
developing capacities through an interplay of forces in which both the infant and the 
environment are active. Sroufe's theory of emotional development retains the active 
person-passive environment model characteristic of Piagetian theory. Although 
Sroufe is careful to differentiate the presence of basic physiological reactions from 
later emotion states, he neglects to integrate cognitive capacities with the development 
of emotionality. The missing link is reciprocal social interaction.
Models which combine an active person w ith an active environment stress that 
the actions of the individual change reality and changes in reality, in turn, affect the 
behaviour of the individual. In this view, developmental outcomes are not a product 
of the initial characteristics of the child or the context or even the combination of the 
two. They are the result of the interplay between the child, the context and the time, 
representing development as a dialectic process. Social approaches to development 
specifically emphasise the importance of interactional social others in the infant's 
development and in doing so they represent development along active environment- 
active person models. The theory proposed here argues that, although infants are 
active information processors, mothers continuously incorporate these skills in 
everyday contexts and activities by defining and responding to them in socially 
appropriate ways. Affect develops out of this context, aided by processes of social 
and joint referencing. The environment, far from being passive, undergoes change 
and reorganisation which is sensitive to the child's growing cognitive and social skills, 
and directly influences the further development of these skills. The mother, or 
primary caretaker, is the agent of this environmental reorganisation.
The social constructivist accounts of emotional development recognise that an 
essential component of emotion is cognition, and that the development of emotion 
rests on the infant's active assimilation and accommodation of emotion rules through 
social interactions with others. Thus, it represents both the child and the environment 
as active in shaping affect. They reject nativistic accounts of emotion and recognise 
that infants' expressions are construed within social contexts that influence their 
meaning and adults' responses to them; hence, they retain the perspective of the 
'other' in interaction. The process of emotional development is not seen as one in 
which basic constituents are added upon to produce the final ingredient. Emotion 
develops out of the child's growing understanding of h is /her role in the context of
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the w ider social group. As I have argued in Chapter 2, infant skills cannot be 
understood outside the functions they fulfil within the wider system of interaction. 
They must be investigated, not only in the way the environment actively shapes the 
infant's emotionality, but also in the way the infant affects its environment. The 
m other's schema of her infant's skill is actively shaped and shapes the way she 
interacts w ith her baby. Examining the mother's perspective on the interaction 
recognises the active nature of both pairs in the dyad and thus adheres to an active 
person-active environment model.
In most of the theories reviewed there is a marked shying away from 
representing theoretical constructs in terms of direct developmental processes. 
Emotion theorists represent emotional development along a set of principles and 
constructs derived largely from characterising emotions phylogenetically rather than 
ontogenetically. I believe that this avoidance highlights an unwillingness to unravel 
the implications of how these theories represent developmental change. It is therefore 
not surprising that the new organisational theorists ap p ea r/ to be unclear on the 
specific role that cognition and socialisation play in emotional development. 
Similarly, although they pay lip service to the importance of the environment, at no 
point is this environmental influence, or how it shapes and is shaped by the child, 
fully explained. The reader is therefore left wondering how emotional development 
ties in with other developmental processes in infancy.
The discussion above has highlighted how different emotion theories make 
implicit assumptions about the nature of development and the interaction between 
the infant and its environment. Most of these theories have neglected some aspect 
or development and interaction. The active-person active-environment social theory 
discussed in Chapter 1 presents a holistic approach to understanding emotional 
development and interaction, to the extent that it provides the potential for 
highlighting the importance of both the infant and the environment in producing a 
developmental outcome. However, in focusing on the regulatory and formative 
aspects of cultural influences in development, research stemming from this approach 
has tended to concentrate on more broad-based issues like child rearing practices and 
how these relate to general cultural patterns. There is a lack of research on the more 
specific mechanisms of this "cultural code" (Sameroff, 1991). Investigating the way 
mothers, as carriers of the social code, interpret the infant's facial expressions and 
emotional state is an initial attempt to integrate an analysis of the socio-cognitive
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schemata of the primary caregiver with the expressive behaviour of the infant. Why 
this is important is explicated in the next section on the ways in which the mother7s 
role is instrumental in the development of infant skills.
3.3 The Environment, the Mother and the Process of Development
"She raised her eyebrows and looked at me which meant that this was quite 
interesting or good fun."
Question: How would you respond when she does that?
"Just do the same thing or do it more boisterously or something to make it 
more involved."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 10-12 month age group)
The adult's role in development is succinctly summarised by Feinman (1991) 
in the following way:
"... The infant's development is guided by the adult's provision of both 
structure and meaning. Through organising, arranging and simplifying tasks, 
sequencing and ordering activities, offering opportunities, limiting access, 
managing focus, and gradually transferring responsibility to the child, the 
adult structures the infant's participation. By conveying information, strategies 
and definitions, the adult endows the situation with meaning." (Feinman, 1991, 
p.297)
While most of the ideas on the adult's active role in social development have arisen 
from work on language acquisition, the general principles are applicable to any action 
by the infant which serves a social and communicative purpose. Two central 
assumptions must be recognised when looking at the communicative aspects of infant 
expressive signals: Firstly, that the human baby comes equipped with a repertoire 
of proto-social behaviours which are the basic equipment with which she enters into 
face to face interpersonal communication. And, secondly, that communication is both 
process and content and that the baby may be involved in the process long before he 
or she can share in the content (Newson, 1979). The role of the mother may be seen 
as an attempt to enter into a meaningful set of exchanges with her infant, a view 
which is supported by the above two assumptions. The mother's role is instrumental 
in creating a shared understanding between herself and her infant. Such a
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perspective on interaction does not conceal the asymmetry of the mother infant 
relationship. The mother is the agent responsible for the introduction of meaning into 
the dialogue through her interpretative responses to the baby's facial expressions. By 
selecting a specific expression from the vague and undifferentiated stream of facial 
expressions, she marks out the expression as if the child's intention was present in the 
act of expressing it. Evidence for the importance of the mother's interpretation of the 
infant is to be found in the fact that the baby's expressions have different communi­
cative significance depending on the different contexts in which they occur and, 
secondly, by the fact that the infant's signals are only given the status of communi­
cative signals to the extent that the mother imputes that status to them.
What the child does spontaneously at first is selected by the parents as 
significant gestures and acted upon in such a way that s /h e  is taught the use of the 
action in social context. The child is learning a retrospective evaluation of her own 
behaviour. Far from assuming any process of orthogenesis, the task constraints that 
the mother imposes upon what she regards as the communicative behaviour of the 
baby is what leads to the development of communicative abilities:
"His task [i.e., the infant's] in learning how to make sense to others is not so 
much learning new movements that he has never made before, as that of 
learning a social use of movements that he makes all the time." (Newson and 
Shotter, 1974, p.346)
Thus, as has been argued in Chapters 1 and 2, facial expressions of infants 
acquire their meaning and usage through the everyday situations in which they occur. 
This includes whether or not a particular expression was instrumental in achieving 
the infant's goal which, in turn, rests with the parent's socially appropriate inter­
pretation of, and reaction to, the emotion state of the infant within the particular 
context in which it occurs. Along the course of the infant's development a transition 
takes place whereby the initial process of interpretation of others is internalised and 
becomes the internal process which enables the infant to express herself in the knowl­
edge and expectation of how this will affect the other, usually the mother.
The concept of intentionality is central to this process. There are two types of 
intentions. Firstly, there are intentional acts which animals are capable of. These are 
signs whose occurrence causes other organisms to infer something from them. 
Secondly, there are intentional signals which are performed with the explicit purpose 
that the other should infer an intention from them, i.e., they are gestures. They are
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conventional gestures in that they have a shared meaning within the particular social 
system in which they take place. Emotions arise out of the negotiation of conven­
tional gestures between mother and infant.
Parents structure and organise the signals of the infant persistently and 
systematically so as to create directionality and intentionality within action sequences. 
By fitting their own actions around the infant's behaviours adults coordinate the 
infant's actions with their own in repeated instances of similar situations, and enable 
the infant to complete tasks that the infant could not complete on her own. 
Coordination is not arrived at by the infant independently; actions are organised from 
outside by adults. As no event is entirely novel, the slightly repetitive character of 
events surrounding the infant allows new events to be assimilated to particular 
existing schemas of skills and those schemas to be accommodated to them (Kaye, 
1982). This ability of skills to become coordinated on the basis of their common 
factors allows us (and parents) to attribute meaning to them, and meaning to the 
child's experience of them. A skill develops through the mutual negotiation of the 
constituents of that skill by older members of the social group. The process through 
which it is acquired must be based on a shared understanding of the purpose of that 
skill. In other words, the adult member must have a schema or representation of the 
infant's behaviour in order to organise their own actions vis-a-vis the infant. For 
example, Reissland (1990), examining Kaye's (1982) concept of 'frames' which he uses 
to describe the ways in which parents organise their activities around their infants, 
found age related differences in the way mothers elicited pleasure and pride in their 
infants. Similarly, adults initiate face to face games such as peekaboo with their 
infants. The infant may learn one aspect of this sequence, such as hiding her face, but 
not expressing surprise when she sees the mother's face. The mother will express 
surprise automatically as part of the sequence of playing peekaboo. In later peekaboo 
games the infant will eventually learn to express surprise as part of playing the game, 
hence mastering the skill in its entirety (Bruner, 1983a). Thus, in order for the infant 
to learn the whole routine, she needs feedback in the execution of the subroutines 
from one who is familiar with the skill and therefore with the subroutines. This 
necessarily must depend on the adult having a representation of the infant's skill at 
any one stage of development.
Infancy has been conceptualised by many developmentalists as the social 
negotiation of age related issues (Erikson, 1950; Sander, 1962; Spitz, 1965; Mahler,
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1968). Development is viewed as a regulatory process whereby parents build 
conventions out of the infants7 actions and signals. Conventions coordinate schemata 
and action between the same individuals in repeated instances of similar situations. 
They develop when participants in an interaction have a coordination problem, the 
solution being the convention. In this way, conventions arise within development as 
a part of a mutual partnership between an infant and its caretaker. Socialisation may 
be represented as a process in which social conventions develop in order to serve as 
transitional structures between an earlier and a later stage of development of the 
individual. For example, Bruner (1981) suggests that the mother coordinates her own 
action w ith the child's by setting up conventionalised "action formats". These formats 
provide recurrent opportunities for the child to develop ways of signalling her 
intentions, and to learn to interpret the mother's signals.
Conventions are thus negotiated in an already conventionalised format and 
serve as transitional structures for the development of stable routines or games. They 
are not simply a response to an immediately prior stimulus, but to the whole context 
in which the stimulus occurs. A change in the context will change the meaning of the 
stimulus for the receiver. The role of the caregiver in interaction may thus be 
conceptualised as one of teaching skills to the infant by interpreting the infant's 
intentions and fulfilling them. In doing so, the adult demonstrates how to perform 
effectively vis-a-vis the environment. The infant's actions become coordinated 
through this parental mechanism. Repetitiveness and novelty aid in the child's 
internalisation of these routines. By negotiating outcomes of actions in systematic and 
consistent ways, caregivers imbue the interaction with meaning for the child in ways 
that are appropriate in the context of the infant's wider behavioural actions and the 
situation in which s /h e  is in.
The process described above involves regarding both the parent and the infant 
as affecting each other, and overcomes the one sided responsibility of assigning the 
task of learning to the infant. Assigning importance to the active participation of 
adults does not conceal the active nature of the child. Infants play an active part in 
their development, both in the effect they have on others and by their ability to 
internalise the initial process of others' interpretations. However, for this dyadic 
process to work, two important concepts must be combined; the idea that parents and 
infants constitute a "social system", and the concept of "intersubjectivity" or shared 
understanding between individuals (Kaye, 1982).
88
3.3.1 Social Systems
"...he looked at me before I clapped m y hands 'cause he thought it was what I 
was going to do...it's the anticipation."
(Attributed by mother of baby boy, 7-9 months)
The concept of "system" as used to describe mother-infant interaction was first 
adapted for use in infancy research by Bowlby (1969) and Ainsworth (1964). It called 
attention to how parents play an active part in development by highlighting the 
infant's effect upon parental behaviour. Its emphasis was in analysing the whole, or 
the dyad, and rejecting the linear unitary causality of mechanistic approaches which 
restrict themselves to unidirectional models of the mother-infant system (Fogel, 1976).
Bowlby's ethological orientation has resulted in a growing popularity of 
conceiving development along general system principles (von Bertalanffy, 1968). The 
attraction of General Systems theory rests in its ability to provide a common language 
within which it is possible to integrate different facets of development across multiple 
domains. Using System's theory terminology, social systems, characterised as "open 
systems", are defined by their violation of the second law of thermodynamics; 
entropy. That is, with increasing time, there will be increasing disorganisation. Over 
the life time of an open system there is "negative entropy", an increasing organisation 
at decreasing cost in energy and so the system develops so as to function more 
efficiently vis-a-vis the outside world (Kaye, 1982). All biological and social systems 
are open systems. However, there are two criteria which distinguish social systems 
from biological systems. The first of these is a "shared history," shared ontologically 
rather than phylogenetically, between two or more members within the system such 
that they know each other individually and can anticipate each other's behaviour. 
Secondly, the members must be working towards a shared purpose (e.g., bees in a 
hive). Their ability to anticipate each other's intentions, however, need not rest on 
a shared individual history but can rest on the common understandings of the species 
(for example, two people in a lift); they do not necessarily know each other, therefore 
they do not share a common history ontogenetically, and yet they share a common 
purpose in that they have both entered the lift with a common purpose of ascending 
or descending. Thus the two criteria are independent, but essential, distinctions of 
what constitutes a social system. The mother and infant do not begin to be a social 
system until the infant too has expectations of how the mother will behave. This
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expectation must be based on a shared history together and not on genetically 
programmed information (Kaye, ibid).
An important implication of defining social systems on the basis of these 
criteria is that contingency functions per se are not sufficient to account for the 
development of the social responses of the infant. For the mother and infant to be a 
social system there must be a mutual exchange of specific signs which have evolved 
through a common history of negotiation of the meaning of these signs. Studies 
which have attempted to justify the idea of a mother infant system as contingent 
behaviours which occur moment to moment, such as those performed on gaze by 
Stern (1974) and crying (Bernal, 1972; DeVore and Konner, 1974; Wolff, 1969) have all 
laid to rest any notion of a one way model of development. However, what they 
have revealed are mutual contingencies which are provided by evolution, not by the 
shared experience of the individual mother and baby.
Evolution has provided the infant with predetermined reflexes and adaptive 
mechanisms which may be seen in the behavioural repertoire of any infant anywhere 
in the world. However, beyond primary fixed action patterns, each infant will be 
socialised according to the social and cultural group to which he or she belongs. This 
does not occur automatically but rests on a shared history or shared ontology between 
the infant and its caretaker. Experiments which have violated normal interaction 
patterns have not produced evidence of a true social system. For example Tronick, 
Als and Adamson (1979) asked mothers to stare blankly at their infants for part of the 
session, then to show their profiles. Ten week old babies showed marked withdrawal 
and distress at this and were slow to resume 'normal' interaction with their mothers. 
Trevarthen (1977) has reported similar results. These studies demonstrate that infants 
expect face to face interaction to proceed in certain ways. This evidence tells us no 
more than that these interactions originate from an innate response repertoire that is 
effectively suited to some kinds of adult behaviour and poorly suited to others which 
adults do not normally produce. That is to say, these expectations do not depend 
upon the development of a dyadic relationship with a particular caretaker (Kaye, 
1982).
It is possible to violate the rules of normal interaction in a way that adults 
would find disturbing without upsetting the infant as long as his or her ability to 
engage in mutual gaze, smiling and vocalising is not disrupted. Bower (1974) used 
mirrors to present infants with three identical images of their mothers, each inter­
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acting with them "live". Up to 6 months, infants did not seem at all surprised, 
interacting normally with one image and then another. Only at stage IV object 
permanence did the infants understand that a mother's face should not be at several 
places at once, at which infants showed signs of distress. It is significant to note here 
that it is only at this age, 7-8 months, which marks the beginning of the use of 
conventions (as evidenced by the infant's ability to take an initiatory role in greeting 
the mother and in smiling in anticipation of the mother's face reappearing in the peek 
a boo games) that the infant notices the violation in the interaction. The integration 
of the infant into the social world of the adult comes about gradually.
The gradual organisation and differentiation of face to face interaction is 
demonstrated in studies which have examined temporal structuring of dyadic 
interaction. For example, in a study conducted by Kaye and Fogel (1980), 6 week old 
infants' expressions were found to be random and haphazard during face to face play 
with their mothers. By 13 weeks, however, there was a clustering of expressions 
when infants were attending to their mothers. Furthermore, whereas at 6 weeks there 
were almost no expressive responses to maternal greetings, at 13 weeks, infant smiles 
were most frequently elicited as responses to maternal behaviour. By 26 weeks, 
smiling did not depend at all upon elicitation by the mother. Infants were able to 
assume the role of initiators of greetings themselves. These results have also been 
demonstrated by Lamb, Morrison and Malkin (1987).
These findings provide evidence that the organisation of face to face 
expressions in the young infant's behaviour only appears gradually and is not an 
inborn capacity. They indicate that the mother-infant system is not simply a matter 
of contingency functions, but rests on the infant's acquisition of the preliminary skills 
for social interaction. Social systems then necessitate that both interactors have shared 
experiences and shared expectations of the other partner. While biology has endowed 
the infant with the basic repertoire of behaviours which ensure its survival, its 
development beyond these basic processes depends on interaction with others. The 
caregiveri s propensity for interpreting, structuring and organising is utilised by the 
infant to share an increasingly responsible role in interacting with the environment 
and making sense of it. As with the organisation of actions, the ability of infants to 
share a common perspective of the world with adults is also a gradual process which 
emerges out of mother-infant interaction.
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3.3.2 Intersubjectivity
"That's when he fully understands what you mean by no. He wants you to 
know he still wants to do it anyway. That noise, that kind of 'You're not 
being fair' noise, and the fact that he kept his finger on the thing. He 
understood what I was saying to him. If he hadn't understood, he would have 
carried on anyway. But making that noise is his kind of 'I don't think you're 
being fair noise.'"
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 10-12 month old age group)
Intersubjectivity, the gradual ability of the infant to share a common 
perspective on the world with the adult, the meeting of minds, marks the child's 
entry into the adult's world. Through a process of mutual negotiation of meaning 
and dialogue, mothers and infants are able to build an increasingly shared perspective 
on the world. Intersubjectivity is thus a result of a process of negotiation of meaning 
and, as such, it is an emergent process. Some developmentalists, however, propose 
that intersubjectivity is an inborn capacity. One such researcher is Trevarthen.
Trevarthen's work on has had a major impact on mother-infant interaction 
research. His theoretical stance, however, makes explicit assumptions about the 
infant's capabilities which have not been substantiated by research findings. Of 
relevance to our discussion is his attribution of "primary intersubjectivity" to infants 
(Trevarthen, 1979). He proposes that infants possess a specific and innate kind of 
sociability which mediates communication between the infant and its caregiver.
He derives evidence for this from the behaviour of babies interacting with 
mothers, which has a highly organised sequence of adult-like actions that bear a 
striking resemblance to a turn taking dialogue. For example, Trevarthen (1986) has 
shown in studies of slow motion video analysis that infant activities are highly 
synchronised with each other and, secondly, that their action sequences are 
temporally organised so that they can mesh with a high degree of precision with 
similar patterns of action produced by mothers. It is not surprising that babies 
possess this characteristic pattern of response. The baby must come equipped with 
mechanisms which ensure its survival which surely must depend on maintaining 
proximity with the mother (Bowlby, 1969). Infants are inherently responsive to those 
patterns of temporal movement which typically govern the episodic behaviour cycles 
characteristic of most living organisms. Whilst it seems true that babies do come with 
certain behavioural, visual and attentional preferences and patterns which fit into the 
ongoing stream of interaction, attributing intersubjectivity to these primary encounters
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is premature. The Kaye and Fogel (1980) study mentioned above supports this view 
by  demonstrating that this organisation is a gradual process rather than an inborn 
capacity.
Moreover, responsibility for the fine-tuning of interaction does not necessarily 
fall on the infant. For example, Murray and Trevarthen (1986) experimentally 
m anipulated the behaviours of mothers and 8.3 week old infants in an attempt to 
determ ine who is responsible for the temporal fine tuning during vocal engagements. 
In adults, the avoidance of co-vocalisations (overlaps) is one means by which adult 
partners jointly manage conversational interaction. From this viewpoint, the 
occurrence of co-vocalisations is not considered to be determined by one or other of 
the partners alone (i.e., unilaterally determined). Murray and Trevarthen believe that 
the presence of this temporal structuring in mother-infant vocalisation is evidence that 
infants in the first few months are able to temporally adapt to vocal ('communicative') 
behaviour in terms of their mothers in conversational ways. However, other studies 
(e.g., Elias, Hayes, and Broerse, 1986; Elias et al., 1988) have shown that the temporal 
characteristics of inter-speaker silences is the result of mothers attempting to engage 
13 to 15-week old infants in turn-taking encounters. Elias et al. (1986) proposed that, 
if the mother was largely responsible for the temporal structure of the encounters, she 
w ould be concerned with establishing and maintaining turn-taking with her infant. 
One would therefore expect that the mother would take her turn rapidly after the 
infant vocalised if she was attempting to create a conversation. Conversely, it would 
be expected that the mother would allow a relatively lengthy silence after her own 
vocalisation so as to maximise her infant's opportunity to produce a vocalisation in 
turn. Results showed that, when compared to vocal patterns that were randomised, 
Infant-silence-Mother silence durations were shorter than the randomised record, 
while Mother-silence-Infant silence durations were longer. These findings are 
consistent with the proposal that within the general framework of mutual influence, 
the fine temporal adjustments are managed by the mother. In this way mothers 
control the temporal structure of dyadic episodes in their attempts to engage their 
infants in turn-taking encounters. Such findings clearly indicate that mothers 
structure the infants' input.
The process described by Trevarthen makes more theoretical sense if it is 
inverted. Rather than intersubjectivity determining organisation of interaction, 
organisation of interaction is the precondition for the growth of intersubjectivity
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between mother and infant. Preliminary skills aid in the process rather than presup­
pose it. What may be said to be happening at this early stage is a negotiation by the 
mother of the joint activities of herself and her baby and a common meeting ground 
of the perspective of the two actors.
Within dialogue, negotiated meaning becomes shared meaning through a 
process of mutually shared activities and ritual sequences. Only when the infant is 
able to use behaviour intentionally, to produce an effect on another, can we begin to 
speak of intersubjectivity, for it is a necessary precondition of this function that there 
is shared meaning between mother and child. Viewed thus, the primary structure of 
the communication between mother and infant may be seen as a precursor of this 
later development and not an endpoint in development.
The mother must necessarily play a greater role in the interaction. The infant, 
however, does share an active part in the dialogue by virtue of her capabilities; it is 
in this sense that meaning is negotiated, for the mother does not have complete 
control over the interaction and she must modify her action alongside her perception 
of what she thinks the baby is doing. In doing so the baby is, on the one hand, given 
a partially autonomous role in interaction whilst, on the other, her behaviour is 
framed by the mother's calculated response and thus imbued with meaning. As far 
as the infant is concerned, particular actions are rendered significant by the quality 
and timing of the mother's gestural and vocal reciprocation. For example, Stern 
(1974) and Stem et al. (1977) found that mothers' facial expressions and speech when 
interacting with their infants were in keeping with the infants perceptual abilities at 
that age. This accommodation was in the form of what they called "infant elicited 
social behaviours". Adults' behaviour when attending to an infant is characterised 
by being exaggerated in time and space. Relative to adult facial expressions, the 
mothers' expressions towards their infants are generally slow to form and are held 
for a long time. Maternal gaze is also extraordinarily long compared to average adult 
gaze exchanges (Argyle and Kendon, 1967). Her repertoire of expressions for the 
infant consist of smiles, expressions of concern and sympathy and mock surprise, all 
of which are highly exaggerated. These behaviours are also highly repetitious, 
sometimes turning into runs (defined by Stern as an episode lasting a minute or two 
during which a definite tempo is maintained). In effect what this creates is a 
highlighting or marking of certain events as having special significance and hence
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punctuates the contribution which the baby is making according to a pattern of 
meaning which is, to a large extent, being imposed by the more sophisticated partner.
Thus, mothers, while largely accommodative in the early months, play a 
crucial role in regulating interaction, providing frameworks within which the infant's 
behaviour is both effective and meaningful vis-a-vis the environment. By creating 
dialogic sequences which have a highly repetitive character, she provides the infant 
with a stable organisation. By creating variations in the sequences, she introduces 
novelty and complexity. Meaning arises out of interaction, as mothers mark off 
behaviours and respond to them, involving the infant in the communicative process 
even though the infant is not yet able to understand the content.
Newson (1977) has expressed a methodological concern stemming from this 
approach which stresses the need to tap into the significance that these dialogues 
have for the mother. In this connection, he has proposed that the roles of observer 
and participant in mother infant interaction are separate and distinct. As an actor, the 
mother cannot pay full attention to her own behaviour as it would seriously interfere 
with the interaction. She can, however, act as an observer of her infant's behaviours 
by viewing the infant's behaviours and reporting their meaning in retrospect. 
Newson believes that there may be considerable advantage in securing this kind of 
information, specifically as regards the development of intersubjectivity between 
mother and infant. Maternal reports enable access to the mothers' schemata of infant 
capabilities and expressive repertoire. Ichheiser states: "Whether something is or is 
not material of social perception has to be decided not in terms of the expressive but 
in terms of the impressive function of the particular manifestation" (Ichheiser, 1949, 
p.15). Wolke et al. (1986) similarly advocate that maternal affective-cognitive 
processes in the perceptions their infants behaviour should be examined as important 
indicators of the interpersonal environment of the infant. It is with these theoretical 
ideas in mind that the mother's accounts of the infant behaviour should be 
approached. In the following section some of the studies that have investigated 
maternal interpretations of infant behaviour are reviewed and critically assessed in 
terms of their methodology.
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3.3.3 Empirical studies on Maternal Perceptions of Infant Behaviour
"...it looked like a very grown up thing to do, hit the table in frustration 'cause 
she couldn't reach it [the toy]. I don't think it meant she was frustrated. I 
think she just wanted to reach it and she hasn't got the powers to reach it in 
a controlled way. It was probably an accident that she hit the table."
(Attributed to mother of baby girl, 4-6 months old age group)
The empirical literature on maternal interpretations is sparse. There have been 
a handful of studies which have specifically addressed maternal interpretations and 
perceptions of infant facial expressions. Most of these studies used questionnaires to 
obtain information on maternal perceptions. The impetus for these studies has been 
to compare mothers as judges of emotional expressions with empirical studies which 
used objective coding systems in order to discover if mothers are able to identify the 
same expressions as observers do and to find out if the age of onset of these 
expressions correspond to empirical findings.
For example, maternal perceptions of infant expressions was examined by 
Johnson et al. (1982). They obtained concurrent and retrospective estimates of 
emotion onsets from mothers of infants between 1 and 18 months. Reports were 
obtained through the administration of an emotion onset questionnaire and two 
versions of the Differential Emotions Scale II (DES-II) (Izard, 1972). Concurrent 
reports referred to the perceived presence or absence of an emotion at the time of the 
survey, whilst retrospective reports were estimates of the month of onset for those 
perceived infant emotions. The emotion categories looked at were interest, joy, 
surprise, anger, contempt, fear, shyness, guilt, disgust, distress and sadness. They 
found that interest, joy, surprise, anger, distress and fear were perceived to be present 
by a majority of mothers of infants in the first quarter (1-3 months). Sadness, disgust, 
contempt and guilt, even amongst the oldest infants (16-18 months), were reported 
by less than two thirds of the mothers. Distress and fear were reported by an 
increasing number of mothers as infant age increased, and were observed by 68% of 
mothers by 16-18 months. Mothers' perception of fear displays increased from 58% 
in 1-3 m onth olds to 90% for the oldest infants. Perceived shyness increased 
dramatically from 9% for 1-3 month olds, to 41% for 4-6 month olds, to 66% for 7-9 
month olds, to 75% for 10-12 month olds and to 88% for 16-18 month olds.
The other type of data analysed was that of when parents first remembered 
perceiving these emotions. This data has serious limitations due to biases of parental
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memory. The results showed that it lead to clumping of the data towards the earliest 
ages. Thus, mothers perceived most of the infants' emotions as having begun in the 
earliest months. The majority of mothers reported interest, joy, surprise, anger and 
distress as first seen during 1-3 months. Half the mothers reported that fear started 
at that age as well. To minimise the effects of biases due to parental memory, they 
conducted another study using one week old newborns. Ninety five percent of 
mothers said that they had witnessed interest and joy by the end of the first week of 
the infant's life; 78% witnessed anger, 65% witnessed distress, 68% witnessed surprise, 
40% witnessed sadness and disgust, and 35% witnessed fear.
Emde (1984) conducted a similar study using the same questionnaire (DES), 
reducing the time span of the report to one week to examine perceived emotion states 
of 2 to 18 month old infants. The results are similar to those reported by Johnson et 
al. above. All mothers felt that interest and joy were present in their infants 
regardless of age. Furthermore, there was a high attribution of surprise, anger, fear 
and distress in the early months. However, shyness and sadness were attributed 
much less frequently and, throughout the age range surveyed, disgust, contempt and 
guilt were never perceived as present by the majority of the mothers.
These findings suggest that mothers may be more attuned to the subtleties and 
individual features of their babies' expressions than observers, as they perceived most 
emotion state onsets far earlier than empirical studies had found. On the other hand, 
mothers may also be interpreting undifferentiated states in the light of contextual 
information. Yet another possibility is that, as mothers, they may be more empathic 
with their infants than external observers. Lastly, it is possible that mothers project 
their own emotions onto the infant.
The wide range of possible explanations can be attributed to the method used 
in the studies. For example, by providing a ready made list of emotion labels in the 
questionnaires, mothers may have felt compelled to attribute more emotions than if 
they were asked to think of their infants' emotions themselves. Secondly, the use of 
questionnaires, rather than a more direct method of eliciting this information, meant 
that it was not possible to find out if situational or contextual information determined 
the mothers' judgements. The questionnaire method, like the still-faced photograph 
method reported in the study by Izard et al. (1988) in Chapter 1, both employ static 
methods. The lack of more dynamic, real time techniques means that it is not 
possible to answer the question of how the mother selects the infant's expressions as
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indices of particular emotions out of the stream of ongoing behaviour. The Johnson 
et al. study did not analyse the specific behaviour of the infant which led to maternal 
perceptions or her responses to them.
Some of these criticisms may also be levelled against techniques for obtaining 
maternal perceptions of infants in temperament studies (Blurton-Jones, 1974). The 
literature on infant temperament is outside the scope of the present thesis. Never­
theless, it is of methodological significance in that it attempts to relate maternal 
perceptions to some measure of infant behaviour. Because of their use of infant 
temperament scales and maternal perception scales, empirical studies on temperament 
are dogged by the problem of disentangling the effects of maternal state and infant 
behaviours/tem peram ent. There has been a growing debate about what temperament 
measures are actually measuring. A number of studies have compared mothers 
perceptions of "difficult infants" with trained observers ratings of infant behaviours 
(e.g. St. James-Roberts et al., 1984 and 1988; Wolke et al., 1987). Results have 
indicated that maternal perceptions ( a ^  have good internal consistency but are not 
generally congruent with objective measures of assessment. In one study (St. James- 
Roberts et al., 1984) results indicated a 'systematic and selective bias' in maternal 
reports compared to trained observers ratings of infants who had delivery complica­
tions. Mothers who had experienced birth complications were less likely to perceive 
their infants' behaviour as difficult while those who had optimal deliveries were more 
likely to perceive their infants as difficult, compared to objective ratings. The authors 
point out that these findings should be understood as providing important indicators 
of the influences of the infants' effects on their mothers. Mothers who had difficult 
deliveries may have perceived the postnatal period in contrast as relatively 'easy', 
while those who had experienced an easy birth may have perceived the postnatal 
period as more difficult in contrast. They point out that mothers ratings should be 
regarded as 'social perceptions' which incorporate parental as well as child factors 
rather than objective measures of within-child characteristics. Similarly, Harris, 
Thomas and Elsdon (1992) found that mothers' reports of their infants' temperament 
was more a reflection of maternal state rather than of the behaviour characteristics of 
their infants. How the infant is rated by the mother appears to be the result of how 
well she has adjusted to the infant's needs. Confusing data on attitudes makes it 
impossible to investigate the relationships between attitudes and behaviour (Blurton- 
Jones, 1974). Moreover, the use of questionnaires, even when accompanied by more
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direct behavioural observation (for example Nover et al., 1984) makes it difficult to 
pinpoint on what aspects of infant behaviour mothers base their perceptions. The 
reports (obtained from questionnaires) are usually comprised of broad based 
characteristics, such as irritability and difficult behaviours, which are hard to relate 
to specific infant behaviours other than crying, sleep disturbances or feeding patterns.
Whilst a number of researchers have pointed to the importance of the way 
caretakers selectively mark and interpret actions as intentional (Bruner, 1983b; Lock, 
1980; Rogoff, Malkin and Gilbride, 1984), few studies have investigated this process. 
One study which has, however, was conducted by Adamson et al. (1987). They 
examined the first step in interpretation, the selection of acts from a stream of 
behaviour. Using both parents and nonparents (students), they asked observers to 
view videotapes of 9 to 21 month old infants. Adults were asked to push a button 
whenever they saw the infant act in ways that were salient to them (a procedure 
derived from the work of Newtson, 1973; Newtson and Engquist, 1976; Newtson, 
Engquist and Bois, 1977). They predicted that, as babies develop and their behaviour 
becomes less diffuse and more clearly marked by defined "points of articulation" 
(Werner and Kaplan, 1963), adults would select more acts overall. They also 
predicted that the behaviour of infants viewed during solitary play would be 
regarded as less salient than the behaviour of babies during joint object play. To see 
if the way in which infant acts were selected was influenced by the way adults 
construed the task, instructions were varied. Newtson (1973) reported that variations 
in instructions affected both how often and how confidently subjects marked a stream 
of activity.
They wished to investigate the validity of the distinction between true 
communicative acts (the sender intends to communicate) and perceived communicative 
acts (the recipient perceives a meaningful act that the sender does not necessarily 
intend) (Lock, 1980). They argued that true communicative acts, which emerge only 
gradually during late infancy, are often conveyed by conventional gestures and 
words. In contrast, perceived communicative acts are less consensually defined as the 
recipient m ust construct criteria for what constitutes a 'meaningful' act. These criteria 
may be more or less restrictive than those applied for true communicative acts. 
Interactional models of communication development assume that parents' criteria for 
'meaningful acts' are far broader than their criteria for 'intentionally communicative' 
acts. The task set for the subjects consisted of instructions to press a button connected
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to two audio tracks of the stimulus tape (an electronic recording device stored time 
codes in minutes and seconds each time a button was pushed), in one case when they 
felt the baby had done something meaningful (MC), in the other whenever the baby 
seemed to be trying to communicate (intentional communication (IC)).
Results showed that, while parents and nonparents were equally likely to see 
intentionally communicative acts, parents were more likely than nonparents to see 
meaning in infants' acts. They also found that adults identified more acts when 
viewing older infants, and when viewing infants engaged in joint toy play rather than 
alone. These results were qualified by the type of instruction parents received. 
Adults given the IC instructions noted more acts during joint object play than those 
given MC instructions. When viewing infants alone with the toy, the IC group made 
fewer selections than the MC group. Interestingly, adults also showed higher levels 
of agreement regarding IC acts than MC acts and did so to a greater extent for older 
infants than for younger babies. Thus, their results demonstrate that the emergence 
of consensual information depends on both developmental changes in infants' 
behaviour and the interpretative skill of their social partners. They also reveal that 
what parents regard to be meaningful is more idiosyncratic and seems to depend in 
part on previous experience with infants.
The above studies, as a whole, may be summed up in two ways: Theoreti­
cally, they provide evidence that parents attribute some emotion states to their infants 
from very early on. They do so in ways that appear to take into account common- 
sense notions of what infants can and cannot do. The social emotions of guilt and 
shame, for example, were not attributed until infants were older than 7 months. 
Parents also select infant behaviours differently according to the type of instructions 
they are given, the age of the infant and the context in which it is embedded. 
Moreover, they are much more likely to see meaningful actions in the infant than 
observers are. Methodologically, the studies on perceptions of facial expressions have 
serious limitations. For example, they do not take into account context, both in terms 
of interaction and in terms of situational context. Perhaps more importantly, by 
relying on questionnaires and still photographs, they are open to criticisms regarding 
their ecological validity.
The investigation of maternal perceptions of infant expressions must take into 
account, not only the interactive and social context of the child's behaviour, but the 
temporal and dynamic aspect as well. It is also vital to examine what aspects of
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infant behaviour mothers are selecting for interpretation and how both the selection 
of these behaviours and the meaning assigned to them may be subject to age related 
and situational factors. These factors were considered in the Adamson et al. (1987) 
study. Their technique provided a more appropriate way of securing the interpreta­
tive process to the dynamic behaviour of the infants. However, it is possible to 
narrow  down these interpretations further by taking account of the specific facial 
expressions that elicited them. To do this, an additional methodological factor that 
must be addressed is how to sample from the behavioural stream of infant expressive 
activity. This is a subject we turn to in the next chapter.
3.4 A Social Model of Development
In much of the discussion it appeared that a great deal of emphasis was placed 
on the mother's role. This was intentional. It is necessary to rectify the imbalance 
between the infant's side of the equation by examining the mother's effect; it is 
argued that it is not the learning of skills that is important as much as the way in 
which they are taught. Without the guidance of the adult, the child will not find an 
anchor in the social world of which she is to be a full member. The theory developed 
in this thesis is multimodal in the sense that it does not simply look at the biological 
basis of facial expressions as manifestations of an internal state, but also deals with 
how these biological reactions are assimilated into the social context of the particular 
situation to become transformed into qualitatively different phenomena, partly 
through maternal interpretations and reciprocal interaction. In doing so, it is 
proposed that it is not sufficient to assess the effect of the environment upon the 
infant, but also the effect of the infant upon its environment. This is represented in 
looking at how, as the infant develops, the mother's attitude and interpretation 
changes toward the infant's expressive behaviours.
At the same time, by examining maternal interpretations in the context of 
infant facial expressions, it is possible to elaborate on how the cultural code influences 
development at more microanalytic levels. This enables the social theory elaborated 
in the present study to be applied to the more developmental issues, rather than to 
the more broad based anthropological ones that have characterised research. A 
substantial body of literature has elaborated upon how important parental participa­
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tion is in the infant's acquisition of behavioural and communicative skills. The 
development of intentionality, co-ordination, organisation and intersubjectivity are 
argued to arise out of joint activities between the infant and its caregiver in ways that 
highlight the essential meaning component which parents carry into their exchanges 
with their infants, and which define what task constraints to impose upon the infant's 
activities at different stages of development.
In this way, the proposed perspective incorporates the active person-active 
environment model framework discussed above. Whilst in this chapter we have 
examined how maternal interpretations are one essential component of the develop­
ment of emotions, they cannot be studied in isolation. In keeping with the principles 
of dynamic models, it is not sufficient only to examine maternal reports but also the 
facial expressions which give rise to them. How to sample infant expressive 
behaviour is a subject we will turn to next.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
"When he had tapped on the table, and I had gone back to [playing with] him, 
tapping back on the table, just him finding that amusing and tapping 
backwards and forth, copying. Copying me or me copying him, and then him 
copying back again."
(Attributed to mother of baby boy, 4-6 month old age group)
4.0 Chapter Aims
In Chapter 3 it was pointed out that, by and large, theories of emotional 
development tend to focus on one aspect of the relationship between the child and 
its environment at the expense of other aspects. In particular there is a pervasive 
neglect in assessing how the active environment (mother) is affected by the child, i.e., 
in assessing the infant's effect upon the mother. This is reflected in the sparsity of 
empirical research on maternal perceptions and interpretations of infant facial express­
ions. It was argued that to overcome methodological weaknesses in these studies 
requires, a primary step, linking expressive interaction with maternal reports. In 
Chapter 3 the role of mothers in development was highlighted and studies which 
have specifically investigated maternal interpretations of infant behaviours were 
reviewed. It was pointed out that a consistent problem with empirical studies of 
maternal perceptions of facial expressions was their failure to include the actual 
behaviours of mother and infant in their analysis, making it difficult to determine 
what was being selected and whether the contexts in which it occurred affected the 
interpretations. Related to this was the criticism that the studies either relied on ques­
tionnaires or static photographs of infant expressions, devoid of situational and 
behavioural context. Whilst these restrictions limited the number of alternative 
explanations of the results, in some cases they raised more questions than they 
answered. For example, are mothers projecting meaning onto infant acts that is not 
present in the physical characteristics of the infant's behaviour? Are maternal 
attributions of infant states influenced by contextual factors? In what way? Do 
maternal interpretations change with infant age? What factors may influence these 
changes? It is therefore argued that facial expressions must be examined in conjunc­
tion with maternal interpretations. To this end, the first part of this chapter will focus
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on models of interaction in order to arrive at a method of sampling infant expressive 
behaviour. Different models of interactions make different theoretical assumptions 
about developmental processes. Whilst the choice of interactional model m ust rest 
w ith the particular research aims of the present study, a review of the various social 
interaction frameworks that have been developed will elucidate important aspects that 
need to be taken into account when sampling from behavioural sequences.
The classification of social interaction is fraught with definitional ambiguities. 
Attempts to study the communicative value of emotions are accompanied by difficult 
problems in the assessment of particular expressions and in the categorisation of 
interactional contexts for the purpose of interpreting their potential meaning. Other 
major difficulties in the developmental approach to interactional emotionality are 
related to the selection of situations that are comparable across age groups (Papousek 
and Papousek et al., 1986). The study of non-verbal communication is compounded 
by the fact that the mother-infant system is in a continual state of transition. The 
particular factors or parameters that control development at one stage are not 
necessarily those that control transitions to other stages. These considerations point 
to the necessity of carefully assessing how to represent mother-infant social interaction 
in ways that are theoretically and empirically congruent with the aims of the present 
study. Thus, in the following discussion, decisions on how to define and sample 
behaviour are presented.
A number of dynamic interaction models have been devised by researchers to 
this end. Theoretical assumptions underlying models of interaction will be discussed 
as they will directly affect how the following issues are resolved:
1. Should the sampling and analysis of interaction be comprehensive or should 
specific segments be selected? On what basis would they be selected and why?
2. Should the interaction model incorporate temporal context, or assess structural 
aspects? Why?
3. Should interaction be defined from the point of view of the interactors or from the 
point of view of an external observer or both? Why?
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These issues will determine how behaviour is sampled and defined in the present 
study. Having arrived at a method of sampling, the hypotheses of the study will be 
presented. The remainder of the chapter will address methodological considerations 
surrounding the design of the study; for example, where and how to conduct the 
study, and issues relating to data coding.
4.1 Models of Interaction: Sampling Behaviour
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines the verb to interact as "to act 
reciprocally; to have an effect upon each other". This definition is not usually 
adhered to by students of infant development. Instead, closed system models are the 
underpinnings of much of the m odem  developmental psychology of infancy 
(Feinman, 1991). Valsiner (1984) has suggested that developmental psychology 
embraces a "social closed model" of child development in its emulation of the hard 
science models of classical mechanics ('physics envy' ?), in which the richness of 
environmental factors are sacrificed in favour of a cleaner but simplified experimental 
method. This leads to a closed model in which social factors do not play a significant 
role; interaction is not seen as the reciprocal effect of the child upon its environment 
and vice versa, rather, the mechanistic or closed system paradigm separates the child 
as the object of investigation (O) from its environmental context (C). The infant, 
despite predisposing genetic factors, is regarded as a passive recipient of external 
causes rather than an active organism. The aim of research is to report exactly which 
factors affect O and proceed to investigate C, i.e., different effects of C on O. 
Causality is attributed to unitary sources rather than to an interrelated causal system 
that includes both O and C. One way causality is maintained, despite the term 
interaction, as is evident in the work of Bijou and Baer (1961):
"An interaction between behaviour and environment means simply that a
given response may be expected to occur or not, depending on the stimulation
the environment provides." (Bijou and Baer, 1961, p.l).
Because of this unidirectionality principle, different portions of the variance are 
"accounted for" by different "effects". And what is "accounted for" is only arrived at 
by the attribution of the "share" of that outcome to some unitary source of causality.
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There can be no information from this type of analysis of how these "interacting 
factors " are related in reality. In the following discussion some models of interaction 
which implicitly assume S-R sequences will be reviewed and rejected. Whilst 
behaviour can, at one level, be reduced to stimulus response chains, this places strict 
limitations on understanding the development of higher order processes when 
interpreting interaction. Methodologically, interaction models are open to criticism 
on a num ber of issues. Some models look for the growth of communication in 
biologically based processes such that it is not possible to extend their use past early 
infancy. Models which look at sequences of interaction as stimulus response chains 
face problems in terms of deciding who is the initiator of the chain. Structural models 
which attempt to code interaction in terms of conceptually meaningful units ignore 
the significance of these interaction units for the interactors and do not incorporate 
the temporal organisation of behaviour. It is argued that analysing interaction in 
these ways is not appropriate to the aims of the present study as the perspective of 
the interactors, which is essential in understanding what is salient in interaction, is 
ignored.
Theoretical assumptions translate into models of interaction at the level of the 
mother-infant dyad. A number of models representing interaction have been sug­
gested. They fall under broad categories, for example, the learning models derived 
from behaviouristic approaches (e.g., Bijou and Baer, 1965; Gewirtz et al., 1976), 
structural formal models, (e.g., Piaget, 1952), psychodynamic models (e.g., Ainsworth, 
1964; Spitz, 1950), ethological models (eg, Blurton-Jones, 1972) and dynamic 
interactional models (e.g., Chappell and Sander, 1979; Lewis and Lee-Painter, 1974; 
Kaye, 1982; Fogel, 1976; Newson, 1977). Theoretical assumptions dictate the emphasis 
placed on certain aspects of the interaction. For example, some models highlight the 
biological basis of interaction, others represent social interaction linearly, i.e., as one 
behaviour following another in time, whilst others analyze social interaction in terms 
of a structured system of units of behaviour. Each category of model sets criteria for 
what to analyze and how to analyze it. In the following, the models highlighted 
above will be discussed respectively to reveal the one best suited to the present study.
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4.1.1 A Biological Model of Development: Levels of Reduction
As I have pointed out repeatedly, social systems are not built solely on 
biological systems. Some theorists have used biology as the basis of the development 
of the social system. However, they have done so to different degrees; thus, for 
example, one may postulate that the biological system is all that is needed to explain 
the development of the social system. Such a view would stress the physical and 
biological maturation of the organism above all else. There are alternatively those 
who believe that biology is the basis upon which social development rests; such a 
view would hold that the biological system of the organism is extended after birth to 
encompass the social system through organism-environment interaction. And, lastly, 
there are those who propose that biology is only part of the social system albeit a 
very important and essential part. In this view, maturational processes are important 
in providing the capacity to acquire developmental mechanisms which will enable the 
organism to acquire the social mechanisms that are essential for its integration into 
a w ider social group. The first two of these developmental propositions may be 
regarded as reductionist and quasi reductionist respectively.
One model which represents the latter view is that proposed by Chappell and 
Sander (1979). They have emphasised the biological system and have extended it to 
exist after parturition. It is their belief that biorythmicity can account for the growing 
communicative abilities of mother and infant. They address the way in which 
interactions which are achieved in the caregiving situation relate to the ontogeny and 
differentiation of the more specific communicative process. They have proposed a 
biological system in which both its maintenance and its changes depend upon 
regulatory mechanisms which govern the interaction between participating elements 
or components (Chappell and Sander, 1979).
The central premise of this hypothetical system is timing based on biorhythms. 
The framework of temporal organisation of these biorhythms lays the groundwork 
for the more specific sequences of behaviours of each participant in relation to the 
other. At the level of sequential interactions the behavioural sequences become based 
on the time course of the infant state over whole awake periods. Regularly recurring 
infant-caregiver behaviours become related to that time course. Directionality is 
introduced by the course of changes in infant state that influences which event is 
likely to lead to which next event. For example, if in the care giving situation the
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infant cries after waking up, this may be construed by the mother as an indication of 
hunger. If, however, the infant cries after a feed the interpretation is more likely to 
be regarding a wet diaper or tiredness, depending on the time of day in relation to 
the infant's own peculiar cycles. Chappell and Sander (ibid) state:
" As the direction of mutually shared sequences becomes familiar it provides 
the basis for interpretation of meaning or intentionality in specific actions of 
the partner." (Chappell and Sander, 1979, p.94).
They conclude that it is the interactive regulatory system shared by both infant and 
mother that subsequently differentiates into an increasingly complex sequence which, 
in providing basic elements of context, provides a framework for the interpretation 
of intention in the behaviours of the partners.
The model seems to conflate the biological system with the social system. In 
most animal species postnatal care of the young depends upon completely different 
behavioural patterns than those of reproduction and gestation. Even granted that 
there appears to be a period in infancy when the mother and infant are interacting 
at the level of shared rhythms, it is not possible to retain this approach beyond the 
period of early infancy and one would run into difficulties when faced with the 
analysis of social processes (Kaye, 1982). Indeed, although the model makes intima­
tions about intentionality and shared meaning, there is no attempt to present a 
systematic methodology for their study and analysis.
Empirically it concerns itself with contingency based on frequency counts of 
maternal and infant behaviour related to state regulation of the infant occurring 
within 15 second epochs. The sequencing of events and the content of the sequences 
are not given any attention at all. Lewis and Lee-Painter (1974) have criticised the 
reductionist perspective of such models as the above in assuming that interaction 
follows cause-effect patterns. By postulating that there is an interdependence between 
the biological and the social systems, Chappell and Sander have implied a direct 
causal link between biological and social processes. No evidence for this is presented 
and it appears that they too are unclear as to the exact nature of this hypothesised 
interdependence. The lack of any systematic attempt to come up with a method for 
analysing the social aspects of this development seems indicative of this.
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4.1.2 A Mechanistic Model of Development: Causality; Linear or Systemic?
The interactive model expounded by Lewis and Lee-Painter (1974) assumes 
that all behaviour is interactive, but that we cannot observe the direction of 
interaction. They acknowledge that a proportion of mother-infant behaviours cannot 
be specified within an interaction as either initiated or response behaviour. Those 
events which initiate behaviour, i.e., which are responded to, are specified within the 
model as an interaction which continues as long as behaviours can be identified as 
elicitors and responders. Once a specified initiation leads to an unspecified response 
(one which does not lead to a further interaction), the interaction is considered to be 
terminated:
"...A proportion of both infant and environment (maternal) behaviour cannot 
be specified as to interaction both as initiated or response behaviour. That is, 
we assume that all behaviour is interactive, but we cannot observe the nature 
or direction of the interaction...Consider a specified infant initiation; this can 
lead to an unspecified maternal response (MR). This then terminates the 
series. Alternatively, a specified infant initiation can lead to a specified 
maternal response which then acts as a specified maternal initiation. This has 
two alternatives, leading to either an unspecified infant response (IR) and 
termination of the interaction, or to a specified infant response. This specified 
infant response in turn becomes a specified infant initiation which then has 
two alternatives. Thus the flow can continue to cycle as long as infant and 
maternal behaviour remain specified (i.e., remain directed toward and effective 
on one another). As soon as this ceases, we are led into either a MR or IR and 
termination of the sequence. As expected, the response of either member of 
the pair also becomes the stimulus initiator for the other." (Lewis and Lee- 
Painter, 1974, p.24)
There are several methodological problems with this model. In the first place, 
the point of entry into the flow may be very misleading, more so as the model 
assumes a Markovian sequence. The Markov model assumes that the probability of 
occurrence of a given event depends only on the last preceding event. Such a model 
becomes tenuous when one takes into account knowledge based on shared experience 
and context as playing a part within interaction. This suggests that the Markovian 
assumptions become less valid the older the infant becomes within the dyad. It must 
also be pointed out that specified behaviours do not have the same consequences, 
although this can be accommodated for within the model by transitional probabilities. 
Still the Markov model does not allow for the fact that the occurrence of an event 
may be affected by a series of prior events, as in "tonic" communication (Schleidt
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1973), when a response is elicited only after a repeated series of stimuli. The problem 
of how to judge the initiator of the chain of interactions in the first place thus rests 
on the assumption that responses are elicited by the immediately preceding event, 
rather than by something else further back as is suggested in the notion of "tonic " 
communication. The model therefore assumes that behaviour is determined by single 
events. Ordering the data in this way fails to do justice to the hierarchical 
organisation of behaviour and leaves aside intentions or longer term goals that may 
explain the form of a particular sequence, especially as goal directed behaviour is 
motivated by the end of the process rather than the beginning of it. Finally, Schaffer 
(1984) has pointed out that the model places restrictions on the length of the 
sequences. The above model is mostly used to study very short sequences which are 
analyzed for contingency which, although not posing a serious threat to the analysis 
in general, nevertheless limits its applicability.
4.1.3 Structural-Interactive models
Some models have sought to overcome the linearity of such models as the 
above by structuring behaviour into units (Bakeman and Brown, 1977; Tronick, Als 
and Brazelton, 1980; Tronick, Als and Adamson, 1979). The monadic phases model 
of Tronick et al. (1980), for example, defines face to face interaction as:
"A structured system of mutually and reciprocally regulated units of behav­
iours." (Tronick et al., 1980, p.4)
Interaction is segmented into units of behaviour which contain information about who 
is acting, what they are doing, and when they are doing it. These units are called 
Monadic Phases. Expressive behaviours based on the face, voice, head and eye 
orientation, body posture and specific gestures are categorised on a scale according 
to criteria of what interactive phase the action units fall under. That is, each second 
by second combination of expressive modalities is transformed into one of seven 
monadic phases according to predefined categories for each participant separately. 
This enables the calculation of the proportion of time spent in each of the monadic 
phases. The segmentation is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the Darwinian (1872) 
principle that opposite emotions are expressed by opposite behaviours. That is,
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behaviours are organised into patterns which characterise opposite states. For 
example, a playing infant sits up straight, smiles, etc., whilst a distressed infant turns 
away, cries, frowns etc. Secondly, they assume that single behaviours do not define 
a monadic phase but, rather, different expressive behaviours in combination can result 
in the same phase. Protest, for example, can be conveyed by crying or turning away 
or frowning or any combination of these behaviours.
The limitations of this model centre on two issues. Firstly, it is not possible 
to assess the significance of the predefined categories for the interactors, as Fogel 
(1988) points out:
"Ostensibly, the scale is meant to reflect the level of interactive 'participation' 
or 'engagement', at least as viewed by the observer. It has not been demon­
strated, however, that this construct has functional significance for the 
participants. Do the phases have psychological significance?" (Fogel, 1988, p.
394)
Thus, for example, behaviours defined as conveying protest may do so to the 
experimenter, but may not be regarded as such by the mother. A frown may be 
understood differently by the mother depending on other situational factors. 
Furthermore, and along the same lines, expressive behaviours or combinations of 
expressive behaviours may assume different meanings as infants get older and 
develop other modes of communicating. Secondly, the model is uni-dimensional and 
obscures the hierarchical temporal organisation of the interaction. Fogel (1988) states:
"Individuals in social interaction operate on a number of distinct and 
embedded time scales. Higher frequency shifts between, for example, infant 
gaze at and away, or mother and infant smiling onsets are embedded in 
relatively long duration behaviours, such as maternal maintenance of the 
baby's body position or maternal gaze at the infant." (Fogel, 1988, p.394)
Thus, although the model overcomes limitations of linear models by providing 
structured units for the analysis of behaviour and avoiding S-R chains, it nevertheless 
has limitations in that, by doing so, it obscures temporal organisation of behaviours 
at more microanalytic levels. Both types of models have advantages and disadvan­
tages. Whilst temporally dynamic models have problems defining who initiates an 
interaction sequence and who responds to it, they do not obscure the way behaviours 
are organised in relation to each other. As was already mentioned, structural 
accounts of interaction, on the other hand, in attempting to overcome problems of
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defining interaction in S-R chains, obscure the temporal organisation of behaviour. 
However, both types of model may be criticised for defining social interaction only 
from the point of view of an external observer. None of the models reviewed so far 
provides any method of finding out what the actors understand of the behaviour of 
the other actor. One advantage of eliciting maternal accounts of what is significant, 
for example, is that it overcomes difficulties in deciding on what actions are 
significant for the interactors and on what basis. Thus, the process of selection need 
not rest on predefined structural units nor on arbitrary S-R chains. The selection and 
definition of the interaction can be made to rest with the actors directly involved.
4.1.4 Social-Interactive Models
Coding schemes provide a way of segmenting the stream of behaviour into 
meaningful units. These units are not inherent in the behaviour but rather something 
imposed upon it in order to make sense of it. Collet states:
"A physical continuum is transformed into discrete categories... and the units
are not, as it were, in the world, but rather in our construction of the world."
(Collett, 1980, p.153).
There are two ways in which this may take place: One can use a set of 
distinctions set by the layman or 'native', as the person who is directly involved in 
the interaction and hence the units are meaningful from his or her perspective. This 
has been termed an 'emic ' description. Alternatively, behaviour can be segmented 
according to the investigator's criteria, in which case they are 'etic' (Collett, 1980). 
Obtaining both accounts is essential for a number of reasons. Firstly, it allows 
comparison between objective and personal descriptions of behaviour. Secondly, it 
addresses the question of whether infant expressions always signify the same 
meaning to the mothers, regardless of situational and behavioural context. Finally, 
it allows us to assess whether mothers' interpretations of 'objectively defined' 
expressions remains constant despite differences in infant age.
Social conventional approaches to interaction recognise the value of obtaining 
the mother's definition of a social interaction. Newson's (1979) model of social 
interaction is an example of this. It incorporates the bio-rhythmic feature of the
112
Chappell and Sander model by proposing that events which are developmentally 
created by caregivers for infants will have a time course which is sensitive to the way 
in which the infant reacts to those events. That is, it recognises that infants are 
normally subjected to social programming as a consequence of the biological necessity 
for nurturing. The mother will continuously make attempts to make these events 
meaningful and entertaining, often embedding them in game-like rituals and thus 
securing the cooperation of the infant (Newson, 1979). In effect, she breaks down the 
ongoing stream of behaviour into temporal chunks with a beginning and an end. 
Due to their daily recurrence they become established familiar sequences to which the 
infant can show his recognition by motor anticipation, also providing feedback to the 
caregiver. The intentionality in these action patterns is initially built into the inter­
action by the mother, and the ensuing dialogues are what eventually lead to mutual 
understanding.
Being naturally highly repetitive, these expressive dialogues enable the infant 
to play an active role in them by virtue of her increasing participation in the same 
ritual sequences. Soon she begins to act in ways which are required of her to sustain 
reciprocal exchanges, smiling in anticipation of the mother7 s face appearing in 
peekaboo, greeting the mother as she walks into the room. Developmentally these 
biorhythmic sequences are the preliminaries for the establishment of socially 
appropriate rules of social interaction. They will increasingly come to depend not 
only on the mother infant pair, but on external social events that have social meaning 
for the mother and will come to have a similar social meaning for the infant.
Unlike Lewis and Lee-Painter there is an emphasis on intentionality which 
manifests itself in a particular concern for the context of the dialogue. It recognises 
that the mother and infant do not signal to us as observers that they have seen or 
heard cues. Newson has observed the mother's natural tendency to present a verbal 
commentary on the infant during interaction (e.g., "Are you hungry? You're hungry 
aren't you?"). He states:
"The procedure which we are describing thus relies heavily on our ability to 
exploit the mother's natural tendency to record indirectly her own spontaneous 
comments, and indeed for certain purposes we may even find it useful to re­
play the video recording to her and ask her to explain exactly what her 
intentions were at certain points in the dialogue." (Newson Ibid, p.55)
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He thus proposes that what is defined as an interaction should rest partly on the 
perspective of the mother. The attribution of responsibility for initiation and termina­
tion of the interaction becomes less problematic in Newson's model, given the 
postulation that mothers capitalise upon "proto-social" behaviours. The mother acts 
upon the non-initiatory and unpremeditated action of her baby, responding to it as 
if it were deliberate. Asking the mothers to report on what these actions are and 
when they occur sidesteps the problem of stimulus-response contingencies and 
focuses on w hat the mother thinks she and her baby are doing.
This approach assumes that all action is meaningful. However, what mothers 
select as meaningful will allow us to see what behaviours have functional meaning 
for the mothers in an interactional context. Thus, mothers can be asked to look at the 
tape of their infants and comment on behaviours they found salient; facial expressions 
accompanying these behaviours can then be coded. This overcomes the methodo­
logical weakness of neglecting analysis of meaning, from the perspective of the 
interactors, in studies of social interaction. More importantly, it limits the analysis of 
interaction episodes to segments that are defined by the mother rather than 
predefined by the experimenter.
However, as Blurton-Jones (1974) has pointed out, objective criteria are also 
needed which are context and inference free. Facial expressions can be coded using 
a commonly employed ethological technique based on Kendon's (1982) "Behaviour 
element approach". He views behaviour as a type of "Mosaic" (Kendon 1982), with 
the fixed elements constituting the pieces of this mosaic. Behaviour, made up of 
elements, is arranged in repeatable patterns that constitute building blocks whose 
combinations and clusters would create more elaborate sequences or structures. This 
must presuppose a very simple view of structures as clusters which ignores temporal 
context. It is interested only in the clustering of frequencies of behaviour elements 
within a specific observational period. For example, the infant element is a set of 
infant behaviours which vary as a function of the age of the child. The environment 
element can either be inanimate objects or people. The model assesses how much of 
a type of behaviour the infant produces. This model becomes implicitly interactive 
when we start to look at either individual differences or developmental consequences. 
When we find differences in the behaviour of infants in different situations we are 
implying that these differences may be because the caregiver does things differently
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in different situations. Assessing the infant's effect on the caregiver, we may look for 
differences in maternal interpretations between the different situations.
Although the behaviour element approach has the same drawbacks as the 
structural approach, it has several advantages in the light of the aims of this study. 
While facial expressions can be defined and coded in great detail, maternal 
interpretations are more gross units of description. Thus, the units used to define 
expressive episodes must assume compatible units of analysis to allow for comparison 
between the two types of data. Secondly, because of the variable nature of infant 
facial expressions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a set of predefined 
interaction categories into which they could fit. This would also appear contradictory 
to the line of thinking adopted here in that we would again have to determine what 
is to be considered significant and what is not. The alternative is to let the mothers 
decide which behavioural elements are significant within the interaction. These 
behavioural elements, i.e., facial expressions, can then be coded second by second 
using an 'objective' and 'context-free' coding scheme. Firstly, this would allow us to 
compare a 'context-free' analysis of facial expressions with the mother's 'subjective' 
interpretation. Secondly, by filming babies in different situations, it would allow us 
to test the ways in which facial expressions derive part of their significance for the 
mother from the context in which they occur. The technique would allow us to 
differentiate between the expressions which the external observer believes exist and 
the reality of the mother infant situation in the eyes of the mother.
The complexity of the mother infant system is partly reflected in the numerous 
models that have been created to describe it. However, in keeping with the main 
focus of the study, maternal interpretations of infant emotionality, it is appropriate 
to study the whole range of behaviours in contained units defined by mothers as 
overall proportions. This is especially appropriate given the elusive nature of both 
the communicative aspect of facial expressions and the level of detail to be expected 
by asking mothers to comment on interaction. Thus, it is proposed that films of 
mothers and infants interacting in different situations be obtained and mothers asked 
to comment upon the tape of their babies. Based upon their comments, segments of 
tape defined by the mothers as significant will be coded and analysed.
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4.2 Hypotheses and Aims of the Study
The thesis proposes that an important part of emotional development is 
maternal interpretations of infant facial expressions. By selectively marking and 
treating actions as if they were intentional, adults support the current interaction and 
guide infants towards more sophisticated means of communication (Bruner, 1983b; 
Lock, 1980; Rogoff, Malkin, and Gilbride, 1984; Kaye, 1982). The infant learns from 
the mother's reactions to his or her expressions what the meaning of these expressive 
states are and how to employ them to convey intentions and to obtain goals. The 
impressions of the mother influence the behaviour towards an end state, that being 
the approximation of socially appropriate skills to obtain socially appropriate goals 
(see Chapter 3).
Several observational studies of adult infant interactions show that adults, once 
an act has been selected, can interpret infants' acts in a manner that is finely tuned 
to developmental change (e.g., Lock, 1978; Tronick, 1982). In contrast, surprisingly 
little experimental research has systematically examined the way in which adults 
select acts for interaction in the first place. Given the ambiguity of the task, it is 
reasonable to assume that selections may depend not only on what an infant does, 
but also on the context, the adult's understanding of the situation and the adult's 
previous experience with the infant.
The task of the present study will be to test the above assumptions. Maternal 
interpretations will be compared to a context free, objective coding of infant facial 
expressions. The following questions will be addressed:
1. On what basis do mothers select meaningful acts from the stream of infant behav­
iours? Are their selections influenced by contextual factors and infant age? Do they 
select more infant behaviours as infants grow older and their behaviour become more 
clearly defined?
2. Do mothers make the same number of selections as external observers?
3. What is the content of mothers' selections, i.e., what types of facial expressions do 
mothers select, and do these selected expressions vary between different situations 
and age groups?
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4. What types of attributions do mothers make concerning behaviours that they have 
selected?
5. Will the context of the interaction influence the way they interpret infant facial 
expressions?
6. Do maternal interpretations undergo changes with infant age, in line with 
developmental capacities?
Maternal attributions of meaning between 4 and 6 months are hypothesised 
to be more situation and context dependent. By 7-9 months mothers' accounts are 
expected to reflect the developing infants' interest in their surroundings. By 10-12 
months accounts are expected to be less context and situation dependent and more 
reliant on expressive conventions that will have been negotiated between mothers and 
their infants.
4.3 Research Strategy
Having identified the key questions to be researched and the model being 
adopted for their investigation, it now remains to outline how they will be empirically 
examined. By and large the explication of developmental processes and mechanisms 
remains a difficult and elusive task. A cross sectional sample is usually valuable on 
its own as a means of revealing age related changes that occur within a sample of 
children, where repeated measurements would confound the variables under study. 
Interviewing the same mothers over many trials would result in reports being 
confounded by earlier interviews, and would also alert the mother to the true nature 
of the study, resulting in experimenter effects both during the interactive episodes 
and in the maternal accounts. In the present project, the decision to use a cross-sec­
tional design rested on the advantage of this sampling procedure in ensuring that 
maternal reports were accurate and unbiased by parental memory. Moreover, 
comparison of maternal selections and interpretations of facial expressions between 
age groups allow for the investigation of how maternal interpretations change, 
depending on the infant's developing abilities.
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Mother-infant pairs will be filmed interacting in different situations and an 
account will be taken of the mothers' interpretations of their infant's facial express­
ions. Based on the review of infant capacities in Chapter 2, the critical phase in which 
face to face interaction becomes the predominant mode of interaction occurs around 
3-4 months. Development of face to face interaction undergoes important changes 
during the next few months, with such capacities as joint referencing and social 
referencing developing around 8-9 months. By 12 months there are the rudim entary 
skills of social communication between the mother and infant. Beyond 12 months, 
language development begins and would confound the study of facial interaction. 
Thus, the study will concentrate on infants between 4 and 12 months.
The behavioural data will be gathered by means of video filming. Decisions 
concerning the method that would be used for the filming centre around where to 
film, what situations to film, how often to film them and for how long. These issues 
will be dealt with consecutively.
4.3.1 Home versus Laboratory
In view of the sensitivity and delicacy of the interaction that is being sought, 
rather than taking the mother-infant pair to the unfamiliar surroundings of the 
laboratory, it is more authentic to restrict movement in the home. Filming in the 
laboratory may bias the natural occurrence of facial expressions and the type of facial 
expressions produced. The one constraint imposed on the mother and infant is to 
restrict the play session to a sit down session with the mother and infant facing each 
other. Mothers would be visited and filmed twice, once to familiarise them with the 
equipment and to put them at their ease and, the second time, to take the actual film 
data, after which they would be interviewed. Whilst it is unavoidable that filming 
has inherent problems in the form of experimenter effects, it is arguably the least 
obtrusive method of collecting this type of data.
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4.3.2 Filming Situations
Regarding the situations that would be filmed, Stem (1974) found that the two 
situations which elicited the highest levels of face to face activity between mothers 
and babies were the play situation and the feeding situation. It was therefore decided 
to pilot those two situations to determine how appropriate they were to the analysis 
of face to face expressive interaction. These situations are also representative of the 
everyday contexts in which mothers and babies interact. In line with the hypotheses 
of the study, more than one social situation needs to be included, as maternal attribu­
tions of meaning to infant expressions are hypothesised to change according to the 
situations within which the expressions occurred. The decision to make the filming 
sessions 7 minutes long rested on previous observational microanalytic research which 
had chosen between 2 minutes and 10 minutes (Brazelton et al., 1974; Fogel, 1985; 
Sylvester-Bradley, 1985; Schaffer and Crook, 1979; Tronick et al., 1978; Cohn et al., 
1989). The sessions must be as short as possible in consideration of the amount of 
coding time but they also have to allow enough time for mothers to comment on the 
interaction.
Two cameras would be used alongside extra lighting when necessary. The 
cameras would record the behaviour of the mother and of the infant on separate 
tapes.11 Facial expressions of mothers will also be collected for comparison. Using 
two cameras would capture most of the interaction on film with little loss of data due 
to obscuring of the faces. Verbal data from maternal accounts would be gathered 
whilst mothers watched videotapes of their infants taken during the previous session. 
Behavioural data will be obtained from video tapes of mothers and infants during 
interaction and coded, using a facial expression coding framework.
The use of film to record behaviour has the advantage of providing sequential 
data which the mothers can comment upon. Presenting babies' actions dynamically 
to mothers is essential for the ecological validity of the study. Coding the data will 
be an extensive procedure and one which may affect the results of the study. It is 
therefore worth discussing facial coding techniques in some detail to explain how 
data will be coded and why.
11. To synchronise the two video tapes it was suggested that a time clock be placed on the 
two videos corresponding to the same point in time on the two videos and running for 7 
minutes, so that the 7 minutes would coincide in the two tapes of mother and infant.
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4.4 Facial Coding Techniques
Facial action coding schemes provide a way of analysing behaviour reliably. 
Save for only two coding frameworks, most facial coding schemes are not diachronic 
(coded in time), i.e., are synchronic (static codes). The only two systems to date that 
include the onset, offset and duration of expressions as part of their codes are MAX 
(Izard, 1983) and FACS (Ekman and Freisen, 1978). They will therefore be discussed 
in more detail below.
For the purposes of this study we need to consider facial coding schemes with 
reference to their theoretical assumptions, their criteria for sampling behaviours to be 
coded, their reliability and, finally, in terms of their advantages for this study. That 
is,
1. What is defined.
2. How it is defined.
3. Why it is defined in this way.
4.4.1 The Theoretical Basis of Facial Action Coding Systems
Theoretical assumptions influence the methods of selection of the target facial 
expressions and construction of the coding scheme. Such assumptions directly 
influence the validity and reliability of the schemes. It is therefore worth reviewing 
the theoretical bases of facial coding techniques. There are three types of system 
classified by Ekman (1982); those which are ethologically or inductively based, those 
which are theoretically based and those which are anatomically based. These 
distinctions are not clear cut and most of the coding schemes are based on identifying 
universally recognised facial expressions.
The first of those, the ethologically based system, is one which concentrates 
on the social or communicative aspect of facial codes. Listings of facial expressions 
are derived by observing spontaneous behaviour. These systems create "ethograms", 
or catalogues, of salient behaviours in the communicative repertoire (e.g., Blurton- 
Jones, 1972) . For example, Young and Decarie's (1977) system catalogues the global 
facial and vocal expressions of 75 infants to six different stimulus situations. The 
facial movements are categorised into expressions of distress, anger, interest, fear and
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joy, using four separate regions of the face (brow, eyes, mouth and other). Their 
system only codes those expressions that are part of the infant's repertoire of 
expressions at the end of the first year. Each unit is purported to have a social, 
emotional and communicative function. Ekman and Oster (1979) have identified 
several weaknesses in these coding systems if considered as general purpose 
measurement systems. For example, they do not have any criteria for explaining the 
exclusion of certain facial movement patterns. They all include both simple muscle 
actions and complex movements involving several independent actions without 
explicitly stating why they are coded together. Moreover, some behavioural units 
are given inference-laden names (e.g., "an angry frown") making objective coding of 
the action difficult. Many action units are also vaguely defined, so that coders cannot 
know if they are coding the same actions. Many of the actions are anatomically 
incorrect. Lastly, individual, racial or age related differences in physiognomy may 
make it difficult to identify certain actions described in terms of static configurations 
(e.g., "oblong mouth").
Theory-based coding systems, such as FAST (Ekman and Freisen, 1975), are 
constructed on the basis of previous research which identifies the distinctive compo­
nents of six universal affect expressions. It is useful in studies which relate the facial 
expression of subjects to autonomic responses, experimental conditions and observer's 
judgements. Actions other than those specified are not included and there is no 
justification for why they are excluded.
Izard's system (MAX) is sometimes regarded as a theoretically based system 
(e.g., Ekman and Freisen, 1978). It was constructed by recording facial expressions 
from different cultures and selecting those which appeared and were understood by 
more than one cultural group. Decisions of what facial movements to define were 
based on inspection of still photographs of posed emotions that had yielded high 
agreement among trained observers of an earlier complimentary coding system, 
AFFREX.
Ekman and Freisen (1978) have criticised MAX on the basis that it is not 
anatomically based. Anatomically based systems score actions in terms of the 
minimal muscle actions that collectively produce the movement. However, this is 
contrary to what Izard and Dougherty (1982) say about this system:
"The Maximally Discriminative Facial Movement Coding System (MAX) (Izard
1979), a coding system anatomically based on movement units, was developed
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as an objective system for identifying exclusively the discrete changes in facial 
appearance necessary for identifying the fundamental emotions." (Izard et al.,
1982, p.105, emphasis added)
Ekman and Oster (1979) state that FACS (Facial Action Coding System (Ekman 
and Freisen, 1978)) is anatomically based as it was designed to code all visible facial 
behaviour in any context, not just actions related to emotions. Moreover, the 
movement codes were also constructed in terms of which actions can be reliably 
distinguished. However, aside from the fact that the system is slow to learn and use, 
it suffers from more serious problems. Ekman and Oster state that FACS includes 
more distinctions than may be needed for any particular analysis. This necessitates 
collapsing some of the elementary measurement units or disregarding subtle 
distinctions, which, given the purported comprehensive nature of the system, would 
be a complicated and time consuming process. The question of comprehensiveness 
versus selectivity will be discussed below.
A further consideration for the present study is that the coding system needs 
to identify facial expressions in infancy. The system devised by Izard is the only one 
to date which was designed specifically to code facial expressions of infants. 
Guidelines have also been given which enable the system to be used to code adult 
facial expressions as well. Malatesta and Haviland (1986), who used the system to 
code both adult and infant expressions, pointed out that MAX was a good system to 
use when analysing adult infant facial interactions because adults' expressions 
frequently m irror the infants' expressions during interaction. This is an important 
consideration which provides strong justification for its use.
4.4.2 Comprehensiveness Versus Selectivity
The criteria for comprehensiveness rests on three dimensions; (a) the type of 
action coded, i.e., what movements of the face are coded, (b) the intensity of action, 
and (c) the timing of action such as the onset, offset and duration of the movement. 
Each of these dimensions is important in the theoretical implications it carries for the 
analysis of facial expressions.
In the case of the first dimension, type of action, a technique which claims to 
be comprehensive in terms of measuring action is claiming that each and every
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movement is codable. For the purposes of most interaction research a comprehensive 
coding system poses certain problems; firstly, in that it makes the study of specific 
expressions more complicated, and secondly (should the researcher wish to study all 
the movements of the face), in providing evidence that the system is indeed 
comprehensive. The reason for wishing to choose a comprehensive system is if one 
is seeking to answer research questions which are essentially exploratory in nature. 
If the researcher is unable to determine the exact character of the expressions that he 
or she wishes to investigate, then the first step must be to find out the forms of the 
expressions that will need to be looked at, using more selective techniques, which 
have the advantage of economy of time and are not so labour intensive. The 
important consideration regarding a selective technique is to know what has been 
excluded. This must depend on the theoretical approach of the creator and what he 
had intended to use the system for in the first place. Ekman and Freisen's (1978) 
system (FACS) is claimed to be able to code all visible movements of the face. They 
derived their list of facial codes from measurement units that were based on what the 
muscles allowed the face to do. The time cost of using such a system, however, is 
such that it should only be used when the researcher is uncertain of the types of facial 
movements to expect. It therefore has two disadvantages. Firstly, it has not been 
proved that the system is indeed comprehensive, and secondly, it does not define 
emotion expression. MAX does not claim to be comprehensive. It specifies the basis 
on which facial expressions are coded, and it and defines emotional expressions.
With regards intensity of action, there have been very few packages to date 
that have included it in their analysis as explicit codes. Ekman and Friesen's FACS 
includes intensity of action in its codes. Izard's (1983) MAX, although it does not 
have explicit codes for intensity, does incorporate intensity of facial expressions. For 
example, code 38, raised cheeks, is an indicator of how much the mouth is open either 
in a smile or in an angular distress shape. This and other codes can indeed be used 
as indices for inferring the intensity of particular expressions, if it is necessary to the 
analysis. By including specific intensity codes, Ekman and Freisen's (1978) system is 
also sacrificing reliability to a certain extent. This is because there has not been any 
evidence that intensity of some actions can be extended reliably for all actions. Thus 
one is not sure whether or not the various parts of the face that have action intensities 
are independent of other muscles of the face. This means that the coding of various 
action intensities cannot be used reliably as codes for only those muscles of the face.
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Timing of action is important in revealing concurrences between mother and 
infant expressions, i.e., overlap of facial expressions. Onset and offset times or 
expressions are important in revealing durations, and concurrences and co-onsets of 
expressions which are hypothesised to change with age and to have certain temporal 
characteristics within certain age spans. This feature is present in both FACS and 
MAX.
In the light of the above considerations, it was decided to use Izard's (1983) 
MAX (Maximally Discriminative Facial Movement Coding System). It is a template 
based coding system which identifies 27 components, consisting of universally 
recognised emotional expressions and blends of expressions. As was mentioned 
earlier, one of its advantages over other coding systems is that it is specifically 
designed for use on infants, whereas most systems to date were designed for use on 
adult faces and later adapted for infants. Furthermore, the system has been adapted 
by the authors for use on adult faces by substituting movements which identify 
bulges in the infant with furrows in the adult.
It was designed to test universally recognised facial expressions, making it 
useful in comparing facial expressions either cross culturally or within a specific cul­
ture. As this study is concerned partly with the recognition of specific facial express­
ions within English culture, it will be appropriate to compare the infants' facial 
expressions, using MAX, with the mothers' interpretations. Although the validity of 
some of MAX's facial configurations has not been established, there has been 
extensive work done on the reliability of the package as a whole in contrast with 
FACS (Facial Action Coding System), the reliability of which has not been established 
altogether. Izard tested the inter-coder reliability of MAX and found it to range 
between 75%-85%. Others who have used it, such as Hiatt and also Haviland (Izard, 
1983), have also stated that they have achieved 80% reliability or higher. Validity is 
more difficult to establish since the emotions underlying the facial expressions cannot 
be validated in infants. However, the construction of the facial codes framework 
relied on anatomical charts and texts on the relationship of muscle movements. The 
other advantage of MAX is its efficiency. Although each minute of video tape takes 
one hour to code, MAX is still not as time consuming as some of the packages avail­
able for coding expressions. In view of the amount of data to be analysed it is 
important to use a system which is not excessively time consuming.
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4.5 Verbal Reports as Data
The other methodological consideration that must be taken into account for 
the purposes of the present study is the validity of the maternal accounts that will be 
obtained. Verbal reports have been fraught with methodological controversies 
historically and even up to the present day. When W undt established the first experi­
mental laboratory at Leipzig in 1879, his method of experimentation was based on 
"controlled introspection". Later on this method was to be misused by his contempor­
aries for the explication of language processes and higher mental phenomena, thus 
bringing it into disrepute. With the advent of behavioursim and its characteristic 
onus on "Off with the head, nothing below the spinal chord", verbal reports became 
totally unacceptable. Only observable phenomena were studied and what they could 
not see was simply not there.
This historical mistrust of verbal reports has remained to the present day. 
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) conducted a series of experiments with the aim of refuting 
the proposition that verbal reports may be accurate representations of cognitive 
processes. They believe that conscious awareness is limited to the products of mental 
processes and that the processes themselves are beyond the reach of introspection. 
When people are asked to report on their cognitive processes, they do not rely on an 
introspective knowledge but make use of implicit cultural or personal beliefs and a 
general judgement strategy which the authors term "the representativeness heuristic", 
a concept adopted from Kahnemann and Tversky (1973)
Ericsson and Simon (1980), White (1980) and Smith and Miller (1978), amongst 
others, have attacked Nisbett and Wilson's article on both theoretical and methodo­
logical grounds. Of relevance to the present study is the proposal by Ericsson and 
Simon that verbal reports can be considered valid if certain conditions are met. For 
example, if the nature of the task allows for the accurate reporting of subjects' experi­
ences. Similarly, subjects need to be 'blind' to the experimental design; if they are 
informed of the advent of a verbal report before the task, this will change the nature 
of the task and the possibility of it influencing the cognitive processes cannot be ruled 
out (Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Prompts can also shape the type of information 
received in verbal reports. For example, Ericsson and Simon report that probing by 
using prompts, although it inevitably depends on the aims of the research, is more
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accurate when it is directed towards a specific topic rather than probing for general 
states (Ibid).
Nisbett and Wilson (1977) state that verbal reports are only reflections of 
common-sense notions of the world:
" When reporting on the effects of stimuli people may not interrogate a 
memory of the cognitive processes that operated on the stimuli; instead, they 
may base their reports on implicit, a priori theories about the causal connection 
between stimulus and response. If the stimulus psychologically implies the 
response in some way or seems 'representative' of the sorts of stimuli that 
influence the response in question the stimulus is reported to have influenced 
the response. If the stimulus does not seem to be a plausible cause of the 
response it is reported to be non influential." (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, 
p.233)
The arguments as to whether or not verbal reports accurately reflect cognitive 
processes is outside the scope of the present study. What is of relevance is that the 
attributional and socially evaluative data that reports will yield are in fact precisely 
what is required from the verbal reports of the mothers. The purpose of the reports 
will be to record the mother's impression of the infant's expressions in interaction 
and, secondly, to derive justification of her own behaviour towards the infant. 
Developmentally, this means testing the following assumptions:
1) That as babies get older there will be a change in maternal interpretations, 
reflecting the increasing abilities of the infant.
2) That there will be a change in maternal attributions in concordance with the 
contexts in which infant behaviour occurs.
Nisbett and Wilson's (Ibid) point that verbal reports will not accurately 
determine the stimulus or responses that actually influenced the subjects in their 
behaviour is a testable hypothesis. Maternal reports and the stimulus behaviours that 
prom pted them are both available and it is possible to compare them. The verbal 
reports give us an interesting insight into mothers' impressions of what the baby does 
and how they are likely to respond.
Indeed, processes operating within the mother-infant system w ork on many 
different levels. There is a hierarchical structure in the routines and subroutines that 
shape mother-infant interaction. The same may be said for the inferential processes
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that operate to shape the mother's behaviour towards the child. In speaking of 
'm ental processes' without defining the theoretical assumptions regarding them 
(Smith and Miller, 1978), Nisbett and Wilson have laid the way open for the criticism 
that their premise for concluding that they are not available for direct introspection 
is untenable. For example, White has pointed out that there is no distinction between 
mental process and mental product, i.e., what gets into mental awareness. He states 
that:
"It is easy to fall into the trap of calling everything that gets into conscious­
ness 'product' and everything else 'process'; if we decide to use consciousness 
as the criterion for making the distinction then the product process viewpoint 
becomes true by circularity." (White, 1980, p.106)
Moreover, it is not clear where one makes the distinction between one process and 
another. All processes have sub-processes, and this divisibility continues down to the 
level of neurons. If processes are large scale entities then almost nothing can be 
conscious, and if they are small scale then a comparatively great deal can be 
conscious.
A problem that does appear here is with the nature of maternal impressions. 
Most of the interaction between mother and infant is automated and comes naturally 
to the mother. Automated processes, highly practised routines, are executed rapidly 
and with little reflection. They will therefore be unavailable for verbal reports 
(Ericsson and Simon, 1980). Although the focus of these verbal reports are not the 
processes of evaluation but their contents, there still remains the possibility that due 
to the automated nature of the interaction, the contents of the processes will be 
unavailable as well. This might mean that verbal account might be scanty when 
concerned w ith long established routines. Using probes overcomes this problem and 
helps to structure the maternal accounts so that classification and coding are made 
easier. New interaction patterns would not have had time to become automated and 
therefore might be more accessible to verbal accounts, therefore reducing the 
m agnitude of the problem further.
Ericsson and Simon (ibid) also pose the issue of emotionality as an interfering 
factor in verbal accounts and suggest that information given under emotive circum­
stances or on emotive subjects would be less complete than reports of an orderly 
process. However, unlike the studies conducted using retrospective reports to record 
the processes of cognition, this study differs in two essential ways. Firstly, it is not 
the cognitive processes that are important in this instance as much as the socio-
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emotive attributions of the mother. As was stated above, this does not enter into the 
controversy of whether or not the reports reveal mental processes. Secondly, and 
more importantly, the reports will be accounts given during a play back of video 
tapes of the mother interacting with the infant. What is therefore expected is that the 
mother will report the salient features that she perceives within the interaction. 
Implicit in these reports will be the social values and beliefs that shape such attribu­
tions. This partly solves the problem of automation for, although the interactions may 
be largely automated, the verbalisation model (Ericsson and Simon, 1980) assumes 
that only information in focal attention can be verbalised.
As far as the validity of obtaining verbal accounts of mothers is concerned, 
from the above discussion one can draw  the conclusion that, despite the historical and 
present day controversy surrounding verbal reports as accurate data, there are cases 
where they may fulfil a function within research strategy. With the shift in emphasis 
away from the behaviourist paradigm, psychology has become increasingly concerned 
with social forms of behaviour and the meaning this holds for its actors and 
participants.
Finally, it should be recognised that demand characteristics will inevitably play 
a part in how mothers describe their infants. This may affect the way mothers will 
describe their infants, and the way they describe themselves ("good mothers"). It is 
also expected that mothers will attempt to present their infants in the most positive 
light during the interaction by trying harder than usual to engage the infant in 
positive interaction. It is possible to minimise these effects, however. In order to 
explore ways of doing so most efficiently, the procedure will be piloted.
4.6 Pilot Study Outline
The analysis of behaviour, with particular emphasis on expressive communica­
tion, presents several methodological issues which have been dealt with in the light 
of the theoretical perspective of the present study. As was pointed out, studies of 
nonverbal behaviour, perhaps with the intention of simplifying the issues in order to 
deal with them better, have made use of rather restrictive research strategies. In 
defining interaction, researchers have focused on either the sequential or the structural 
aspects of behaviour. However, in both cases, they have been confronted with the
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awkward task of deciding what aspects of behaviour count as communicative 
interactions and which fall outside it. It is suggested that the solution to this problem 
is to select behaviours on the basis of the interpretations of the interactors regarding 
what is communicative and significant. This is also congruent with the theoretical 
aims of the thesis, in addressing the oversight in the literature on emotional 
development, by assessing the infant's effect on its environment and on the mother 
in particular. This particular focus falls out of the theory that mothers' select, inter­
pret and respond to their infant's facial expressions in ways that support the current 
interaction and guide infants towards more sophisticated means of interaction. 
Obtaining maternal reports on what is happening during interaction is a first step in 
redressing the 'decontexualisation' (Valsiner and Benigne, 1986) which occurs in 
developmental studies that ignore meaning as it arises in interaction and in the 
context of social situations.
The study aims to examine maternal selections and interpretations of infant 
facial expressions. Coding the segments interpreted by the mother, using a 
standardised facial coding scheme, allows for comparison between the meaning 
mothers attach to infant expressions and a context free coding of the same segments 
of behaviour. In this way, it is possible to assess situational and age related 
influences on maternal perceptions of infant emotionality. It is hypothesised that 
expressions hold different meanings for mothers, depending on the conditions that 
elicit them, and are not based solely on the facial expressions of the infant. 
Demonstrating such contextual influences highlights the importance of obtaining 
maternal accounts and elucidates their characteristics.
The technique to be used, and the research design, need to be piloted for 
several reasons. Most importantly, the method of eliciting maternal accounts of 
dynamic infant behaviours must be able to provide information on specific infant 
behaviours rather than global descriptions. Furthermore, the technique must allow 
the data from the reports to be integrated and compared to the facial expressions of 
the mother-infant pair. A second and related consideration is in testing out the 
technique of sampling behaviour, by relying on maternal interpretations to define 
what segments of infant behaviour to select and code. Other aspects of the study that 
need to be piloted are the appropriateness of the two situations, play and feeding, the 
length of the filming sessions, and the appropriateness of using MAX. We will turn 
to these issues next.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PILOT STUDY
5.0 Levels of Analysis
The pilot study was set up to address two cental concerns: Firstly, to assess 
w hether the method and procedure outlined in Chapter 4 are feasible and reliable 
and, secondly, to examine what different data reduction measures reveal about the 
interaction and which would be most appropriate for data analysis. For the 
behavioural data, issues concerning filming subjects, coding facial expressions and 
potentially analysing them are addressed. The method of obtaining and coding of 
data will be assessed to determine whether it allows the identification and classifica­
tion of the facial expressions of mothers and infants. At the level of maternal 
interpretations, the pilot study set out to assess whether interviewing mothers whilst 
viewing the tape would elicit adequate accounts of how mothers were interpreting 
their infants' behaviour.
5.1 Pilot Study Aims
The pilot study was set up to address the following questions:
1. Age groups: Is the method of data coding and analysis sensitive enough to tap 
differences between the three age groups? What measures for reducing data are most 
sensitive to these changes?
2. Appropriateness of interaction situations: Do the feeding and play situations 
provide an adequate sample of behaviour for maternal interpretations and facial 
expression analysis?
3. D uration of session: Will 7 minutes of filming be an adequate amount of time to
sample the variety of facial expressions?
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4. Reliability of MAX: Can an adequate level of reliability be reached using MAX 
and what modifications needed to be made to increase reliability?
5. Account technique: Is the method proposed for maternal accounts effective in 
eliciting maternal interpretations of infant expressive behaviour?
The following sections contain the method and procedure for the pilot study. 
Following this, issues concerning data coding are addressed. The results of the 
coding are presented and their implications for the main study are discussed.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 The Sample
Health visitors at London NHS child health clinics were asked to identify 
primiparous mothers whose infants matched the sample criteria for age and sex. 
Mothers had no previous history of involvement with psychologists or psychiatrists. 
They were told that the study was concerned with normal infant development. 
Twenty mother-infant pairs were obtained. All the mothers were English, 
primiparous, in their mid 20s to early 30s and came from mixed socio-economic 
backgrounds. An equal number of boys and girls was obtained and infants were 
divided into three age groups: 4-6 months (mean 4;4, range 4;0-5;l), 7-9 months (mean 
8;0, range 7;l-9;2), 10-12 months (mean 11;1, range 10;3-12;4).
5.2.2 Procedure
The data was collected at subjects' homes during normal play and feeding 
times. Two cameras were used, one focused on the mother, the other on the infant. 
At first the play and feeding sessions were unrestrained.12 Later, infants were placed
12. Mothers were left to sit wherever they pleased and place their infants wherever they 
wished. However, this posed difficulties for filming. Mothers of younger infants placed them 
on the floor and knelt over them making filming of faces impossible. Mothers of older infants
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in the baby chair as it became increasingly difficult to film older infants who were 
very mobile. Following the second filming session,13 mothers were asked to view 
the video of their infants and instructed to give an interpretative account of the 
infants' actions. They were not told before the filming that they would be asked to 
comment on their infants' behaviour on video. Mothers were given the following 
instructions:
"You know your baby better than I do, would you mind helping me by telling
me what s/h e is doing when s/he does something that you recognise?"
The baby tape was then viewed and maternal accounts were taped on an audio­
recorder.
5.3 Data Analysis
5.3.1 Coding
All 7 minutes of both situations were coded for each mother and infant using 
MAX. Four volunteers including the author conducted the coding. Before coding the 
tapes, all trainees achieved the criterion reliability (85%) with a range of 81% to 100% 
(see Appendix 1). In order to achieve the criterion reliability for coding the pilot 
study tapes, some decisions had to be made concerning the codes (see Appendix 1). 
These modifications arose mainly as a result of the difference between the training 
video provided by the MAX manual and the pilot study contents.14 Ambiguities 
were resolved and the inter-coder reliability increased from below 80% to 85%.
sat them on the floor and infants turned away, crawled or tried to get up, obscuring their faces 
and those of their mothers.
13. A preliminary 'desensitisation visit' was made in which mothers and infants could 
become acquainted with the procedure.
14. The expressive behaviours of the infants in the training segments were derived from 
infants in two situations: during vaccinations in clinics and during play. There was therefore 
a predominance of practice segments showing very upset infants. The facial expressions in 
these tapes were very intense and followed in quick succession. The pilot study tapes, on the 
other hand, were taken in the relaxed surroundings of the home and the activities filmed were 
mundane and low keyed. Babies expressions did not change as frequently and were more 
subtle than the expressions coded during the training segments.
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5.3.2 Data Reduction
Due to technical errors, inadequacy of film and lighting problems, only 11 
mother-infant pairs were used. There were 2 girls and 2 boys in each of the three age 
groups except in age group 1 where there was 1 girl and 2 boys.
The data was reduced to the following measures, taken from Fogel (1976):
Time [T] (%) : Time taken up by a particular category, calculated by adding all the 
durations of one category and dividing by total time of the session in seconds.
Mean Duration [M.D]: The average duration of each expression, calculated by 
adding the total time that an expression was 'on ' and dividing by the total number 
of onsets of that expression.
Rate [R]: The rate per minute of a particular category occurring. This was calculated 
by dividing the total number of onsets of a particular expressive category and 
dividing by the total time of the session in minutes.
Co-occurrence (Co): The total time during which two categories of expression are on 
simultaneously expressed as a proportion of the total session time in seconds.
5.4 Results of Behavioural Data
5.4.1 Individual Measures of Facial Expressions
Analysis of the facial expressions of mother and infant revealed age and 
situation trends. The feeding situation could not be analysed. Four to six month old 
infants were breast fed. Their faces were obscured by the mothers breast. In the 
older age groups, facial expressions could not be seen clearly because of spoons and 
food on their faces. Therefore, the feeding session was dropped. The rest of the pilot 
results are devoted to the analysis of the play session data.
The diversity of facial expressions found was in line w ith developmental 
studies on mother-infant interaction (Oster, 1978; Bremner, 1988). For purposes of
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comparison and analysis, facial expressions were grouped together to reduce the high 
variability created by different expression blends. The categories were grouped on 
the basis of whether expressions were positive (all blends containing EJ (enjoyment) 
and SA (surprise) expressions), negative (expressions and blends which included any 
of the negative expressions; sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, pain and fear provided 
the blend did not contain an EJ code in the mouth which is identified as a smile). 
The third and fourth categories were those containing neutral expressions (O) and 
interest (IE). The averages of these results for each age group may be seen below 
(Tables 1-3) .
5.4.2 Infant Expressions
Coding and grouping of facial expressions revealed clear differences between 
age groups using measures of proportion of time, mean duration and rates of infant 
expressions (Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-3). Positive facial expressions comprised the 
largest proportion of total session time and occurred with the highest rate in age 
group 3 (10-12 month old infants), compared to age group 1 (4-6 months) and age 
group 2 (7-9 months). However, age group 1 infants held their expressions for longer 
durations than the older infants (Figure 2). Furthermore, positive expressions 
occurred with the highest rate per minute for age groups 2 and 3 compared to 
negative, interest and neutral expressions (Figure 3).
Interest expressions for age group 1 infants occurred 48.2% of the session time 
and had the longest mean durations of any facial expression (8.29 seconds). This may 
have been due to the presence of the cameras and the author which was an unusual 
occurrence for the infants. Older infants were not as affected by the presence of the 
cameras as the younger babies, although they too displayed keen interest in the 
equipment and myself. Thus, the predominance of interest expressions may have 
been an artifact of the experiment.
Compared to all other expressions of age group 2 infants, still faced 
expressions were held for the longest duration (4.35 seconds) and comprised the 
largest proportion of session time (30.87%, see Figure 1). Comparing age group 2 
infants to the younger and older infants, their interest expressions occurred with the 
lowest rate, with the lowest mean duration, and took up the smallest proportion of
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total session time. At 7-9 months infants are preoccupied with the external 
environment. Playing with their mothers when strapped to a baby chair may not 
have provided them with adequate stimulation. The predominance of neutral 
expressions and the low incidence of interest expressions for this age group may be 
indicative of this. Mothers in that age group commented on the infant disliking the 
baby chair for long periods of time (e.g., Pit 4 in Appendix 1).
On the whole, the results of different reduction measures reveals that 
differences exist between age groups in the amount of time, the length of time and 
the num ber of times an expression occurs. While the variation in expressions is 
apparent in all three measures, the least variable measure appears to be that of mean 
duration of infant expressions. Apart from the long mean duration of interest 
expressions for age group 1, there is little variation between age groups in the mean 
duration of different facial expressions. Comparing %T with mean rate per minute 
of expressions gives a similar profile, the noticeable difference being that expression 
of positive states occurs frequently, but does not take up a large amount of total 
session time (between 11.98% and 21.6%), due to the fact that it is not held for long 
(i.e., short mean duration).
The different measures reveal that infant expressions overall are characterised 
by a predominance of interest, and neutral, expressions which are held for long 
periods of time, and by frequent positive expressions w ith short mean durations. The 
short mean duration may be due to mothers' attempts at keeping the infant engaged 
in positive face to face play. In the next section maternal expressions will be 
examined to find out if the various reduction measures used were sensitive enough 
to pick up differences between age groups and whether the profiles they yielded 
could be compared meaningfully to the profile of infant expressions.
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Table 1: Facial expressions of 4-6 month old infants
Sample Expression %t* MD R
PSl:BOY positive 19.40 1.52 7.64
mean 11.98 2.81 5.65
negative 2.94 1.76 1.09
mean 3.53 1.12 2.0
neutral 17.77 2.36 4.91
mean 20.3 3.89 3.09
interest 38.73 2.34 10.72
mean 48.20 8.29 5.98
PS16:GIRL positive 9.33 5.60 1.00
negative 0.98 0.59 1.00
neutral 6.40 2.45 1.57
interest 68.50 17.97 2.29
PS9: BOY positive 7.20 1.30 8.30
negative 6.70 1.00 4.00
neutral 36.70 6.07 3.20
interest 37.38 4.55 4.93
Average number of different positive expressions=6.7
Average number of different negative expressions=8.3
Remainder of %T=Expressions which were either obscured from view or did not fall into any 
category defined by MAX (non-codable)
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Table 2: Facial expressions of 7-9 month old infants
Sample Expression %T MD R
PS2:BOY positive 4.25 0.95 2.67
mean 18.03 1.91 5.25
negative 1.91 0.61 1.63
mean 5.68 0.96 2.35
neutral 25.03 2.88 5.21
mean 30.87 4.35 4.15
interest 32.72 2.61 6.55
mean 27.10 2.79 4.66
PS7:GIRL positive 13.95 1.36 6.14
negative 0.19 0.40 0.29
neutral 57.05 8.26 4.14
interest 17.88 2.35 4.57
PS13:BOY positive 28.30 2.48 6.84
negative 1.78 1.07 1.00
neutral 32.40 4.26 4.56
interest 29.45 2.48 7.13
PS21:GIRL positive 25.62 2.85 5.39
negative 18.85 1.75 6.50
neutral 9.03 2.01 2.70
interest 28.36 3.71 4.58
Average number of different positive expressions=8.5
Average number of different negative expressions=6.7
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Table 3: Facial expressions of 10-12 month old Infants
Sample Expression %T MD R
PS20:BOY positive 30.90 2.70 6.86
mean 21.60 1.75 7.20
negative 1.09 2.30 0.29
mean 4.40 1.37 2.26
neutral 14.55 4.36 2.00
mean 24.80 4.06 4.17
interest 50.4 8.55 3.60
mean 34.20 4.1 6.10
PS4:GIRL positive 3.60 1.26 1.71
negative 10.9 1.17 5.57
neutral 31.5 2.37 8.00
interest 38.81 2.47 9.43
PS10:BOY positive 16.83 1.22 8.29
negative 0.74 0.31 1.43
neutral 32.1 5.62 3.43
interest 29.52 3.76 4.71
PS6:GIRL positive 35.25 1.76 12.00
negative 5.04 1.73 1.75
neutral 21.17 3.91 3.25
interest 17.92 1.59 6.75
Average number of different positive expressions=7.7
Average number of different negative expressions=4.7
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Figure 1: T% of infant expressions
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5.4.3 Maternal Expressions
The different measures of maternal expressions appeared to be sensitive to 
differences between mothers in the three age groups (Tables 4-6). In general, all three 
measurements showed that mothers predominantly displayed positive and neutral 
expressions overall (Figures 4-6). While mothers in age 1 and 3 appeared to interact 
more with their infants, i.e., displayed frequent onsets of positive facial expressions 
which took up the largest proportion of total session time (approximately 50% of the 
session), age group 2 mothers appeared to be less positively interactive, spending less 
time displaying positive facial expressions (33.6%, see Figure 4). This is further 
supported by looking at the amount of time (Figure 4), length of time (Figure 5) and 
rate (Figure 6) of age group 2 maternal neutral expressions. The three measures all 
indicate that age group 2 mothers display more still faced expressions than the rest 
of the sample. This is further substantiated by the rate of maternal positive 
expressions in age group 2, which also indicates that positive maternal expressions 
occur less frequently and take up less of the total session time than the rest of the 
sample.
Unlike their infants, mothers' interest expressions did not occur as frequently, 
were not displayed for as long, and did not take as large a proportion of session time. 
Mothers may have been aware of the effect of the cameras on their infants and were 
trying to attract their infants' attention away from it. This may partly explain why 
there was a wide variation in different maternal positive expressions for age group 
1, where infant interest was predominant (11 different positive maternal expressions, 
see Table 4).
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Table 4: Maternal expressions in the 4-6 month old age group
Sample Expression %T MD R
PSlrBOY positive 58.60 1.9 18.7
mean 41.70 2.1 12.54
negative 2.40 0.86 1.75
mean 1.53 0.72 0.92
neutral 0.067 0.20 0.17
mean 27.9 5.88 1.93
interest 17.68 1.45 7.83
mean 16.51 2.46 4.82
PS16:GIRL positive 46.24 2.00 13.86
negative 2.19 1.31 1.00
neutral 20.40 4.50 2.70
interest 26.86 3.13 5.14
PS9: BOY positive 20.26 2.40 5.06
negative 0.00 0.00 0.00
neutral 63.20 12.93 2.93
interest 5.00 2.04 1.50
Average number of different positive expressions=ll
Average number of different negative expressions=3.8
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Table 5: Maternal expressions in the 7-9 month old age group
Sample Expression %T MD R
PS2:BOY positive 34.81 2.61 8.00
mean 33.60 3.10 6.55
negative 1.12 0.67 1.00
mean 0.34 0.35 0.32
neutral 20.00 2.21 5.43
mean 44.70 9.96 3.65
interest 25.43 2.48 6.14
mean 13.50 1.85 4.30
PS7:GIRL positive 17.88 2.60 4.14
negative 0 0 0
neutral 71.14 21.34 2.00
interest 9.67 2.26 2.57
PS13:BOY positive 36.7 4.16 5.28
negative 0.00 0.00 0.00
neutral 46.40 9.28 3.00
interest 6.60 1.11 3.57
PS21:GIRL positive 45.05 3.03 8.91
negative 0.25 0.55 0.27
neutral 41.61 5.97 4.18
interest 12.26 1.51 4.86
Average number of different positive expressions=4.7
Average number of different negative expressions=1.5
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Table 6: Maternal expressions in the 10-12 month old age group.
Sample Expression %T MD R
PS20:BOY positive 76.95 5.10 9.00
mean 49.00 3.80 7.40
negative 0.57 0.80 0.43
mean 2.84 0.91 1.70
neutral 9.02 4.20 2.85
mean 19.50 4.20 2.85
interest 7.40 2.40 1.90
mean 12.30 1.80 4.10
PS4:GIRL positive 49.43 3.84 7.71
negative 0.60 0.50 0.70
neutral 25.00 3.80 4.00
interest 15.10 1.80 5.00
PS10:BOY positive 46.72 3.76 7.46
negative 0.77 1.13 0.57
neutral 29.00 5.85 3.10
interest 6.96 0.99 4.20
PS6:GIRL positive 23.87 2.60 5.50
negative 9.42 1.20 5.00
neutral 15.00 3.00 3.00
interest 19.63 2.20 5.25
Average number of different positive expressions=7.5
Average number of different negative expressions=5.0
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Figure 4: T% of maternal facial expressions
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Comparing mother and infant measures reveals other significant differences 
between the two interactors. While both age group 1 and age group 3 mothers spent 
approximately 50% of the session displaying positive expressions, they differed in 
how they expressed them. Age group 1 mothers displayed positive expressions 
frequently but did not hold these expressions for long, while age group 3 mothers 
held their expressions for longer (Figures 4-6) but did not display them at the same 
high rate. This is in contrast to infant positive expressions, where in age group 3 
infants expressed positive expressions at higher rates compared to age groups 1 and 
2 (Figure 3), but held these expressions for the shorter durations (Figure 2). Mothers' 
positive expressions were less frequent and were held for longer as infants got older 
while infant positive expressions occurred with greater frequency but were held for 
less time. It is also possible that there is greater m utual co-ordination of positive 
interaction in age group 3 as mother and infant positive expressions occur with the 
same frequency.
Both mother and infant negative expressions were scarce compared to other 
expressions. Not surprisingly, negative maternal expressions were very few overall. 
Seen as a whole, the trend for negative expressions appears to be that infants spent 
little time (although more than their mothers) expressing negative expressions, 
although there was great variety in these expressions at first 15 (Tables 1-3, see 
average number of different negative expressions). Negative expressions did not 
increase as infants got older. 16
Mothers in age group 2 appear to spend longer periods than their infants still­
faced. As during this phase of development babies begin exploring their environ­
ment, these figures may indicate a shift in the focus of the interaction. It may be that 
a large part of the interaction was spent in focus on inanimate objects and thus the 
facial expressions may be reflecting a mutual focus of attention on external objects. 
As during the filming mothers were free to interact with or without toys, it is not 
possible to establish from this data if the profile of age group 2 mothers and infants 
is due to play with objects.
15. The very low incidence of negative expressions for the mother may be a result of the 
presence of an observer in the home and cameras.
16. Sternberg et al. (1983) reported that infants' ability to express anger increases at around 
6 months as was evidenced by the reactions of infants deprived of their biscuit. However, the 
decrease in the number of different number of negative expression blends may be due to the 
fact that these expressions are becoming more clearly defined as babies get older.
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Lastly, the different reduction measures for maternal expressions yielded 
similar profiles. While each reduction measure provides a different perspective on 
the characteristics of facial expressions, all measures pick up changes in some 
characteristic of facial expression. The choice of which measure or measures to 
employ for the main data analysis must rest with assessing how they will correspond 
with maternal accounts data. This issue will be readdressed in the next chapter after 
assessing the procedure used for obtaining maternal accounts.
Before discussing the results of the pilot study as regards obtaining maternal 
interpretations, we will look at the results of analysis of co-occurrences of facial 
expressions between mothers and infants. While it is recognised that they do not 
reveal the sequential occurrence of events in time, it was decided to examine what 
type of information this measurement would yield and how it would fit into an 
analysis of maternal interpretations of infant behaviour.
5.4.5 Co-occurrence of Facial Expressions
How do the individual measures for mother and infant expressions compare 
to co-occurrence measures? Table 7 presents the proportion of time in which specific 
mother-infant expressions occurred as a percentage of total session time. Not 
surprising, co-occurrence of negative expressions is very low given their rare 
occurrence overall. Individual mother-infant co-occurrences varied widely. For 
example, PS1 mother-infant positive expressions co-occurred 14.50% of the session 
while, for the rest of age group 1 mother-infant pairs, co-occurrences comprised 
approximately 4% of the total session time. Whilst some co-occurrences were less 
variable (e.g., all infant expressions accompanying maternal interest expressions), the 
majority of co-occurrences were not suitable for quantitative comparisons. Part of this 
variability can be explained by some infants generally being 'fussy' during the 
filming. However, other factors could have affected the co-occurrences as well. As 
was mentioned before, object versus face to face play were not controlled and hence 
some mother-infant pairs interacted in the context of joint object play, whilst others 
preferred to play joint face to face games such as peek-a-boo. In general, however, 
despite wide variability, when infants displayed negative expressions, maternal 
expressions were predominantly positive or neutral.
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Table 7: Co-occurrence of expressions for individual mother-infant pairs (expressed as proportion of total time of session)
Co-occurrence of facial expression categories (%T)
Mother
Baby
POS
POS
NEG
NEG
NEU
NEU
IE
IE
POS
NEG
POS
NEU
POS
IE
NEG
POS
NEG
NEU
NEG
IE
NEU
POS
NEU
NEG
NEU
IE
IE
POS
IE
NEG
IE
NEU
Age group 1
PS1
PS16
PS9
14.50 0 0 11.23 2.90 13.30 25.50 0.30 1.30 0.50 0 0 0 4.10 0.60 3.20
3.89 0 2.20 19.60 0.16 1.20 12.60 1.20 0 1.36 1.83 0.07 14.60 2.14 0.43 2.33
3.90 0 24.35 1.90 1.13 3.11 4.76 0 0 0 1.80 4.50 27.10 1.44 0.40 0.75
Age group 2
PS2
PS7
PS13
PS21
3.90 0 24.40 1.89 1.40 6.50 5.90 0 0 0 1.80 4.50 27 1.30 0.4 0.76
11.40 0 49.80 4.90 0.19 4.55 0.60 0 0 0 8.70 0 9.70 1.70 0 2.60
20.40 0 24.40 2.00 0.01 3.70 11.80 0 0 0 5.30 1.90 12.60 2.35 0.19 2.00
19.20 0.25 6.22 1.70 9.26 1.73 10.60 0 0 0 3.50 7.80 16.05 2.90 1.90 1.10
Age group 3
PS20
PS4
PS10
PS6
25.70 0 2.40 3.75 0 8.64 37.00 0 0 0.54 2.83 0.20 3.26 1.40 0 2.05
2.50 0 8.30 5.02 7.45 14.60 22.50 0 0.27 0.40 1.10 1.90 7.30 0.20 0.98 6.30
11.90 0 10.40 3.20 0.10 13.60 12.80 0.13 0.02 0.60 2.70 0.45 8.50 0.60 0 1.74
10.90 0 1.83 2.80 0.10 2.70 5.40 3.00 3.00 1.90 4.00 0 3.96 7.30 0.75 8.30
POS=Positive; NEG=Negative; NEU=Neutral (O); IE=Interest.
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Some co-occurrences also reflected individual measures. For example, neutral 
expressions for mothers and infants of age group 2 co-occurred for large proportions 
of time, compared to age groups 1 and 3 (mean= 26.21 compared to 8.85 and 5.73% 
of total session time for age groups 1 and 3 respectively). This is also reflected in the 
individual measures for infants and mothers (Figures 1 and 4 respectively). On the 
whole, however, the variability in co-occurrences between mother-infant pairs 
suggests that, if this measure is to be employed, it is best suited and more reliable 
when applied to a qualitative analysis of individual pairs rather than as a descriptive 
tool for the types of expressions that co-occur in a particular age group as a whole. 
This is so especially in view of the small sample size.
5.5 Results of Maternal Accounts
The procedure for obtaining maternal interpretations of their infants' 
behaviour did not yield adequate or specific information. Maternal accounts were 
sparse and did not reflect the rich interaction that was recorded on tape. Instead, 
mothers tended to comment on infant behaviour in very broad and general terms (see 
Appendix 1 for a sample of these accounts). Two factors appear to have been 
responsible for this result. Firstly, the instructions given to the mothers were too 
vague and unspecific and thus mothers were not sure what they were supposed to 
interpret. Secondly, the task of both selecting and commenting on infant behaviours 
from a running tape may have placed too many task demands on the mothers. An 
alternative technique was developed to address these problems and is discussed in 
the next chapter. The maternal accounts for the pilot study, however, could not be 
coded or analysed.
5.6 Conclusions from Pilot Data Results
The pilot study was useful in clarifying a number of issues regarding data 
collection and reduction. While the results are incomplete without maternal accounts, 
some behavioural measures were explored and yielded the following preliminary 
conclusions:
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1. Filming procedure: The preliminary filming session to familiarise mothers and 
babies with the procedure was disadvantageous. Mothers knew what to expect in the 
second session and took great pains to dress up their babies and 'pu t on a show'. 
Infants still continued to be attracted to the cameras and did not become more 
familiar w ith me or the cameras after the first filming session.
2. Length of Filming sessions: The sessions were too long for both mothers and 
infants. Younger infants especially became tired during the filming. Mothers 
appeared anxious to terminate the filming sooner.
3. Coding of Facial Expressions: MAX proved to be a reliable method of objectively 
coding facial expressions of both mothers and infants.
4. The three individual data reduction measures revealed differences between the 
three age groups. Proportion of time taken up by an expression and rate per minute 
of expression yielded similar profiles. These measures gave slightly different 
information regarding different aspects of facial expressions. The choice of the most 
suitable measurement must however rest with the method in which maternal accounts 
will be obtained and linked with facial expressions.
5. Measures of co-occurrence of facial expressions revealed highly variable results. 
While this high variability may be a characteristic of mother-infant interaction, 
individual measures produced less variability between subjects. Co-occurrence 
measures would thus be better suited to looking at individual profiles of mother- 
infant pairs in conjunction with maternal interpretations, if necessary.
6. The feeding situation was not suitable for examining infant expressive behaviour. 
The youngest infants were breast fed, which meant that their faces were obscured by 
the mother's breast. The oldest infants faces were obscured by cutlery and food.
7. The play situation confounded object play with face to face play. It was impossible 
to determine if the differences between expressions in the three age groups were the 
result of changes in mother-infant interaction styles or were due to mothers and 
infants using toys.
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8. The results of the pilot study for obtaining maternal accounts suggested that clearer 
instructions needed to be given and an alternative method for obtaining maternal 
accounts should be used to encourage mothers to be more specific about what they 
were interpreting.
A potential criticism of the method of examining facial expressions is that the 
context within which facial expressions occurred was missing from the data analysis. 
As was argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the aim of the study is to let the mothers define 
the context and meaning of the behaviour. Thus, the data presented here gives an 
incomplete picture. Furthermore, the types of measurements used provide a static 
picture of facial expressions. Although co-occurrences may be partially effective in 
highlighting the changing roles of mothers and infants within interaction, they are not 
suited to deal with the data at a more conceptual level. Seen in the light of the nature 
of maternal interpretations, while it may be possible to define antecedent, co­
occurring and consequent facial expressions, it remains a difficult task to ask mothers 
to identify the specific facial expressions that gave rise to their interpretations and 
their responses. This is especially so if one takes into account that the meaning 
mothers attribute to their infants7 emotional expressions is likely to be based on many 
different aspects of the infants7 behaviour. A preliminary conclusion is that this 
study, as a first step in examining maternal interpretations, should adhere to a broad 
based analysis of facial expressions. This type of analysis would provide a good 
starting point of examining the relationship between maternal interpretations and 
infant expressivity than a microanalytic and detailed level of analysis.
In conclusion, the results of the pilot study suggest that a shift in emphasis 
from facial expressions to maternal accounts is needed. In most aspects of the data 
collection and coding there was a need to introduce a more functional level of 
analysis to the expressive behaviours measured. In the following chapter a number 
of issues pertaining to an increased emphasis on maternal interpretations are 
discussed. While pilot results have addressed and resolved basic issues pertaining 
to data coding and reliability, more conceptually related considerations need to be 
addressed.
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CHAPTER 6
RESTATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
6.0 Chapter Aims
It is proposed that maternal interpretations of infant behaviour provide 
important indicators of what mothers find salient when negotiating dialogue with 
their infants and hence what they are likely to respond to. Whilst it is not possible 
to address all aspects of this complex process at once, an important facet of this 
mechanism is what factors shape maternal perceptions of their infants. In addressing 
this particular issue with regards to infant emotional expression, empirical analysis 
must concern itself w ith revealing the particular conceptual structures mothers use 
to create meaning out of infant expressivity and what aspects of both the infant's 
behaviour and the situational context they depend upon to do so. Retaining this 
focus, the following chapter re-addresses the design, procedure and data analysis for 
the main study.
The pilot study results have provided important indicators of what modifica­
tions are required. The following chapter presents decisions concerning what 
situations to film, how to obtain detailed maternal accounts, what aspects of maternal 
interpretations to code and how to analyse what mothers select. Issues pertaining to 
reliability of the procedure, and external and internal validity are also addressed. The 
theoretical and empirical implications of these changes are discussed and the 
hypotheses of the thesis are reappraised.
6.1 Recording Session
(a) The feeding sessions did not provide a good method of sampling infant 
expressions and were therefore inadequate for analysis and for promoting maternal 
interpretations of infant emotional behaviour. Trevarthen and M urray (1989) have 
pointed out that the interest in the feeding situation, which mainly stems from the 
psychoanalytic interest in the breast, is unjustified in microanalytic research on facial
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expressions, this is bom  out by the data from the pilot study. The feeding situation 
will therefore not be used in the main study.
(b) The play sessions as they stand now are unstructured, that is they include face to 
face play as well as object play. This is confusing and confounding as expressive 
interaction with objects cannot be assessed independently of expressive interaction 
with another person. The meaning mothers attach to infant behaviours is likely to 
differ depending upon whether the infant is interacting with them alone or with a 
toy. Therefore the play situation will be divided into two parts; interaction with and 
without toys, each of 3 minutes duration.17
(c) A prohibitive condition will be included. This will take the form of placing an 
unfam iliar/attractive object in front of the child and asking the mother to prohibit 
him or her from touching it without physically restraining the child (Murray, 1989). 
This condition will serve three purposes: Firstly, it will counterbalance experimenter 
effects which may influence the mother into attempting to create a 'good' impression 
by encouraging the mother to use negative displays. Secondly, it will provide data on 
how infants respond to a frustration of intention brought on by verbal and expressive 
actions of the mother. Thirdly, maternal accounts obtained in this situation would 
also provide information on whether or not the mother thought the infant understood 
the prohibition and how she dealt with the infant.
In summary, the observational study will comprise of three different filming 
situations:
1. A face to face play situation.
2. A prohibitive situation.
3. A toy play situation.
17. Filming infants in joint rather than solitary object play was necessary for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, situations had to be suited to all three age groups. It would have been 
unsuitable and unnatural to film infants playing with the novel toy on their own. Secondly, 
in line with the focus of the study, infant behaviours had to occur in interpersonal contexts 
given the hypothesised role of maternal interpretations. Thirdly, filming infants in joint object 
play provided an opportunity of exploring how mothers viewed their role in the interaction 
when an object was introduced compared to when the interaction centred on them.
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6.2 Maternal Accounts
Accounts obtained in the pilot study showed that, when mothers were asked 
to interpret their infants' behaviour, they were not specific about particular action 
sequences or what they meant. A method is needed which will encourage the 
mothers to be less reticent about their infants and to focus their accounts on actual 
events on video tape. As the stimuli presented to mothers are dynamic, two steps are 
required to reach an interpretation, the first is to select an act on the basis of specific 
criteria, the second is to describe what the act means. Thus, in the first instance a 
method is needed to allow mothers to select acts from the stream of behaviour.
Newtson (1973) devised a technique for segmenting the behaviour stream by 
asking subjects to bleep when they saw breakpoints in movement. However, the 
bleeps were recorded on a separate event recorder and did not allow the researcher 
to see the actions that were selected. Adamson et al. (1987) used a similar technique 
to examine how parents and non-parents selected infant acts in two different 
situations when given two different sets of instructions about what to select. 
However, they did not examine what was selected or what it meant to determine the 
nature of behavioural cues that might have influenced the impressions of the 
observers.
McPhail and Collett (1978) devised a more refined method of obtaining 
accounts of what observers were actually selecting. They showed subjects a tape and 
instructed them to press a button which places a mark on the sound track of the 
video tape, whenever subjects saw an act they had been asked to select and to mark 
the end of it and the beginning of the next. Once the tape had been marked it was 
played back and subjects were asked to provide a description of the segment which 
they had identified on the first viewing. This overcomes the problem of asking 
subjects for their explanations after they have viewed the tapes and also overcomes 
the difficulty of asking subjects to interpret behaviour whilst viewing the tape, a dual 
task which would place a heavy burden on the processing capacities of observers.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the variation in instructions in the Adamson et al. 
study (1987) resulted in differences in selectivity of subjects, depending on whether 
they were parents or non-parents. Their results indicated that, when asked to select 
meaningful acts, parents selected far more acts than non-parents, while both parents 
and non-parents selected similar numbers of intentionally communicative acts. This
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divergence in perception between parents and non parents, however, is in line with 
theories that state that parents " thicken thin data" (Kaye, 1979) and attempt to find 
m eaning in the smallest of infants' acts even when they are not regarded as 
communicative. The criteria for selection are thus much broader and reports are 
expected to be more numerous and hence more informative.
Based on a combination of the three procedures described above, maternal 
accounts will be obtained in the following way. The mothers will be given the 
"meaningful" set of instructions and requested to view and mark the tape of their 
infants when they note a meaningful act. Following this, they will view the tape a 
second time and stop at each bleep to explain what selected infant acts mean. These 
interpretations will be identified by noting the time on the video tape at which each 
bleep occurred and audio-recording the accounts for later transcription.
6.2.1 Structure of Tapes to be Shown to Mothers
How the tape will be presented to the mother will affect the types of 
attributions she makes. There are several alternatives as to how the material could 
be presented. It is possible to edit the infant tape before it is shown to the mother by 
predefining and selecting infant acts on the basis of theoretically relevant criteria, e.g., 
imitative sequences, turn-taking sequences, and feedback sequences. The advantage 
of this is that a more controlled account of attributions surrounding target behaviours 
would be obtained. It would also show if mothers make different attributions about 
events falling within the same category and if this may be related to particular aspects 
of the interaction or situation. The method, therefore, appears more concise. 
However, the disadvantage is that there may be behaviours which mothers might find 
meaningful which will be left out and therefore missed. Since the object of the study 
is to investigate what selective mechanisms mothers use to identify meaningful infant 
acts this design is not suitable as it would seriously undermine the goals of the 
research.
Another possibility is to show mothers the full video of their infants but 
including their own behaviour as well. Mothers would then be asked to account for 
why they responded the way they did and what they were thinking when they 
performed certain actions. Accounts will therefore include attributions of mothers'
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and infants7 behaviour. The advantage of this would be that mothers would be able 
to provide direct information concerning their strategies for negotiating dialogues 
with their infants. However, it would not be possible to compare what mothers say 
with what they did independently of each other, since it is likely that their accounts 
will be in line with what they perceives themselves to be doing. Structuring the data 
in this way would necessitate a different type of analysis based more on maternal 
impressions of their own behaviour rather than on that of their infants.
A final alternative is to show the mother the entire infant tape, as was done 
in the pilot study, but only to code facial expressions which fall in maternally selected 
segments. This would allow the examination of the selective mechanisms of the 
mothers. Probes may then be used to focus the mother7s attention on aspects of the 
interaction that are important to the investigation or to extract more information on 
those aspects of the infant's behaviour which she has selected. The latter design will 
thus be used for the main study.
6.2.2 Facial Expressions and Attribution Categories
By structuring the data in this way several factors can be examined. Firstly, 
by obtaining maternal accounts of each behavioural episode, it is possible to define 
event categories based on maternal interpretations. In this way the event will be 
defined by the mother. There are several advantages to this method; Firstly, it will 
provide a social context for facial expressions represented by maternal interpretative 
categories. Secondly, by analysing infant facial expressions that fall within maternally 
selected segments, it will be possible to see if these expressions are perceived and 
interpreted by mothers in a similar manner across situations and in different age 
groups. Thirdly, it is more economical with coding time as there will be no need to 
code every second of the sessions. Finally, in order to compare between maternally 
selected behaviours and baseline behaviour, behaviour falling outside maternally 
selected segments will be sampled for comparison.
One consideration that should be addressed here is what reduction measures 
to use. In the pilot study, behavioural reduction measures were used to make sense 
of the various characteristics of facial expressions. While in the pilot study a 
continuous record of facial expressions existed, in the main study segments may
155
interfere with the duration and frequency of facial expressions. The measure that is 
likely to be most affected by the new procedure is the mean duration of expressions. 
As selected segments may cut into the duration of an expression this would result in 
artificially short mean durations. The proportion of time taken up by an expression 
is also dependent on the duration of an expression and thus would also be affected 
by segment definitions, although it would nevertheless provide information on the 
proportion of time a particular expression was selected. The last measure, mean rate 
per minute, is not subject to such biases. Only in cases where two consecutive 
segments span the length of one expression will it affect the rate, as the same 
expression would be counted twice. However, given the fact that, in general, infant 
expressions are not characteristically held for long periods of time, this measure is the 
most appropriate one to use.
6.3 Design Considerations
Before going on to discuss the hypotheses which will be addressed, it is 
important to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed analysis in terms 
of internal and external validity and reliability, and to consider the various conceptual 
trade-offs which result from the constraints such considerations impose.
6.3.1 Internal and External Validity
Internal validity is the degree of confidence with which the manipulation of 
the independent variables (infant age and situational context) is responsible for 
observed changes in the dependent variable (maternal interpretations of infant 
behaviour) (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The A-B-C intervention design used here is 
an extension of the single subject multiple intervention design. While it is advantage­
ous in allowing several hypotheses to be tested successively, it also provides checks 
on the internal validity of the assessment. By presenting multiple interventions to 
different subjects, it is possible to check if these interventions result in systematic 
changes in the dependent variable (maternal selectivity and interpretations ). To the 
extent that the dependent variable systematically varies with the independent
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variables, it is possible to infer that changes in the independent variable (situation or 
age) are responsible for the observed change in the dependent variable (maternal 
interpretations of infant behaviour).
Internal validity can be threatened by high variability in the data. This can be 
reduced by averaging the data or transforming it (as was done in the pilot study). 
This will reduce fluctuations and will clarify levels and trends so that a reasonable 
estimate of the intervention effect can be made.
External validity, the extent to, and manner in, which results of an experiment 
can be generalised to different subjects and settings, is concerned with two central 
considerations: population-sample considerations and ecological and environmental 
invalidating factors. Regarding the former point, while the sample size (N=12) is 
small, generalisability can be established on the grounds that the same intervention 
is applied in sequence across subjects (matched on specific variables) and exposed to 
nearly identical environmental conditions. If consistent findings are obtained, then 
it is possible to generalise since the same intervention is replicated over different 
subjects in the same experiment. That is, to the extent that each of the factors 
systematically accounts for the pattern of maternal interpretations, the findings can 
be generalised to similar subjects in the larger population.
Ecological validity, which is concerned with confounding variables such as 
experimenter effects, has been taken into consideration in the proposed analysis at a 
number of different levels. Firstly, as regards the conditions of assessment, 
naturalistic observation in the home was employed. The results of the observations 
thus potentially reflect what occurs in natural settings in everyday interaction 
between mother and infant. However, the study was not fully naturalistic for obvious 
and necessary reasons. Purely naturalistic observations (as were attempted in the 
pilot study) did not result in a sufficiently frequent sample of facial expressions. 
Similarly, confining infants to a baby chair was the result of practical considerations 
related to ensuring standardised measurements of the assessment conditions. Thus, 
the present design has been constructed to achieve as many as possible of the 
advantages that both naturalistic and contrived settings could potentially provide.
Another ecological validity consideration that was taken into account was the 
unobtrusiveness of measurement and how to reduce the problems w ith reactivity. 
While video techniques offer reliable methods of assessment, mothers and infants are 
nevertheless aware that they are being filmed. To minimise reactivity effects I did not
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interact with mothers or infants during the pilot study filming (filming mother-infant 
pairs twice seemed to make matters worse). To minimise experimenter effects on 
maternal behaviour, a prohibitive condition was introduced, which would encourage 
mothers to display negative affect.
The pilot study has clarified important conceptual and methodological factors 
which have resulted in shifts of focus and modifications of hypothetical constructs. 
The following section will discuss these shifts and provide a framework for the 
analysis of the data from the study.
6.4 Recapitulation of Hypotheses
The focus of this study on maternal interpretations of dynamic facial 
expressions distinguishes it from similar work on infant emotional development. 
Social developmental theories of socialisation maintain that mothers project meaning 
onto the infant's actions and respond as if the infant intended to communicate a 
particular message. The organisational principles that guide development are 
hypothesised to arise out of parental schemata of how the interaction should develop. 
That is, out of what mothers perceive as the end point of a particular action and how 
that fits into the general stage of infants' development. The types of questions that 
empirical analysis will address pertain to identifying maternal perceptions of emotion 
by examining the content of maternal interpretations in relation to infant behaviours 
occurring in different situational contexts and for infants of different ages. The 
research thus comprises of three main aims. These comprise of examining what 
mothers select as meaningful, the coded facial expressions in these selected 
meaningful acts, and maternal interpretations regarding these expressive behaviours. 
Within each of these aims there are a series of questions that need to be addressed. 
These questions are concerned w ith developmental changes, contextual influences and 
comparisons with baselines (see Table 8).
The first aim is to examine mothers perception of meaningful acts. To 
examine the initial step in the process of interpretation, the selection of meaningful 
acts, it is necessary to compare mothers' perception of meaningful behaviour in 
different situations. Research has suggested that the degree to which infant behaviour 
is perceived as meaningful is subject to contextual influences. Does situational
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context influence maternal perceptions of meaningful infant acts? Research has also 
suggested that infant behaviour becomes more less diffused and more clearly marked 
by 'points of articulation' as infants get older (Werner and Kaplan, 1963). Do mothers 
select more infant acts as infants get older? On what basis do mothers perceive 
meaning in infant behaviour? To find out if there are differences between mothers 
and external observers, mother and observers' selections will be compared. If 
differences exist between observers and mothers, this suggests that mothers may use 
different criteria to define meaningful acts. If so, what are these criteria? Do they 
change as infants get older?
The second step is thus to examine what facial expressions are contained in 
selected meaningful acts. If mothers are finding more meaning in behaviour in 
certain situations, the expressions which accompany them are likely to indicate what 
facial responses are considered significant in interaction. To this end, selected infant 
expressions will be compared in three different situations. The evidence from studies 
on infant facial expressions in Chapter 2 indicates that expressive responses to 
environmental stimuli become more differentiated with increasing age. It is expected 
that selected meaningful infant acts will reveal more differentiated expressive 
responses as infants get older. To examine this proposal, selected expressions will be 
compared between age groups. To examine if the behavioural repertoire varies 
between conditions, baseline samples will be obtained from non-selected behaviour 
and compared to selected behaviour.
The third aim is to analyse maternal interpretations regarding these expressive 
behaviours. Questions which will be addressed involve identifying the influence of 
situational context and infant age on maternal interpretations. With reference to 
maternal inferences surrounding infant emotion states, evidence suggests that mothers 
infer a variety of emotion states from still-faced photographs depicting emotion 
expressions (Huebner and Izard, 1988). Is there a relationship between infant facial 
expressions in selected segments and maternal interpretations of emotion states? 
Does situational context affect this relationship as was suggested by empirical studies 
presented in Chapter 1 (e.g., Sherman, 1927a and b)? Secondly, developmental 
influences on maternal interpretations of meaningful infant acts will be examined. 
Do mothers become more articulate about the meaning of their infants behaviour as 
infants get older? Evidence presented in Chapter 2 has shown that, from 9 months 
onwards, infants increasingly share in the parents' perspective on the world. Will
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maternal reports reflect the growing intersubjective skills of the infant? How do 
mothers conceive of their own role in the interaction vis-a-vis these developments?
It is hypothesised that maternal interpretations are meaning frames which 
mothers impose upon their infants' activity based on previous experiences with their 
infants, and are not necessarily shared with us as observers. To highlight this 
difference in perspective and examine the specific areas in perception which differ, 
external observers' interpretations will be compared to maternal interpretations of 
infant behaviours.
Table 8: Aims and objectives
Which acts are meaningful? (a)Does definition of meaningful acts 
depend on the context of interaction?
(b) Does infant behaviour become more 
clearly defined as meaningful as babies get 
older?
(c)Do observers differ from mothers in their 
selections of meaningful acts?
What facial expressions occur in those 
acts?
(a) Do selected infant expressions become 
more differentiated with age?
(b)Do mothers select infant acts containing 
contextually congruent expressions? Does 
situational context affect what types of facial 
expressions mothers select?
(c) Does the behaviour of infants in selected 
meaningful acts differ from baseline behav­
iour?
What developmental changes occur in 
maternal interpretations of meaningful 
acts?
(a) Do mothers' perceptions of infant emo­
tions change as infants get older?
(b) Is there a relationship between emotion 
state attributions and perceptions of emotion 
states?
(c) Do mothers become more articulate 
about what infant behaviour means as 
infants get older?
(d) Will maternal reports reflect the growing 
capacities of infants to engage in interper­
sonal exchanges?
(e) If observers are given the same criteria 
as mothers for the meaning of infant behav­
iours, are they as likely to perceive infant 
acts as mothers do?
Finally, the above analysis will elucidate who is leading the interaction. 
Research has revealed that the majority of maternal expressions in face to face 
interaction are initiatory (Malatesta et al., 1982). This suggests that the mothers' role
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may be one of guidance whereby they lead infants by initiating expressive exchanges 
rather than simply accommodating to the infants' expressions. For example, Kaye 
and Fogel (1980) demonstrated that 6Vi month old infants assume a more active role 
in interaction, as evidenced by their ability to initiate positive exchanges rather than 
simply respond to them (Chapter 3). Will maternal self-reports reveal this shift in 
responsibility? Will maternal accounts of the infant's skills reflect the more active role 
of the infant as babies get older? In the following chapter these questions will be 
addressed.
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CHAPTER 7
MATERNAL SELECTIONS OF INFANT ACTS AND EXPRESSIONS
7.0 A Brief Reorientation
The results of the pilot study highlighted aspects of the design that would 
have to be changed when conducting the final investigation. These changes were 
presented in Chapter 6. A greater focus on identifying the dynamics of maternal 
interpretations has necessitated the creation of a new technique for obtaining maternal 
accounts of infant acts, and the introduction of three semi-structured situations to 
allow for a clearer profile of the effect of situational context on maternal inter­
pretations. The use of a cross-sectional design will permit a comparison of age related 
processes. The study will therefore focus on aspects of maternal interpretations of 
infant behaviour, and facial expressions, which appear to be characteristic of each age 
group and situation. Comparisons of maternal interpretations and facial expressions 
will provide the basis for an understanding of the dynamics of maternal interpreta­
tions in the social development of infant emotionality.
The analysis will thus comprise of the three broad components presented in 
Table 8; Firstly, to identify the circumstances under which infant behaviour is 
selected as meaningful by mothers. For example, do contextual factors or the age of 
the babies influence mothers perception of meaningful infant acts. Having 
determined conditions under which meaningful acts are selected, what is the content 
of these selected segments? What types of facial expressions do mothers select, and 
is there any evidence to show that there are developmental or contextual influences 
on the selection of these expressions? Secondly, to determine what mothers say about 
these infant acts, and to see if are the interpretations are subject to situational and 
developmental influences. Thirdly, to compare the way mothers select and interpret 
their infants' behaviour with those of external observers. These three broad 
components of the analysis will be dealt with in three separate chapters.
The present chapter comprises of two types of analysis: Firstly, a comparison 
between age groups and situations of the number of meaningful infant acts mothers 
identity. Secondly, a comparative analysis of the facial expressions contained in these
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selected meaningful segments in different age groups and situations. In Chapter 8, 
maternal interpretations concerning the meaning of these infant acts is analysed and 
compared between ages and conditions. A quantitative and qualitative analysis 
exploring how maternal interpretations map onto infant facial expressions is also 
presented. Chapter 9 presents a series of experiments designed to compare maternal 
selections and interpretations with observers, to determine if there is a divergence in 
perspective between mothers and nonparticipant observers.
The first part of the current chapter presents the design of the study. Any 
problems that occurred are documented and their solutions outlined. The next section 
of the chapter covers the method, framework for coding, problems encountered in this 
area and solutions. The hypotheses and results of the analysis of maternal selectivity 
are then presented and discussed.
7.1 The Structure of the Study
As was outlined in Chapter 6, it was decided that the filming sessions would 
be structured into three conditions;
- a face to face session lasting approximately three minutes;18
- a prohibitive session lasting two minutes, or less if the infant got distressed;
- a toy play session in which mother and infant played together, lasting a 
further 3 minutes.19
18. The length of these observational periods was determined by the results of the 
pilot study which revealed that the initial length of filming each situation for 7 minutes 
was too long for babies, as they became distressed. Using shorter observation periods took 
this into account, as well as recognising that infants were now required to engage in three, 
rather than two, situations. Observational periods could not be shorter to ensure that there 
was sufficient time for mothers to select and comment adequately on infant acts, and to 
allow enough time to obtain a varied sample of infant behaviour. The shorter length of 
the prohibitive condition was necessary due to the fact that both mothers and infants 
found it difficult to maintain interaction in this condition for long. In this condition, 
observation was terminated sooner in babies became distressed by the prohibition.
19. The three conditions were presented in the same set sequence for each mother- 
infant pair. The order of the sequences was kept the same to minimise infant distress due 
to the prohibitive condition.
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It was expected that the three situations would enable three types of 
interactions to be elicited and compared. As was mentioned in Chapter 6, one of the 
purposes of the prohibitive condition was to encourage the mothers to display 
negative facial expressions. The pilot study results showed that mothers displayed 
few negative expressions and suggested that this may be due to reactivity effects. 
The presence of the cameras and the researcher would also have made it less likely 
that mothers would engage infants in activities that were likely to create conflict 
between themselves and their infants. The prohibitive condition also permits an 
analysis of what happens when there is a divergence in goals between mothers and 
infants in terms of how mothers view the situation, and their infants behaviour. On 
the infant's side, it will reveal how infants react to the mother's prohibition.
The face to face play situation, on the other hand, was set up to reflect and 
capture what is likely to be interactions occurring naturalistically between the dyad 
when their attention is directed at each other. In this condition, it was expected that 
mothers would use face to face games to keep their infants engaged, and hence would 
elicit many instances of positive interactions. It would also allow a comparison of age 
related changes in infants behaviour in terms of how they respond to purely face to 
face interaction without the aid of toys, and how mothers would interpret the child's 
behaviour in this interpersonal context.
The toy play situation, involving, as it does, focus on a third, inanimate object, 
is designed to compare the types of expressive interactions, and mother's interpreta­
tions of these acts in a situation where the baby's attention is divided, as such 
involves a negotiation of goals to coordinate interaction. It is expected that infants 
would focus on and explore the toy, although age changes would make other 
reactions possible. For example, the youngest infants are likely to have short 
attention spans, and may not be able to play with the toy for long lengths of time. 
Older infants, on the other hand, are likely to find the toy interesting, and are likely 
to be more content playing with the toy and their mothers. Last but not least, and 
as was mentioned above, the toy play condition will also permit a comparison of 
maternal interpretations in a situation where the interaction involves a negotiation 
between mother and baby of the infant's attention.
The infants were divided into three age groups as presented in Table 9.
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Table 9: Age groups
Age group 1 4-6 month old infants Range=4;l-6;3
Age group 2 7-9 month old infants Range=7;0-9;1
Age group 3 10-12 month old infants Range=10;l-ll;3
These age groups have been conventionally used in the developmental literature to 
highlight critical phases in the infant's development. A discussion of these critical 
phases and their significance is to be found in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3).
Each age group comprised of a sample of 4 infants, 2 girls and 2 boys, 
balancing for sex differences. Data collection took place in two stages. In the first 
stage, mothers and infants were filmed in the three different situations. 20 The 
second stage of the data collection involved obtaining maternal accounts of their 
infants' behaviour. In the following section the procedure for this will be described.
7.1.1 Procedure for Data Collection
A sample of 12 normal mother-infant pairs was obtained through the National 
Childbirth Trust (NCT) in Oxfordshire. National Childbirth Trust nurses were asked 
to contact mothers who were not suffering from any psychological problems. None 
of the mothers filmed had any involvement with psychiatrists or clinical psychologists 
either before or during the filming. Mothers were English, white, middle class, 
primiparous and in their mid-20s to mid-30s. The sample of mothers were selected 
from the NCT because of the homogeneity of its population of mothers. It was 
reasoned, on the basis of the theory developed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, that 
interpretations are likely to differ on the basis of the social and cultural group to 
which the interpreters belong to. The conceptual framework caregivers carry with 
them would be likely to affect the types of interpretations they made of their infants. 
In order to ensure that interpretations were based on changes in the mother-infant 
relationship, rather than reflections of different social or cultural backgrounds, it was 
important to ensure that mothers belonged to the same cultural and socio-economic 
background.
20. Two cameras were used, one aimed at each of the pair.
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They were told that the purpose of the study w as to examine the normal 
developm ent of perception in infants. After obtaining their consent, a familiarisation 
visit w as m ade, follow ing which filming took place. For the film ing session, mothers 
w ere asked to place infants in a baby-chair facing them. The follow ing were the 
instructions given for each situation:
Stage 1: Face to face play (FF)
"I'm going to film you and the baby for about 3 minutes. Could you play 
with your baby as you often do when you are together. Please do not use 
any toys or objects. Try to relax and ignore me and the cameras."
Stage 2: Prohibitive condition (PR)
"Now I'm going to bring out a toy (placing the novel toy 21 at the edge 
of the table or on the mother's lap if necessary, just within reach of the 
baby). Could you try to stop the baby from playing with it without 
physically restraining him/her?"
Stage 3: Toy play condition (T)
"Could you just carry on playing with the baby and the toy for a few  
minutes?" (At this point I intervene and place the toy completely within 
the infant's grasp).
Each stage w as treated as a separate filming session. If the baby became distressed  
between sessions the film ing w as halted until s /h e  had been quietened. If the infant 
could not be calm ed the mother-infant pair were replaced (N =l).
W ithin a tw o w eek p er iod ,22 a return visit w as m ade to show  the mother the 
infant video w hich had been edited w ith a video time generator. Connected to the
21. The novel toy comprised of a black box with coloured lights and buttons, and a 
small compartment with a lid. None of the infants had seen this box previous to that 
point in the filming. The toy was built specifically for the study by K. Holdsworth at the 
Social Psychology Laboratory.
22. It was decided, on the basis of previous experience, that the gathering of accounts 
should not be delayed for over two weeks. This was because the infants developed so fast 
that there was a danger that accounts would be confounded by skills developed after the 
filming. This had happened in a pre-pilot sample of mothers, where a delay of one month 
between filming and obtaining accounts resulted in mothers relating the relevance of skills, 
seen on video, to the development of new skills acquired after the filming.
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vid eo  m achine w as a bleeper which was handed to the mother w ith the follow ing  
instructions:23
"As the baby's mother you know your infant far better than I could from 
a tape. Could you please help me by pressing this button every time the 
infant does something that you find meaningful? Please mark the tape 
even if you had previously marked the same type of action before."24
These instructions were elaborated upon by asking the mothers to im agine that 
they w ere actually interacting w ith the infants and to press the bleeper w hen they  
w ou ld  have been able to interpret and respond to the infant, such that they could  
describe it to m e and tell me what s /h e  meant. M ost mothers, how ever, seem ed to 
grasp intuitively what w as asked of them, and had no difficulty in selecting from the 
stream of their baby's behaviour. After the tape w as marked, mothers w ere asked to 
see the tape again and to explain what the selected acts meant.25 These accounts
23. The video machine with the bleeper was designed and constructed by Steve 
Bennett at the Social Psychology Laboratory.
24. With the bleeping technique, one initial problem was that mothers bleeped only 
once to mark a particular infant act but would not mark it again if it recurred, even 
though it was meaningful to them. The solution was to state in the instructions that they 
should mark the segments even though they may have done so before. After mothers 
bleeped during the first viewing of the video tape, they were asked to hold onto the 
bleeper during the second viewing. This was because in many instances mothers found 
that they had missed meaningful episodes in the first viewing and needed to mark them. 
That also meant that the tapes were viewed thoroughly by the mothers, reducing the 
likelihood of meaningful infant acts being missed .
25. It was important to present the three conditions in the same order that they were 
filmed to preserve the temporal context of the infant's actions. A potential criticism may 
be that this method may give rise to order effects in, for example, the frequency of 
bleeping across the three conditions. This is not necessarily the case. The mother bases 
her interpretations not only on the present context of the infant's actions, during 
interaction, but on how much time has elapsed during which the infant was engaged in 
a particular activity. Indeed many examples were found where the meaning of an infant 
action was bound to a previous session or to the length of time which had passed since 
the beginning of the filming. Thus, it was felt that changing the order of the sequences 
would have distorted the mothers' interpretations on viewing the tape. Moreover, the 
object of using this technique was to try to achieve, as closely as possible, a running 
commentary from the mother while she was engaged in the process of interaction and 
communication with the infant. As it was not feasible to do so whilst she was interacting 
with the infant, due to task demands, the alternative was to keep the sequence of events 
as close as possible to the reality of the filming situation. Therefore, in the light of the 
above reasoning, although the possibility of serial effects may not be entirely ruled out, it 
is unlikely that they would have posed a threat to the reliability of the data. This is so 
especially in view of the number of opportunities the mothers had to view the tape, and
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were recorded on an audio machine, along with the corresponding time at which the 
bleep occurred to synchronise them with the infant behaviour data.26 To ensure that 
the mothers had been blind to the purpose of the study, mothers were asked what 
they thought the study had been about. Those who guessed the true nature of the 
study were replaced.27 Mothers were informed of the true nature of the study at the 
end of the procedure. In the following section the hypotheses pertaining to this study 
are presented.
7.2 Hypotheses and Aims of Analysis
To examine the role of maternal interpretation of infant expressions in 
interaction, the following questions are addressed in the next three chapters. The 
analysis may be divided into 5 main sections:
A. Does maternal selectivity from the stream of infant behaviour change between 
situations and age groups? The number of times mothers selected meaningful infant 
acts was examined to assess:
1. Whether maternal selections of infant acts are affected by infant age or 
situational context;
2. Whether maternal selections differ from student observers' selections of 
infant behaviours.
B. Having established the characteristics of maternal selectivity, the next step is to 
examine what mothers select. What infant facial expressions occur in maternally 
selected segments? Are there differences in the frequency of selected expressions 
which can account for the patterns of maternal selections of infant acts?
on the nature of the instructions.
26. From a brief pilot of this method it was found that mothers were sometimes 
reluctant to go into detail or were not being specific. Therefore a set of standard prompts 
and probes were used in cases where the mothers' accounts were unclear. Probes used 
were: "Could you please explain what you meant ...?", " I don't understand, could you 
explain a bit more?", and " How could you tell your baby wanted/was....?"
27. One mother-infant pair were replaced due to such biases.
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1. Do facial expressions, occurring in segments selected by mothers as 
meaningful, reflect maternal sensitivity to the developing capabilities of infants?
2. Does situational context affect the type and frequency of these facial 
expressions?
3. Are mothers' selections of facial expressions in various situational contexts 
also sensitive to the developmental capacities of the infant?
4. Are mothers' selections of infant behaviours haphazard, or do selected 
behaviours differ from baseline behaviours? As infant age increases, is there less 
change in facial expressions which can account for maternal selectivity?
C. Having examined what types of expressions mothers select, we go on to examine 
how mothers interpret these facial expressions. What attributions do mothers use to 
explain infant behaviours?
1. Do maternal attributions reflect maternal sensitivity to the age-related 
capacities of their infants?
2. Are maternal attributions influenced by situational context?
3. Does infant age affect maternal attributions in different situational contexts?
4. Do mothers' interpretations differ from observers' interpretations?
D. W hat relationship exists between facial expressions accompanying specific 
attributions?
1. Are maternal attributions of emotional states congruent with context free 
coded facial expressions?
2. Are non-emotion attributions made in the context of particular patterns of 
facial expressions which are age or situation specific?
E. Finally, w hat evidence does the above investigation provide about:
1. Who is controlling the interaction?
2. The mothers' role in this interaction?
In the following, the method used to investigate the hypotheses presented in 
the first two sections on maternal selectivity is presented. The analysis of this data 
is divided into two parts. After a discussion of measurement and reliability issues, 
a comparison of maternal selections of meaningful infant acts between age groups and
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conditions is presented. The aim of this comparison is to determine whether maternal 
selections of baby acts are affected by the age of the baby or the situational context. 
In part two, the content of these selected segments is examined. The aim of the latter 
analysis is to examine what types of facial expressions occur in maternally selected 
segments. This will reveal possible patterns of differences in frequencies of 
expressions between conditions and age groups which may suggest developmental 
and contextual influences in maternal selectivity.
7.3 Data Reduction and Coding of Facial Expressions
The behaviour segments which were selected for coding and analysis were 
based on maternal identifications, i.e., on marked segments of the film. These bleeped 
behaviours permitted a direct comparison of maternal interpretations with the facial 
expressions of the infant. Segments were defined on the basis of mothers' 
descriptions of behaviours at each bleep, and backtracking until the beginning of the 
behaviour defined by the mother. Therefore, the bleep was defined as the end of the 
segment. Maternal attributions fell around breakpoints in the infant's behaviour. 
Thus, to define the beginning of the segment was unproblematic as it was generally 
indicated by a change in the infant's behaviour corresponding to the mother's 
description of that behaviour. Expressions falling within these segments were coded, 
providing information on the types of facial expressions upon which mothers based 
their interpretations. Data for the baseline behaviours comprised of one segment of 
baseline behaviours which fell outside maternal selections of meaningful behaviours. 
Baseline segments were 4 seconds long on average, which was the average length of 
maternally selected segments. Segments falling outside maternally selected segments 
were shorter than the average length of those segments; therefore, although a number 
of baseline segments occurred between alternate selected segments, I could only take 
one four-second baseline segment from each session.
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7.3.1 Intercoder Reliability of MAX
The reliability of the facial coding scheme was tested using the same method 
as in the pilot study. MAX was used to code the facial expressions, and inter­
observer reliability of the facial expressions codes was checked throughout the coding. 
A segment of film was randomly selected from each condition and age group, and 
was double coded by another trained coder. Intercoder reliability was 85%28 (see 
Appendix 2).
7.3.2 Facial Expression Categories
MAX coding resulted in over 30 different facial expressions. The large number 
of expressions was the result of blends of various expressions in different regions of 
the face. This made any type of comparison of facial expressions between infants in 
various age groups and conditions problematic, because of the low frequencies of 
specific facial expressions. To enable comparisons, expressions were collapsed on the 
basis of their central features, as is explained below. After collapsing the facial 
expressions, 7 main expression categories were created.
1. Positive expressions, defined by the existence of the smile (code 52 in MAX).
2. Negative expressions, defined by the predominance of any of the negative muscle 
movements identified by MAX as involved in negative expressions. Although MAX 
identifies several negative facial expressions (sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, 
pain and shame), these did not occur in unblended form and were collapsed to form 
one negative emotion expression category.
3. Interest expressions not blended with any other expression.
28. Izard's instructions in the MAX manual were to compute intercoder reliability as: 
Agreements+disagreements.
Disagreements
Agreements and disagreements were calculated by comparing codes of each facial action 
movement and the onset and offset of the muscle movement in time.
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4. Surprise expressions not blended with any other expression (not included in the 
analysis due to low occurrence).
5. Neutral or rest expressions in which there was no codable movement, i.e., the face 
was at rest (denoted by open eyes, smooth forehead, and closed relaxed mouth).
6. Obscure face in which the face was hidden from view (not included in the analysis 
due to low occurrence).
7. Noncodable: Expressions for which MAX did not have codes (not included in the 
analysis due to low occurrence).
7.3.3 Statistical Issues
A number of statistical methods have been used to analyse videotaped data. 
In a comprehensive review of the uses of video techniques for the study of human 
action, Bakeman and Ginsburg (1981) list a variety of statistical techniques for the 
analysis of non-sequential event based data, ranging from chi-square tests, analysis 
of variance (e.g., Izard et al., 1987; Malatesta and Haviland, 1982), and log-linear 
analysis (e.g., Brownlee and Bakeman, 1981; Bakeman and Brownlee, 1982).
Given the small sample size, a nonparametric test, log-linear modelling, was 
used, which enabled comparison between the various levels or factors in the design. 
Because of the low power of the statistical test there was a high risk of Type II errors 
(i.e., failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false). Thus, it was expected that 
several of the comparisons would not be statistically significant although there may 
have been a substantial effect. Because of this the following analysis will be based 
on both inferential and descriptive statistics.
7.3.4 A Note on Data Management
Figure 7 presents a simplified example of the data layout to give the reader 
an idea of how the data was structured. To obtain a measurement of a particular
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category of expression or interpretation the data was reduced by calculating the total 
num ber of occurrences of that particular category in all selected segments. 
Observational periods differed in length depending on the state of the infant. It is 
thus also worth pointing out that because film sessions were of unequal lengths, fre­
quencies could not be used directly. Shorter films would have fewer facial 
expressions and interpretations, whilst longer films meant that there was a higher 
probability of more facial expressions and interpretations occurring. Therefore, in all 
aspects of the data analysis, the total time of each session had to be taken into 
account. For descriptive purposes, the rates per minute of facial expressions and 
attributions are used in graphs and tables, as calculated in Chapter 5. Specific facial 
expressions were summed across the selected segments and divided by the total 
session time. For purposes of computation, actual frequencies were used, weighted 
by total time of session (see Appendix 2).
Figure 7: An Example of the structure of data segments
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7.4 Analysis and Results of Maternal Selection of Infant Acts
The initial step in the interpretation of behaviour is the selection of w hat to 
interpret.29 How do mothers select from the stream of infant behaviour? Are 
maternal selections of meaningful infant acts subject to contextual and developmental 
influences? A comparison of the differences in maternal selections of meaningful 
infant acts in different situations and age groups will go some way towards 
answering these questions and will highlight the nature of the criteria mothers use 
to define what they consider meaningful.
Do mothers note meaningful acts in some situations more than others, or in 
some age groups more than others? Results of log-linear modelling revealed that the 
number of meaningful acts noted by mothers did not differ significantly between age
groups (%2=5 .2 5 8 ;d/=2 ;p.=.0 7 2 ) . Table 10 shows that there is a high level of individual 
variability between mothers.
Table 10: Mean rates per minute of maternal selections
Age groups
Situations 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months
Face to face 5.09
(4.60-8.50)*
5.70
(3.50-9.40)
5.05
(2.44-7.70)
Prohibitive 4.50
(2.50-5.40)
4.35
(3.40-6.86)
4.96
(1.70-6.66)
Toy play 4.40
(1.90-6.60)
3.65
(2.59-4.63)
2.88
(1.07-4.99)
* Figures in brackets represent ranges.
No significant differences were found between each age group and situation 
(%2=3.58;d/=4;p.=.47), although Figure 8 suggests a trend in the data. Log linear
analysis did, however, reveal a situation main effect (%2=22.65;df=2',p.=.000001). 
Mothers selected more acts in face to face interaction (FF), and the prohibitive 
situation (PR), than in the toy play condition (T) (Figure 8). In FF and PR, mothers
29. Maternal selections refer to the number of bleeps mothers used to mark the infant
tape.
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selected between 4 and 5 episodes per minute, while in T, they selected between 3 
and 4 episodes per minute. This would suggest that mothers note more meaningful 
acts when their infants are engaged with them in interpersonal exchanges, than when  
infants are playing with inanimate objects. Although PR could arguably have 
resulted in the infants' attention being focused on the toy, observations from the 
video tapes revealed that mothers distracted babies by playing face to face games, 
especially in age groups 1 and 2.
F igu re 8: M atern al se le c tio n s  o f  in fan t b eh a v io u r
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Although maternal selections did not differ significantly between age groups, 
trends in Figure 8 suggest that mothers make progressively fewer selections as infant 
age increases. While mothers of the youngest age group select approximately the 
same number of meaningful acts across the three situations, selections of older infant 
behaviours appear to be fewer, especially in the toy play episode. Older infants may 
be displaying less interactive behaviour than younger infants in T.
Returning to the original hypotheses, the initial question regarding maternal 
selectivity was to identify the basis on which mothers perceived and selected infant 
acts as meaningful. Moreover, whether this is influenced by the age group of the 
babies or by situational context. The above results showed that mothers find more 
infant behaviours meaningful in some situations than in others (suggesting that babies 
may be displaying more meaningful behaviours in these situations). The data 
suggests that selectivity is also affected by the age of the infant: Mothers of the oldest 
age group infants' make fewer selections in T than the rest of the sample.
5.7
face to face play prohibitive toy play
Situations
B  age group I H I age group 2 |T) age group 3
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On the whole, however, infant age did not affect the number of meaningful 
acts noted. It is not clear why mothers did not note more meaningful acts overall in 
older infants. It has been suggested that, as babies develop, their behaviour becomes 
more clearly marked by 'points of articulation' (Werner and Kaplan, 1963). In support 
of this, Adamson et al. (1987) found that adults selected more acts overall as babies 
got older. The present findings show that mothers selected a similar number of acts 
overall regardless of infant age (mean=4.66 for age group 1, 4.57 for age group 2 and 
4.30 for age group 3). Indeed, the trend, although not significant, appears to be for 
mothers to select fewer acts with increasing age. If this were so, it may be that, 
although mothers in different age groups do not differ in the number of meaningful 
acts they select, they may differ in what they select and how they interpret it. In the 
following section, the analysis assesses the expressive content of selected segments in 
the different conditions, and in so doing, examines what mothers are focusing on. 
This analysis will identify whether differences between age groups reveal a 
developmental progression in selected facial expressions.
The present results are, however, congruent with Adamson et a l/s results 
regarding the effect of situational context on selectivity. Their findings show that 
more meaningful acts are selected in interpersonal situations than in situations where 
infants are interacting with objects on their own. Although the filming episodes in 
the present study were not identical, the present investigation partly corroborates 
these findings; mothers selected more acts in situations where one would expect 
frequent episodes of interpersonal exchanges and maternal involvement (FF and PR), 
than in situations where the babies' attention was directed more at the toy (T). If 
mothers are more inclined to find infant behaviour meaningful in interpersonal 
contexts, it suggests that they are highlighting potentially communicative expressions 
for their babies. Moreover, it implies that expressions are selected in behavioural 
episodes which are characterised by joint dialogue between mothers and infants.
7.4.1 Developmental Changes and Situational Contexts
In the following analysis, the content of maternal selections is examined. What 
mothers find meaningful is analysed to find out if there are qualitative and 
quantitative differences in mothers' selections of expressions with increasing age, and
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in different contexts. Do developmental variables affect the way infants react to the 
various situations, and the way mothers select expressive acts? As infants grow older 
their responsivity to environmental stimuli develops, as was demonstrated in Chapter
2. This means that babies' facial expressions will become more articulate and less 
ambiguous. Will this affect the way mothers select and read these expressions? Will 
mothers find it easier to select and identify changes in infant state from their facial 
and expressive reactions, as infant expressions become more familiar to mothers?
At the same time, it is hypothesised that situational constraints will affect the 
expressive behaviour of infants. Evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests that 
infants may respond with stereotypical facial expressions when they are confronted 
with strong stimulation. The situations presented here, on the other hand, do not 
involve the presentation of strong stimuli, but rather were designed to capture aspects 
of mother-infant interaction which were likely to commonly occur in everyday 
settings. Thus, it is expected that facial expressions of infants may be ambiguous and 
difficult for mothers to define, especially in the younger age groups. This ambiguity 
is an important aspect of expressive communication in the dyad. As has been shown 
in Chapters 1 and 2, research designed to uncover the universality of facial 
expressions has not found universal recognition of facial expressions. Similarly, 
studies which assessed mothers recognition of stereotypical facial expressions did not 
find clear-cut evidence of mothers correctly identifying infant emotion states in line 
with preset definitions. In this connection, as was pointed out by Plutchik (1980b), 
the stereotypical facial expressions on which so much of the naturalist argument and 
research rests are fleeting at best and, when they occur, are only held for a short 
period of time. All these factors indicate that studies which attempt to elicit 
stereotypical facial expressions in infants by the use of artificially strong environ­
mental stimulation are not representing the process of expression and interpretation 
adequately.
The choice of situations in this study was set up to answer the question: In 
naturalistic settings, how are facial expressions selected and interpreted by caregivers? 
What are the likely influences on these interpretations? This is not to say that the 
situations chosen here fully represent the range of interactions in everyday settings. 
However, an attempt was made to use situations and settings with good ecological 
validity. In this connection, it is recognised that there must be necessary restraints 
on the activities of the mother-infant pair in naturalistic settings, weakening the
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ecological validity of the observational study. However, conducting the study at the 
m others' homes helps to reduce the inherent reactivity problems in conducting 
observational work in artificial settings. The more relaxed and familiar settings of the 
home environment would have reduced reactivity effects of myself and the filming 
equipment, although undeniably, they would have had some effect.
The previous analysis revealed that mothers are finding infant behaviour 
meaningful when it occurs in contexts characterised by interpersonal interactions. In 
the following analysis, it is expected that the face to face condition would be likely 
to contain frequent positive exchanges. While, as was stated earlier, the prohibitive 
condition would be likely to give rise to negative exchanges, although developmental 
variables may affect how infants respond.
Sugerman-Bell (1978) and Trevarthen and Hubley (1978) found evidence that, 
whereas infants under 9 months could not yet coordinate between persons and 
objects, at around 9 months infants began to look up from the toy to their mother 
during toy play, creating a more interpersonal dialogue during joint toy play. Do 
selected acts of mothers in the oldest age group contain high frequencies of positive 
expressions during T to reflect these developments? In the next section these 
questions are addressed.
7.4.2 Selected Infant Facial Expressions
Infants' expressions fell into four main facial expression categories: positive, 
negative, interest, and neutral or still-face. Three other expressions were coded, 
surprise, obscure, and noncodable, but they did not occur with sufficient frequency 
to allow for statistical analysis. Coded segments did not contain expressions of shame 
or contempt as identified by MAX; infants do not express the 'social emotion' 
expressions in maternally selected segments. Table 11 provides a summary of the 
results of log-linear modelling. It was not possible to compute an expressions x age 
x situation effect. The number of permutations of such an analysis would require a 
larger sample size.
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Table 11: Chi-square statistics results of log-linear model for main and interaction 
effects of infant facial expressions
Expressions Age
effect
Situation
effect
Age x Situ­
ation interac­
tion
Positive 5.83 44.58*” 18.69***
Negative 1.80 3.31 26.61**
Interest 0.88 2.51 5.21
Neutral 6.40* 6.40* 11.71*
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, and *** = 0.001
Degrees of freedom for main effects = 2
Degrees of freedom for age x situation interaction = 4
1. Ages:
As can be seen from Table 11, only neutral expressions differed between age 
groups. Selected segments contain increasingly higher occurrences of neutral or still­
faced expressions in age 2 than ages 1 and 3. Table 12 also suggests possible trends 
in the remaining facial expressions. For example, compared to mothers of 4-6 and 7-9 
month olds, mothers of 10-12 month olds selected segments in which infants smiled 
less and displayed more negative expression, suggesting that mothers of the oldest 
infants may have begun to regard negative expressions as having interpersonal mean­
ing. This possibility is examined in the section on maternal interpretations below. 
Comparing expressions within each age group, a general pattern was found showing 
positive, interest and negative expressions occurring frequently in age 1 and 3 selected 
segments. In age group 2, babies were more still-faced and displayed fewer negative 
expressions than the other 2 age groups in selected segments.
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Table 12: Mean rate per minute of infant expressions for age groups
Mean rate of infant facial expressions
Age groups Positive Interest Neutral Negative
4-6 months 2.53
(0.39-4.98)*
2.60
(1.61-3.54)
0.58
(0.25-0.78)
1.07
(0.57-1.53)
7-9 months 2.72
(1.51-3.93)
2.70
(2.21-3.38)
1.47
(0.12-2.89)
0.93
(0.55-1.26)
10-12
months
1.67
(0.00-4.94)
2.40
(0.86-3.39)
0.79
(0.51-1.52)
1.7
(0.26-2.32)
* Figures in brackets represent the range of rates of expressions.
W hile age differences m ay have been concealed by high w ithin group variation 
(see ranges in Table 11), and the small sample size (n=4 for each age group), the 
results obtained here are similar to those found in the study by Malatesta et al. (1982, 
1986) w hich found no significant differences in facial expressions across age groups. 
H ow ever, as w as argued in Chapter 1, the Malatesta and Haviland study ignored the 
possible effects of situational variations.
2. Situations:
It is expected that both mother and infant w ould  be influenced, not only by  
each others' behaviour, but also by the overall situational context of the interactive 
situations. For example, if the mother's task is to engage the infant in face to face 
interaction, the type of mother-infant dialogue, and maternal interpretations of the 
infant's behaviour, w ou ld  be expected to highlight concerns pertinent to face to face 
play, such as sm iling and attending. This is likely to be different if her task w as to 
prohibit the infant from playing w ith a toy, or if it w ere to engage in object play. 
M oreover, the w ay in which she defines her task is expected to vary from one age 
group to the next, as both the infant's capacities develop, and her perceptions of her 
develop ing infant change. Therefore, age group differences m ay be em bedded in  
situational context.
Significant situational differences in mothers' selections of infant facial 
expressions w ere found (Table 11). Differences in selected positive expressions w ere  
highly significant. As can be seen from Table 13, positive expressions predom inantly  
occur in the FF and PR selected segments. Neutral expressions also differed
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significantly across situations, appearing m ost frequently in PR. Mothers' selections 
of interest and negative expressions did not differ across situations, although interest 
is the predom inant expression occurring in PR and T selected segments.
Table 13: Mean rate per minute of infant expressions across situations
Mean rate of infant facial expressions
Situations Positive Interest Neutral Negative
Face to face 3.55
(0.00-7.06)
2.60
(0.35-3.69)
0.56
(0.00-1.65)
0.90
(0.00-2.09)
Prohibitive 2.00
(0.00-4.50)
2.70
(0.41-4.54)
1.30
(0.00-5.12)
1.50
(0.00-3.99)
Toy play 1.42
(0.00-5.02)
2.40
(0.220-
4.62)
0.94
(0.00-2.63)
1.32
(0.00-1.85)
3. A ge x situation:
To find out if situational variations are related to the age of the infant, an age 
by situation interaction w as tested for (Table l l ) . 30 Selected positive, negative and 
neutral facial expressions differed significantly betw een each situation and age group 
category. Tests failed to show  a significant age by situation interaction for interest 
expressions. Segm ents of 4-6 and 7-9 month olds contained frequent episodes of 
positive expressions in FF w hile, in 10-12 m onth old segm ents, interest w as  
predom inant and positive expressions were fewer, compared to the other 2 groups 
(Table 14). In PR, 4-6 and 7-9 month olds' segm ents contained predom inantly  
positive, interest and neutral expressions. Segm ents of 10-12 m onth olds, on the other 
hand, contained predom inantly negative and interest expressions (Figures 10-13). In 
T, 4-6 and 7-9 m onth olds' segm ents contained predom inantly interest episodes. 
H ow ever, whereas these expressions were accompanied by high frequencies of 
negative expressions in 4-6 m onth old selected segm ents, segm ents of 7-9 m onth olds 
contained high frequencies of neutral/still-faced expressions (Figures 10 to 13). 
M others of 10-12 m onth olds' segments again differed from the rest of the sample, 
containing predom inantly positive and interest expressions (Table 14).
30. Frequencies of expressions were used. Using total duration of time as the unit of 
measure was not advisable, given that log-linear modelling requires frequencies. The 
alternative test to use with total duration of time for expressions would have been an 
ANOVA. However, the small sample size would have made this test unreliable.
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Table 14: Mean rate per minute of infant expressions for situations and age groups
Mean rate of infant expressions
Age Groups Situations Positive Negative Neutral Interest
4-6 months Face to face 3.95 0.42 0.50 2.70
Prohibitive 2.34 0.93 0.18 2.20
Toy play 1.42 1.85 1.05 2.90
7-9 months Face to face 4.40 1.08 0.80 2.92
Prohibitive 2.79 0.80 2.20 2.67
Toy play 0.95 0.91 1.37 2.61
10-12 months Face to face 2.31 1.18 0.38 2.32
Prohibitive 0.80 2.72 1.59 3.30
Toy play 1.90 1.18 0.39 1.63
The results of maternal selections of facial expressions show  :
• A ge groups: The frequency of selected expressions did not vary significantly  
betw een age groups. Only neutral expressions differed betw een age groups and 
occurred predom inantly in mothers of m7-9 m onth olds' selected acts. Possible trends 
appeared w hich w ere not significant; for example, positive expressions appeared to 
be selected m ost frequently in ages 1 and 2, follow ed by interest and neutral. In age 
3, on the other hand, facial expressions did not exhibit as m uch variation as the 
younger ages, w ith  interest expressions occurring m ost frequently in selected  
segm ents (Table 12).
• Situations: Results show ed that FF selections contained predom inantly positive  
expressions, w hile PR and T contained progressively fewer such episodes (Figure 9). 
Neutral expressions were least frequent during FF and highest during PR. A lthough  
interest expressions did not differ significantly betw een situations, they w ere the 
predom inant expressions in PR and T selected segments, follow ed by positive  
expressions.
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Figure 9: S ituational variations in  in fan t facial expressions
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• Age by Situation: Selected segments of the 10-12 month old age group, infants 
smiled less during FF and PR, and more in T, compared to mothers of younger 
infants. Negative expressions were most frequently selected by mothers of 4-6 month 
olds in T, and by mothers of 10-12 month olds in PR. Neutral expressions were 
selected predominantly during T by mothers of the youngest age group, and in PR 
by mothers of 7-9 and 10-12 month olds (Figures 10-13).
For comparative purposes, test results for mothers' facial expressions in 
selected segments can be found in Appendix 2. As the main focus of the analysis is 
to examine maternal perceptions, it was decided to leave them out of the main 
presentation of results.
Figure 10: Positive infan t expressions Figure 11: N egative in fan t expressions
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Figure 12: N eutral in fan t expressions Figure 13: In terest in fan t expressions
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Comparing the above results with the number of meaningful acts noted by 
mothers shows certain similarities. In FF and PR, where mothers in all age groups 
selected the most number of acts, these acts contained frequent occurrences of positive 
and interest expressions. In T, interest was the most predominant expression, positive 
expressions were fewer, and negative expressions more frequent, compared to the 
other 2 situations. Mothers appear to select infant acts that are accompanied by a 
high occurrence of positive expressions in the context of interpersonal situations. 
However, taking age into account, mothers of 10-12 month olds violate this pattern 
in PR, where selected episodes contained frequent occurrences of negative and 
interest expressions. This may indicate that negative expressions have assumed 
interpersonal significance for mothers of the oldest infants. Segments of 7-9 month 
olds in PR also contained frequencies of interest and neutral expressions similar to 
those of positive expressions, suggesting a possible progression in the way infants 
react to maternal prohibition. While 7-9 month old babies were less positively 
interactive and more still-faced in PR than 4-6 month old babies, they did not become 
distressed at the prohibition as the older infants did.
Overall, there appears to be a trend for mothers to select expressions which 
portray the youngest infants as happiest during FF and PR, and unhappy but 
interested in T. This pattern changes for 7-9 month olds, where selected expressions 
portray the infant as less happy but expressing interest in PR, and mostly interested 
during T. Expressions selected by mothers of 10-12 month olds portray infants as 
displaying the most situationally appropriate expressions; in FF, infant expressions
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sh ow  the infant as happy and interested, in PR, distressed, interested and inactive 
(neutral expressions) w hile, in T, as happy and interested w ith bouts of distress.
H ow ever, it is possible that selected facial expressions are only a reflection of 
w hat is occurring during the rest of the time. That is, that the differences across 
situations and betw een age groups are a reflection of developm ental changes and the 
effect of different situations on infant behaviour. It m ay thus be that m others are 
only m aking haphazard choices and selecting what is predom inantly being expressed. 
If this w ere the case, the types of behaviour infants exhibit in selected segm ents 
w ou ld  not be expected to differ from behaviour occurring during the rest of the time. 
On the other hand, one criterion for defining m eaningful behaviour m ay be that 
selected behaviour is characterised by high frequencies of expression changes.
7.4.3 Comparison of Baseline and Selected Expressions
U pon inspection of the tapes it appeared that mothers used breakpoints w hen  
selecting m eaningful infant behaviours. Breakpoints are changes in behaviour, both 
verbal and nonverbal, which signal a change from one action unit to another. 
M others m ay be defining infant behaviour as m eaningful w hen it involves som e  
change in the level of ongoing activity. To address this possibility the number of 
changes in baseline facial expressions w as compared w ith  facial expression changes 
in selected segments. Mothers may also be selecting infant acts on the basis of the 
types of facial expressions they contain. Thus, facial expressions occurring in  baseline 
segm ents w ill be inspected.
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Table 15: Summary of ANOVA results for baseline sample comparisons
SOURCE SS DF MS F Sig. of F
Within cells 17.13 9 1.90
Age 1.53 2 0.79 0.42 .672
Within cells 6.79 9 0.75
Condition 5.01 1 5.01 6.64 .030
Age by cond. 13.36 2 6.68 8.85 .007
Within cells 25.25 18 1.40
Situation 0.58 2 0.29 0.21 .814
Age by sit. 1.83 4 0.46 0.33 .856
Within cells 20.08 18 1.12
Cond. by sit. 1.69 2 0.85 0.76 .48
Age by cond. by sit. 14.56 4 3.64 3.26 .035
A n Analysis of Variance w as used to compare selected and baseline segm ent 
expression changes (Table 15). Situations and conditions (baseline or m other data) 
w ere treated as within subject factors. Baseline segm ents differ significantly from  
selected segments. Figures 14 to 16 show  that facial expressions change more 
frequently in selected segments than in baseline segm ents overall. This pattern varies 
significantly depending on infant age (Table 15). Selected segm ents in ages 1 and 3 
contained more changes in facial expressions than baseline segm ents whereas, in age 
group 2, they contained fewer changes than the baselines. This pattern is further 
differentiated by situation. Baseline segm ents of age group 2 infants contained m ore  
expression changes than selected segm ents in FF and, especially, in T (Figures 14 and 
16). It is not imm ediately clear w hy age group 2 mothers should differ from the rest 
of the sample. A  number of possibilities exist. M others m ay be concentrating on one 
specific expression rather than patterns of facial expressions. Or, m others m ay be 
selecting aspects of infant behaviour which are not characterised by frequent changes 
in facial expressions. For example, concentrating on the toy w ould  require the infant 
to remain still whilst characteristically displaying either interest or still-faced express­
ions. In fact, this appears to be partially substantiated by looking at infants' facial 
expressions for that age group (Figures 12 and 13), where the m ost frequently 
occurring facial expression in T for 7-9 m onth old infants is interest, and the second  
m ost frequent expression is neutral.
Results also show that, in T, mothers selected segm ents that contained m any  
more expression changes than baseline segments. Both mothers of 4-6 and 10-12 
m onth olds selected acts containing expression changes which differ m arkedly from
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baseline expression changes. It will be remembered that mothers of the youngest 
infants selected more acts in that condition than mothers in the oldest age group. 
Thus, while the two groups of mothers selected segments characterised by frequent 
expression changes, mothers of 10-12 month olds selected fewer such segments. It 
may be that the difference in the number of selections between the two groups of 
mothers may be partly explained by the fact that the oldest infants emit fewer 
behaviours containing frequent expression changes and, thus, mothers make fewer 
selections. (The other possibility is that mothers of 10-12 month olds are defining 
meaningful behaviours differently from mothers of 4-6 month olds and thus are not 
relying on expression changes per se. Examining differences in maternal interpreta­
tions will allow us to test this.
Also of interest is the fact that baseline and selected segments of mothers of 
4-6 month olds in FF contain the same number of expression changes (Figure 14). Are 
mothers making arbitrary selections of the infants' behaviour in this category, or do 
they depend on other aspects of infant behaviour? Comparing baseline expression 
changes for those infants across situations suggests that, whilst infant expressions 
slow dow n over situations, mothers consistently select segments which contain 
frequent changes in expressions, especially in T.
Figure 14: Baseline and selected segm ents in  face to face play episode
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Figure 15: Baseline and selected segm ents in  p roh ib itive  episode
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Figure 16: Baseline and selected segm ents in  toy play episode
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When infant behaviour is highly variable, as in FF, mothers of the youngest 
babies may be making arbitrary selections of infant behaviours, i.e., they may be 
'guessing'. This possibility may be addressed by examining what mothers actually 
say about the infants' behaviour. The oldest age group, on the other hand, differs 
from the rest of the sample in FF, in that mothers in this group are the only ones to 
select segments which contain more expression changes than baseline segments. This 
may be due to the increasing specificity and articulation of infant behaviour and the 
increasing selectivity of mothers.
One aspect of baseline segments that could not be statistically analysed was 
the specific facial expressions contained within them. As was pointed out earlier in 
this chapter, baseline segments were shorter than the average length of selected 
segments. To get a baseline segment of similar length to selected segments was there­
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fore difficult. Because only one baseline segment could be analysed for each 
condition x situation, the frequency of facial expressions occurring in these selected 
segments was very low. This prevented comparing specific facial expressions in 
baseline and selected segments.
Although, as was mentioned above, tests could not be computed for baseline 
facial expressions, percentages of specific facial expressions out of the total number 
of expressions occurring in baseline segments are presented in Table 16. Baseline 
segments contained all 5 facial expression categories. One apparent trend is that 
baseline segments increasingly comprise of interest expressions as infants get older. 
In age group 3, baseline segments in all three conditions show that interest is the 
main expression in non-meaningful infant behaviour.
T able 16: Facial expressions in  baseline segm ents
Age group 1
Positive Negative Interest Neutral Surprise
Face to face 57% 28.6% 14%
Prohibitive 28.6% 57% 14%
Toy play 50% 25% 25%
Age G roup 2
Face to face 80% 20%
Prohibitive 42.9% 42.9% 14.3%
Toy play 22.2% 11.1% 44.4% 22.2%
Age group 3
Face to face 33.3% 66.6%
Prohibitive 16.7% 66.7% 16.7%
Toy play 20% 20% 60%
Positive expressions in the younger age groups, especially in age group 2, make up 
a large percentage of baseline segments in FF. Older infants' positive expressions are 
much fewer, both in selected and in baseline segments. This appears to indicate a 
developmental trend whereby, after 9 months, infants generally display fewer positive 
expressions and more interest expressions. Finally, negative expressions are present 
in baseline segments in age group 3 in PR and T. Negative expressions were also 
very frequent in selected meaningful PR acts. This would suggest that mothers were 
selecting most of the negative expressions infants produced in PR. It is also possible 
to speculate that mothers may have been partially ignoring negative expressions in
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T, as they occur w ith low  frequency in selected segm ents but are also found in 
baseline segments.
It is conceivable, for example, that, had it been possible to analyse baseline 
expressions, differences w ou ld  have been found in frequency of expressions betw een  
age groups and betw een selected and baseline expressions. If differences betw een age 
groups w ere found in baseline expressions, this w ould  have show n that infant 
expressions underw ent developm ental changes independently of what m others chose 
to select. N o differences between baseline expressions and maternally selected  
expressions w ou ld  have suggested that mothers selected w hat w as prevalent in infant 
behaviour and that their selections underwent parallel changes to infant expressive  
developm ents. If differences betw een mothers' selections and baseline selections 
existed, they w ou ld  have show n that mothers were ignoring certain expressive  
responses.
A  cautionary note is that these figures are based on very few  expressions. The 
baseline segm ents are not large enough to generalise to the rest of the tape. 
N evertheless, the percentages provide a rough picture of the types of facial 
expressions exhibited by infants outside m eaningful acts. They suggest firstly that 
infant positive expressions becom e fewer w ith age, and interest expressions increase. 
Secondly, w hen  seen in the light of maternally selected facial expressions, they 
indicate that mothers in general select expressions which are prevalent in infant 
behaviour. In other words, facial expressions alone do not appear to determ ine what 
m others find m eaningful in infant behaviour. The overall behavioural context (i.e, 
situation) and the more local behavioural context (i.e., level of activity as measured  
by the number of facial changes) appear to affect what is selected as m eaningful. To 
com plete this picture, it is necessary to examine w hat mothers actually say about 
these infant acts.
The above results highlight a number of important points. Firstly, they show  
that, on the w hole, mothers select segments in w hich facial expression changes are 
frequent compared to the rest of the interaction. H owever, w hen situation and age 
are taken into account, changes in facial expressions are not always used as a criterion 
for selecting infant acts. Thus, w hile changes in level of activity, or breakpoints, do 
play a role in maternal selectivity, they do not, by them selves, determ ine w hat is 
selected. The profiles of different expressions for each condition suggest that 
selectivity depends on other aspects of the interaction, such as the m eaning of particu­
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lar expressions for mothers in particular contexts. This is partly substantiated by the 
difference in selectivity betw een mothers and observers. Secondly, w h ile it w as  
expected that older babies' expressions w ould  be less variable than younger babies', 
as w as found in Malatesta et al.'s study (1982), the data did not reveal age differences 
in the num ber of expression changes betw een different age groups. Som e trends in 
the data do, how ever, suggest that this m ay be happening. For exam ple, baseline seg­
m ents in FF suggest that expression changes becom e fewer as infant age increases 
and, furthermore, that positive expressions in both baseline and selected segm ents 
decrease after 9 m onths of age and negative expressions increase. It is likely that, as 
babies develop, their responses to situational stim uli became more articulate, and 
m others selections and interpretations were sensitive to these changes.
7.6 Interpersonal Contexts and Developmental Transitions
The aim of the above analysis w as to answer tw o specific questions. Firstly, 
to assess if maternal selectivity is influenced by situational context or infant age. 
Secondly, to examine the content of these selections to determine if differences in the 
frequency of selected expressions can account for the patterns of maternal selections 
of infant acts. The above results, taken as a w hole, provide evidence that maternal 
selectivity is affected by situational context. Mothers note more m eaningful acts in 
FF and PR than T, indicating that one criterion for selection of m eaningful acts may  
be the interpersonal context of the behaviour. This is substantiated by the findings 
on maternal selections of infant expressions. A lthough mothers in all age groups and 
situations make selections involving all 5 facial expressions, segm ents in specific age 
groups and situations reveal differences in the frequency of particular expressions. 
These differences appear to indicate a preference for positive expressions in situations 
characterised by joint interpersonal exchanges. H ow ever, mothers of 10-12 m onth  
olds appear to differ from the rest of the sample. Whereas mothers of 4-6 and 7-9 
m onth olds select segm ents highlighting positive interaction during FF, m others of 10- 
12 m onth olds select segm ents which contain frequent episodes of distress in PR and 
similar frequencies of positive expressions during FF and T, suggesting a transition 
has taken place by 10-12 months. These results support the hypothesis that mothers' 
selections of facial expressions in various situational contexts is also sensitive to the
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developm ental capabilities of babies. To find out if mothers interpret infants' 
behaviour in w ays that are congruent w ith their selection of facial expressions, w e  
w ill turn now  to an analysis of the attributions mothers make concerning these 
expressions in the next chapter.
A  cautionary note here is that w hile these findings suggest important 
m echanism s they m ust be seen in the light of certain limitations. Two m ain  
lim itations prom pt caution in generalising these findings to the w ider population. 
Firstly, the small sample size used for the study places limits on extrapolating the 
results of the above analysis to a wider population of similar mothers. Moreover, 
although significant effects existed, despite the high probability of a Type II error due 
to the small sam ple size, the analysis w as restricted in terms of the types of 
com parisons that could be made.
Secondly, the sample of mothers w ho participated w ere hom ogenous in terms 
of socio-econom ic status and age. At one level, this ensured that changes in maternal 
selections w ere a reflection of the influences of context and developm ental changes. 
A t the sam e time, how ever, it restricts the results to a similar, and narrow, sam ple of 
m others in the general population. Further research is needed to determine to what 
extent these findings are characteristic of mothers of different ages and from different 
backgrounds.
Certain m ethodological limitations in the present study have highlighted areas 
of im provem ent for future studies. For example, it w as not possible to determ ine if 
m others attributed m eaning to infant expressive behaviour on the basis of a single  
expression or a pattern of facial expressions. Despite the high variability and 
changeability of babies' facial expressions, caregivers sustain relatively stable 
interaction patterns w ith their babies (e.g., Fogal, 1980). In this connection, little 
research has been undertaken to examine w hat influences caregivers in their selection  
of a particular expression, or pattern of expressions, for interpretation. Possible w ays  
of shedding light on this issue may be to look at behavioural interactions in more 
detail. For exam ple, to examine the types of body m ovem ents accom pany infant 
facial expressions in segm ents mothers identify as meaningful. In this connection, it 
w ou ld  be possible to investigate if combinations of expressions and body m ovem ents 
retain the same m eaning in different social and interactional contexts, or indeed w hen  
they are held for different durations. In other words, w hile the above analysis looked  
at the context of expressions in broad terms, as overarching situational context, a
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more detailed analysis of context, at a more behavioural level m ay shed light on more 
specific characteristics of parental interpretations.
The present analysis w as useful, how ever, in shedding light on som e  
important processes. By looking at how  mothers select the m eaningful behaviours of 
their ow n infants it w as possible to show  that m others select fewer acts as infants 
grow older, rather than selecting more acts, as A dam son et a l/s  (1986) results show ed. 
This w ou ld  suggest that the increasing articulation of infant expressive behaviour 
does not necessarily lead to more acts being selected as meaningful. Rather, it w ou ld  
appear that, w ith the increasing co-ordination in infant acts, mothers becom e more 
specific and more selective concerning what they label as meaningful. In order to 
examine this issue in more detail, the analysis m ust be taken a step further by  
examining mothers' interpretations regarding these selected segments. This w ill allow  
us to assess whether maternal interpretations undergo parallel changes w ith  infant 
acts in different age groups and situations. In the next chapter, this analysis is 
presented.
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CHAPTER 8
MATERNAL INTERPRETATIONS OF INFANT BEHAVIOUR
8.0 Hypotheses and Aims of Chapter
The results of the analysis presented in Chapter 7 suggested that mothers 
perceive more meaningful acts in babies w hen they are engaged in predom inantly  
interpersonal contexts. The analysis also highlighted the possibility that m others find 
few er infant acts m eaningful as babies get older. The expressive content of these 
selected segments show  that mothers select infant acts w hich reflected both situational 
and age related developments; selected segm ents contained fewer positive expressions 
in FF, more negative expressions in PR, and more positive expressions in T. These 
differences in the expressive content of selected segm ents suggest that infants have 
becom e more articulate in response to certain kinds of stimulation. As important is 
that these expressions may have assum ed a new  com m unicative functions for 
mothers. By looking at the w ay mothers actually interpret these segm ents of infant 
behaviour, the types of linguistic m eanings they ascribe to them, w e can exam ine this 
possibility further.
Using a qualitative technique to explore maternal selectivity of m eaningful acts 
is an important new  step in the area of expressive developm ent. In recent years there 
has been a growing emphasis on using a mix of m ethodologies, both quantitative and 
qualitative, in approaching research questions (Robson, 1993). This flexibility has 
m ostly characterised research in social psychology; developm ental psychology has 
been slower to mix techniques. In the follow ing sections, I w ill exam ine the 
underlying themes or m eanings that characterise the w ay  caregivers perceive and 
make sense out of their infants' behaviours. In doing so, the analysis w ill uncover 
possible relationships and associations betw een the developing expressive capacities 
of infants and the changing m eanings they assum e w ithin the mother-infant system . 
This enhances our understanding of what parents are focusing on w hen they ascribe 
m eaning to their babies' behaviour. It also underlies a concern, discussed in Chapter
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1, w ith  understanding the child's developm ent from the point of v iew  of the 
caregiver.
Developm ental psychology has been instrumental in constructing w hat the 
child is able to do, and the caregiver's role in the developm ent of capacities. 
H ow ever, as W oolett and Phoenix (1991) point out,
"Although psychologists generally argue that mothers are central figures in their 
children's lives, as carers, as 'socialisers' and providers of stimulating and sensitive 
environments, they are rarely considered as having an existence of their own or a 
perspective on what they do as mothers." (Woollett and Phoenix, 1991, p.29)
There has been little question that the construction of infancy by researchers m ay be 
lacking vital com ponents of interpretation. Indeed, there is an increasing concern that 
despite the plethora of research conducted on identifying what aspects of parental 
behaviour influences the child's developm ent, no clear cut findings have emerged:
"That parents do have an effect on children may seem obvious, yet in practice it 
has often proved extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate such an effect. It is ironic 
that in spite of the enormous amount of research in this area we still face the 
challenge of specifying as to what really goes on between parent and child that has 
such an impact on the child's development." (Schaffer, 1986, p.769, quoted in 
Woollett et al., 1991)
Linked to this is the 'invisibility of mothers' in psychological theories (W oolett and 
Phoenix, 1991). Mothers are not asked to describe their feelings or perceptions 
regarding their children. This m ay w ell be due to the lack of a conceptual framework 
for analysing these aspects of the mother-child relationship. H ow ever, evidence  
presented in earlier chapters suggests that the perspective of caregivers m ay provide  
an important source of information regarding how  em otionality develops in infancy. 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 have developed a conceptual framework w ithin w hich maternal 
perceptions of their infants have a place w ithin expressive developm ent. The 
assessm ent of these interpretations, from the perspective of mothers, w ill suggest 
underlying relationships between the developing capacities of infants, the inferential 
process of caregivers, and the influence of context on that.
The following analysis thus hopes to com plim ent the latter quantitative 
analysis of infant facial expressions. It addresses the follow ing questions; w hat do the 
different themes in mothers accounts tell us about the developing relationship
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betw een mother and infant? H ow  do the developing expressive capacities of babies 
becom e incorporated into the mothers' perceptions of their babies? There appeared  
to be specific age related developm ents in infant expressive behaviour. Expressions 
selected by mothers also show ed situational variations. What are the m eanings 
ascribed to expressive acts in these different developm ental and situational contexts? 
W hat can they tell us about developm ental mechanisms?
By providing a comparative aspect to the data, analysing maternal accounts 
further explicates and expands our understanding of quantitatively based findings. 
The use of multiple m ethods in this study distinguishes it from others done in the 
area of expressive developm ent. Em ploying both techniques allow s for comparisons, 
exam ining matches and mismatches, between the objective coding of facial 
expressions, and caregivers' ascriptions of m eaning to these expressions.
Thus, having exam ined what types of expressions mothers select, w e  now  go  
on to examine what types of attributions mothers make concerning these m eaningful 
acts. More specifically, the analysis addresses the follow ing questions:
• Firstly, whether the m eanings mothers ascribe to their infants' expressive 
behaviour is influenced by the social context of the interaction
• Secondly, whether maternal interpretations are in line w ith changing infant 
capacities. That is, to explore how  m others begin to ascribe different 
meanings to infant actions as babies becom e more skilled communicators. 
The first part of this chapter deals w ith h ow  the data from the mothers
accounts w as transcribed and coded. The particular m ethodology used for 
constructing the coding frame is described, and the grounds for its construction 
explicated. The results of the investigation are then presented and discussed.
8.1 Verbal Accounts
Verbal accounts w ere transcribed and coded using Textbase Alpha (Tesch, 
1989),30 a computer package which supports the qualitative analysis of verbal data. 
The program allows the coder to perform unstructured coding of text and incorpor­
ates the codes into SPSS. Codes were constructed using Grounded Theory principles
30. C ourtesy  of Dr. Julie Dockrell.
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(Strauss, 1987). Grounded Theory analysis explicitly allow s for the generating and 
testing of theory. Strauss (1987) explains,
"The methodological thrust of the grounded theory approach to qualitative 
data is towards the development of theory, without any particular 
commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research or theoretical 
interests." (Strauss, 1987, p.5)
The basic categories for coding the accounts w ere derived from prevalent themes in  
the mothers' ow n accounts. Coding was conducted w ith the aim of isolating those 
aspects of the mother's accounts which were relevant to the facial and behavioural 
changes in the infant's actions. While no coding frame is totally free of the theoretical 
orientation of the researcher, the construction of the codes w as explicitly conducted  
to reflect the types of concerns that characterised the maternal accounts. It w as  
decided that, rather than im pose a rigid structure on the mothers' accounts, it w as  
m ore advantageous to look for commonalities and underlying themes in maternal 
interpretations. In this w ay, the codes w ou ld  be a reflection of salient maternal 
concerns in interaction. Furthermore, the technique provided a systematic w ay of 
reducing the high degree of variability in maternal accounts. This w as achieved by  
first coding the data to reflect the complexity of the accounts and subsequently  
grouping these categories along theoretically m eaningful lines. Strauss describes this 
process thus:
"Many indicators (behavioural actions/events) are examined comparatively 
by the analyst who then 'codes' them, naming them as indicators of a class 
of events/behavioural actions. He or she may give this class a name, 
thinking of it then as a coded category. By making comparisons of 
indicator to indicator the analysis is forced into confronting similarities, 
differences and degrees of consistency of meaning among indicators. This 
generates an underlying uniformity, which in turn results in a coded 
category." (Strauss, 1987,p.25)
These dim ensions or 'linkages' then become the m ost important or salient core 
categories of the resulting coding frame. The present coding rested on 'sociological' 
or socio-psychological constructs which are "essentially the terms used by actors in 
that field themselves" (Strauss, 1987, p.33), and, thus, w ere derived directly from the 
language of the mothers, and were concerned w ith  descriptions of infant em otion  
states. For example, if mothers made the statement that the baby 'is happy', it w as  
coded as an attribution of happiness. These codes also go beyond local m eanings to
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broader socio-psychological concerns (Strauss, 1987). For example, if a mother stated 
that the baby "wanted to play w ith the toy" it w as coded as an attribution of intention.
The resulting core categories were concerned w ith statements of infant activity 
and state, attributions of infant mental or cognitive skills and mothers' self reports. 
The latter category included statements mothers m ade about their ow n activities w hen  
explaining the m eaning of infant acts. Intercoder reliability of the final coding  
framework w as tested against another coder. A  different condition from each age 
group w as randomly selected and double coded. Overall intercoder agreem ent w as  
83%. The coding framework may be found in Appendix 2.
8.1.2 Maternal Attribution Categories
Coding frames in large part reflect theoretical concerns. The types of 
categories that were constructed reveal the predom inant underlying them es in 
maternal reports. Consensual categories of m eaning in mothers perceptions of their 
infants were formed w hich were salient to grasping the w ay they understood their 
infants at a number of different levels. Previously, evidence w as presented which  
show ed that the prescription of em otion states w as subject to contextual and 
interpersonal influences. Intentionality and inter subjectivity w ere show n to be 
essential scaffolding frames through which caregivers can share and organise infants" 
input. Caregivers interpret their infants' emotional expressions in h ighly variable 
ways. Hence, maternal statements m ade regarding current, ongoing activities view ed  
on video provide a rich source of pertinent concerns during interaction. They were  
also analysed to thematically reflect interpersonal and inter subjective m echanism s 
which are hypothesised to be crucial to the developm ent of the mother-infant system.
Qualitative data can be coded at m any different levels, ranging from categories 
concerned with the characteristics of language to those concerned w ith abstract ideas 
or "reflection' (Tesch (1990). Interpretative segm ents were coded to reflect the 
different themes mothers used to describe their infants. For exam ple, a typical 
example w ou ld  be a mother describing her infant's state (e.g., bored), then describing  
som ething she w as trying to do to attract the babies attention (e.g.,clapping hands), 
then describing the child's response (e.g., clapping hands back). That segm ent w ou ld
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be coded attribution of boredom , maternal behaviour, and maternal effect respective­
ly. Statements made about infants referring to general characteristics that w ere not 
related to the ongoing interaction were not coded. For example, mothers referring to 
infants performing a specific activity in another context, as an analogy.
Aside from the focus on em otion states and facial expressions, a num ber of 
important aspects of developm ent were included, as m entioned above. For exam ple, 
the ascription of intentionality to infant acts is a vital m echanism  by w hich parents 
are able to manage and organise the child's environment. It w as important to bring 
this theme into focus in  order to compare how  mothers ascribed intentions to their 
babies behaviour in different situational and developm ental contexts. Similarly, as 
w as discussed in Chapter 2, inter subjectivity is hypothesised to be a vital com ponent 
in the child's cognitive, emotional and social developm ent. Hence, statements m ade  
by mothers reflecting a shared understanding betw een herself and her baby were  
highlighted and coded thus. Codes describing mothers' accounts of their ow n  
behaviour were useful as a measure of how  involved mothers felt they were in the 
interaction, and as a verbal reflection of the process of 'scaffolding'. In the follow ing  
analysis, the different com plexities in meaning used by mothers is explored.
In order for maternal interviews to yield useful results, because they are 
explicitly concerned w ith  interpreting infant behaviour v iew ed  on video tape, the 
coding w as geared to the an understanding of the activities, em otion states, and 
m eanings mothers regularly referred to w hen interpreting babies' behaviour.
The codes reflect themes of differing complexity; the bottom  categories reflect 
m ore com plex activities than categories at the top of the coding frame, w hich describe 
basic infant acts. The thematic levels are advantageous, not only because they 
generally characterise the w ay mothers interpret their babies' behaviour, but also 
because they allow us to compare the contexts in w hich mothers use more versus less 
com plex m eanings w hen interpreting interactions. Maternal attributions w ere divided  
into 5 main categories. In the following, each category is defined and described by  
providing examples from maternal attributions to reflect the predom inant them es in 
each category.
Category 1: Simple Descriptions of Facial and Body M ovem ents refer to descriptions 
of sim ple body m ovem ents, e.g., "He's looking d o w n " , "She's reach in g  o u t f o r  an  object, 
she's lookin g a t the object" , and descriptions of facial m ovem ents, e.g., "She's w r in k led
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h er nose", and "She s tu ck  her ch in  ou t" . Mothers did not elaborate on these descrip­
tions.
Category 2: Emotion State Attributions refer to descriptions of infant em otion states. 
These are further divided into the follow ing categories: Positive attributions, for 
exam ple, "So she's sa y in g  'yes th is is f u n  an d  I'm  jo in in g  in  th is gam e'" , and "This is  her  
en jo y in g  herself, she's h a v in g  a g ood  tim e". Or more sim ply, "She's h appy" . N egative  
attributions formed another category, as w hen mothers m ade the follow ing types of 
interpretations: "She w a s n 't en jo y in g  i t  as m uch", "She w a s g e t t in g  d is tre ssed " ,  
"E xasperated an d  'its n o t fa ir '  ty p e  o f  th ing" . Som etimes these attributions did not 
contain a specific negative em otion label but were descriptions of vague feelings of 
discontent. For example, "...it w a s a b it like she w a s n 't h appy, i t  w a s n 't th a t the box  
w a s n 't in te res tin g  her, I  th in k  in  a w a y  m aybe i t  w a s  too m u ch  f o r  her". A ttributions of 
infant attentiveness 31 were concerned w ith the infants focusing either on objects in 
their environment or on their mothers. For example, "In qu isitive , w a tc h in g  o b se rv in g  
w h a t I'm  d o in g  w ith  m y  hands. Ju st in terested . I  cou ld  te ll he w a s  in teres te d  because o f  the  
w a y  he w a s  a c tu a lly  co n cen tra tin g  on w h a t I  w a s do in g" , and "He a c tu a lly  seem s to  be 
co n cen tra tin g  on m y  hand, he's n o t looking back a t m y  face" . Attributions o f boredom , 
as w hen mothers described their infants as disinterested or distracted, contained  
phrases such as "That tu rn in g  her head, s to p p ed  lookin g  a t m e, looked a w a y , an d  g o in g  
'm eueueu ' m eans, I'm  bored w ith  th is..." , "That 'u m f , a rm s a w a y  again  is aga in , 'I'm  bored  
a n d  fe d  u p . . .". There were other attributions m ade by the mothers w hich w ere coded  
but which occurred so rarely (3-4 times for the total of all 12 mothers and infants in  
the three different situations) that they could not be used (e.g., describing the child  
as hesitant or confused).
Category 3: Attributions of Mental Skills refer to descriptions of the mental processes 
of the infant. These contained two categories created from collapsing other categories;
31. Some attribution categories were collapsed due to their low numbers. Collapsing 
was done on the basis of the general categories mentioned above. For example, the 
category of attributions of attentiveness was used to encompass maternal attributions of 
interest and concentration. Similarly, the category of negative attributions was used to 
encompass attributions of frustration, tiredness, distress and unhappiness.
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attributions of intersubjectivity 32 and attributions o f exploratory behaviours. 33
Attributions of intersubjectivity contained frequent references to social referencing by  
the infant. For example, "She's v e ry  m uch  lookin g a t  m e to  see h ow  I  w a s  re a c tin g  to  w h a t  
w a s  there cause she's n o t sure" . Or, "There he's w a tch ed  y o u  b r in g  so m e th in g  d o w n  an d  
o b v io u s ly  w a n ts  to do  so m e th in g  w ith  i t  b u t he ju s t  g lan ces a t m e to  k in d  o f  m ake su re  its  
a lrig h t" . Mothers also attributed intersubjectivity to their infants in the context of 
explaining how  their babies were reacting to their prohibition to not play w ith  the 
toy. These descriptions highlighted a m utually understood system  of rudimentary 
gestures which had a shared m eaning betw een the mother infant pair. For example, 
"She's g o t her m ou th  s tu ck  like th a t because she's so r t o f  m ak in g  a p o in t to  m e th a t she w as  
u p se t a n d  ju s t  le tt in g  m e k n o w  th a t she , w ell n o t u p se t, b u t th a t she d id n 't like it ,  th e w a y  
I 've  spoken to her or th a t she co u ld n 't do  it" , and "That's w h en  he f u l l y  u n d e rs ta n d s  w h a t  
y o u  m ean b y  no". Mothers also described their infants as sharing know ledge and 
expectations w ith them  w ith reference to objects in their environment. For example, 
"There she w a s n 't q u ite  su re  w h a t I  w a s d o in g  cause she w a s  looking... b u t she w a s  lookin g  
'rou n d  f o r  the dog  b u t then  w h en  I  sa id  no she sm iled  so r t o f  as i f  to  sa y  'w ell w h a t d id  yo u  
sa y  i t  f o r  then or w h a t are w e  do in g?" ', and "She ju s t  com m u n ica ted  to  m e a b o u t the lig h ts , 
ooh look th ey're  f la sh in g , I 've  n ever seen a n y th in g  like i t  before ."
Attributions of exploratory behaviour were rare. H owever, w hen they  
occurred they were generally used to describe instances w hen babies were searching 
for objects in their environment or w hen they w ere being curious. For exam ple, "H e's 
b ein g  q u ite  in q u is itiv e" , and " ...he looked a rou n d  to  see i f  there w a s  so m e th in g  m ore  
in te re s tin g  g o in g  on , he's an  in cred ib ly  n osey child". Or, as w hen  one mother described 
her daughter looking for the father, "She s to p p ed  ru b b in g  her eyes a n d  becam e in teres te d  
aga in  an d  w a s look in g  arou n d , her head m oved  a n d  her eyes m o ved  to look f o r  h im ". 
Similarly, mothers described their babies as 'finding out about things'. For example, 
"...he tr ied  to  close the lid  to  f in d  o u t abou t it" , or " ...an d  the so r t o f  p a tt in g  the box to  fee l
32. Attributions of intersubjectivity encompassed attributions of infant understanding, 
social referencing, intentional communication by the infant and infant responding 
explicitly rather than reacting to the mother.
33. Attributions of exploratory behaviours encompassed two attributions: Attributions 
of exploring or being nosey, and attributions of searching, either for a specific object or 
for something to grasp their interest. Tests were tried on some of these categories in 
uncollapsed form; however, due to their very sparse occurrence, no test statistic could be 
computed.
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it ,  I  su p p o se  to f in d  ou t abou t it . ..to  f in d  o u t a b o u t [ its ]  te x tu re  a n d  w h a t so r t o f  th in g  i t  is  
rea lly . H e  does th a t to fa b ric , an d  to  m e an d  to  to y s  a n d  th in gs. H e strokes them ".
Category 4: Attributions of Intentionality refer to descriptions of intentionality in 
infant behaviour. These descriptions were usually w ide ranging in their usage. They 
frequently described som ething that the child either w anted or did not want. For 
exam ple, "S om eth ing th ere an d  she w a n ts  it" , "Just d id n 't w a n t a n y  m ore to  do w ith  it" , 
"W an ted  m e to  carry  on", "In th a t section  he a c tu a lly  w a n ts  to reach o u t a n d  g e t m y  hand, 
he's m a k in g  h is ow n  decision  to touch  m y  hand, reach o u t an d  take it" . In addition, 
m others im puted intention to activities in the course of describing them. For 
exam ple, "She's ju s t  see in g  w h a t I'm  d o in g  w ith  i t  before she tries i t  herself", and "She w a s  
tr y in g  to  p u ll the box nearer her". These attributions also highlighted the dynam ic and 
activity bound nature of mothers' perceptions of their babies. For exam ple, "She 
w a n te d  a h u g  then , she w a n te d  to  be p icked  u p  fro m  the chair, or m e to  com e closer or  
som eth in g" . They underlie a course of action on the mother's part, as m ay be seen  
from som e of the previous quotes and from the follow ing one, "He d o esn 't w a n t m y  
h ands on  i t  he ju s t  w a n ts  to  be able to p ick  the box u p  an d  exam in e i t  because h is h ands go  
s tra ig h t rou n d  the box".
Category 5: Maternal Self-Attributions refer to mothers' accounts of their ow n  
behaviour w hen describing the m eaning of an infant's behaviour, as in "She d id  look  
up b u t o n ly  m o m en ta rily  , I  a ttra c ted  her a tten tio n " . These attributions either described 
how  som e aspect of mothers' behaviour w as designed to elicit a response/reaction  
from the infant, or how  some aspect of their behaviour had an effect on the baby. 
These tw o descriptions were coded maternal behaviour and maternal effect 
respectively.34 Examples of the former category are, "I tr ied  to  m ake h im  in terested  b y  
m akin g  those noises an d  p re ss in g  the b u tto n s  a n d  ta lk in g  to  h im  a b it m ore", "I tick led  her 
there", and "I d id  a certa in  th in g  th a t I  k n ew  w o u ld  catch his a tte n tio n , w h ich  is to sa y , 
w h ere is B ertie the dog". Examples of the latter category include statements such as, 
"I s ta r te d  s in g in g  the so n g  an d  then spoke, an d  w h en  I  spoke she w e n t back to  lookin g  a t the
34. Other attributions were coded but could not be used because of their low numbers. 
Only attributions which occurred with a frequency of 10 or above for the whole data set 
were included. Attributions which were not included were those of surprise, identifiers 
of emotion or mental states used by mothers, maternal prediction of next infant act and 
attributions of infant anticipation.
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to y  in s te a d  o f  looking a t me". Or, "She sto p p ed  w h en  she h eard m y  voice" , and "She w a s  
ceasin g  to  p a y  a n y  a tten tio n  to  m e because I  called  her n am e an d  sh e'd  respon ded  an d  n o th in g  
had h appen ed , a n d  I'd  f la p p ed  m y  f in g e rs  an d  she'd  respon ded  an d  n o th in g  had h appen ed  so  
she w a s  ceasin g  to p a y  a n y  a tte n tio n  to  m e ca llin g  her n am e or f la p p in g  m y  fin g e rs" . These 
attributions also refer to instances where mothers behaviour resulted in negative  
consequences, "That's her h a v in g  reached o u t an d  m e sa y in g  n o ...H er eyes are look in g  d o w n  
an d  her eyebrow s are d o w n  an d  her m ou th  is d e fin ite ly  d o w n  like I 've  n ever seen i t  before 
cause she's being  to ld  n o t to  do  i t . "
8.2 Results of Maternal Interpretations of Infant Behaviour
Examining maternal interpretations w ill reveal whether mothers' criteria for 
meaningful acts are (a) subject to situational influences, and (b) qualitatively different 
as babies get older. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 17.
Table 17: Chi-Square statistics results of log-linear modelling of maternal attributions
Attributions Age effect Situation effect Age x Situation 
interaction
M ovem ents 29.40”* 2.32 3.37
H appiness 3.55 15.28*** 17.61**
N egative States 0.43 8.29* 9.96*
Boredom 12.28** 1.61 10.46*
A ttentiveness 1.26 4.58 36.66**
M aternal behaviour 5.99* 13.71** 2.75
M aternal effects 6.87* 11.96** 4.02
In tentions 3.86 13.91*** 2.86
Intersubiectivitv 6.15* 14.33*** 10.92*
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, an d  *** = 0.001.
1. Age:
Significant differences betw een age groups were found for descriptions of 
body m ovem ents, boredom, maternal behaviour and effect, and intersubjectivity. 
Descriptions of body m ovem ents are predom inantly m ade by mothers of 4-6 m onth  
olds (age group 1) (Table 18). As babies get older, mothers make fewer such  
attributions. Boredom is attributed predom inantly by mothers of 7-9 m onth olds, and 
least frequently by mothers of 10-12 month olds. Maternal behaviour and effect
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attributions w ere m ade m ost frequently by mothers of 4-6 and 10-12 m onth olds. 
H ow ever, unlike mothers of the youngest infants, mothers of the oldest babies also 
m ade frequent references to infant intersubjective skills (Table 18).
Table 18: Mean rates of attributions for age groups
Age groups
Attributions 4-6 months 7-9 months 10-12 months
Movements 1.31*
(0.00-4.229)
0.72
(0.31-1.61)
0.18
(0.08-0.24)
Happy 1.04
(0.56-1.54)
0.76
(0.16-1.51)
0.73
(0.22-1.56)
Bored 0.65
(0.20-1.15)
0.96
(0.45-1.69)
0.32
(0.00-0.67)
Negative state 0.81
(0.10-1.19)
0.73
(0.49-0.92)
0.85
(0.33-1.56)
Attentive 0.96
(0.00-1.38)
0.76
(0.40-1.27)
0.87
(0.43-1.31)
Maternal behaviour 0.81
(0.00-1.97)
0.45
(0.34-0.71)
0.92
(0.00-1.47)
Maternal effect 0.55
(0.00-1.25)
0.27
(0.10-0.47)
0.67
(0.34-1.14)
Exploring 0.18
(0.00-0.56)
0.40
(0.00-0.77)
0.32
(0.07-0.61)
Intention 1.00
(0.90-1.63)
0.74
(0.61-1.18)
1.30
(0.78-1.75)
Intersubjectivity 0.31
(0.00-0.91)
0.21
(0.00-0.61)
1.21
(0.16-3.33)
* Figures in bold are significantly different across age groups.
2. Situations:
Interpretations differed significantly betw een situations, except for boredom , 
attentiveness, and sim ple descriptions of body m ovem ents (Table 17). M others 
attributed happiness predom inantly in FF, and negative states predom inantly in PR 
and T (Table 19). Maternal self attributions and attributions of intention w ere m ost 
frequent in FF, but were attributed with decreasing frequency in PR and T. M others
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attributed comm unicative and intersubjective skills to their infants in PR predom i­
nantly.
Table 19: Mean rates of attributions for situations
Situations
Attributions FF PR T
Movements 0.75
0.00-3.35)
0.85
(0.00-5.71)
0.61
(0.00-3.62)
Happy 1.32*
(0.50-4.63)
0.55
(0.00-2.00)
0.67
(0.00-1.95)
Bored 0.77
(0.00-2.19)
0.46
(0.00-1.48)
0.69
(0.00-1.94)
Negative state 0.46
(0.00-1.88)
0.99
(0.00-2.47)
0.92
(0.00-2.16)
Attentive 0.62
(0.00-1.38)
1.25
(0.00-2.14)
0.93
(0.00-2.07)
Maternal behaviour 0.94
(0.00-2.96)
0.83
(0.00-2.00)
0.42
(0.00-1.23)
Maternal effect 0.60
(0.00-1.98)
0.67
(0.00-2.00)
0.23
(0.00-0.92)
Exploring 0.51
(0.00-1.68)
0.16
(0.00-0.50)
0.23
(0.00-1.84)
Intention 1.40
(0.35-3.38)
0.94
(0.00-2.00)
0.66
(0.00-1.29)
Intersubjectivity 0.31
(0.00-1.98)
1.33
(0.00-9.99)
0.095
(0.00-0.28)
* Figures in bold are significantly different between situations.
3. A ge by Situation:
All attributions of em otion were affected by the specific age and situation in 
which they occurred (Table 17). Mothers of 4-6 and 7-9 month olds interpreted 
infants as becoming increasingly attentive, bored, and unhappy across situation. 
Mothers of the oldest infants interpreted their behaviour as m ost attentive, and m ost 
unhappy during PR, and m ost bored during FF. They perceived their infants as 
happiest w hen playing with the toy, although infant positive expressions in T were  
less frequent than in FF. Attributions of sim ple body m ovem ents, intention, maternal 
behaviour and maternal effect did not differ significantly betw een specific age group  
and situation categories.
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The above results thus indicate the following:
• Age: Mothers become more specific about the meaning of their infants' behaviour 
as infants get older. Figure 17 presents the rate per minute of attributions of maternal 
descriptions of simple movements. This category refers to infant acts at a rudim en­
tary level, devoid of explicit interpersonal, emotional, or social meaning. The frequent 
occurrence of this descriptive theme in mothers of 4-6 month old shows that their 
interpretation of infants is based on a wide range of behavioural cues. Thus, while 
they are able to label facial expressions as indicating a variety of emotion states, they 
require a whole range of behavioural cues to support such interpretations.
As infants get older, mothers become more specific about inferring emotion 
states and thus such descriptions decrease. The decline of these attributions with 
increasing age indicates, not surprisingly, that mothers become more specific about 
the meaning of infant behaviours as infants get older. Thus, the criteria of 
meaningful behaviour become more strictly defined with increasing age.
Figure 17: D escriptions of S im ple M ovem ents
1.6
age group 1 age group 2 age group 3
A ge Groups
Moreover, the profile of maternal interpretations between the different age 
groups suggest that they undergo qualitative changes, especially in the oldest age 
group (Figures 18 to 20). While all mothers attribute emotion states to their infants 
consistently, mothers of older infants attribute intersubjective skills as well. This, 
apparently developmental, progression is in line with social constructionist views of 
emotion development. In order for the child to understand the meaning-rules of a 
given culture, there must be some means of transmission of these rules. It also lends
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credence to the theoretical proposal in Chapter 2, that intersubjectivity is not an 
inborn, inherent, capacity, but rather something that develops betw een m other and 
child. What is novel about the following evidence, is that it is the babies' mothers 
w h o are ascribing shared m eanings to their infants, and not researchers. It is notable 
that younger mothers do not describe their infants in those terms.
For example, from age group 1:
"There she's happy 'cause she's smiling, and its combined with then turning to the 
other person in the room and smiling at them..."
In contrast w ith an attribution from age group 3:
"It's a fairly obvious reaction to me saying no. I mean it was a bit more 
frustration, feeling she couldn't do what she wanted to do than that she was 
actually frightened of me...She was very cross 'cause she felt she couldn't do what 
she wanted to do."
Maternal perceptions, both of their ow n role, and of the m eaning of infant behaviour, 
change as infants get older. Specifically, boredom  is attributed less frequently by  
mothers in age group 3 than those in age groups 1 and 2, and intersubjectivity is 
attributed more frequently as babies get older; mothers of 10-12 m onth olds are now  
perceiving these em otion displays as having intersubjective m eaning, that is, as 
intentionally communicative. Mothers of 7-9 m onth olds m ade the least num ber of 
attributions of maternal behaviour and effect compared w ith mothers of the youngest 
and oldest age group babies. Mothers of the m iddle age groups' perception of the 
less personally interactive nature of infant behaviour, m ay w ell be a reflection of 
babies' preoccupation w ith the external world of objects at this phase of developm ent. 
For example,
"She made a little noise and put her arms out to the side which is another ges­
ture...she wasn't wanting me to do what I was doing 'cause she was wanting to 
investigate what was going on round about." (Mother in 7-9 month age group)
The perception of younger and older mothers of the infant being responsive to them  
m ay be seen as indicative of the younger infant's preference for face to face 
interaction, and the older infant's growing social and cognitive skills in interaction 
(game playing, eg. the nam ing game in older infants, and in younger give an exam ple  
of sm iling reciprocally w ith mother).
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The development of mother and infant into a social system was previously 
discussed as a necessary building block for the acquisition of skills. Social systems 
are characterised by the ability of both partners to anticipate each others' actions 
towards each other. The following examples show that what appears to be happening 
is that mothers initially project an expectation onto the infant. Later on, as babies got 
older, expectations reflected previous experiences, and appeared to be based on the 
growth of socio-cognitive capacities in the child.
One mother, from the 4-6 month age group, explained her baby's behaviour 
as follows:
"'Looking directly at me and he's laughing, telling me to carry on with what I'm 
doing really, so he's enjoying himself."
In comparison, mothers of older infants described their effectiveness as resting on 
previous experiences with their infants, and the child's ability to recognise and 
anticipate these experiences:
"I could tell she was bored because she's not looking at me and not anticipating 
what I 'm going to do, which she would do if she was following it. She had 
anticipated before. I know because she was watching me and she was still, and 
her body was still, and she wasn't making any noise. These indicate that she's 
following me and anticipating me going 'Boo!'"
As the following figures show, while emotion states are a consistent theme in 
maternal accounts, by 10-12 months, the descriptive content of maternal reports 
contains increasing emphasis on intentionality and intersubjectivity.
Figure 18: M aternal a ttribu tions for age group 1
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Figure 19: M aternal attributions for age group 2
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Figure 20: M aternal attributions for age group 3
A tt r ib u t io n s
• Situations: Emotion state attributions are predominantly of happiness in FF, and 
attentive and negative states during PR and T (tests failed to show a significant differ­
ence for attributions of attentiveness) (Figure 21). The attribution category 'maternal 
behaviours' refers to instances where mothers made explicit reference to their own 
activities vis-a-vis the infant, despite the fact that mothers could not see their own 
activities on tape (although they could hear their own vocalisations on the film sound 
track). These attributions may be regarded as indicators of how important mothers 
felt their activities to be in explaining the infants' behaviours. They indicate mothers' 
perception of the interactive and interpersonal nature of selected infant acts. Mothers 
find it important to refer to their own behaviour when interpreting infant behaviours 
during FF and PR but less so during T. Lastly, attributions of intention are only 
significantly different between situations.
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Figure 21: S ituational differences in m aternal a ttribu tions
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Figure 21 shows that intention is the predominant attribution category in FF, but 
decreases over situations. Intentionality in meaningful behaviour is attributed most 
frequently in the context of purely interpersonal interaction (FF), and decreases as the 
context of the situations becomes less interpersonal.
For example, intentions were frequently described in the context of face to face 
interactions, as can be seen from the interpretation of this mother from the 10-12 
month old age group:
"She just looked up to me as if to say, this game is alright, you can carry on with 
it"
However, while frequent references to infant intentions characterise FF segments and, 
to a lesser extent, PR segments, references to intersubjectivity mainly characterise PR 
episodes. For example:
"That's when I said no again and she's trying to touch the lights and pursed her 
mouth a little bit and looked down. It means she's not very happy with the 
situation. She wants me to stop saying no and let her touch the lights." (Mother 
from 10-12 month age group)
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M others' interpretations of infant acts in PR reveal that they perceive intention in the 
context of communicative behaviour (attributions of intersubjectivity contain references 
to infants responding explicitly, communicating intentionally, and understanding the 
m other's own communications, which all contain references to intentional behaviour 
by the infant). While mothers continue to attribute intentions to infants, they use 
interpretative categories which reveal intentions with an interpersonal significance in 
PR.
• Age x situation: Figures 22-24 show that attributions of happiness are different 
from all the other attributions. Happiness is attributed most frequently in FF, and 
declines over subsequent conditions. This pattern is characteristic of the two 
youngest age groups. In age group 3, mothers attribute happiness most often in toy 
play. They also perceive infants to be most distressed in PR, and attribute fewer 
negative states in T relative to the younger age group mothers.
Figure 22: A ttributions of em otion states for 4-6 m onth  olds
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Figure 23: A ttribu tions of em otion states for 7-9 m onth  olds
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Figure 24: A ttribu tions of em otion states for 10-12 m onth  olds
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This result is interesting in the light of the number of selections mothers made overall 
during T. While mothers noted few acts in T, they attributed happiness most fre­
quently in this condition, relative to FF or PR, suggesting that the majority of selected 
segments in T contained attributions of happiness. Mothers were concerned with 
describing the infant's positive state while playing with them and the toy. No 
evidence was found for self-attributions or attributions of intention differing w ith age 
of infants across situations (Table 17). However, mothers of 10-12 month olds make 
significantly more attributions of intersubjective skills during PR than all the other 
mothers, and compared to all the other situations (Figure 25).
Differences in attributions of boredom were only significant when infant age 
was taken into account (Table 17). Thus, although situational context significantly 
affects this interpretation, it does so only in the context of infant age. While mothers
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in age groups 1 and 2 perceived their infants as becoming increasingly bored over 
consecutive situations, mothers in age group 3 perceived their infants as bored most 
frequently during FF, but becoming less so when the toy was introduced. Compare 
the following quotes from FF and T respectively of a mother of a 10-12 month old 
girl:
"I thought she was getting a bit fed up with it [game] there because she is 
fidgeting and she's looking up at me and she wasn't smiling or anything..."
"She'd seen the box and she's smiling because something interesting is going to 
happen."
Figure 25: S ituational and age differences in  m aternal
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All mothers interpret infants as more exploratory in FF; this is most likely to 
be due to initial interest in the cameras and the author (Figure 25).35 Mothers of 7-9 
month olds attribute more exploratory behaviours to infants in general, and in T in 
particular, implying that they are sensitive to the infant's increasing interest in the 
environment at this age, as the following quote shows:
35. Log-linear modelling was not used on this category because of the infrequent 
number of attributions. It is presented here for descriptive purposes only.
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"For the last few seconds he'd been exploring the toy with his mouth, which he 
couldn't do before 'cause it was too far away from him. He was interested, 
curious, holding it with his hands."
The previous analysis examined objectively coded facial expressions, w h ile the 
present analysis up until now  has examined mothers' subjective interpretations. 
Com bining the two types of data is likely to yield important insights into the degree 
to w hich mothers' subjective inferences map onto objective categories of infant 
behaviours. It is also interesting to examine if maternal sensitivity to infant em otion  
states in general rests on certain characteristics of infant behaviour w hich are readily 
codable and accessible to observation. Thus, it is useful to examine whether mothers 
infer infant emotion state on the basis of the predom inance of corresponding facial 
expressions, or whether there are other influencing factors. Similarly, to explore the 
contexts, both expressive and situational, in w hich mothers make non-em otion  
attributions of their babies. As w as pointed out above, this analysis is important as 
it directly compares mothers' subjective im pressions of their babies w ith the objective 
facial coding frame. In the follow ing section, the results of this analysis are presented.
8.3 Emotion State Attributions and Facial Expressions
Emotion attributions m ay be m ade on the basis of the predom inance of 
corresponding expressions. This is suggested by the fact that there are fluctuations 
to show  that infants are interacting differently in each situation and that maternal 
attributions of emotion states appear to parallel these fluctuations. To find out 
whether there is an association between maternal attributions of em otion and corre­
sponding infant expressions, a Spearman's Rho w as com puted. W hile it w as not 
possible to test for associations in each age group and condition separately (n=4), or 
across situations for one age group, as these w ou ld  have contained the same subjects, 
hence inflating the probability of a significant correlation, it w as possible to compare 
across subjects regardless of age. To find out whether there w as an association  
betw een attributions and expressions overall, the three situations w ere collapsed for 
each of the mother infant pairs. To determine whether situational context affected the 
association, each situation w as com puted separately for all 12 mother-infant pairs. 
The categories examined were: Positive expressions w ith  happy attributions, negative
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expressions with negative state attributions and interest expressions w ith attentiveness 
attributions.36 The results are presented in Table 20.
Table 20: Results of spearman's rho on attributions and facial expressions
Correlation coefficients
Comparisons Positive-Positive N egative-N egative Interest-Attentive
Overall association 0.357 0.466 -0.362
Face to face 0.508* -0.266 0.394
Prohibitive 0.497 0.645** -0.074
Tov plav 0.833’* 0.461 0.593**
* p<.05 one tailed
** p<.025 one tailed, .05 two tailed
N o  overall association betw een rates of expressions and attributions w as found. 
H ow ever, w hen scores were com puted for each situation separately, important 
relationships were found.
• There is a significant relationship between the am ount of positive infant expressions 
and mothers' attributions of happiness in FF and T.
• Mothers' attributions of negative states are significantly related to infant negative 
expressions during PR.
• Mothers' attributions of attentiveness are positively related to infant interest 
expressions in T.
These findings suggest that there are significant associations betw een objective 
coding of some expressions and maternal perceptions of emotion. It appears that 
situational context, and not only the predominance of an expression in  iso la tio n , affects 
how  mothers perceive infant em otion states. That is, it is probable that m others were 
also influenced by the differences in rates and durations of expressions in  the 
different situations. The evidence presented in Chapter 7 on the different frequencies
36. Rates per minute of attributions and expressions were used. While it is not 
possible to assume that only the occurrence of an expression, regardless of its duration and 
behavioural consequences, can be directly associated with an attribution, because the rates 
were ranked, the scores only reflect general quantities rather than precise scores. This 
overcomes any implicit assumption of a one to one relationship between the occurrence 
of a particular expression and the attribution of a corresponding emotion state.
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of infant facial expressions point to babies responding differentially to different 
situations. In a similar manner, and as w as discussed in Chapter 7, certain situations 
m ay have affected the quality and articulation of the infants' expressive responses, 
m aking it easier for mothers to identify and label them. Thus, both the context of the 
interaction and the infants' expressive behaviour allow ed mothers to make the link 
betw een the child's expressions and broad em otion states in particular situations. In 
others, mothers were ignoring expressions. The result is that, by identifying and  
recognising emotional reactions as they occur in specific situations, mothers appear 
to be consolidating and articulating links between the child's facial expressions, their 
physiological responses, and experiences in specific situations.
In this w ay, while mothers perceive their infants' positive expressions as 
indicating happiness in FF and T, in PR, where infants are being prohibited from  
playing w ith an object (an inherently negative situation), there is no relationship  
betw een positive expressions and perceived positive states. In the sam e w ay, 
negative expressions are associated w ith negative attributions only during PR, 
although they occur in the other tw o situations. Interest expressions are significantly  
associated with attentiveness in T, suggesting that mothers are more likely to link 
interest expressions w ith attentiveness, in the appropriate context of toy play, than 
in FF or PR.
Alternatively, mothers m ay be using other attribution categories to describe 
the significance of the facial expressions. A lthough comparison betw een age groups 
w as not possible, making it difficult to compare these results w ith those on observers' 
interpretations, the findings indicate that the existence of facial expressions does not 
necessarily lead mothers to attribute a corresponding em otion state. For exam ple, 
although the frequency of selected positive expressions in T w as similar to that in FF, 
mothers of 10-12 month olds perceived their infants as happier in T. It w ou ld  
therefore appear that mothers were highly sensitive to positive infant activity during  
T.
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8.4 Mental Skill Attributions and Facial Expressions
Mothers interpret the same segments of infant behaviours using more than one 
attribution category .37 W hile they interpret infant acts by referring to infant states, 
they also use non-em otion categories to describe the m eaning of the infants' 
behaviour. H owever, the above analysis only exam ined em otion attributions and 
facial expressions. Further examination of non-em otion attributions is needed to find 
out what facial expressions these segm ents contain. Such analysis is particularly 
important in demonstrating how  mothers' perceptions of cognitive and 
com m unicative skills of infants m aps onto infants' expressive displays. It also 
dem onstrates what types of facial expressions m oth ers use w hen they think their 
infants can understand them and, hence, provides a link betw een maternal 
perceptions and maternal expressive responses. Thus, a qualitative analysis of facial 
expressions falling in segm ents, interpreted using non-em otion attributions, w ill be 
presented.
Facial expressions co-occurring with attributions of intention, intersubjectivity 
and maternal effects were examined. These categories were chosen to illustrate how  
mothers label facial expressions w ithin the context of perceived goal directed  
behaviour on the part of the infant (intention and intersubjectivity), and in the context 
of perceived goal directed behaviour on the part of the mother (maternal effect).
8.4.1 Attributions of Intention and Facial Expressions
Figures 26-28 show  facial expressions occurring in segm ents in w hich mothers 
attributed intentionality.
• In FF, mothers of 4-6 and 7-9 month olds selected intentional behaviours containing  
predom inantly positive and interest expressions. MO, on the other hand, selected
37. An analysis of co-occurrences was made to see which attribution categories co­
occurred with each other. The results only confirmed general patters already found in 
maternal accounts. That is, in cases where two attributions occurred with high frequency, 
they co-occurred with a high frequency.
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intentional acts containing predom inantly interest expressions, w ith positive express­
ions occurring less frequently.
• In PR, all mothers selected intentional behaviour w hich contained predom inantly  
interest expressions, although mothers of 7-9 m onth olds' segm ents also contained  
frequent neutral expressions, and segm ents of mothers of 10-12 m onth olds contained  
predom inantly negative expressions.
• In T, intentions attributed by mothers of 4-6 m onth olds were m ade in the context 
of predom inantly interest expressions, although the segm ents also contained positive  
and negative expressions. Mothers of 7-9 m onth olds perceived intentional acts w hich  
contained predominantly negative expressions, w hile mothers of 10-12 m onth olds 
perceived their infants to be acting intentionally in behaviour sequences that 
contained frequent episodes of interest expressions.
The results show that infants of all age groups display positive and interest 
expressions in FF in the context of perceived intentional behaviour. Maternal 
accounts contained references to infants being interested and enjoying their mothers 
attempts to engage them. For example,
" He's quite enjoying that 'cause he laughed and he wants to hold onto my hand, 
and he's accepting that its quite amusing, quite entertaining. He probably wanted 
more contact, wanted me to hold him, or hold my hand or suck my finger." 
(Mother from 4-6 month age group)
W hen mothers perceive intentional behaviour in PR, how ever, it appears to refer to 
acts w hich show  the infant as predom inantly interested, in m any cases because of 
mothers' distracting strategies. For example,
"He obviously wanted to look at the box...and the way he could be distracted by 
the movement of the hands, they were moving in circles, you could see his head 
moving around and he obviously found them quite interesting." (Mother from 4-6 
month age group)
Mothers of 10-12 month olds again differ from the rest of the sample; predom inantly  
negative states accompany perceived intentionality:
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"She's trying to touch the lights and pursed her mouth a little bit and looked 
down. It seems she's not very happy with the situation. She wants me to stop 
saying no and let her touch the lights."
This points to a developmental shift in the way infants respond to prohibitions, and 
the way mothers interpret infant negative expressions; by 10 months, negative states 
gain communicative significance for mothers. In T, intentionality is attributed to acts 
which contain interest and positive expressions in age 1 infants, mostly negative 
expressions in age 2 infants, and mostly interest and negative expressions in age 
group 3 infants. Mothers frequently commented that infants were getting tired 
during toy play. Hence, they may have interpreted infant negative states as 
indicating a desire to be removed from the chair and to terminate play, as in the 
following example:
"...he'd moved his arm up [to the toy] but then decided 'no', he didn't want to 
play this game any more. He wanted to come out. I mean he slowly turned 
round to me again and shouted as if he wanted to come out. The look on his face, 
looked like he wasn't happy." (Mother from 7-9 month age group)
The results above suggest that a developmental shift has occurred by 10 months, 
which is characterised by a greater understanding between mother and infant, and 
a more effective maternal role in interaction. In the following section, this proposal 
will be examined by looking at facial expressions accompanying intersubjectivity 
attributions.
Figure 26: In ten tion  a ttribu tions and expressions in  age group 1
interest negative neutral positive
F a c ia l e x p r e s s io n s
M  Face to face Q  Prohibitive Q  Toy play
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Figure 27: In ten tio n  a ttribu tions and expressions in  age group 2
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8.4.2 A ttr ib u tion s o f In tersubjectiv ity  and Facial E xpressions
To find out if mothers use their facial expressions in the belief that babies 
understand their prohibitions, mother-infant expressions accompanying 
intersubjectivity attributions in PR for age group 3 were examined.
interest negative neutral positive
F a c ia l e x p r e s s io n s
H  Fa** to face §|§ Prohibitive §  Toy play
a ttribu tions and expressions in  age group 3
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Figure 29: Co-occurrence of in tersubjectiv ity  attribu tions and facial expressions for 
10-12 m onth  old in fan ts d u ring  proh ib itive episode
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Mothers displayed high rates of negative facial expressions in segments w here they 
attributed intersubjectivity (Figure 29). This pattern of maternal response was unique 
to that age group and situation (see Appendix 2 for comparison with other age 
groups and situations)38. This cannot be taken as evidence that there is a causal 
connection between mothers' perceptions and their expressive behaviour. However, 
it suggests that there is some association between maternal responsivity and their 
perceptions of their infants capabilities. Infant interest in the toy and distress at the 
prohibition was evident in the high rate of interest and negative expressions, and the 
very low rates of positive expressions. Mothers, in contrast, responded w ith many 
times more positive expressions, appearing to create a balance between their positive 
and negative displays, calming yet prohibiting the infant. Mothers were able to exert 
a greater control over their infants' behaviour with the use of their facial expressions, 
and perceived infants as being capable of understanding their expressions.
38. This condition was unique in that it was the only instance where a) mothers 
negative expressions were more frequent than infants' negative expressions, and b) there 
was such a large discrepancy between mothers and babies in the rates of positive 
expressions.
221
8.4.3 Maternal Behaviour Attributions and Facial Expressions
This is further substantiated by looking at expressions accompanying 
attributions of maternal behaviour (Figure 30). In the prohibitive situation, mothers' 
self-reports of their behaviour occurs largely within the context of infant negative 
expressions. They perceive their behaviour as creating negative states in the infant. 
Compared to situations 1 and 3, both mothers' and infants' facial expressions were 
markedly different in both type and frequency.
Maternal behaviour attributions are made in segments containing mostly inter­
est and positive expressions in FF, highlighting the types of expressions mothers are 
explicitly interested in eliciting and responding to for that situation. This is echoed 
in their attributions:
"...she liked what I was doing [playing peekaboo]. I knew because she smiled with 
her mouth and her eyes and her eyebrows and her whole face and showed her 
teeth."
In T, where the infant is engaged in the toy, maternal behaviours are rarely attributed 
at all (Figure 30). When they are, infants are generally still faced. This suggests that, 
when maternal self-reports occur in T, babies attention would be directed away from 
mothers, at the toy, and their facial expressions would therefore likely to be fewer. 
The following quote supports this:
"She just heard the noise I was making with the button and was 
interested...in the button. She's looking...see, concerntrated." (Mother of 
baby girl, 7-9 month old age group).
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Figure 30: Co-occurrence of m aternal behaviour a ttribu tions and  facial expressions
in age group 3
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To sum up this section, the profile of maternal expressions suggests that 
maternal perceptions reflect characteristic patterns of maternal responsivity at the 
interactional level. When mothers attributed intersubjectivity in age group 3, there 
was an associated high rate of maternal negative facial expressions, possibly used to 
deter infants. Infants responded to their mothers' prohibitions by becoming 
distressed. Mothers tempered their prohibition with frequent episodes of positive 
expressions. Similarly, these reactions were also described by mothers to indicate the 
effect of their own behaviour on their infants. Overall, mothers use their facial 
expressions instrumentally, communicating information about the environment, and 
about the infant's own actions vis-a-vis the environment, within socially meaningful 
contexts.
8.5 Specificity and the G row th of Shared M eaning in In terpretations
The initial hypotheses regarding maternal interpretations questioned whether 
maternal attributions reflected the influence of developmental variables, and of 
situational context. Questions asked were whether maternal attributions would reflect
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maternal sensitivity to the age related developments of their babies. Moreover, 
whether the different conditions in which mothers interpreted their infants' behaviour 
affected the way they perceived their babies. Assessing maternal attributions revealed 
important characteristics of mothers' perceptions of their babies that would otherwise 
have been missed using a purely quantitative analysis.
The analysis showed that mothers become more specific about the meaning 
of their infants' behaviour as babies get older. Mothers of 4-6 month old infants 
describe selected infant acts in terms which contain predominantly simple descrip­
tions of body movements, devoid of explicit social or interpersonal meaning. With 
increasing infant age, mothers make fewer such interpretations, becoming more 
precise about the meaning of behaviours they have selected. Thus, while infant 
behaviour may become increasingly defined by 'points of articulation' (Werner and 
Kaplan, 1963; Adamson et al., 1987), mothers become more precise about w hat this 
behaviour means rather than selecting more acts.
Selection of meaningful acts appears to be related to the interpersonal context 
of infant behaviour, and to mothers' perception of the appropriateness of the infants' 
affective and mental states. Thus, for example, mothers select infant acts which 
contain predominantly positive expressions in FF, and interest and negative 
expressions in PR and T. However, as infants get older, these acts contain fewer 
positive expressions and higher frequencies of interest displays in FF, and more 
episodes of positive expressions in T. While these facial expressions are consistently 
interpreted as indicating infant emotion states, they appear to be reported on the basis 
of whether they were situationally appropriate, rather than only on how often they 
occurred. This suggests that the criteria of selectivity and interpretation rest on the 
mother's knowledge of the infant, her representation of the demands of the situation, 
and also on the physical characteristics of the behaviour.
Analysis of meanings mothers ascribed to infant acts they had selected 
revealed that contextual significance does not only refer to the physical situation in 
which mother and infant interact, but also includes the interpersonal meaning of these 
expressions for the mother. Perception and attribution of emotion states is 
accompanied by attribution of intentions consistently in all age groups. Moreover, 
mothers perceive intentionality differently depending on the situation, and integrate 
emotion states w ith this intentional behaviour. Thus, for example, in FF, where 
mothers attribute the greatest number of intentional acts, they also interpret their
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infants as predominantly happy. In PR, on the other hand, where intention 
attributions are less frequent, mothers predominantly perceive their infants as attent­
ive and unhappy. Interestingly, in the case of mothers of 10-12 month old infants, 
negative states are interpreted as signalling an interpersonal understanding of the 
prohibitive situation.
The same pattern is found for maternal behaviour and maternal effect 
categories. When mothers perceive an intention, they describe some aspect of their 
own actions vis-a-vis this perceived intention. Mothers' attributions of intention, in 
Figure 21, appeared to follow the same pattern as their descriptions of their own 
behaviour. Thus, when mothers perceive intentions, they also describe w hat they do 
to fulfil their infants' desires. Hence, the perception of emotion states is embedded 
in dynamic action sequences, and is perceived as goal directed. Mothers' perceptions 
of intentionality is an important indicator of what is responded to (as evident in 
maternal behaviour and effect attributions) in interpersonal exchanges. Moreover, 
mothers' perception of the interpersonal and intentional significance of emotion states 
is not restricted to a particular emotion. For example, in some cases, positive states 
are linked to intentional behaviour (e.g., in FF) while, in others (e.g., PR), negative 
states are linked to intentionality. In T, although positive and negative expressions 
occur frequently, attributions of intention and maternal self attributions are low. 
Mothers do not perceive infant behaviour as interactive during T, and they perceive 
the least number of meaningful acts.
Mothers are also influenced by infant age; mothers of 4-6 month olds perceive 
their infants as happy in FF, and becoming increasingly attentive, unhappy and bored 
over consecutive situations. Mothers of 7-9 month olds perceive their infants as 
happy and distressed in FF, attentive and happy, but getting bored, in PR and 
attentive, bored and unhappy in T. Mothers of 10-12 month olds perceive infants as 
mostly attentive during FF, as understanding their prohibition and highly distressed 
and attentive in PR, and happy in T. In some instances, frequencies of selected facial 
expressions do not correspond to frequencies of emotion attributions. In those cases, 
mothers appeared to either over-interpret or under-interpret a particular emotion 
state. For example, although mothers of the oldest babies selected segments which 
contain more frequent displays of infant positive expressions in FF than in T, they 
interpret the infant as happier in T. Similarly, although mothers of 7-9 month olds 
select segments which contain more episodes of positive expressions during FF than
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mothers of the youngest infants, they make far fewer attributions of infant happy 
states than those mothers.
The general pattern that can be deduced from the above findings shows that, 
as babies get older and their expressive abilities become more articulate, mothers a) 
select fewer acts, b) become more specific regarding w hat these acts mean, and c) 
attribute intersubjective meanings to these acts. Thus, as infant expressive responses 
become more attuned to environmental stimulation, these expressions become 
'fram ed' by mothers in explicitly interpersonal language. Mothers of 4-6 m onth olds 
appear to project haphazard meanings to infant expressions. Babies' expressions, in 
turn, appear to be highly variable in response to the different types of environmental 
stimulation. Nevertheless, mothers perceive this behaviour as highly meaningful. 
They appear to project meanings onto their infants' activities, although they describe 
it in simple themes. As babies get older, their responses to environmental stimulation 
become more situationally appropriate. Mothers become more selective as there is 
less 'variability' or ambiguity in infant expressions. Hence the trend to select fewer 
acts, and for selected segments in the older age groups to reflect developmental 
capacities (e.g., positive expressions in the toy condition, and negative expressions in 
the prohibitive condition).
The text of mothers' reports also shows that they are more specific regarding 
what this behaviour means. Emotion states are consistently attributed across all age 
groups. This indicates that, in infancy, there is a pre-occupation with the emotional 
states babies. It further shows that facial expressions are the main m edium  of 
messages in the mother-infant system. However, as infants get older, this message 
system evolves from being one in which babies' expressions are used as simple 
indices of internal states, to one in which these affective expressions signify 
underlying shared meanings. Signals become interpersonally communicative, and 
mothers reflect this by describing their babies as able to communicate intentionally.
The progression of maternal interpretations towards more abstract meanings 
highlights how symbolic rules are introduced into the management of affective states. 
It also appears that the introduction of interpersonal meanings into mothers 
perceptions of their infants results in a greater degree of self-perceived maternal 
control. Thus, two, seemingly contradictory, perceptions develop; on the one hand, 
there is a greater perception by mothers of infants being autonomous, while at the 
same time, mothers' descriptions reflect how much more effective they are when they
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interpret the meaning of their infants' actions. In Chapter 10, a discussion of how 
these age-related developments map onto the theoretical framework developed earlier 
is provided.
Some ambiguity in the findings on maternal interpretations did exist, however. 
Mothers appear to label the same expressions, e.g., negative expressions, in a variety 
of ways depending on the context and age of the infant. It will be remembered that 
negative expression codes were collapsed as a result of the multiplicity of blends that 
resulted from the coding. Because of these blends, few pure MAX emotion 
expressions could be identified. This may be because infants do not display pure 
anger, distress, or pain expressions and, so, mothers project meaning onto ambiguous 
negative expressions. It is also possible that few unambiguous negative expressions 
were elicited in the situations filmed because they did not involve high levels of 
intense stimulation.
Such methodological limitations are possible to overcome by using more 
controlled methods of eliciting maternal accounts. For example, in some cases 
mothers were asked to identify facets of infant behaviour that they based their 
interpretations on. The probes used did not, however, elicit this information 
adequately. Consequently, 'identifiers' were not numerous enough to be included in 
an analysis. An improvement on the technique used here would thus be to ensure 
that mothers give adequate justifications for their ascription of emotion states to 
babies. This may be done by specifically asking mothers to account for their 
interpretations in the instructions given to mothers at the beginning of the interview.
A second alternative would be in the choice of interaction situations mothers 
were interpreting. It is a testable hypothesis whether mothers would be less 
ambiguous about the meaning of infant negative displays with increasing age, if the 
stimulation used to elicit these expressions was stronger than that used in the present 
situations. Using stronger stimulation to produce infant affective reactions may 
sharpen the focus on the criteria mothers are using to ascribe emotions. One 
possibility may be to ask mothers to identify situations in which they think their 
infants are likely to react strongly, and film infants in those situations. A third 
possible method for bringing maternal criteria into sharper relief is to compare their 
interpretations with those of observers.
While the above results imply that mothers both interpret infant acts on the 
basis of what is prevalent in infant behaviour, and also infer mental skills which may
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not be directly observable, it is not clear whether observers would attribute the same 
meaning to infant behaviour. It may be that, w ithout any definition of meaningful 
acts, observers perceive meaningful behaviour differently to mothers, as was 
suggested by Adamson et al/s (1987) study. It may also be that, once they are given 
the same criteria as mothers, they may interpret infant acts in the same way that 
mothers do.
The results suggest that mothers are making specific selections of infant 
behaviours. Analysis of baseline samples in Chapter 7 revealed that on the whole 
baseline segments contained fewer expression changes than selected segments. 
However, it is not clear if mothers' perceptions rest on observable physical 
characteristics accessible to any observer, or if they are the product of specific 
experiences between mothers and infants. If maternal perceptions are congruent with 
external observers perceptions of infants, then eliciting maternal accounts is 
unnecessary. W ithout a comparative study it is not possible to demonstrate the 
particular value of the attributions and selections of parents or caregivers. Taking the 
findings one step further, to confirm that the perspective of interactional others is 
indeed a reflection of a different conceptual framework, and a different orientation, 
to that of observers, and hence to highlight the importance of this insiders perspec­
tive, two experiments were conducted. In the next chapter, these experiments are 
reported.
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CHAPTER 9
COMPARISONS OF MOTHERS' SELECTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS
WITH THOSE OF OBSERVERS
9.0 A im s an d  O bjectives
Up until now, the behavioural and verbal analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 has 
been used to address some of the initial theoretical concerns presented in Chapter 1. 
Attribution theory advocates that actor-observer differences exist, and that they affect 
how people's actions are interpreted and understood. Ichheiser points out that there 
is an important tension between impressions and expressions. Our perception of 
other people is subject to contextual and interactional dynamics, and does not depend 
soley on the physical characteristics of their behaviour or their appearance. Hence, 
our interpretation of others will vary according to who is doing the interpreting. 
Attribution theory therefore has important lessons for our understanding of what 
emotions are, and how they develop.
In Chapter 1, Kaye (1984) identifies three types of relationships between 
expressions and impressions. He highlights the need to integrate perspectives other 
than those of researchers into the appraisal of emotions, especially in studying infants. 
Obtaining multiple persectives allows us to examine commonalities and disprepancies 
between individuals who have different relationships with babies. If interpretations 
differ, it may be possible to attribute discrepancies to characteristics of the relation­
ships they hold have vis a vis babies. For example, in Adamson et a l/s (1987) study 
of adult's perceptions of meaningful acts, they compared parents versus nonparents 
selections of meaningful and intentionally communicative acts. Their findings suggest 
that caregivers attach greater meaning to infant behaviour than non-parents 
(Adamson et al., 1987). The more consensually defined intentionally communicative 
acts were as likely to be selected by one group as the other. This has been taken to 
indicate that parents criteria for defining meaningful acts are far broader than those 
of nonparents. If this were indeed true, it may be taken as important evidence that 
part of the parental mechanism of scaffolding and social referencing is to over­
attribute meaning to infant behaviour so as to be better able to manage the baby in
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a coherent and consistent fashion. In addition, this overattribution would enable 
parents to be one step ahead of their babies, enabling them to drive infants' 
capacitities to greater levels of complexity. Hence, capturing more than one 
perspective can highlight aspects of infant behaviour which are particularly salient to 
parents in their understanding and management of their babies.
The analysis has so far has dealt with two points of view on infant emotional­
ity. In the first instance we have looked at infant expressions using an objective, 
context-free coding frame. In the second, we have obtained the perspective of 
caregivers regarding the meaning of their infants expressions. Comparison of the two 
points of view yeilded some important results. It showed that, regarding the selection 
process, mothers find babies' behaviour more meaningful in some situations than in 
others. Mothers also appear to become more selective as infants get older. There was 
also evidence that expressions in segments selected by mothers reveal developmental 
and situational changes. When maternal attributions of emotion and corresponding 
facial expressions were compared, the analysis revealed strong associations between 
the two. This was especially true when the situational context was conducive to a 
particular affective state. Importantly, as babies got older, mothers started to ascribe 
mental states and intersubjective meanings to their babies.
The results raise a number of issues. It may be possible to deduce from them 
that facial expressions are the main criteria used to attribute emotion states in infants. 
There was evidence of strong associations between facial expressions and emotion 
attributions. However, the analysis has not shown whether mental skill categories 
would be perceived in the same way from multiple perspectives. Shared meanings 
between mother and infant may not be physically present in the behaviour that is 
being interpreted. In this case, the data would be especially valuable in providing a 
framework for understanding how the mother-infant expressive signalling system 
evolves. At present, the analysis does not show whether caregivers' interpretations 
are any different to those of other groups. Thus, while these findings are important 
in highlighting the predominant concerns and criteria with which caregivers assess 
their babies, they need to be extended to answer a number of questions.
One such question is whether parental criteria regarding what is meaningful 
behaviour in their infants is consensually defined, and present in the physical 
characterisics of that behaviour alone. Data from the baseline comparions suggests 
that there are no clear physical demarcation points regarding w hat is defined as a
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meaninful act. Indeed, mothers of the youngest age groups may have been 'guessing' 
or projecting meanings onto infant acts. This raises the question: In the absence of 
any set definition of a meaningful act, how much meaning do observers ascribe to 
infant behaviour compared to mothers? The Adamson et al. (1987) study suggests 
that parents select more meangful acts than non-parents because non-parents have to 
construct criteria for what consistutes a meaningful act. The study also suggests that 
selectivity is influenced by interactional context. This raises the question of whether 
observers too are influenced by the situational context in which they view the baby.
A second related question is; if non-parents are given the same criteria for 
interpreting infant acts as parents, will they interpret infant acts in the same way? 
The results of comparing mothers attributions with objectively coded facial 
expressions showed that the criteria for attributing emotion states may, at least 
partially, lie in the physical characteristics of behaviour. However, does the same 
apply to non-emotion categories? I have agrued elsewhere (Chapters 2 and 3) that 
intentionality, intersubjectivity and the development of a social signalling system 
between mother and baby rests on a history of shared experiences. Transitional 
gestures evolve through the negotiation of dialogue between caregivers and their 
babies. Comparing observers with parents would bring this divergence of perspective 
into sharper focus.
Hence, the following chapter addresses the following: The mother's role in 
interpreting her baby's acts on tape is one of both participant observer and of a 
caregiver who knows the baby. To highlight how this dual role contains important 
dynamics which differ from those of external observers, two types of comparisons 
were made: The number of maternal selections of meaningful acts was compared to 
those of student observers, and the type of interpretations mothers made was 
compared to those of observers. The first experiment examines if the criteria 
observers use to define meaningful acts are the same as those of mothers. Secondly, 
if the absence of criteria for defining meaningful acts is partially responsible for 
disparaties between observers and mothers, how do observers compare to mothers 
when they are given the same interpretative criteria? The second experiment is set 
up to address this issue. In the following section the two experiments are described, 
and the results are discussed. The overall results of the are then summarised and 
discussed. W hat they inform us about the organisation of mother-infant interaction 
is considered. Finally, the stengths and limitations of the overall study are addressed.
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9.1 Comparions between Mothers and Observers in Selection of Meaningful
Infant Acts
As it can be argued that mothers are only selecting what is simply prevalent 
and therefore directly observable in infant behaviour, we must examine whether the 
mothers' selections of infant acts are based on the same criteria as those of external 
observers. To do this, differences in selectivity of infant acts between mothers and 
external observers were tested for.
Student observers (N = 24) were asked to view the tapes of two of the infants 
filmed, one boy and one girl from age group 1, and to note infant meaningful acts. 
The sample of students consisted of a large number of mature students. Many had 
had experience handling babies. At this stage, it was felt that an important first step 
was to identify disparaties between mothers and non-mothers to highlight the role of 
participant observers. However, it is recognised that future studies will need to 
assess if different groups perceive infants differently, depending on their familiarity 
with the particular baby versus their familiarity with babies in general. For example, 
by asking mothers to interpret each others babies and comparing that w ith how they 
interpret their own babies behaviour.
As an initial step, however, it was necessary to establish if there was any 
discrepancy between mothers and observers. During the experiment, observers were 
shown the mother-infant tape (with the mother's film edited onto a split screen) in 
its entirety, as had been shown to mothers. They were asked to note down instances 
where they felt the infant had done something meaningful. Their selections were 
compared to those of the mothers. From Table 21 it can be seen that for 4 of the 6 
conditions, mothers' scores are outside the range of observers' scores. The remaining 
two scores, for the baby girl, in FF and PR, although not falling outside the range of 
student observations are, nevertheless, within the range by a very small margin.
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Table 21: Observers' selections of meaningful infant acts
Frequency of selections
Girl Boy
Situations Observers Mother Observers Mother
Face to face
Mean (x)
Range (min., max.) 
(x±2s.d)*
6.76
(4,12)
(4.76,8.76)
11
4.17
(1/13)
(2.17,6.17)
31
Prohibitive
Mean (x)
Range (min., max.) 
(x±2s.d)
3.35
(1/8)
(1.35,5.35)
7
2.90 
(1/7) 
(0.9,4.9)
16
Toy play
Mean (x)
Range (min., max.) 
(x±2s.d)
2.81
(U )
(0.81,4.81)
8
3.09
(0,9)
(1.09,5.09)
13
*s.d= Standard Deviation
It is significant to note that both observers and mothers select the greatest 
number of meaningful episodes in FF (Table 21). This suggests that the behaviour of 
4-6 month old infants interacting with their mothers is more easily defined as 
meaningful by observers, whether they are participant or external observers. 
However, while external observers appear to note more meaningful acts in FF relative 
to the other situations, they, nevertheless, select far fewer behaviours compared to 
mothers. During the task, there was a striking difference between the ease and confi­
dence with which mothers selected from the stream of behaviour and the difficulty 
observers faced when deciding what was meaningful. It appeared that mothers were 
more flexible when selecting acts as meaningful, or were more ready to project 
meanings to infant acts than observers.
The difference between mothers and observers highlights the point made by 
Adamson et al. (1987) that mothers' criteria for 'meaningful acts' are far broader than 
the criteria of observers. As regards the selection of infant behaviour, it would appear 
that the perception of what is regarded as meaningful does not only depend on preva­
lent infant behaviour, but also on the criteria one uses to define these acts. In the 
absence of any definition of meaningful acts, observers make fewer selections than 
mothers. However, it may be that, once they are given the same criteria as mothers,
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they may interpret infant acts in the same way that mothers do. In the next section, 
this hypothesis is tested.
9.2 Comparisons of Maternal and Observers' Attributions
Do mothers' interpretations of their infants' behaviours differ from the 
interpretations of observers? An experiment was run to compare mothers' and 
observers' interpretations using a group of thirty psychology students. Postgraduate 
students were divided into groups of 4-8 people. Two tapes (with mother and infant 
on split screen) were shown to each group (total number of tapes shown = 12). 
Students were asked to view the tapes in their entirety and interpret infant behaviour 
using the same categories derived from the maternal accounts coding frame. This 
restricted the number of possible interpretations observers could make, and defined 
the types of behaviours to be coded in advance.
In this way, the criteria for interpretation corresponded to Adamson et al.'s 
(1987) definition of consensually defined acts. In their study, they suggested that 
intentionally communicative acts are easier to select than perceived communicative 
acts (i.e., acts which were meaningful to the observer), because the former are 
consensually defined, often conveyed by conventional gestures and words. In 
contrast, perceived communicative acts are less consensually defined, and so the 
recipient must construct criteria for what constitutes a 'meaningful act'. The previous 
experiment which compared mother and student selections of infant behaviours did 
not provide the observers with predefined categories to select from. They experienced 
great difficulty in deciding what was meaningful. It was predicted that if, as 
Adamson et al. argue, providing criteria for a given act facilitates its selection, 
observers would be as likely as mothers to perceive the same types of acts.
To test for differences between mothers and observers, a binomial logit model 
was used (those who had used a particular attribution were scored as 1 and those 
who had not were given a score of 0). Three attributions of infant emotion state were 
examined: Happiness, negative state, and attentiveness. Three categories of infant 
mental skills were also compared: Intention, exploration of the environment, and 
intersubjectivity. Lastly, maternal attributions of the effect of their own behaviour
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were compared to student perceptions of the effect of maternal behaviours on the 
infant.
9.2.1 Emotion Categories
The emotion-related categories tested were happiness, negative states, and 
attentiveness. Results of testing for differences between mothers and observers in 
attributing happiness revealed that, although there was no significant difference 
overall between the two groups, the numbers of mothers and observers attributing
happiness differed depending on infant age (x2=5.99;d/=2;p.=.05). This difference was 
found in age group 3. Out of the total number of subjects who attributed happiness, 
62% were mothers and 37% were observers (in age group 1, 46% were mothers and 
54% were observers and, in age 2, there was a 50% division of mothers and 
observers).
Attributions of attentiveness and negative state were used frequently by both 
mothers and observers in all age groups and situations, and tests failed to reveal 
significant differences between the two groups.
9.2.2 Attributions of Mental Skills
There was a highly significant difference in the number of mothers (71%), 
compared to the number of observers (29%), who attributed intention to the infant's
behaviour overall (%2=22.70;d/=l;p.=.000001). Mothers and observers did not differ 
significantly between specific situations or age groups; the difference represented an 
overall trend. This is important in highlighting how maternal interpretations of 
infants are framed in explicitly intentional, and hence dynamic, terms. Observers, on 
the other hand, provide a more static picture of infants. This points to an important 
characteristic of the divergence in perspective between mothers and observers.
Results on attributions of intersubjectivity showed a significant age related 
difference between the number of mothers and observers attributing intersubjectivity
(X2=7.25;d/=2;p.=.02). While mothers generally do not attribute intersubjective skills
235
to infants until 10-12 months of age, the majority of observers interpret the behaviours 
of 4-9 month old infants as indicating that the infant understands the mother's 
communication or intends to communicate (Table 22). Surprisingly, fewer observers 
interpret 10-12 month old infant behaviours as communicative, compared to observers 
in the younger age groups. This result is especially interesting as this category 
specifically refers to Adamson et al's definition of 'intentionally communicative' acts 
and should have yielded the same result for both students and mothers. As 
Adamson et al. did not use the infants' own parents in their study, this may explain 
the difference in results, and points to the dynamic nature of maternal perceptions of 
infants compared to external observers. It is possible that mothers and observers use 
different criteria to decide when the infant understands or is communicating 
intentionally.
Table 22: Percentage of mothers and observers attributing intersubjectivity
Percentage of subjects attributing intersubjectivity
Age categories Mothers
%
Observers
%
Age group 1 33 67
Age group 2 40 60
Age group 3 58 42
An overall significant age effect was found for the number of subjects who 
attributed exploratory behaviour (%2=6.22;d/=2;/?.=.05). Of the total number of subjects 
who attributed exploratory behaviour to infants, 18.75% made these attributions in 
age group 1, 40.6% in age group 2, and 40.6% in age group 3. Infant behaviour from 
7 months onwards begins to be perceived, by both mothers and observers, as explora­
tory, suggesting that it is more readily interpreted without specific knowledge of the 
infant.
Finally, comparing students' perceptions of the effect of mothers on the 
infants' behaviour with maternal attributions of their own behaviour did not reveal 
significant differences overall. However, there was a significant difference between
age groups for mothers and observers (x2=7.76;d/=2;p.=.02). Whereas more observers 
attributed maternal effect to mothers of 4-6 month olds than the mothers themselves 
(60% observers and 40% mothers), more mothers of 10-12 month olds attributed the
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infants' behaviour to their own actions than observers (60% and 40% respectively). 
There was an even division in the attribution of maternal effect in age group 2.
Taken as a whole, these findings show that mothers use different cues to 
attribute happiness, intersubjectivity, intention, and maternal effect from those of 
observers. In the case of maternal effect, the difference between mothers and 
observers is important in revealing the divergence in perspective between actors and 
observers. Student observers viewed the mothers' behaviour on a split screen, while 
mothers inferred their own behaviour from observing the infant. More observers 
noted maternal effect than mothers in age 1, but less noted maternal effect than 
mothers in age 3. This suggests that observers may be interpreting maternal 
effectiveness on the basis of stimulus response contingencies, while mothers' 
perceptions of their own effectiveness rests on knowledge based on previous experi­
ence w ith their infants.
Interpretations of intersubjectivity are attributed by more observers than 
mothers in age 1, and by more mothers than observers in age 3. As one of the 
definitions of this category is deliberate responding on the part of the infant, 
observers may again be relying on stimulus-response contingencies between mother 
and infant. Mothers may be interpreting behaviour on the basis of their knowledge 
of 'transitional gestures', by which they negotiate and maintain dialogue with their 
infants. Such gestures would not have been accessible to observers. In the case of 
intentionality, where the definition of this activity does not necessarily rest on 
stimulus response contingencies, but on the perception and understanding of an 
infant's gesture, observers made few interpretations compared to mothers.
A cautionary note is that this analysis does not tell us if the discerpancy in 
interperetations is due to differences in level of experience with babies between 
mothers and observers. In other words, if the differences are a reflection of 
experience with babies, rather than with a particular baby. However, the lack of 
significant differences between observers and mothers in attributions of most emotion 
states suggests that emotion may be inferred on the basis of the predominance of 
emotion related facial expressions. It may be, for example, that some facial 
expressions may be easier to 'read' and interpret than others in some situations.
The exception to this proposition are mothers of 10-12 month olds, who appear 
to perceive happiness in their infants on the basis of other criteria than those used by 
observers. Mothers of the oldest babies may be inferring positive states on the basis
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of the type of activity in which the infant is engaged, rather than the predominance 
of positive facial expressions. An alternative possibility is that observers do not find 
positive expressions to be salient indicators of older infants' behaviour, while mothers 
continue to find such expressions important in interpreting infant behaviour. In the 
following summary of results, the above results are integrated with those in the 
previous two chapters.
9.3 Lead or Follow: Synopsis of Results
Infant facial expressions in selected segments indicated that infants display 
predominantly positive expressions in FF, increasingly come to display negative 
expressions in PR, and display more positive expressions in T as infant age increases. 
While it is possible to speculate that mothers simply respond to this input by selecting 
what is prevalent in infant behaviour, other indicators pointed to mothers using 
specific criteria to select what was meaningful. For example, compared to students' 
definition of meaningful behaviour, mothers' criteria for selectivity were more 
differentiated, leading to more acts being selected by mothers than students. What 
are these criteria?
It was found that mothers perceive and select more meaningful infant acts 
when infants are engaged in interactive situations. They select more acts in FF than 
in PR, and more acts in PR than in T. There also appears to be a trend for mothers 
to select fewer acts, i.e., to become more selective, as infants get older, although the 
trend failed to reach significance. The evidence from results on selectivity suggests 
that maternal perception of what is regarded as meaningful does not only depend on 
what is prevalent in the physical characteristics of the infants' behaviour. Indeed, 
when maternal interpretations were analysed, mothers differed between age groups 
revealing that, as infants got older, mothers, firstly, became more specific about the 
meaning of their infants' behaviour and, secondly, began to describe infants as able 
to communicate or share interpersonal knowledge with them. Similarly, when 
compared with observers' interpretations, agreements between mothers and observers 
concerning emotion state attributions were high, but the two groups differed in 
attributing intentionality, inter subjectivity and maternal effectiveness. Thus, two 
criteria appeared to be central to the dynamics of maternal interpretation of infant
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behaviour; firstly, mothers select overt behaviours which are interpersonally directed 
and, secondly, they select acts on the basis of knowledge of the infant not present in 
the physical characteristics of infant behaviour.
Comparing baseline segments showed that mothers did not depend on 
changes in facial expressions alone to make selections. For example, mothers of 7-9 
month olds differed from the other two age groups; they selected infant acts that were 
characterised by fewer expression changes, compared to the baseline in FF and T; 
mothers focus on infant acts concerned with exploring the environment, as was 
supported by the rise in both mothers and observers attributing exploratory 
behaviours to infants after 7 months. Both mothers of 4-6 and 10-12 month olds' 
segments were characterised by frequent changes in facial expressions compared to 
baseline segments. However, analysis of maternal interpretations showed that, as 
infants got older, mothers interpreted infant activity differently.
Simple descriptions of infant behaviour decreased with increasing infant age. 
Mothers of 4-6 month olds interpreted infant acts using predominantly attributions 
of positive emotion states and descriptions of behaviour that were devoid of social 
or cognitive terms. In the light of results for baseline segments, such findings show 
that mothers of 4-6 month olds appear to make haphazard selections during FF. 
Mothers of all age groups attributed emotion states, intentionality, and maternal self­
attributions to their infants. All three attributions decreased across situations. This 
appeared to mirror the pattern of maternal selections of infant acts. The three 
categories taken together show that, when mothers attribute an emotion state, they 
also describe it in the context of an intention on the part of their infant. They refer 
to their own behaviour vis-a-vis their infants as well (using maternal behaviour and 
effect attributions). For example, " I bleeped that 'cause I put my hand in front of 
her eyes and so affected her vision, took my hand away and so she smiled a lot. She 
smiled because it was an unexpected thing for me to do, and maybe to make me do 
it again" (attributed to mother of baby girl, 10-12 month group). Thus, the findings 
support the earlier proposal that one criterion for defining meaningful acts is maternal 
perceptions of the interpersonal nature of their infants' behaviour.
Mothers of 10-12 month olds interpreted their infants as happiest in T, 
supporting research by Trevarthen and Hubely (1978) and Sugerman-Bell (1978) 
showing that, after 10 months, infants are able to coordinate object interaction with 
person interaction. It also implies that mothers of the oldest infants were selecting
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infant acts in T that were directed at them, rather than the toy, instead of focusing on 
simple changes in the level of infant activity, as mothers of the youngest babies did. 
Partial evidence for is to be found in the descriptive content of maternal accounts. 
Mothers of 4-6 month olds interpreted infant acts in T as expressing predominantly 
attentiveness, boredom and negative emotion states, appearing to reflect the 
discomfort of infants in this situation.
Mothers' interpretations also contained differences between age groups in the 
three situations. In particular, mothers of the oldest babies made a dramatically high 
num ber of attributions of inter subjectivity in PR. Their infants displayed high levels 
of negative expressions, suggesting that negative expressions become intentionally 
communicative to mothers by 10-12 months. Younger mothers did not generally 
perceive their infants' expressions as indicating a deliberate intention to communicate, 
or an explicit mutually shared understanding.
Moreover, while mothers attribute emotion states to their infants, this 
attribution is situation dependent. A relationship was found between attributions of 
emotion states and corresponding facial expressions. Positive expressions were 
positively correlated to attributions of positive emotion states in FF, but not in PR or 
T. Similarly, negative expressions were significantly associated with attributions of 
negative emotion states in PR, but not in FF or T. In the same way, attributions of 
attentiveness were positively correlated with interest expressions in T, but not in FF 
or PR. Mothers were thus ignoring facial expressions which were atypical of the 
general trend of the infants' behaviour, and which were less frequent and less 
ambigious than other expressions, thus creating a consistency and stability in the way 
expressive behaviour is managed in social context.
The results highlighted an important transition in mothers of 10-12 month olds 
compared to the rest of the sample. This transition was discussed in Chapter 8. By 
10 months, mothers gain more control over their infants (i.e., become more effective) 
in driving and directing the interaction, while at the same time, perceive their infants 
as able to assume a more active and communicative role in interaction. Qualitative 
analysis revealed that, when mothers of 10-12 month olds perceived their infants as 
exhibiting intersubjective skills, negative maternal expressions in PR were frequent. 
Mothers also made frequent references to the effect of their own behaviour in 
segments which contained predominantly negative expressions. This demonstrates 
a point that will be discussed in detail in the following chapter; that mothers of older
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infants were influential in directing their infants' activities and perceived themselves 
as so. At the same time, they perceived their infants as able to initiate communication 
w ith them and to understand their own expressions and desires. Hence, unlike 
mothers of younger children, they perceived their infants as playing a more active 
role in the interaction. Without proposing any causal mechanisms, this also suggests 
that maternal perceptions are associated with the way mothers interact with their 
infants, although further research is needed to examine this possibility in more detail.
Mothers of 4-6 month olds perceived their infants as displaying emotion states 
and intentionality, but while maternal behaviour and effect attributions were frequent 
in FF, mothers did not perceive infants as able to assume an autonomous role in 
interaction. Similarly, although they place expressions in the context of infant desires, 
embedding them in activity bound contexts, they do not perceive their infants as able 
to comprehend these responses, but rather only emphasise the resulting effect of their 
own actions to control or maintain the infants' positive state.
Taken as a whole, the results highlight how maternal interpretations provide 
important indicators of the types of affective processes that are salient to mothers in 
the social development of infant emotionality. They have demonstrated that what 
mothers find meaningful does not necessarily depend on the presence or absence of 
a particular facial expression alone. Mothers project meanings which are context and 
age related. They provide the infants with continuity in the course of development 
by consistently perceiving, interpreting and responding to affective displays. They 
provide increasing complexity by interpreting these affective states in the context of 
more complex socio-cognitive processes, leading infants towards more complex 
relationships between their own expressive behaviours and the wider environment.
Socialising influences are also present. Mothers discipline their infants to obey 
them by using negative displays when they think that infants can comprehend them; 
however, they attempt to discourage negative displays by involving infants in positive 
exchanges. The process is reciprocal, with mothers relinquishing ever greater control 
to their infants. By 12 months, mothers' face to face exchanges with their infants are 
characterised by the more active participation of the infants. Simple positive facial 
interaction is no longer the main medium of exchange. Infants are seen as being 
capable of being happy outside the context of face to face play, in T, highlighting the 
growing independence and capabilities of the infant vis-a-vis the wider environment. 
These findings suggest that infant emotion cannot be studied outside social context.
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Furthermore, that maternal interpretations provide essential information on how 
emotions in infancy emerge as complex socio-cognitive processes. However, aspects 
of the design of the study give cause for caution in interpreting these results as 
general mechanisms.
As was mentioned earlier, the small sample size and the nature of the sample 
are limiting factors. In this connection, the homogenous nature of the sample (NCT 
mothers), while being a strength in terms of limiting variablity in interpretation due 
to differences in SES backgrounds, nevertheless limits generalisability to a wider, 
heterogenious population. Similarly, the small number of subjects used calls for 
caution in extrapolating the results of the present study to a wider population of 
similar mothers.
At the same time, because the of the cross-sectional nature of the design, 
developmental processes could not be studied more directly. This issue is dealt with 
in detail in Chapter 10. For the present, it is important to draw attention to the 
problem of extrapolating developmental processes from the cross-sectional results 
obtained here. While there is continuing controversy surrounding the empirical 
assessment of longitudinal processes, it is nevertheless recognised that further 
research needs to longitudinally assess how mothers' perceptions of their babies. In 
the next chapter issues dealing with the directions this research might take are 
examined.
A final potential limitation is the lack of analysis of gender issues in maternal 
selections and interpretations. In this connection, two points need to be made. 
Firstly, the findings on sex differences in the expression of emotions and their 
interpretation have generally been ambigious and variable. This is partly due to the 
lack of studies which set out to study gender differences in expressivity as a topic 
worthy of study in its own right.
Most of the literature that was reveiwed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, treated 
gender as one of a set of independent variables, if it was included at all. Gender 
differences are rarely interpreted adequately, are mostly treated as peripheral to the 
investigation. Hence, in the present case, it was felt that to do justice to the issue, it 
should be investigated in its' own right, in future research extending the scope of the 
investigation. That is, as a seperate investigation of gender issues in emotionality. 
By first identifying general characterisitcs of maternal interpretations, more specific 
hypotheses can be generated to investigate how gender may affect it. The present
242
study was primarily geared to understanding maternal perceptions of babies. A 
secondary step would then be to examine how other varibles may affect this process, 
one such being the gender of the child.
This is related to the second point. In the present study equal numbers of 
male and female babies were chosen. It may have been advantagous to select one 
gender only, hence reducing any variation that may have arisen from sex differences. 
However, in doing so it would have been necessary to decide on a single gender, and 
to have specific reasons for doing so. This would have then shifted the focus of the 
study to an examination of how maternal perceptions are associated with the 
development of socio-emotional gender identities. As was mentioned above, this was 
felt to be more appropriate as secondary analysis, as the issue of sex differences is an 
im portant and complex issue in its own right. Nevertheless, as was mentioned 
earlier, some prelimary tests for sex differences were made, and did not show 
significant effects.
While limitations did exist, the study was important in that it combined the 
use of objective coding of facial expressions with caregivers' interpretations. This 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques was innovative in the area of 
emotion development. It revealed important dynamics in the way mothers perceive 
and manage their babies emotionality. The use of both techniques was vital in 
unraveling how maternal perceptions adapt to the child's developing expressive 
capacities. They also revealed the way mothers' perceptions are tied to the different 
contexts in which they interact, and suggested how mothers may be selecting specific 
expressions and filtering out others in the process of interaction. In addition, 
maternal accounts revealed that mothers were highly skilled and sensitive observers 
of their childrens' skills and were in tune with developing capacities. With the above 
points in mind, in the next and final chapter, the implications of these results for our 
understanding of the social development of emotions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 10
FACIAL EXPRESSIONS, THE CAREGIVER'S PERSPECTIVE,
AND EMOTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
10.0 Diversity and Integration
Emotions regulate all aspects of our lives. They permeate other psychological 
processes and regulate relationships with people and events. In infancy, the debate 
surrounding emotional development has important repercussions for the way 
emotions are understood as motivational and social processes in later life. 
Researchers have come a long way from viewing emotions as epiphenomena. 
However, they have faced difficulties in integrating emotions w ith the wider 
development of the child. In this thesis I have proposed that emotions are socio-cul- 
turally mediated responses to events and people. In infancy, caretakers are respon­
sible for instilling these socio-cultural attitudes by their propensity to act as a scaf­
folding mechanism. One critical aspect of this process is caretakers' projection of 
meaning onto infant facial expressions. Through treating facial expressions as indices 
of emotion states, caretakers incorporate infants' instinctive expressive responses into 
social discourse out of which emotions develop in conjunction with other capacities.
The present chapter assesses the extent to which the current findings support 
these developmental proposals. The empirical evidence in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 is 
brought to bear on the models of emotional and social development presented in 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3, and key findings are synthesised with the original basis of the 
thesis. The particular problems of the approach used are highlighted and the pros­
pects for further research are discussed.
10.1 The Caregiver's Perspective in Emotional Development
Eliciting maternal interpretations of infant facial expressions has uncovered 
important indicators of how emotionality is perceived and contextualised in interac­
tion. By objectively coding facial expressions and comparing these codes to maternal
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interpretations, it was possible to assess how mothers integrated the perceived 
affective states of infants7 with their expressive behaviour in the context of the infants7 
w ider development. Such integration has largely been lacking in theories of emo­
tional development. These theories have either tended to under-emphasise emotional­
ity, or to have over-emphasised it, at the expense of understanding how it relates to 
the w ider socio-cognitive development of infants. It was argued that emotions cannot 
be said to exist in infancy without the development of a socio-cognitive understand­
ing of the social significance of events and that this understanding takes place 
through social interaction shaped by maternal interpretations of expressive behaviour. 
In the present study, mothers emphasised positive face to face exchanges in the 
youngest infants. In the 7-9 month old age groups they emphasised the infants7 
preoccupation with, and exploration of, the environment. Frequent attributions of 
happiness during toy play pointed to the propensity of 10-12 month old infants for 
for joint activity. These findings highlighted how maternal accounts linked the 
perceived affective states of infants with different modes of infant activity. Eliciting 
maternal accounts has provided a new opportunity for understanding how infant 
capabilities from different domains become integrated in day to day settings. The 
developmental changes that occur in the interpretation of infant expressive behaviour 
have highlighted how infant expressions are incorporated into ever more complex 
processes by adults, suggesting how infant instinctive processes become transformed 
into higher mental processes.
It has been proposed that investigating how mothers transmit social rules of 
w hat to feel starts during infancy with their perception of the infants7 affective state. 
In Chapter 1, research paradigms which do not recognise the nature of facial 
expressions as inter-individual processes were criticised. Acknowledging that facial 
expressions should be assessed in more naturalistic settings led to the proposal that 
parental mechanisms governing responsivity to infants may be based, not on the 
expressive function of facial expressions, but on the ability of parents to form 
impressions of their infants7 affective signals. Research paradigms that sought evi­
dence for the presence of emotions in infancy by assessing discrete affective signals 
under various environmental conditions were criticised for not including the 
inferential processes of caretakers. It was proposed that such research needed to be 
complemented by studies which considered the psychological significance of these
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affective reactions for the interactors. For example, infant behaviour was perceived 
differently by observers and parents (Adamson et al., 1987).
It was proposed in Chapter 3 that the infant's development is guided by 
adults' provision of both structure and meaning. Meaning is not inherent in 
interaction, but something we impose upon behaviour; the infant's signals in 
interaction are only given the status of communicative signals to the extent that 
mothers impute that status to them. The divergence in perspective between observers 
and parents in the Adamson et al. (1987) study suggested that, if parents were finding 
infant behaviour more meaningful than observers, it was important to examine what 
they select as meaningful and the conditions under which they do so. What is 
selected by caregivers, and the influence of context on selectivity, would provide 
insight into the different conditions under which the infant's signals are highlighted 
as salient.
In the present study, the situational context of behaviour and who was 
interpreting it affected what infant acts were perceived as meaningful. Mothers 
perceived more meaningful acts in situations characterised by interpersonal exchanges 
such as face to face play and the prohibitive episode. They also perceived more 
meaningful acts than external observers. The fact that mothers' criteria for mean­
ingful acts are more differentiated than observers' suggests that the former are 
particularly sensitive to certain aspects of infant behaviour which are ignored by 
external observers. Without examining these criteria an important factor in 
understanding the dynamics of expressive interaction and development is overlooked.
Chapter 1 highlighted how the interpretation of emotional expressions can be 
approached from different perspectives. It was suggested that there were important 
advantages in adopting the criteria of sense 2 (Kaye, 1982) but from the perspective 
of the primary caregiver. In Kaye's sense 2, expressions lead others to infer feeling 
states or emotions in the expresser. That is, facial expressions are interpreted as 
indices of emotion states. This sense is distinct from the other two senses. In sense 
1, for example, expressions are regarded as accurate indices of emotions. Most 
research carried out on emotionality in infancy implicitly or explicitly assumes that 
facial expressions are synonymous with the presence of emotion states.
The finding that observers perceive fewer meaningful acts than mothers 
demonstrates that employing the criteria of sense 2 on its own, from a perspective 
that is external to the interaction, ignores important inferential dynamics. Caregivers'
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propensity for perceiving meaning in infant expressive behaviour is far more differ­
entiated than that of observers. Evidence from the present study suggests that 
maternal selectivity is based on the mother's perception of the interpersonal nature 
of infant expressive behaviour. Studies which assess infant expressivity from an 
external perspective, or those which ignore situational and behavioural context, lack 
the necessary ingredients to gain a full understanding of how different components 
affect emotional development. In order to understand the dynamics of expressive 
development, the salience, for caregivers, of facial expressions needs to be examined.
What mothers perceive as meaningful, and the circumstances under which 
they do so, should be considered in models of emotional development. Research has 
shown that adults structure interaction and endow situations with meaning for the 
infant. From the adult's point of view, there must be some representation of how to 
organise interaction and what sense to make of it. The results obtained here suggest 
that adults find behaviour meaningful when it occurs in interpersonal contexts, that 
is, when expressions are directed at them, rather than at other objects in the 
environment. This suggests, at least initially, that emotional expressions are 
contextualised through interpersonal exchanges. When expressive behaviour is 
directed at inanimate objects, such as in toy play, caretakers attach less meaning to 
it. Infant emotionality is meaningful primarily when it is directed at others. As a 
first step, the results suggest that the common pathway which links expressive beh­
aviour to the wider environment is the caretaker. Through her, emotional responses 
become associated with events and gain meaning for the infant. For caregivers, the 
meaning of facial expressions is embedded in a wider social reality. In the next 
section differences found in facial expressions occurring in selected meaningful acts 
demonstrate how situational context influences the salience of expressions for 
mothers.
10.2 Contextual Influences and Developmental Changes: Facial Expressions 
and their Interpretation
There appeared to be a growing differentiation in the way infants responded 
to different situations within perceived meaningful acts. Facial expressions occurring 
in selected meaningful acts contained fewer positive expressions in FF, more negative
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expressions in PR, and more positive expressions in T, as infant age increased. 
Baseline facial expressions appeared to be similar in content. It would appear that, 
as infant expressions became more differentiated, maternal interpretations underwent 
parallel changes, that is, mothers were sensitive to changes in expressive behaviours.
These results appear to contradict those in the Malatesta et al. (1982; 1986) 
studies which found that mothers acknowledged fewer expressions generally, and 
ignored negative expressions in particular with increasing age. Instead, mothers in 
this study appeared to be sensitive to the increasing differentiation in infant express­
ive behaviour and considered expressions to be meaningful/salient depending on 
their representation of the situation and the infants' abilities.
Infants' expressions did become more differentiated with increasing age, as 
was suggested by research evidence presented in Chapter 2. For example, studies on 
the expressive repertoire of infants indicted that negative expressions contained more 
differentiated anger signals to external stimulation as infants got older, especially after 
7 months of age (Sternberg et al., 1983; Izard et al., 1981). One important difference 
between the method used in these experiments and in the present investigation was 
in the type of elicitor used. Intense levels of stimulation were employed to produce 
these reactions (repeated arm restraint and painful inoculations). In more naturalistic 
settings, such as in the present study, it was found that infant emotional expressions 
rarely occurred in 'pure ', undifferentiated form, which in fact led to the collapse of 
facial expressions.
Furthermore, in such settings it was possible to see how infant negative states 
became dissociated from physical stimuli and were elicited by the behaviour of others, 
as for example in the prohibitive situation. By 10-12 months infants displayed a large 
number of negative expressions in selected acts (and in baseline segments) without 
any physical contact with their mothers. Thus, while negative expressions were 
produced in other situations, selected PR segments contained the most number of 
negative expressions. Mothers' interpretations indicated that they attached specific 
communicative significance to these negative expressions, perceiving them as being 
caused by their own behaviour and as being intentionally communicative.
Developmental changes in positive facial expressions and their interpretation 
were also found. Infants expressed more positive expressions in T, indicating a 
transfer of expressivity to object related contexts. Mothers of younger infants did not
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generally perceive infants to be happy during toy play, while mothers of older infants 
perceived their infants as happiest when playing jointly with the toy. For example,
" There she's looking at me to say, 'Look what I've done, I've opened it 
[the lid on the toy].' She wants me to recognise that she's pushed it all the 
way back. She's pleased with herself because she's smiling and looking at 
me as if to say, 'Good girl!'. (Mother of baby girl, 10-12 month age group)
That affect becomes gradually transferred from the immediate nucleus of the mother 
infant system and linked to objects, is also supported by Trevarthen and Hubley 
(1978) and Sugerman-Bell (1979) in their studies on intermodal perception and 
interaction. Cognitive theories of emotional development would argue that smiling 
is a result of mastery. However, while this may be the case, these positive 
expressions are also signals to interactional others which result in an integration of 
mother and infant into a common perspective. They allow the mother to 
acknowledge the child's mastery while, at the same time, creating a communicative 
act. Thus, affect works at many different levels, and analysis at different levels expli­
cates multiple functions and how they are interrelated.
In infancy, the link between facial expressions and emotion states rests on the 
evaluative capabilities of the adult. Naturalistic theories of emotional development 
portray the relationship between facial expressions and emotions in overly simplistic 
terms. Such an approach fails to integrate the inferential process into a wider social 
dynamic which shapes the course of development. Important cross-cultural differ­
ences in the recognition of facial expressions suggested that cultural factors play an 
important role in what expressive displays signify. Studies of infants found that 
precipitating conditions determined what emotion was inferred from infants' express­
ive displays. Context appeared to affect what meaning observers inferred from facial 
expressions. Even studies which removed contextual information revealed that facial 
expressions were interpreted as indicating to mothers a variety of emotion states 
(Huebner and Izard, 1988).
In the present study, two things were evident. Firstly, as I will elaborate upon 
presently, discrete negative facial expressions were not found, nor did mothers use 
clear emotion labels. Secondly, when situational context was taken into account, posi­
tive expressions were associated with happy states in FF, negative expressions with 
negative states in PR, and positive and interest expressions with happy and attentive 
states in T. Mothers acknowledged general categories of facial expressions as indices
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of general emotion states only when it was contextually appropriate to do so. 
A lthough further research needs to document how these relationships are affected by 
infant age, the present findings demonstrate that the relationship between perception 
of emotion states and facial expressions rests on the interpreter's representation of the 
situation, and the appropriateness of behaviour occurring within it.
If these results are integrated with findings on maternal selections of facial 
expressions, it would appear that mothers select what is predominantly occurring in 
infant behaviour. They attribute emotion states in line with the predominant 
expressions. Hence, it is not surprising that associations between attributions of 
emotion states and corresponding facial expressions were found for different 
situations. But the results suggest that mothers are constraining the infants' 
expressive reactions by selecting what is prevalent and ignoring whatever else is 
being expressed. They are organising infant affective reactions by creating a 
particular representation of the infants' affective state and filtering out expressive 
'noise'. This creates a stability for the infants, in that mothers are reducing the 
possible combinations of affect-event relationships for the infant and are consolidating 
certain others which have social significance for mothers. The ambiguity and 
variability of expressive behaviour is gradually reduced as mothers impose a 
particular schema or representation of the infants' state and organise interaction 
around the regulation and management of this state. Moreover, this representation 
will also contain social significance, whereby the perceived affective state is given 
further meaning by the overarching contextual reality. The following results also 
imply that this may be occurring.
As was mentioned above, discrete facial expressions of negative affect were 
not found and were not validated as differentiated social signals, as Huebner and 
Izard (1988) maintain. They found that, when given checklists of emotion labels, 
mothers interpreted emotion slides of negative facial expressions using a number of 
emotion labels, although they attributed the highest intensity emotion to the 
corresponding slide of emotional expression. It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that the 
method used by Huebner et al. used static, still-faced emotion slides and checklists 
of emotion labels, seriously affecting the ecological validity of the results.
In the present study, where infant expressions were in dynamic social contexts 
and maternal reports were unrestricted, maternal accounts of their infants' negative
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expressions were often ambiguous. A particularly salient example is the following 
transcript during the prohibitive episode:
"There he's furrowed his brow. Frustrated or cross, or something like 
that...he's cross, frustrated, doesn't know. He's either bored or cross, looks 
more like he's frustrated. Difficult to tell." (Mother of a baby boy, 4-6 
months age group)
Moreover, when mothers interpret infant states in more naturalistic settings, they infer 
subtle differences in emotion states based on behavioural cues that would have been 
concealed using Huebner and Izard's method. The following quotation during T 
demonstrates this:
"The flailing around with her arms, I think that would have meant that she 
was less happy, and although she's still looking at me, she's...I'm not doing 
exactly what she wants." (Mother of baby girl, 4-6 months age group)
Drawing on the above discussion, emotion expressions are not clear-cut, unambiguous 
affective signals. Nevertheless, mothers perceived subtle differences in infant behav­
iour and interpreted them as indicative of general affective states. Such subtle cues 
were likely to have been missed by external observers. Mothers were highly sensitive 
to these cues, despite the fact that they seemed unsure exactly what they meant, 
especially in the younger age groups. As is implied by the quote above, these 
meaningful acts were almost always linked to a course of action on the mother's part. 
This aspect of maternal accounts has important implications for the way emotionality 
becomes differentiated, as was pointed out above.
Viewed in the light of the rapid development of perceptual and inferential 
abilities, it is possible to see how later emotions become qualitatively different 
through the contextualisation of expressive reactions by mothers. For example, the 
ability of 5 to 6 m onth old babies to discriminate happiness, sadness and surprise, and 
that of 4 to 6 month olds to be particularly sensitive to joy expressions but not to 
neutral expressions (see Chapter 2) would make social referencing using still face or 
negative expressions ineffective. Mothers appeared to have a mental representation 
of infants' skills at each age of development, and organised their own actions around 
these skills. In the present study they used two different strategies when interacting 
with their infants in PR. Up until 9 months mothers distracted their infants from
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playing with the toy by drawing their attention away from the toy or playing social 
games with them. For example:
"She had been mainly looking at the toy and looking excitedly at it, and 
then, as soon as I started to sing, she looked up and raised her eyebrows 
and was interested in what I was doing." (Mother of baby girl, 4-6 months 
age group)
Similarly:
"I was just trying to distract him with my hand cause you didn't want him 
playing with the box." (Mother of baby boy, 7-9 months age group)
After 9 months, mothers used more direct strategies:
"So I lifted my hand up to say 'No, no, don't, it's hot!' He immediately 
starts crying with his hands up in the air, cause he thinks I'm completely 
denying him something, or telling him off." (Mother of baby boy, 10-12 
months age group)
The ability of infants to integrate information across time and space means that 
they are able to perceive links between events and stimuli in their environment. For 
example, 5 month olds possess some form of object permanence, and can perceive 
continuities in motion (Section 2.2). Such capacities are the tools with which infants 
increasingly come to appreciate that the mothers' signals vis-a-vis the infants' own 
behaviour are differentially organised around events occurring around infants; 
furthermore, that these routines are repetitive and have certain outcomes. Thus, 
when mothers vary their responses to infants on the basis of their representation of 
the situation and the infants' goals, important new associations are formed between 
the infants' own behaviour and its consequences. For infants, their developing 
expressive capacities assumed novel functions as mothers incorporated them into 
interaction as intentional gestures. The development of infant skills, being 
characterised by their increasing co-ordination, allowed mothers to attribute meaning 
to them, and meaning to the child's experience of them.
For example, in FF, MY segments contained similar levels of facial expression 
changes to baseline segments, suggesting that mothers were 'guessing' what infant 
behaviour was meaningful. Differences between selected and baseline expression 
changes in the rest of the sample indicated that it was not the level of activity per se
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which influenced what mothers acknowledged, but the mothers7 representation of the 
infants7 skills and the context in which they were interacting. This was supported by 
the fact that the younger age group mothers needed to refer to general body 
movements to support their interpretations of meaningful episodes. Mothers of the 
youngest infants were selecting from the stream of expressions and justifying their 
inferences by referring to general movement patterns; perceived affect was linked to 
behavioural manifestations. As infants got older, mothers became more concerned 
with the underlying mental processes implied by these expressive behaviours and 
used fewer attributions of body movements; perceived affective states became linked 
to socio-cognitive processes.
Maternal representations of what the infant is doing, and what the infant is 
able to do, seem critical to the way they respond. A mother marks out an expression 
as if the infant's intention was present in the act of expressing it. The perception of 
intentionality seems to lie at the very root of the integration of the infant into the 
adult's world. In the following excerpts from maternal accounts, two things are 
evident: Firstly, intentions accompanying the perception of the emotion state are 
linked to a general course of action on the part of the mother and, secondly, that 
mothers explicate infant intentional behaviour in line with the overall situational 
context in which they are interacting. A quote from the mother of a baby boy from 
age group 1 during FF illustrates the first of these two points:
"...sort of enjoyment, carry on, sort of. It was in the middle of when I 
stopped bouncing him, and he wanted to carry on...I've stopped bouncing 
him, but he wants to carry on, so this is at the end of the laugh saying,
'Carry on, I'm enjoying myself.'"
The following quotes, from an age group 1 mother in T, demonstrates the second 
point:
"There he doesn't really like [the toy], and he's looking at me to say, 'Take 
it away'. He had a little cry and looked at the object then at me, as though 
expecting me to do something about it."
Bruner (1981) has described how the ascription of intention by others affects the way 
behaviour is responded to. Such behaviour is subject to correction of a kind not 
usually given to action perceived as caused. Thus, perceived intentions are
253
responded to (as implied by maternal self-reports) on the basis of the goals they 
imply vis-a-vis the interaction. Attributions of intentions in the present study differed 
significantly between situations. Situations in which mothers perceived the greatest 
num ber of meaningful acts were also those in which they made the most number of 
attributions of intentionality. Perhaps not surprisingly, mothers linked the signifi­
cance of meaningful acts to intentionality in their infants and to their own activities, 
i.e., the mothers'. This further suggests that an important criterion for maternal 
selectivity is the interpersonal significance of infant behaviour.
Moreover, while attributions of intentions were not affected by infant age, 
other important changes occurred suggesting that intentionality was being perceived 
at a more abstract level. Socio-cognitive skills became salient for mothers by 10 
months, whereas in earlier accounts mothers did not attribute intersubjectivity (i.e., 
social referencing and in ten tio n a l communication). The results were in line with 
studies on infant social referencing which have shown that infants begin to use the 
emotional signals of others systematically by 10 to 12 months of age (Hornick and 
Gunnar, 1988; Nelson, 1985). For example, mothers described this process in the 
prohibitive episode as follows:
"There he's watching you bring something down and obviously wants to 
do something with it, but he ju s t glances a t m e to kind o f make sure it's  
alright." (Mother of baby boy, 10-12 months)
Mothers felt that their infants were able to negotiate interaction and comprehend the 
mother's prohibition. For example:
"She was looking down, because she's got her finger on the black button, 
and she kept it there all the time, and she kept looking at me, almost 
defiantly, because she knew I was saying  no but she just kept it there and she 
would look up at me when I would say no and she would just look down 
on her finger again. I think she's try in g  to tell me 'Well, you might be able 
to stop me touching those little lights, but I'm going to touch those little 
buttons." (Mother of baby girl, 10-12 months, PR)
As was pointed out in Chapter 3, there are two types of intention. One type 
is intentional acts of which animals are capable. These are signs whose occurrence 
causes others with whom we are interacting to infer an intention from them. The 
other type is intentional signals which are performed with the explicit purpose that
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the other should infer an intention from them, that is, they are gestures. Most 
importantly, they are conventional gestures because they have a shared meaning with 
the particular social system in which they take place. Before 9 months, infants' 
intentions were inferred on the basis of behavioural signals. After 9 months, mothers 
began to use attributions of intersubjectivity. That is, they began to describe their 
infants as intending to affect them, i.e., the mothers. Maternal interpretations 
depicted episodes where their infants were using intentional signals or conventional 
gestures. Even though they continued to attribute intention to infants' behaviour, 
intentions became linked to intersubjective skills after 9 months. Infants are depicted 
by their mothers as sharing knowledge and expectations with others. For example:
"That's her having reached out and me saying no, her eyes are looking 
down, and her eyebrows are down, and her mouth is definitely down like 
I've never seen it before, cause she's being told not to do it...She's got her 
mouth stuck like that because she's sort of, making the point to me that she 
was upset and just letting me know that she....didn't like it, the way I've 
spoken to her, or that she couldn't play with the toy." (Mother of baby girl,
10-12 months)
Similarly,
"That's when he fully understands what you mean by no. He wants you 
to know he still wants to do it anyway. That noise, that kind of 'You're 
not being fair' noise, and the fact that he kept his finger on the thing. He 
understood what I was saying to him. If he hadn't understood, he would 
have carried on anyway, but making that noise is his kind of, 'I don't think 
you're being fair noise". (Mother of baby boy, 10-12 months, PR)
It is significant to note that intentional communication occurred in one context 
predominantly, when mothers were using social referencing. Coming back to the 
discussion in Chapter 2, infant inferential, perceptual and expressive skills gain 
significance, i.e., are made use of and become instrumental in development, through 
processes which allow the parent and the child to share a common perspective on the 
world, that is, through intersubjectivity. Moreover, that mothers did not attribute 
inter subjectivity until 10 months also suggests that this is an emergent process built 
on a history of mother-infant interaction and not an innate infant capacity, as 
Trevarthen (1979) maintains.
Returning to theories of emotion development, important issues are brought 
to light. Campos et al.'s (1983) proposal concerning the development of emotions
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stipulates that emotions are subject to psychophysiological programmes. Certain 
events are associated w ith particular emotional reactions. They propose that whether 
or not the events do elicit the emotional reaction depends on the goals of the 
organism at the time. However, the present study showed that, in early infancy, the 
goal significance of emotional reactions is the mothers' and not the infants'. Facial 
expressions are elicited within interpersonal contexts, and are salient to caretakers 
within interpersonal contexts. The infant's expressions never occur in isolation, they 
are contextualised in the reality that produces them, and this contextualisation takes 
place through parental interpretations. Mothers perceive intentions which imply a 
course of action on their part to respond to their infants. The notion of basic 
physiological programmes in early infancy is incomplete without including the 
mother's perspective while, in later development, it is too restrictive to accommodate 
the cultural constituting of emotions. Moreover, the development of cognitive skills, 
and mothers' perceptions of them, redirects the interaction as well as being influenced 
by it. As Campos et al. point out, this allows more environment-affective relation­
ships to become possible. However, the evidence presented here suggests that this 
occurs through the interpretative and prescriptive nature of mothers' responsivity. 
The responsibility of affective, social and cognitive development does not fall on the 
infant alone.
Novel functions emerge via this dialectic process. For example, as facial 
expressions became more differentiated, they were interpreted by mothers as 
communicatively significant. When mothers acquired a representation of infants' 
ability to comprehend and share mutual understanding with them, they, the mothers, 
displayed the most frequent number of negative facial expressions. These expressions 
implied that mothers had a representation of what was expected of the infant, and 
constrained the situation in line with this representation using specific signals. Such 
developments in signalling functions between mothers and infants underlines the 
increasing integration of mother and infant into a coherent social system. Such 
integration does not rest on behavioural or cognitive skills per se, but requires the 
development of a mutual understanding between members of the dyad. The 
internalisation of display rules is not based on behavioural contingencies, but on what 
mothers perceive infant expressions to mean when expressed in wider behavioural 
contexts, and in the context of the situation in which these behaviours occur.
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It was proposed in Chapter 3 that, for the mother and baby to constitute a 
social system, there must be a mutual exchange of specific signs that have developed 
through a history of experience with each other. Support for such a proposal came 
from differences in interpretation between mothers and observers. Although both 
mothers and observers perceived emotion states in infants, mothers differed from 
observers in interpretations of intersubjectivity, intentionality and maternal effect. 
The divergence in perspective concerning these attribution categories illustrates that 
mothers were inferring them on the basis of different types of criteria from observers. 
As was suggested in Chapter 9, it appeared that observers may have inferred these 
categories on the basis of behavioural contingencies, while mothers appeared to be 
relying on knowledge of the infant not accessible to direct observation. The longer 
history of mother infant interaction in the oldest age group suggests that mothers had 
developed a specific signalling system with their infants. These categories point to 
a divergence in perspective between mothers and observers in the perceived dynamic 
nature of facial expressions (intentions), in their communicative value (intersubject­
ivity), and in the mothers7 responsivity to their infants (maternal effect).
These results only suggest increasing organisation in the mother-infant system. 
The demonstration of how the mother and infant constitute a social system requires 
more detailed investigation. However, they do point to how the cognitive compo­
nents of development may become integrated with affective development by 
demonstrating the increasing understanding and negotiation of goals and meanings 
between mothers and their babies.
In this respect, the concepts of Sroufe (1979) and Campos et al. (1983) are not 
contradictory to the hypothesis developed here. Developments in the cognitive 
domain (Sroufe et al., 1979) do allow the infant to develop more organisation vis-a-vis 
the environment. However, this organisation is not arrived at by the infant on her 
own. Emotions become integrated and linked to cognitive processes and to disposi­
tions towards certain forms of actions through the necessary interaction between the 
mother and the infant. Maternal interpretations highlighted the fact that increasingly 
complex and sophisticated infant capacities became salient in interaction. These 
capabilities and the increasing organisation of affective responses suggested that a 
qualitatively different emotion is formed by virtue of how the affective state of the 
infant is perceived, and, as was mentioned earlier, responded to, by mothers in PR.
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The sharp differences in attributions and facial expressions between the earlier 
age groups and the 10-12 month old age group have pointed to a developmental shift 
in infant behaviour and the way it is perceived. The changes suggest rapid 
reorganisation. By 10 months, mothers gain more control over their infants in driving 
and directing the interaction. At the same time, they perceive their infants as able to 
assume a more autonomous and active role in interaction. Mothers in all age groups 
perceived their infants' expressions in the context of infant intentions, embedding 
them in activity bound contexts. Situational context influenced the degree to which 
infant acts were perceived as intentional. In this way mothers direct, constrain and 
contextualise the interaction in line with the infants' abilities, while providing a 
consistent thread of continuity by perceiving affective states throughout. Although 
mother-infant interaction is bidirectional, one can see by the variability in maternal 
facial responses in particular instances, and by the fact that mothers refer to their own 
behaviour, that they are active in shaping and organising infant activities. The 
projection of meanings which are age and context dependent provide the infant with 
both continuity and change in the course of development. The increasing complexity 
in the perception of the underlying processes of emotional expression ensure that 
emotionality is responded to in ways that increasingly come to reflect the values of 
the wider culture.
10.3 Limitations of Approach
Throughout this thesis I have pointed out the methodological and conceptual 
problems in research on emotional development in infancy. In trying to overcome 
some of these problems the present study encountered others which were peculiar to 
the approach that was employed. In attempting to redress the poverty of meaning 
in research, the approach was faced with the problem of dealing with the ambiguity 
of meaning. This was especially problematic given the variable nature of infant facial 
expressions and maternal interpretation, and the difficulty in identifying develop­
mental variables. The research presented here has shown what it is that develops, but 
has not provided direct evidence of how it develops. Thus, it was not possible to 
draw any direct causal links between the inferential process of caregivers and the 
development of emotions. This limitation was based on a number of conceptual and
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methodological problems which could not be resolved within the framework of this 
thesis.
Conceptually, it is difficult to address the link between inferential processes 
and direct behavioural consequences because of the bidirectionality of mother-infant 
interaction. While bidirectionality (and multiple causality) has been demonstrated as 
a necessary condition when assessing how development proceeds, it nevertheless 
makes the modelling of specific developmental processes difficult. This problem is 
not new to developmental psychology or to the social approach adopted here. There 
is an inherent circularity in proposing that infants develop through the internalisation 
of the rules of social exchange. Does the development of capacities affect mothers' 
interpretations and behaviour, or do mothers' interpretations affect their behaviour 
and hence affect the development of infant capacities? To be consistent with the 
principle of multiple causality, both are likely to be true. However, the next question 
is the extent to which each component is responsible for the developmental outcome 
and the relationship between the two components. Such questions are extremely 
difficult to answer. Moreover, there has been a shift away from causal associations 
and a growing call for looking at the functions and relationships between various 
components in development.
Recent conceptualisations of the developmental model, such as the 
transactional model of Sameroff and Chandler (1975), have attempted to explicate the 
dynamics between the various components in development. For example, 
interactional models have provided important insights by incorporating the effects of 
the child on the environment. They have added to the independent contributions of 
the child and environment characteristics of the environment that are conditioned by 
the nature of the child. Different characteristics of the child will trigger different 
responses from the environment. Sameroff (1991) demonstrates the continuity implied 
in the organisation of the infant's development in Figure 31 by the series of arrows 
from C l to C2 to C3. Yet there is still a missing sense of continuity in the 
organisation of the environment from El to E2 to E3.
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Figure 31: Reciprocal Interaction Model of Development
El E2 E3 E4
C l  ► C 2  ►  C 3 ► -C4
The transactional model extends the dialectic nature of development by emphasising 
the effect of the child on the environment, so that experiences provided by the 
environment are not independent of the child. In this way, the previous behaviour 
of the infant may have been a determinant of current experiences. In Figure 32 
transactional processes between infant and environment are combined with 
continuities in each. The continuity of competency in the infant is represented at C l, 
C2 and C3. With increasing age, the competencies increase, represented by the 
thickening arrows. The other set of arrows leading from El to E2 to E3 represent the 
environment's state at successive points in time. Those environmental factors would 
be the parents' understanding of the rules of emotional exchange and their compet­
ency at regulating their infants' development in the present study.
Figure 32: Social Regulatory Model of Development
E l  ^ E 2 ----- ► E 3 --------► E4
Just as in biological models there are two levels, the developing organism and a 
superordinate regulatory system, so too for behavioural outcomes there is also a 
system that regulates the way human beings fit into their society. Sameroff (1991) 
calls this the cultural code. It is directed at regulating cognitive and social-emotional 
processes so that the individual will fill some social role defined by the society, 
including the reproduction of that society. Although the cultural code can be 
conceptualised independently of the child, changes in the ability of the child are major
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triggers for regulatory changes and may in fact have been major contributors to the 
evolution of the code.
In the approach adopted here, I have argued that research has not integrated 
the social aspects, or cultural code, with developmental outcomes, and I have docu­
mented how this has led to a neglect of a necessary component in development. Lock 
et al. (1989) have called on researchers to adopt a more social/transactional perspec­
tive in developmental psychology. They state:
"Depending on the perspective...the locus of responsibility for what 
happens can be attributed to something inherent in the individual [e.g., 
skills]...or something inherent in the [environment]. We can apply this to 
the conception of infancy inherent in the dominant paradigms. Develop­
mental psychologists tend to act as objective observers who attribute what 
they see to something inherent in the infant, seeing the infant as respon­
sible for what happens in the situation. Instead, we want to consider the 
other attribution, that the responsibility for much of what infants do 
should be attributed, not to them, but to the situational context and the 
participating adult." (Lock et al. 1989, p.244)
By examining the changing interpretations of mothers regarding their infants, 
the present study was able to reveal the changing characteristics of the infant's envi­
ronment. Mothers were not just sensitive to the developmental changes in their 
infants' expressive capacities. They interpreted facial expressions within selected 
meaningful acts using increasingly interpersonal and interactive terms. At least as a 
first step, such changes revealed the transactional dynamics between the development 
of the infant and the changes in mothers' representations and responsivity towards 
their infants. In Figure 32 the process of interpretation is represented by the upward 
arrow from the infant (Cl) to the mother (El). This component has generally been 
overlooked in models of emotional development. Yet this aspect of development has 
important potential for understanding the way in which the dynamics between 
mother and infant evolve and the consequences of this for the further development 
of the infant at a social-emotional level.
Returning to the analysis in this study, causality cannot be ascribed to either 
the infant or the mother alone. Interaction and development are dialectical. What is 
cause at one stage or level is an effect at another. What is possible to isolate and 
inspect in this dynamic process is a snapshot of changes at any one time (Hinde, 
1990). It is still clear from the analysis that mothers' perceptions of what infants 
expressed changed as infants got older. However, to then proceed to differentiate
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which came first, the change in behaviour or the maternal interpretation, is to reduce 
development to linear causal sequences.
Attempting to integrate developmental outcomes with social processes requires 
the conceptual link between the psychological processes of others and the behaviour 
of the infant. This link must depend on the philosophical perspective or paradigmatic 
position one adopts. In Chapter 1, it was pointed out that, by and large, research on 
emotions is conducted within the Cartesian paradigm. This view ignores the 
individual's social environment and conflates the expression of emotion w ith the 
communication of emotion. Likewise, by regarding behaviour as essentially 
irreconcilable with thought processes, an artificial rift is created between the two.
In this thesis a link was made between the thought process of the adult and 
the behaviour of the child. The path between the inner world of instinct and reflex, 
and the outer world of symbols is the communicative act. The act committed by the 
infant does not start off as inherently communicative as some have suggested (e.g., 
Trevarthen, 1979), bu t acquires communicative status for the child gradually, by 
becoming a communicative act for the parent through interpersonal dialogue.
At the behavioural level, dialogue is shaped by, and shapes, maternal 
representations of the infant which influence her responsivity to the baby. The link 
between mothers' perceptions and behaviour was suggested by the finding that, when 
they thought infants possessed intersubjective skills, they displayed frequent negative 
expressions. How mothers may actively influence development was hinted at by 
demonstrating how they used their facial expressions to prohibit infants from playing 
with the toy. The relationship is reciprocal; infant facial expressions in different 
situations became more differentiated with age.
Methodologically, certain limitations prevented the exploration of the develop­
mental process in more dynamic terms. For example, one issue that was not 
addressed in the present study was the accompanying behavioural interaction of 
mother and infant. Future research will need to assess how maternal interpretations 
are associated with their behaviour and that of their infants. In Chapter 4, models of 
behavioural interaction were criticised for presenting either a linear framework or a 
structural one in which no justification was given for the imposition of predefined 
structural units onto behaviour. Nevertheless, it would still have been informative 
to compare predefined structural units with facial expressions and maternal interpre­
tations in the present study. There were a number of reasons why this was not
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carried out. Apart from time constraints on the research, the small sample size meant 
that it was not possible to include more permutations in the analysis (e.g., Age x 
interaction category x situation x maternal interpretations, or, age x interaction 
category x situation x expressions).39 Nevertheless, the present study did include a 
preliminary analysis of behavioural context at one level by looking at interaction in 
three different situations. The three different conditions employed constrained the 
interaction and predefined the types of behavioural patterns that were likely to be 
emitted by the interactors. Objective coding of facial expressions provided a more 
detailed measure of the types of behaviours which occurred within these interactional 
contexts. The next step for further research is to analyse interactional or dyadic 
variables more directly. A related issue was the inability to take into account patterns 
of expressions within segments. Due to the variable length of segments, and to the 
fact that they did not comprise a continuous record in time, there was not enough 
data generated using this technique to allow for statistical analysis of patterns of facial 
expressions in selected segments.
Another limitation that arose from segmenting behaviour was that durations 
of facial expressions could not be included in the analysis. Segments truncated 
duration of expressions. Similarly, because segments were generally quite short (4 
seconds), calculating total time of a particular segment yielded results similar to using 
frequency counts. This was because facial expressions in selected segments were 
reduced to very short durations as was just mentioned. For example, if 2 facial 
expressions occurred in one segment, each of one second duration, calculating the 
total number of seconds of duration of a particular expression was equivalent to 
counting the number of times it occurred. In most segments, facial expressions 
occurred with a mean duration of one second. Frequency counts and total durations 
were therefore very similar. In the next section some suggestions are made regarding 
how analysis of expression durations can be improved.
Co-occurrences between infant and maternal expressions were not analysed 
in the main study. As was shown in Chapter 5, co-occurrences of facial expressions 
in the pilot study were highly variable. As I pointed out there, using this measure 
in the main study would therefore only have been possible as a qualitat­
39. In some cases, however, this was implicitly carried out by creating event cat­
egories out of maternal interpretations, as for example in attributions of intersubjectivity 
and attributions of exploratory behaviour.
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ive/descriptive analysis of mother-infant pairs. In effect, such an analysis was carried 
out, in the last section of Chapter 8, by looking at mother and infant facial expressions 
in segments where mothers attributed intersubjectivity and maternal behaviour. The 
striking results on attributions of inter subjectivity, which revealed that mothers of 
older infants made the largest number of such attributions in the prohibition 
condition, endorsed focusing on mother and infant expressions in associated segments 
and in segments where other attributions related to intersubjectivity were made.
One particular shortcoming was that it was not possible to compare the 
num ber of particular interpretations observers made with the number of attributions 
mothers used. It may have been the case that, although a similar number of mothers 
and observers perceived emotion states in infants, the actual number of such 
attributions differed in the two groups. This analysis was not possible due to limita­
tions of sample size, making it necessary to use a binomial logit model to analyse the 
data. Similarly, it was not possible to examine the relationship between emotion 
attributions and corresponding facial expressions across age groups, again due to 
sample size limitations. The association between inferring emotion states and the 
quantity of corresponding facial expressions may have also been influenced by the 
age of the infants. It is possible to speculate, for example, that no association would 
have been found between positive expressions and attributions of positive emotion 
states in the face to face condition for age group 2. The frequent episodes of positive 
expressions, and relatively lower frequency of attribution of emotion states in FF, 
suggest that this may be the case. This would have suggested that mothers were 
ignoring positive displays of infants in that age group and interpreting other aspects 
of infant behaviour such as exploration of the environment.
Methodological limitations in eliciting maternal interpretations concerned the 
types of information that could be obtained. For example, although mothers used 
identifiers to explain what they used to infer emotion states, these were not numerous 
enough to be included in the analysis. Future research, using more direct prompts 
and a larger sample size, is needed to examine to what cues mothers attended when 
making an attribution of emotion state and what they perceived as causing the 
emotion state. For example, we need to know whether they use behavioural 
categories consistently to infer emotion states, whether the same behavioural cues are 
used to infer all emotion states, whether mothers perceive infant states to be caused 
by the same events, and how these causal factors and identifiers change as infants get
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older. Similarly, maternal descriptions of their own behaviour would have benefited 
from being more detailed. This would have provided more differentiated information 
on the types of responses mothers saw themselves as making when they attributed 
particular meanings to infant acts. However, in this particular study, it was necessary 
to conceal the mothers' behaviour when obtaining their accounts, to provide the 
closest approximation to interpretative processes in interaction.
The research presented here has provided an important initial step in 
examining a very complex issue. This step will provide crucial guidelines for further 
research. It is evident from the above discussion that there is much to be done to 
further our understanding of the role of inferential processes in expressive interaction. 
To approach these issues more directly requires different types and levels of analysis 
and integration between them. This should facilitate a greater understanding of the 
relationship between different aspects of emotional development, and of the most 
promising directions for future research. In the following and final section, some 
proposals to that end are presented.
10.4 Directions for Future Research
In answering questions about one aspect of maternal perceptions of infant 
expressions, other questions have been generated. Future research should fulfil two 
purposes. On the one hand, it should broaden the findings already presented by 
extending them and discovering their range of applicability. On the other hand, it 
should focus on specific hypotheses that are generated from extending and 
broadening the findings. As specific relationships are uncovered, these relationships 
should be examined in broader scope by examining under what conditions these 
relationships are true, and those under which they are false. In other words, there 
needs to be a dialectic process of establishing the adequacy of these constructs over 
a range of contexts, and elaborating the conditions under which these constructs hold 
true and when they are false (McGuire, 1983).
With this in mind, the next section is divided into two parts outlining the main 
areas of future research on the caregivers' interpretation in development. Drawing 
on an excellent review of research on parents' beliefs and actions by Goodnow (1988), 
research proposals stemming from this particular study will be presented. The first
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part of this section is concerned with outlining research to examine more precisely the 
relationship between maternal interpretations and infant expressivity, that is, outlin­
ing ways of further assessing the source of parental interpretations and perceptions, 
and the conditions in which they are likely to change or develop. The second part 
explores the relationship between maternal interpretations and their actions. This 
section deals specifically with developmental outcomes by suggesting ways of 
assessing the possible relationships between parental perceptions and their actions, 
possible links to the development of infant capacities, and how these issues may be 
empirically examined. The point is made that success in understanding caregivers' 
interpretations in development is dependent upon developing explicit hypotheses on 
how various aspects of this developmental component fit together.
10.4.1 Specifying Links between Maternal Interpretations and Infant Facial 
Expressions.
By identifying important dynamics in maternal interpretations, the present 
study has laid the groundwork for exploring this issue in greater detail. One 
im portant requirement for looking at maternal interpretations in future studies is to 
use a larger sample size. Another is to examine the relationship between interpreta­
tions and expressions longitudinally. Using a larger sample permits the examination 
of several specific questions which can extend our understanding of the relationship 
between maternal interpretations and infant expressions. For example, what types 
of co-occurrences of mother-infant facial expressions accompany maternal attribu­
tions? Is there a relationship between maternal attributions and durations of facial 
expressions? It may be, for example, that, when attributing negative infant states, 
mothers rely on very short segments of infant activities. Other emotion state 
attributions may require longer durations of specific facial expressions or certain types 
of activities. To examine these proposals, mothers could be asked to define the begin­
ning and end of the meaningful acts they select. This would partially overcome the 
problem of truncated durations of facial expressions. It would also provide 
information on whether they are selecting a composite of acts or focusing on single 
acts. Behaviours occurring in these segments could be categorised using an indepen­
dent coding framework. Comparisons could then be made between the mothers'
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interpretations and the expressive and behavioural content of selected segments, to 
determine whether there are characteristic patterns of infant behaviour on which they 
focus when making an attribution of emotion state.
Maternal interpretations themselves should be examined in more detail. For 
example, what types of identifiers do mothers use when they deduce an emotion state 
in their infants? Maternal accounts in the present study found that mothers used 
information from the face, voice, body, and gaze. The data could not be used because 
of the low frequencies. Using a larger sample size and more prompts, the researcher 
could examine whether the use of these identifiers was related to the age of the 
infants and the situational context in which the infants were being observed.
Another area for extending the scope of the present study is to assess whether 
all parents interpret expressive behaviour in the same way, that is, to examine 
interpretations across different groups. In the present study, parents and nonparents 
were employed and mothers of younger infants were compared with mothers of older 
infants from within the same socio-economic group. Other comparisons need to be 
carried out with different socio-economic groups and across different cultural groups.
In particular, it would be useful to determine whether cross cultural con­
sistencies in caregivers' perceptions are related to critical phases of infant develop­
ment. Cross cultural studies cited in Chapter 3 found that mothers from different 
cultures interact differently with their infants during the teaching of a task, and that 
infants from different cultural groups approached these tasks differently. A large 
body of evidence exists on cross-cultural recognition of emotional expressions. 
Research now needs to examine what differences in interpretation and selection of 
infants exist between different cultures and how they may be related to interaction 
styles and infant capacities. Do differences between maternal interpretations highlight 
cultural codes for child rearing? Are differences in maternal interpretations between 
cultures reflected in their interaction styles with their infants? One possibility would 
be to ask whether mothers cross-culturally use the same distracting or prohibitive 
strategies with infants in the prohibitive episode. Do they interpret infants using the 
same types of categories? Do they focus on the same aspects of infant behaviours 
when making attributions? Do infants respond in the same way? What aspects of 
mothers interaction styles and interpretations may be associated with differences in 
the way infants respond in the prohibitive episode?
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A longitudinal study is also needed to address developmental transitions in 
signalling function. The present results have suggested that maternal selectivity and 
interpretations may be based on the mothers' knowledge of their infants derived from 
a previous history of interaction. It may be that mothers build on recognisable and 
recurring infant activities in younger ages by reinterpreting them in the light of the 
greater differentiation of infant capacities for joint engagement and interaction at later 
ages. For example, the findings presented here demonstrate that emotion states were 
consistently salient to mothers, whereas mental skills became salient in the oldest age 
group. This suggests that there may be a transition whereby behavioural modalities 
become reorganised in later age groups. Are selections and interpretations of older 
infant acts related to the body movements mothers selected in their younger infants? 
Are there characteristics of these actions which change and may therefore account for 
the changes in maternal interpretations? For example, do these body movements 
become more sustained at later ages? Do they occur as parts of a composite of other 
acts? Could these changes contribute to mothers' ascription of intersubjectivity to 
infants in later age groups?
From the present study it appeared that the introduction of language into the 
communicative process had important effects on infants (for example, in cases where 
mothers explicitly prohibited infants by saying 'no'). Language development would 
allow for more specific communication of the significance of emotion states vis-a-vis 
events. Extending the analysis further, what changes in expressive and emotional 
development occur after 12 months? Do mothers still focus on infants' affective states 
after they begin to establish meaningful dialogue based on the child's ability to 
comprehend language? In what way does language facilitate the communication of 
affective significance? Such questions may be examined by looking at the age at 
which mothers start to use emotion labels when interacting with their infants. What 
words they use and the contexts in which they use them would provide data on how 
expressive reactions and linguistic categories become linked in naturalistic settings.
Practical considerations also need to be met in assessing maternal interpreta­
tions longitudinally. A longitudinal study would necessitate a more complex 
methodological approach for a number of reasons. Firstly, and as was pointed out 
in Chapter 6, there are important considerations regarding the effects of repeated 
interviewing on mothers. Recurrent filming and interviewing would sensitise mothers 
to the aims of the study and would be likely to affect interaction and accounts.
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Alternatively, if interviewing occurred at the end of the longitudinal study problems 
w ould arise due to the biases of parental memory. Another consideration would be 
in the choice of filming situations. In the cross sectional study it was possible to 
introduce a novel toy and observe the effect this had on the dyad. In a longitudinal 
setting, the use of the prohibitive condition would be subject to biases resulting from 
repeated trials. For example, it would be difficult to assess whether the strategies 
mothers employed as infants got older were the result of practice effects or were due 
to the natural progression of the mother-infant dyad. One technique for overcoming 
the confounding effects of repeated trials in longitudinal research is the use of cross- 
sequential analysis (Baltes and Schaie, 1973). An example of this design is presented 
in Figure 33.
Figure 33:Cross-Sequential Analysis Design
Age in Months 
6  ---------- ^ 9   ►  12   ►  18
Matched Sample 9   ^  12   ► I S
Matched Sample 12   ►  18
Matched Sample 18
Although it is not often used, due to its heavy demands on time, this design permits 
an analysis of developmental processes over successive trials or multiple interventions 
by partialling out the bias from repeated trials using matched subjects.
Questions pertaining to assessing caregivers in diverse groups, and especially 
in high-risk groups, also point to another important area of investigation: the 
relationship between maternal interpretations and maternal behaviour. In the 
following and final section, a number of research proposals are presented which 
suggest how this relationship may be examined.
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10.4.2 Beyond the Here and Now: Interpretation and Activity
Firstly, and as Goodnow (1988) also points out, links to action should not be 
the justification for studying maternal interpretations. This form of justification is a 
residual attachment to the notion that only overt behaviours are worth studying. An 
alternative argument is that, just as the study of cognition in general does not stand 
or fall by the demonstration of links to overt actions, so also should the study of 
parental interpretations. These interpretations w arrant attention in their own right. 
Moreover, enquiring about sequential links between ideas and actions m ust be 
approached with caution. Those seeking links often hold inappropriate models of the 
causes of actions. Ideas do not simply mediate actions. Such a view would be a 
reconditioned form of behaviourism where interpretations mediate links between real 
causes (stimuli) and concrete effects (responses). Instead, an alternative position 
w ould be to argue that interpretations are the stimulus in the first place. As was 
stated earlier in the thesis, it is the pre-established images and representations that 
both determine the choice and restrict the range of responses. Perceptions are not 
responses to the exterior stimulus as such, but to the category in which we classify 
such images and to the names we give them (Moscovici, 1984). Mothers' social 
representations determine both the character of the stimulus and the response it 
elicits. These representations are created out of a network of transactional processes 
between a variety of previous experiences and interactions, and future goals; that is 
to say, they are dynamic and changing.
A number of researchers have proposed that ideas lead to actions. This 
position is found in "cognitive-mediational" views (e.g., Hess, 1981; Parke, 1978), and 
in the "theory of action" presented by a number of social psychologists (e.g., Von 
Cranach and Valach, 1984). Without adopting an extreme position, it may be that the 
best way forward, rather than trying to sort out the consistency and directionality 
between actions and beliefs or perceptions, is to examine the circumstances in which 
caregivers' interpretations or perceptions mediate their behaviour towards their 
infants, the circumstances under which they do not, and how these relationships may 
change with development (Dix and Grusec, 1985).
For example, in Chapter 3 it was proposed that the process by which 
caregivers impose task constraints upon what they regard as meaningful behaviour 
is an important factor in the development of communicative abilities. This, in turn,
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rests on the mothers' socially appropriate interpretation of, and reaction to, the per­
ceived emotion state of the infant within the particular context in which it occurs. 
One of the key aspects that emerged from the study was that mothers' perceptions 
of intentionality were related to the situation in which infants were interacting and 
to a course of action on their own part. This finding points to the importance of 
incorporating maternal behaviour, subsequent to their interpretation of the infant, in 
future studies. How does maternal perception of infant intentionality affect their 
behaviour vis-a-vis their infants? Comparing maternal accounts, where they report 
that infant states were caused rather than intended, with their subsequent behaviour 
under the two conditions would clarify the relationship between maternal perceptions 
and their responses. Such comparisons can also shed important insights into how 
interactional variables may rest with certain perceptions on the part of caretakers.
Explicating the link between parental interpretations and their interaction with 
their infants may also be approached by examining high risk groups and depressed 
mothers. For example, how would depressed mothers select and interpret their 
infants' behaviour compared to normal mothers? What aspects of infant activities do 
depressed mothers ignore compared to normal mothers? What changes occur in the 
interpretations and interactions of depressed mothers when they are not depressed? 
Are there any associations between changes in interpretations and changes in 
maternal responsivity when they are and are not depressed? Such research would 
have important clinical implications.
Implicit in the above questions is the underlying query of how maternal 
interpretation, mothers' actions, and developmental outcomes in infancy are linked. 
This is still a grey area in research. However, the studies proposed above can shed 
some light on this by identifying links between the emotional responses of older 
infants and parental interpretation of, and interaction with, their infants at earlier 
times. Beyond this, there are measures which can enhance the way research in this 
area is conducted. Firstly, researchers should bear in mind that patterns between 
interpretations, interaction and developmental outcomes are likely to be transactional. 
This directs research enterprise to exploring how each of these units contributes to 
any other, and what each contributes independently of the others. For example, 
assessing maternal responsivity in the belief that it will reveal how it affects the 
development of infant capacities is misleading if infants do not possess some 
information processing ability with which they can interpret this responsivity.
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Secondly, and as I have done in this study, research should give more room 
for parents to bring out issues and make connections. Part of the problem of research 
on emotional development is the researcher's insistence on choosing dimensions. 
McGuire (1986), for example, believes that the most promising directions for the 
future lie, not only in looking to connections among components, but in adopting "a 
low profile to participants - allowing them to select issues, make connections in their 
own terms, and choose their own response dimensions" (McGuire, 1986, p. 121). This 
also necessitates considering particular methods of analysis which can retain the 
critical information contained in these interpretations, while permitting responses to 
be standardized (McGuire, ibid) (for example, by using grounded theory techniques 
(Strauss, 1987) as in the present study). In addition, investigators should look 
towards using techniques that can serve to detect interconnections between caregivers' 
interpretations, possible sources of these ideas, and developmental outcomes. 
(Goodnow (1988) cites examples of these techniques, such as structural equation 
modelling and path analysis.) Finally, as was stated at the start of this section, 
researchers need to build explicit hypotheses about how connections come about. 
This will allow for accounting for connections and not only documenting them 
(Goodnow, 1988).
This study was an essential prerequisite to understanding the signalling 
function of facial expressions in naturalistic settings. Theories of emotion have 
worked within a closed-system model of development and, by doing so, have 
regarded emotional development as the property of the infant. In this thesis, I have 
demonstrated that they have ignored important components which may shape the 
course of emotional development. A review of the literature on emotionality demon­
strated that research methods have been too restrictive in their approach. Using 
Kaye's (1982) sense 2 criterion from the perspective of an external observer alone only 
presents half the picture. By relying only on objective criteria and not looking at the 
significance of these behaviours and events from the perspective of caretakers, it is 
not possible to understand all the forces that shape emotional development. Even 
though the research was not able to answer specific hypotheses regarding the precise 
relationship between emotional development and maternal interpretations, it showed 
that nonparents interpreted infant expressive behaviour in different ways. They 
perceived infants to possess interpersonal skills at different ages and attached 
meaning to infant behaviour to different degrees. Moreover, by examining the
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relationship between maternal selections and interpretations of their infants' 
expressive behaviour, the present research has shown that mothers' perception of 
their infants' expressive behaviour is related to contextual factors, to developmental 
changes, and to the growth of intersubjective understanding.
The method that was developed in the present study has proved to be a 
powerful tool in exploring caregivers' perceptions of their infants. It was able to elicit 
information on what parents select, how much of it they select, and how they 
interpret it. Most importantly, it enabled this information to be obtained in a 
dynamic and relatively naturalistic fashion. By employing this technique, the study 
presented an ecologically sound method and approach to emotional development.
Theoretically, it has integrated the study of emotional development with the 
study of social development. Social constructionist accounts of emotion imply that 
social mechanisms are important without providing a coherent account of these 
mechanisms. The literature on the social development of skills and on the role of 
caregivers provides evidence of important inter-personal mechanisms which can 
account for how caregivers play an important role in the social development of 
emotions. Approaching emotions from a social and interpersonal perspective was 
also called for by the lack of studies which attempted to place emotions in social and 
dynamic contexts. This study showed that caretakers create new and more complex 
meanings for expressive behaviours as infants get older and that these meanings were 
not readily accessible to observers. Moreover, by demonstrating how caregivers' 
perceptions were subject to contextual and developmental influences, this research 
was essential to the study of the social development of emotion in infancy. It is 
hoped that this first step will encourage further work and integration in this area.
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Appendix 1
Intercoder Reliability of Facial Expression Codes
The MAX manual comes with its own set of instructions for learning the 
codes, training and achieving reliability.1 Coders had to achieve 80% reliability 2 or 
higher in order to finish the training. This was achieved by coding pre-coded 
segments of practice material and comparing the results with the manual's master 
codes. Reliability was obtained when the trainee was able to code three consecutive 
sets of video segments with 80% reliability or above (Table A l.l).3
The time taken to learn the coding scheme ranged from 7 hours to 10 hours. 
Further reliability was tested for using segments from the pilot study tapes where the 
first three tapes coded by a particular coder were coded again by the author, i.e., 
double coded and the reliability checked again (table A1.2).
Filming Problems
Coding was also affected by filming technique, the following precautions were 
taken to avoid similar problems in the main study:
Filming: Parts of the mothers' faces were sometimes obscured by their hair. This is 
a recurrent problem with brow and cheek data and therefore a hair band was bought 
and mothers with fringes were asked to put it on whilst the filming is taking place.
1. MAX codes the faces by assigning codes to the three regions of the face , the 
brows, the eyes and cheeks, and the mouth, independently of movements occurring in the 
other regions. This is to guard against coders making subjective judgements.
2. The calculation of reliability for the scores was defined in the MAX manual as 
agreements = agreements.
agreements + disagreements 
Agreements are scored both with regards the correctness of the codes and the onset and 
offset of their occurrence within a 0.5 sec margin of error. Reliability is achieved only 
when there is intercoder reliability of over 80% for three consecutive sets of video 
segments.
3. MAX requires coders to code the three regions of the face independently of each 
other. These codes are then combined using formulae provided in the manual.
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Lighting: there was not enough lighting in some of the films making it difficult to see 
the movements of the face, therefore lighting equipment was used in the main study. 
Care was also taken to ensure that the camera was not facing a window creating a 
silhouette.
Table Al.lrlntercoder Agreement for MAX Training
Coder 1
average reliability = 92%
range = 90%-94%
time to learn codes= 7 hours.
Coder 2
average reliability = 88.8% 
range = 81%-100%
time taken to learn codes = 10 hours. 
Coder 3
Average reliability = 83% 
range = 81%-88%
time taken to learn codes = 9 hours
OVERALL AVERAGE RELIABILITY = 87.9% 
RANGE = 81%-100%
Table A1.2:Intercoder Agreement of Pilot Tapes
CODER PLT. NO. RELIABILITY
1. PS4BF
PS10MF
PS10BF
87%
93%
96%
2. PS2MF
PS4MF
PS6BF 91%
85%
94%
AVERAGE 91%
Focus: The camera must be sufficiently zoomed onto the faces to enable detailed 
coding of the facial movements; some of the Pilot video films were difficult to code 
because of this.
Further ambiguities in the coding were resolved thus:
1. Any baseline movement such as talking, blinking or chewing will be coded O, as 
is suggested by Izard (1983).
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2. Obscure (OBS) will only be coded if it exceeds one second or there is a change of 
expression when the face is visible again.
3. Codes 36 (gaze downwards, askance) and 39 (gaze cast downward, head tilted 
back) have been removed as there was no practice of their use at all either in the 
manual and no demonstration of their presence during the coding of the video films.4
Sample of Pilot Study Accounts
The following are a sample of maternal accounts during play. One example 
from each age group is presented. The figures on the left hand side of each segment 
is the time in minutes and seconds.
P ltl: M other of 4-6 M onth  O ld baby Boy in  Play
2.18: He's distracted here 'cause he's seen you. He's easily distracted anyway.
2.30: Same again.
2.49: I suppose now he makes noises. That was just his attempt at talking I think. Now 
he squeals when he pouts...Oh no, he's probably looking for something to put in his 
mouth. When he knows he's going to the breast, that's the movement he makes.
5.02: See, it could also be a pose of concentration. I stick my tongue out when I 
concentrate. He likes watches, really fascinated with them.
7.24: He likes the noises and facial expressions more than he likes the toys. I think that's 
it. If you laugh he laughs back.
4. MAX identifies interest, joy, surprise, sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, fear, 
distress and the various combinations or blends of two or more of these expressions. 
Contempt was expressions were not present in the training tapes.
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Plt2: M other of 7-9 M onth O ld Baby Boy in  Play 
0.34: Plays with the toy which he plays with in his bath.
1.04: If you talk to him he'll go 'eh?' If anyone talks to him he'll just go 'eh'.
3.48: Makes noises of a dog.
6.24: He's getting excited cause he likes that music.
Tape Plt4: M other of 10-12 m on th  O ld Baby G irl in  Play
0.28: She wants to eat him. She wants to bite him. She's particularly fond of those little 
men.
1.04: The funny face is when she's teething she does that. We always made a joke of it so 
she does it more.
3.34: Throwing toys means that she's had enough really, but also, she'll pick up a toy and 
look at it then throw it just to watch it fall. She'll throw things so she can watch them fall.
4.19: She's going to start crying to get out [of the baby chair] in a minute.
5.01: I want to get out Mum.
6.05: It means, 'I've had enough and you'd better make it good'.
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Appendix 2
M aternal Account Codes
A. Simple Descriptions
BM: Describing behaviour as body movements or only describing facial movements.
B. Interpretations of Emotional States
H: Happy, pleased, enjoyment.
AT: Concentrating or interested.
NG: Negative emotion states: Frustrated/cross, 
tired, distressed, unhappy.
S: Surprise.
E: Excited.
B: Bored.
Identifiers
Dl: Identified through vocalization.
D2: Identifed through gaze/eye movements.
D3: Identified through body movements/ posture.
D4: Identified through facial expressions.
C. Mental activities
INS: M7 (understanding), M8 (social referencing), M5 (responding),
M9 (deliberate communication).
PL: (M3) Checking, exploring, (M4) searching for something specific.
D. Interpretations of Intention and Maternal Self Reports 
N l: Infant Intention.
Tl: Maternal behaviour.
T2: Maternal effect.
Coding M ethod
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Maternal accounts were coded to reflect the predominant themes in each 
segment. In some cases, two or more codes were used to code one segment. The 
coding frame reflects different levels of complexity. Categories at the bottom of the 
chart are broader and reflect more complex activities than categories at the top. 
Accounts were coded when they referred to current, ongoing activities viewed on 
video. Statements made about infants referring to general characteristics were not 
coded. This was to allow for verbal codes to be mapped onto expression codes. 
These statements were not numerous however. Intercoder agreement was assessed 
by double coding segments from each of the three age groups in each of the three 
conditions. Intercoder agreement between myself and another coder was an average 
of 83%. This was a particularly good score as the second coder was not given any 
training in the use of the codes, save to be asked to code only segments which 
referred to current interaction. One point worth pointing out however, is that in 
some cases maternal accounts were quite vague unless one had access to the infant 
tape, as when they comment on 'the movement of the head' when referring to their 
infants shaking their heads, for example. This was easily resolved by describing the 
movement to the second coder.
Examples of the way codes were used are presented below:
Examples from Attributions of Happiness:
From Age Group 1:
"She's pleased there."
"She was enjoying it."
"She's very happy and contented and she's not disrupted by anything."
From Age Group 2:
"So she's saying 'yes this is fun and I'm  joining in this game'."
"This is her enjoying herself, she's having a good time."
From Age Group 3:
"He's been perfectly happy playing with it."
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A ttributions of Negative State:
Age group 1:
"...in frustration."
"She w asn 't enjoying it as much."
"She was getting distressed."
"...was a bit like she w asn't happy, it wasn't that the box w asn't interesting her, I 
think in a way maybe it was too much for her."
"You see she's building up from here to getting really quite unhappy,"
"...is getting cross with it now."
"At that point she was completely fed up with it."
From Age Group 2:
"She was getting a bit upset."
"She was getting a bit cross."
From Age Group 3;
"Exasperated and 'its not fair' type of thing ."
Attributions of Intention:
From Age Group 1:
"Something there and she wants it."
"Just d idn 't want any more to do with it."
"Wanted me to carry on."
"In that section he actually wants to reach out and get my hand, he's making his own 
decision to touch my hand, reach out and take it"
From Age Group 2:
"She's just seeing what I'm  doing with it before she tries it herself."
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"She was trying to pull the box nearer her"
"I think that he wants to touch it, he seems to want a closer examination of it really." 
From Age Group 3:
"I'm doing exactly what she wants there."
"She wanted a hug then, she wanted to be picked up from the chair, or me to come 
closer or something."
"He just wants to start again, pull my ear and pull my hair o u t ."
"He doesn't want my hands on it he just wants to be able to pick the box up and 
examine it because his hands go straight round the box "
A ttributions of Intersubjectivity:
Age Group 3:
"She's very much looking at me to see how I was reacting to w hat was there cause 
she's not sure."
"There she w asn't quite sure what I was doing cause she was looking... but she was 
looking round for the dog but then when I said no she smiled sort of as if to say 'well 
w hat did you say it for then or what are we doing?'
"She's got her mouth stuck like that because she's sort of making a point to me that 
she was upset and just letting me know that she , well not upset, but that she didnt 
like it, the way I've spoken to her or that she couldn't do it."
"She just communicated to me about the lights, ooh look they're flashing, I've never 
seen anything like it before."
"There he's watched you bring something down and obviously wants to do 
something with it but he just glances at me to kind of make sure its alright,"
"That's when he fully understands what you mean by no"
Examples from Maternal Self-Report Codes 
From Age Group 1:
"I put my finger in her mouth..."
"when I said Rosy..."
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"She did look up but only momentarily , I attracted her attention,"
"I started singing the song and then spoke, and when I spoke she went back to 
looking at the toy instead of looking at me."
"I tried to make him interested by making those noises and pressing the buttons and 
talking to him a bit more."
From Age Group 2:
"She stopped when she heard my voice."
"I helped her."
"She was following my finger, looking at what I was showing her."
"She was ceasing to pay any attention to me because I called her name and she'd 
responded and nothing had happened, and I'd flapped my fingers and she'd 
responded and nothing had happened so she was ceasing to pay any attention to me 
calling her name or flapping my fingers."
"Um, I think I'm  entertaining him by movement and by sound, I'm  clearly more 
exciting than all the other things that have distracted him."
From Age Group 3
"Because I'm  carrying on going peebo."
"She did that because she liked what I was doing."
"I tickled her there."
"She's reacting to the tickle and probably saying 'get off' or ju s t ' haha, you're tickling 
me'."
"That's her having reached out and me saying no."
"Her eyes are looking down and her eyebrows are down and her mouth is definitely 
down like I've never seen it before cause she's being told not to do it."
"Here I was banging on the table which would normally bring his attention straight 
round."
"Then I said no, cause I said Took at me' and 'no you can't do that'."
"I did a certain thing that I knew would catch his attention, which is to say, where 
is Bertie the dog."
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Example of Complete M aternal Accounts
In the following, two examples are given. The first account is an example 
from age group 1, the second is an example from age group 3. These two accounts 
provide a good contrast of maternal accounts of the youngest and oldest infants. The 
figures at the start of each segment are the point in time that mothers placed a bleep 
on the video tape. The time code represents minutes, seconds, and tenth of seconds.
M aternal Account of Baby Bov, 4-6 months.
Face to face play
0.3.6: Laughing, at my voice and movement. Just the expressions on my face and the 
clapping of the hands. He's feeling excited and happy. I could tell cause his hands 
were up in the air, wide grin, just his face.
0.13.1: Just the same, the tickling, just when he's touched and the expression on my 
face. He's responding in the same excited, coy , giggly type of way.
0.21.9: Inquisitive, watching observing what I'm  doing with my hands. Just 
interested. I could tell he was interested because of the way he was actually 
concentrating on what I was doing. So his mind goes from being happy and grinning 
and watching my face to watching my finger, 
q: how could you tell he was concentrating on your fingers?
Because the grin has gone, he's just staring but it looks more intelligent than ..its not 
bewildered and its not excited.
0.29.0: That went from being seemingly intelligent and watching my fingers to 
concentrating on what they were doing and then once they touched him, taking that 
as play and giggling, well his response to being poked in the chest is to giggle, 
q: How could you tell he had made a switch.
Because his face had been looking serious and focusing entirely on my fingers and 
then as my fingers moved the expression and my body language, touching his body 
in the way he sees as play made him giggle and play and look back at my face.
0.31.0: Again, just, by grabbing his hands and sort of wiggling his body he considers 
that funny looking back at my face, I was probably making some idiot facial 
expression. He was responding by laughing and seemingly to me he opens out, he 
expresses himself in really quite an open way.
Q: Is he responding to you or are you responding to him?
He's responding to me.
0.47.1:1 had obviously been playing with him physically, touching his face and chest 
and hands, and I'd  be back, so he's almost taking on the play on his side and playing 
back to me. The tapping on the table is the drawing back of my attention. From 
tapping him round the face and tickling his sides he's tapping the table and looking 
back at me to get my attention back again cause my hands have come off the table.
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0.51.1: When he had tapped the table and I had gone back to him tapping back on the 
table, just him finding that amusing and tapping backwards and forth, copying, 
Copying me or me copying him and then him copying back again.
Q: How did you know he was copying?
Just the way he's concentrating on my hand there and then he'll tap back with his 
own hand and he's not being distracted by anything else around the room as well.
0.57.5: He's laughing out loud because its always rounding off that section of play 
with the tapping on the table and the hands and its the peak of his excitement with 
a giggle. Because he's not really a giggly, giggly baby so when he does laugh it really 
is the peak of his excitement.
1.7.2: I'm  obviously there, moving my hands around the table and its actually taken 
his fancy, (my hand) he's now not giggling, not smiling but reaching out for my 
hand. In that section he actually wants to reach out and get my hand, he's making 
his own decision to touch my hand, reach out and take it, not looking at my face and 
not making any particular expressions on his own. He's obviously thinking about 
w hat my hand is doing and not wanting to touch it, whether he's wanting to feel it 
I don 't know, I don't know what he's thinking about it, there is something about my 
hand that is interesting him.
1.15.8: The same as before. He actually seems to be concentrating on my hand, he's 
not looking back at my face.
1.26.5: Its made him laugh now, he's beginning to grin at it...Its become more rather 
than being something to investigate, its almost like a realization that its actually 
attached to me and its just Mummy playing a game. The facial expression is more 
of concentration.
1.47.3: The way he's responding to whatever I've said. By lifting his hands up in the 
air and that hugh aping grin. It just seems that he's content, happy, just responding 
in a nice way to me.
2.06.4: Again, its from that hugh aping happy grin, to more serious face, like the way 
his mouth has dropped and he's just looking straight at my hands, whatever its 
doing, crawling across the table and just wants seemingly to be wandering w hat its 
doing.
2.19.0:1 just held out my hand and he's obviously with the way I'm  waving my hand 
around he's responded to that by a big smile and reaching out to touch my hand.
2.33.7: He's giggling again now which seems to me to be the peak of his excitement. 
He's excited about the way I'm  becoming more frantic with my hands, my voice, the 
way I am physically touching him, the way I'm  grabbing his hands, its just something 
he finds exciting.
3.10.4: Now I sort of brushed his face and just I suppose the way he touches me with 
his hands and screws his eyes up, the grins and the aping response.
3.25.0: Boredom setting in, the way the eyes have gone from going up to going down, 
q: Why?
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No idea.
3.44.2: That winging is a sure sign of wanting to be either outside the chair or to be 
somewhere completely different, so just be putting my hands up underneath the high 
chair is a bit of a chair from using my hands around the high chair. He's giggling 
again and his eyes, whereas when he winges they go down they've gone up again, 
and the sort of the down mouth is a big grin.
4.2.0: Again he's starting to get more difficult to distract him, from my side, so 
entertaining him just by my hands he starts rocking like that, grunting and winging. 
Rocking sometimes goes hand in hand with the winging and that means he wants to 
do something different, he doesn't want to be where he is, he doesn't w ant to play 
the game he's playing, he doesn't want those toys etc.
Prohibitive Condition
0.03.1: He sees the green light on the box and so I'm  trying to distract him but he still 
wants the green light, he's just looking inquisitive.
0.16.3: I was just trying to distract him with my hand cause you d idn 't w ant him 
playing with the box.
0.30.4: He was watching my hand, followed it all the way round the side of the high 
chair, and then when it stayed on the other side he carried on looking. He was 
concentrating. I don't know what he wants from what he's looking at but he's 
obviously finding it interesting. He's being quite inquisitive.
0.37.1: He obviously wanted to look at the box a few moments before I bleeped then 
and the way he could be distracted just by the movement of the hands, they were 
moving in circles, you could see his head moving around and he obviously found 
them quite interesting. When they were at a distance he found them quite interesting. 
He was quite happy just to look at them but then he found them amusing as they 
came towards him, he could tell that they were going to touch him, the ultimate 
excitement was when I pinched his nose at the end which was when the biggest grin 
came and the giggle.
1.9.0: Again, the way he watched my hand again, and he's just waiting, its the 
anticipation look on his face, he's just waiting for that hand to come close to him, you 
can tell, his eyes are flickering.
1.26.3: Again, the way he looks in anticipation for the hand to do something, same 
as before.
1.27.9: Same as the above, probably why I pressed it above.
1.30.5: Its just the way he's holding his face in the same position, he's not moving 
again, he's just waiting for that nose to be squeezed again. It's a game to him, he 
enjoys probably the physical interaction, whether its the noise, cause I'm  making a
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noise at the same time as I'm  pinching his nose. He's still cause he's waiting for the 
hand to come back again.
2.0.0: It seems to me that his concentration began to wander by the way he was. he 
started to waver again (before his head?). He held his body still, very still, watching 
the hand and then his head began to turn, look around and maybe look at me a bit 
more until I wiggled his nose again and then there was the big grin and it was like 
it was excitement again.
q: Why was his concentration beginning to waver?
I'd  been doing it a long time, it wasn't interesting any more, it w asn't new.
2.19.3: He's responding, he knew that I touched his face the first time he's actually 
managing to respond the second time by putting up his hand, although he thinks its 
fun, he knows the hand is going to be there, he knows that he can actually touch it, 
grab it and help to push it away. He still finds it fun because he's still grinning, in 
the same way. He soon lets you know by winging when he does not want 
something.
Toy Play Condition
0.49.7: There,just by the way he moved his head around, looking around the room 
he's not concentrating on me even though I've been making noises to attract his 
attention and moving my hands and touching the box. H e'd been in the chair a 
while, he's obviously beginning to get tired of it, the box had been there a while, it 
w asn 't new any more and he'd been distracted from it before but now he was being 
told to play w ith it, it took a while to actually drive into him the excitement that it 
was going to be interesting to play with and eventually by the way he's reached out 
again focusing to where my hand is and its just focusing his attention on the box. q: 
did anything start him doing that?
The way I'd  become more frantic about the box and the more exciting way I seem to 
be generating some kind of excitement in my voice, and my body language, and my 
hand, waving it around a bit more.
0.59.0: Again, he turned away to look over the side of the high chair and then 
pretending it was interesting to my, the box, pretending it was mine, drew him back 
to it. Pretending I wanted to look at it, pretending the black button and the green 
button were interesting to me draws him back to it.
1.22.4: Again, he doesn't particularly want to look at it, he's not grinning any more, 
there aren't any explicit facial expressions any more except for one of blankness, so 
I slammed the box down and made a loud noise which seemed a bit different to him, 
it pulls him  round and there is a vague smile there but nothing...there's nothing that 
is holding his attention there he turns because of the noise and I was probably pulling 
some face to make it seem that it was supposed to be exciting and he responded to 
that by the vague grin but it wasn't a true," I'm  finding this really exciting mum" kind 
of smile.
1.40.9: There again, I'm  having to pretend its interesting to me, and the way he's 
frowning, its rather an expression, the way I see this is an expression of pleading, he
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doesn't w ant to do this any more. More of a ' I'll really do this if you really want me 
to but..'. Its almost like he's forcing himself to find it interesting now. He's not 
naturally finding it as something he really wants to do, or really wants to play with, 
he'll do it because I am being a bit persistent and going on and on about it and really 
trying to pretend its the most exciting toy he's got.
1.59.3: Again, he really doesn't want to do this now. He's starting to rock now which 
is his half way sign from 'I am half happy to do this but I'm  not quite sure what I 
w ant to do next, but I don't think its this.'
2.15.6: The way he's moving his body there, just about to reach out that is a genuine 
interest in w hat he's about to look at or what he's looking at now, what I'm  pointing 
out. Its a more positive determined reach rather than the way he looked before, the 
way he just lollops across the table.
2.34.5: Same as before really.
2.37.0: Its getting more and more difficult to hold his attention on the box because of 
the rocking, the way he's looking around the room, he seems to me to be looking for 
something more interesting to play with and he c a n t, there is nothing there except 
for the box and me. The rocking seems to be a bit of a protest.
2.48.5: He's focusing on the box again now. I could tell because he's looking at where 
his hand is and it seems he's interested.
2.56.7: He's stopped rocking, he's playing with the box again and looking at it, which 
is another positive way of showing he's interested in something rather than the 
negative which is the negative.
3.05.1: Same as before.
3.16.1: H e'd  been bored for a while, but now tasting it is something new again, and 
he's got his arms right round the box, drawing his body into it and really trying to 
get his chops round it.
M aternal Account of Baby Girl, 10-12 months.
Face to Face Play
0.05.3: She was looking at my whole face expecting me do something 
Probe (q): w hat do you think she is expecting you to do?
Well I don't know, to do something exciting I suppose. Cause I said "Pee bo", I said 
"Pee bo" there so I expect she is expecting an expression.
0.06.9: I think that's because you were walking by. She wonders w hat you were 
doing there or why you are just walking by and not paying any attention to her. The 
way she raises her eyebrows and looks expectant that sort of thing. She has that 
certain look.
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0.12.5: She is just looking at the camera and not looking at me or what I'm  doing. 
She's bored (because) her face is just a rest expression and its obvious that I am going 
peebo but she has just looked right by me while I'm  doing and looked at the camera 
which was more interesting.
0.14.3: There she has looked back at me because I'm  carrying on going peebo. She's 
going "Oh mum's keeping on at this what is it after all" cause her eyes are a bit wider 
there and her eyebrows are a bit lifted up. She's just interested
0.18.6: She did that because she liked what I was doing. I knew because she smiled 
w ith her mouth and her eyes and her eyebrows and her whole face and showed her 
teeth.
q: What was it you were doing that she was so pleased about?
I was playing peebo.
0.21.0: I was playing peebo before the smiling before, now its finished she's 
wondering what's coming next cause she's got a bit fidgety and her mouth is down 
a bit and her eyes are looking down.
0.34.2: She is now interested on concentrating on what I'm  doing with her feet, with 
her toes. I know because she's got her mouth open and she's looking at w hat I'm  
doing and she's not looking around at anything else that there is that is going on.
0.47.0: I thought she was getting a bit fed up with it again there because she is 
fidgeting and she's looking up at me and she w asn't smiling or anything, she was 
looking so., she wants me to either hurry up or do something different I think.
0.49.0: That's when I finished the piggy thing and she liked that because she is 
smiling again.
0.58.1: That's her concentrating again or just watching what is happening. I could tell 
she was concentrating because the fingers were going under the table and she actually 
follows the noise under the table and looks to expect them on the other side of the 
table so she's not sort of all over the place. Her eyes are steady and her mouth is 
open.
1.04.3: She just looked up at me as if to say, this game is alright you can carry on with 
it. I could tell because her whole body was still, her head was following my fingers 
and then she just looked up at me just with her eyes and her m outh didnt change or 
anything. So it meant that I could just carry on with the game.
1.10.5: She raised her eyebrows and looked at me which meant that this is quite 
interesting or good fun.
q: how would you respond when she does that?
just do the same thing or do it more boisterously or something to make it more 
involved.
1.14.7: She laughed and...I don't know what I did to make her laugh there I can't 
remember and I took it that she was enjoying what we were doing.
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1.19.9: That was that she was "oh look there is that thing there again" ( the camera) 
and I don 't know whether I bleeped because of that or because of my playing fingers 
again and sh e 's  looking down at those, 
q: how is she feeling?
happy, because she is not looking anywhere else apart from what I'm  doing.
1.29.2: Well, there just because she doesn't watch what I'm  doing it doesn't mean 
she's not happy. There she's laughing, I cant remember what I was doing, she's 
looking at the camera.
1.35.8:1 tickled her there. She's reacting to the tickle and probably saying 'get off' or 
just ' haha, you're tickling me'. I could tell by her whole physical wriggle and her 
laugh and the fact that she doesn't look at me but looks past me. 
q: w hat does she mean when she looks past you?
She means 'you can stop that if you want'.
1.47.5: I'm  not doing any thing particularly interesting there and so she's having a 
look round to see where you are again to see if you've got anything interesting to do 
or to see w hat you are doing.
1.58.0: I'm  playing peebo again and I think she's enjoying it because she's looking at 
me and she crinkled her nose as she does when she's having fun and her mouth is 
open again.
2.0.5: She hit the table as well as laughing which she does sometimes. She means 
she's having a good time
2.09.4: She's really bored with peebo now and so she's pointing to the camera. I 
could tell she was bored because she's not looking at me and not anticipating that I'm  
going to do which she would do if she was following it. She had anticipated before. 
I know because she was watching me and she was still and her body was still and 
she w asn't making any noise. These indicate that she's following me and anticipating 
me going 'bo!'.
2.19.6: She raised her eyebrows a little and she's got that glib look on her face and her 
lips smack together, as if to say "oh God, what is this woman doing!" She probably 
wants me to do something more exciting or get a toy out or ...
2.22.6: I bleeped that cause I put my hand in front of her eyes and so affected her 
vision, took my hand away and so she smiled a lot. She smiled because it was an 
unexpected thing for me to do and maybe to make me do it again.
2.24.4: But then she looked away and so she didnt want me to do it any more and she 
physically jerked a bit. She w asn't feeling unhappy or bothered by it she just said 'no 
I don't w ant to that any more'. She wants to just look at the things in the garden. 
By turning her head completely from me and looking out window.
2.30.9: She sighed and so that was she was getting a bit tired of it, of either playing 
or just sitting in the chair and she was looking around, at the camera, which sort of 
meant to me "how much longer do I have to sit here and how much longer is this 
going to go on?"
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2.38.1: Well she's looking out at the grass again so she wants to .. 
q: w hat do you think caused her to do that movement just before you bleeped ? 
she just wants to look out of the window, she's getting fed up w ith what I'm  doing 
or w hat we are doing together. She's getting bored and she wanted me to do 
something else, in the chair she's not free to control what she does. I can tell just 
from knowing her. I mean she's not grumpy or grisly and she's not physically trying 
to get out of the chair and she's not crying, in fact she's being quite nice.
2.49.8: She's looking around for the cat.
q: how could you tell she was looking around for the cat?
Because I was saying cat and she was looking at the door where the cat usually 
comes in.
2.53.8: She recognises the word dog. 
q: How can you tell?
Because usually every time I say doggy or dog she goes woof woof. But I now there 
because she was looking around and she instantly looked at me and raised her 
eyebrows and her face looked interested in what I was saying.
3.01.1: There she w asn't quite sure what I was doing cause she was looking (along?) 
but she was looking round for the dog but then when I said no she smiled sort of as 
if to say 'well what did you say it for then or what are we doing?'
3.19.6:1 don't know what I'm  doing there or what she's doing there but there was a 
smiling in her eye, she looks quite happy with the situation, she was feeling quite 
alright then.
3.40.3: I was just saying peebo which is a familiar word to her because I say it a lot 
when I play with her and so she reacted to the word peebo by looking at me and 
smiling because its familiar. What it looks like that because she's smiling and looking 
at me that she wanted to play it.
3.50.0: Well she did want to play it, and so we played it and she liked playing it 
because she opened her mouth even more and crinkled her nose, 
q: How did you know she wanted you to play it?
because she kept looking at me, after I said the word peebo she kept looking at me 
so she was anticipating me to play it maybe.
3.58.5: I'm  doing exactly what she wants there. I know because she's giving me a 
really broad smile and she's reaching out her arms and she's laughing. She wanted 
a hug then, she wanted to be picked up from the chair, or me to come closer or 
something.
Prohibitive Condition
0.15.1: She just looked at me and raised her eyebrows and gone 'hm!' which means 
'this looks interesting, I wonder what this is'.
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0.17.9: And now she's getting a bit more sure of it because she's smiling and she's 
looking at it more and she hasn't needed to look at me. 
q: W hat happens when she looks at you?
I would either say its good or bad.
0.20.7: That's just her way of showing her excitement about the flashing lights, she 
does that by going 'hee' and crinkling her nose and her mouth like that.
0.27.1: That was just, she was watching the lights...cause I presume she was watching 
the lights that were flashing cause her eyes were moving from light to light to light 
and then I think she's going to reach out for one. She is feeling intrigued, interested 
because she's watching and she's reaching out.
0.32.8: That's her having reached out and me saying no her eyes are looking down 
and her eyebrows are down and her mouth is definitely down like I've never seen it 
before cause she's being told not to do it. So she's feeling a bit upset that she can't 
do what she wants. She's upset that I've spoken to her in that way maybe.
0.35.8: She's got her mouth stuck like that because she's sort of making a point to me 
that she was upset and just letting me know that she , well not upset, but that she 
didnt like it, the way I've spoken to her or that she couldn't do it.
0.39.1: She seems to have forgotten that (or she might have) and she left that and is 
now quite interested in the light again.
q: Is there anything that she did that indicated her transition?
She seemed to sort of, just in the way she was sitting and she pointed out her finger 
again.
0.52.0: She's made a 'uh ' sound again and she's pointing and she looked up at me. 
q: What did she mean by doing this? If you were in front of her what would your 
reaction be?
It would either be, yes look at the lights and encourage her to touch them or in this 
case I'd  just nod my head and say yes, lights. So she's saying that she can notice, that 
she's watching the lights, that she can see them .
1.01.6: There her eyebrows moved and that was that she was just intrigued by the 
lights and that she wanted to touch them but why couldn't she touch them?
1.05.4: She just communicated to me about the lights "ooh look they're flashing, I've 
never seen anything like it before." 
q: How can you tell?
Just cause she looks , well she looks a bit unsure with her eyes and her mouth, she 
doesn't look sure of the situation.
1.11.1: There again when I said no she's looking at me with her bottom lip swallowed 
practically and I don't know what it means.
1.22.2: Well that was cause she's saying ' I know she's saying no but I'm  going to do 
it anyway' her lip moved around, it w asn't that she gritted her teeth but it was that 
sort of determined 'well I think I'll do it anyway.'
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1.28.7: She was looking down, because she's got her finger on the black button and 
she kept it there all the time and she kept looking up at me almost defiantly because 
she knew I was saying no but she just kept it there and she would look up at me 
when I would say no and she would just look down on her finger again I think. 
She's trying to tell me 'well you might be able to stop me touching those little lights 
but I'm  going to touch those little buttons'
1.49.2: There she's looking at the lights again.
2.12.0: That's where I said no again and she's trying to touch the lights and pursed 
her mouth a little bit and looked down it means that she's not very happy with the 
situation. She wants me to stop saying no and let her touch the lights.
Toy Play Condition
0.11.3: She'd seen the box and she's smiling because something interesting is going 
to happen.
0.20.5: She's going ehem ehem and all that, her hands have come to the box because 
now she can touch it. That sound means its a positive sound, goody.
0.23.2: She's laughed there because she's seen me doing all the three buttons so she
thinks its her turn next and she wanted me to touch them.
q: If she is seeking permission, how would you give her permission?
I would look at her or look at the thing and say 'yes you can ' or smile at her or do 
them and say 'you do it now'.
0.30.9:1 think she's interested there in the lights again cause her eyebrows are raised 
and her face changed from the smiling to the normal concentrating. I think its the 
lights because its her eyes looking at them.
1.13.4: She raised her eyebrows and that meant that she was having a good time with 
what she was doing. Although she was looking at ..she looked away cause I think 
you were behind the camera but she was happy investigating the toy.
1.28.3: She's surprised by the machine because of the way her mouth is and her eyes 
are, excited eyebrows.
1.44.7: There she's happy, she's pleased with that little trap door thing because she 
is looking at it and she's got her teeth over her bottom lip and she's smiling, and the 
way she crinkles her nose.
2.08.6: That's because she went UUUUh ! which is different from the other sounds 
and that's.'oh, look what that is, this is something here, look what she found, she 
found the hinge' ..She was drawing my attention to it. She was pointing to it as well 
and her eyes pointed to it.
2.13.1: She crinkles her nose and smiles with her eyes and m outh which I took as that 
was interesting, she was responding to me opening the, responding to the door 
opening.
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2.26.4: There she is pleased that she is opening and shutting herself rather than me 
because she is smiling and watching the hinge shut and watching the door shut and 
watching her hand doing it.
2.28.3: She's pleased that she's opened it all the way because she followed it with her 
eyes and was smiling and she made a noise as she pushed it all the way back.
2.34.1:1 was pushing it and she wanted to play with something else. She was playing 
with the yellow lights and I was still playing with the trap door and she was going 
Rrrih! which meant 'no don't! oh alright I'll shut it and open it again but I want to 
play w ith all these lights here'
2.46.4: There she's looking at me to say look what I've done, I've opened it. She 
wants me to recognize that she's pushed it all the way back. She's pleased with 
herself because she's smiling and looking at me as if to say 'good girl'
2.51.4: 'Cause I said 'Elena shut it' I presume. I bleeped there cause she laughed and 
made that noise which was a laugh she does when she does something that she 
thinks is clever (like clapping with her own hands, that sort of thing) so she'd done 
something that she thought was good by shutting it after I said to her 'Elena shut it'.
3.01.9: There she doesn't want to shut it now, though I said the same thing again and 
she's looking at the lights.
3.08.5: She raised her eyebrows cause I was playing with them she was watching 
what I was doing and was interested, not bored at all.
3.12.4: She came back to the door and was pleased with herself again having shut it.
3.21.3: She gave another squeal, she really likes shutting that door, it was different to 
other times, its a matter of degrees. The first time she did it was the best, 'aah!', and 
then just the time before that it was ' Ah I thought of it myself rather than Mummy 
told me to do it' and this time it was 'oh, I'll do it again'.
3.35.7: 'Cause she's making those noises and looking at the lights and the buttons, 
she's just finding them very interesting and wants to keep playing with them.
Intercoder Reliability of MAX
As in the pilot study, criterion intercoder reliability (85% agreement) on the 
MAX training tapes was reached before coding the main study tapes. This measure 
was taken to ensure guard against 'drift' in judgements of movement codes. 
Intercoder reliability between myself and a second coder was assessed during coding 
of the main tapes. For these tapes, intercoder reliability ranged from 80% to 89%.
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Use of Log-Linear M odelling
A log linear model weighted by time of total sessions was used for the data 
analysis. For example, if you have a number of 6 scores taken within different time 
lengths:
Score Time
13 11
2 12
45 15
6 3
17 6
4 8
sum: 87 55
If all scores are the same 87/6 is the expected value, weighting by time is:
expected value= 87/55 x e.g., 11 for first time-score. 
observed = 13
Expected value = Number of responses x prob row x prob col 
which can be represented as y= t pj pj 
Observed value = time p* pj + e.
= log (t) + log Pi+log Pj (additive model)
If you observe 87 in time 55 seconds you would expect to get:
11 x 87/55 (in 11 secs).
The model assumes that the longer the observation time, the more scores are 
expected. Conversely, the shorter the time span in which the subject is engaged in 
a particular activity, the lower the score.
Results Analysis of M aternal Facial Expressions
Analysis of maternal expressions revealed similar differences to those found 
for infant facial expressions. The one discrepancy between the two sets of data was
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for interest expressions. Mothers differed significantly in the number of interest 
episodes they expressed in each age group and situation whereas there were no 
significant differences between frequencies of interest expressions for infants. The 
results of the analysis are presented in Table A2.1.
Table A2.1: Chi-Square Statistics Results of Log-linear Model for Main and Interaction 
effects of Maternal Facial Expressions
Expressions Age
Effect
Situation
Effect
Age x Situ­
ation Interac­
tion
Positive 2.50 10.76“* 18.71***
Negative 3.04 1.86 18.04***
Interest 3.66 2.53 18.71***
Neutral 3.06 7.90** 17.22***
Significance levels: * = 0.05, ** = 0.01, and *** = 0.001
Degrees of freedom for Main Effects = 2
Degrees of freedom for Age x Situation interaction = 4
1. Age: No significant differences between age groups were found for any of the 
mothers' facial expressions. Comparing the different expressions in each age groups 
(Table A2.2), mothers display predominantly positive expressions in all three age 
groups. In age groups 1 and 2, interest expressions are the second most frequent 
expressions, while in age group 3, neutral expressions are frequently expressed after 
positive expressions.
Table A2.2: Mean Rates per Minute of Maternal Expressions for Age Groups
Mean Rate of Maternal Facial Expressions
Age Groups positive interest neutral negative
4-6 months 3.55
(1.47-6.73)*
1.32
(0.22-4.40)
1.18
(0.00-2.78)
0.33
(0.00-2.59)
7-9 months 2.90
(0.99-6.56)
1.90
(0.27-3.73)
1.33
(0.00-3.00)
0.16
(0.00-0.62)
10-12
months
3.70
(0.35-6.59)
1.32
(0.00-3.50)
1.61
(0.00-3.18)
0.85
(0.00-4.00)
* Figures in brackets represent the range of rates of expressions.
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2. Situations: Maternal expressions differed between situations for positive and 
neutral expressions. Table A2.3 shows that maternal positive expressions decreased 
from FF to T and neutral expressions increased, being predominantly expressed in T. 
The decline in maternal expressivity (neutral expressions are coded when there is no 
observable movement of facial muscles) may be associated with the infants7 attention 
being increasingly focused on the toy, and directed away from face to face exchanges. 
Comparing expressions within situations, maternal segments contained predominantly 
positive expressions. There were however, variations in the other facial expressions. 
For example, mothers expressed more interest than neutral expressions in T, but more 
neutral than interest in PR. This would suggest that mothers were using negative and 
neutral expressions to prohibit the infant, and using neutral and interest expressions 
when playing with their infants in T.
Table A2.3: Mean Rate per minute of Maternal Expressions Across Situations
Mean Rate of Maternal Facial Expressions
Situations Positive Interest Neutral Negative
Face to face 4.03
(0.35-6.74)
1.80
(0.70-3.73)
1.10
(0.00-2.76)
0.22
(0.00-0.62)
Prohibitive 3.40
(0.99-7.99)
1.70
(0.00-3.50)
1.15
(0.00-3.18)
0.59
(0.00-3.99)
Toy play 2.72
(1.05-6.60)
1.45
(0.00-2.77)
1.88
(0.00-2.75)
0.17
(0.00-2.69)
Overall, if mothers7 expressions are compared with infant expressions, 
mothers smile more frequently than their infants in all three situations. On the whole 
however, their positive expressions also decrease over consecutive situations in 
parallel to infant expressions. They are still-faced most often in T compared to the 
other 2 situations while infants, on the other hand, are still faced most often in PR.
3. Age x Situation:
All 4 maternal expressions differed significantly between age group and 
situation. That is, mothers displayed different frequencies of facial expressions in 
each age group and for each condition. Table A2.4 shows that in age groups 1 and 
2 mothers positive expressions were most frequent during FF but gradually declined
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in subsequent situations. In age group 3 however, mothers displayed the most 
frequent episodes of positive expressions in PR, and less so, in T. Negative 
expressions were generally very rare. However, MY displayed some negative 
expressions in T, as did MM in FF. In age group 3, mothers negative expressions 
were most frequent in selected PR segments compared to the younger age groups. 
Neutral expressions were expressed by mothers in selected segments most often in 
T and least often in FF for all age groups. Mothers also expressed interest predomi­
nantly in FF selected segments for age groups 1 and 2. The oldest mothers differed 
from the rest of the sample. They expressed interest predominantly in PR and least 
frequently in T (see Table A2.4).
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Table A2.4: Mean Rate per Minute of Maternal Expressions for Situations and Age
Groups
Mean Rate of Maternal Expressions
Age Groups Situations Positive Negative Neutral Interest
4-6 Months Face to face 4.63
(2.24-
6.73)
0.07
(0.00-0.28)
0.43
(0.00-
0.74)
1.19
(0.74-
2.35)
Prohibitive 3.00
(1.84-
4.50)
0.08
(0.00-0.31)
0.79
(0.00-
2.86)
1.76
(1.22-
2.47)
Toy play 3.02
(1.47-
5.69)
0.37
(0.00-2.59)
2.32
(1.47-
3.10)
2.21
(0.22-
4.40)
7-9 months Face to face 4.64
(3.23-
6.56)
0.36
(0.00-0.62)
0.98
(0.24-
1.93)
2.36
(0.94-
3.73)
Prohibitive 2.50
(0.99-
3.33)
0.12
(0.00-0.46)
1.14
(0.00-
3.00)
1.61
(0.27-
2.33)
Toy play 1.56
(1.46-
2.21)
0.00 1.88
(0.26-
2.49)
1.73
(1.05-
2.77)
10-12 months Face to face 2.82
(0.35-
4.14)
0.25
(0.00-0.50)
1.90
(1.05-
2.76)
1.70
(0.70-
2.30)
Prohibitive 4.70
(1.38-
7.99)
1.58
(0.00-3.99)
1.51
(0.00-
3.18)
1.79
(0.00-
3.50)
Toy play 3.58
(1.08-
6.59)
0.14
(0.00-2.69)
1.43
(0.00-
2.23)
0.48
(0.00-
1.08)
In all age groups and conditions, mothers expressed the greatest number of 
positive expressions compared to the other 3 facial expressions. However, some 
trends are suggested. For example, mothers expressed fewer expressions in FF as 
infant age increased, mirroring infant expressions. MO expressed the highest rate of 
positive expressions in PR. This was contrary to the pattern of their infants' facial 
expressions, where they displayed the fewest episodes of positive expressions 
compared to other age groups and situations. Infants also displayed the greatest 
number of negative expressions in that age group. This suggests that mothers may 
have been attempting to soothe their infants. The high frequency of negative
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expressions expressed by MO in PR also suggests that they were using their facial 
expressions to prohibit their infants from playing with the toy. Both mothers and 
infants displayed higher rates of positive expressions in T than in FF. This result 
again supports the proposal that the toy situation has become more interpersonal for 
mothers and their infants. In the younger age groups, MM showed more neutral than 
still-faced expressions in T, while MM displayed more neutral than any other 
expression in T. It may be that infants preoccupation with the toy at that age resulted 
in mothers preferring to observe them than trying to engage them in any interactive 
exchanges. Mothers in the youngest age group, on the other hand, may have been 
trying to encourage their infants to play with the toy by expressing interest in it.
In sum, the results indicate that mothers appear to respond differentially to 
infant facial expressions depending on the age of the infants and the interactive 
situation. In most cases, mothers and infants expressions follow similar patterns. 
However, there are exceptions to this. Mothers appear to respond w ith particularly 
high rates of positive expressions when infants express distress, as in age group 3 in 
PR. Facial expressions of mothers towards their 7-9 month old infants also appear to 
reflect infants' exploration of the external environment. Mothers' positive expressions 
in T indicate that they can maintain positive exchanges with their infants during toy 
play.
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